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

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

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A HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

Ἕλληνες σοφίαν ζητοῦσιν

The Greeks look for wisdom.

(1 Cor. 1: 22)

A HISTORY OF
Ancient Philosophy

IGNATIUS BRADY, o.f.m.

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adhuc Dei gratia gloriose docenti
ac
R. P. fr. Philotheo Boehner, O.F.M.
iam Sorori morti obedienti
in gratiarum actione

Foreword

This is the first of a three-volume history of philosophy projected by the Franciscan Institute. It is to be followed by a second volume on Christian philosophy in the Fathers and Scholastics and by a third on modern and contemporary philosophy. Such a survey, it is hoped, will help the undergraduate student grow in philosophical thought.

As the first of such a series, this book contains a general introduction on the *what, why,* and *how* of the history of philosophy, with a brief glance at the whole course of such history. Its content is almost exclusively devoted to the Greek tradition, including the direct heirs thereof in the Oriental Scholasticism of the Arabians and Jews, and leaves for the second volume the history of philosophy as affected by Christian revelation. If this is a departure from the usual order of treatment, it seems fully justified.

Since the book is intended for undergraduates, it makes no attempt at an exhaustive study of all the philosophers of antiquity. Rather, the heart of their thought has been sought, with an effort to emphasize the organic development of philosophy. The text is not burdened with lengthy bibliographies; some source books are of necessity cited, when possible in more recent editions and English translations (though the author has preferred to attempt his own translations in quotations from individual philosophers). It presupposes, however, some knowledge of the techniques or auxiliaries of philosophy and history, such as those set forth by Louis de Raeymaeker in his *Introduction to Philosophy.*

Lastly, because the history of philosophy is here viewed primarily as the history of metaphysics and its immediately subaltern disciplines, the author readily grants the possible complaint of students that this is not an easy book. He hopes instead, however, that it offers them a genuine challenge, to grow in philosophical method and thought. A decade and a half of teaching has convinced him that the material is not beyond the earnest student who with the Greeks seeks something of the wisdom that human reason can attain.

Collegio S. Bonaventura
Quaracchi-Firenze
February 12, 1958

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A HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

General Introduction

Historia, testis temporum, lux veritatis, magistra vitae! Thus Cicero salutes history, the witness of past times, the light of truth, the teacher of life.[1] In history we see man in action: we learn his foibles, his struggles, his ideals, his successes, and his failures. History should thus teach us human nature, how it acts, why it acts, what man must do to reach the truth, what he must avoid, what makes for human happiness or human misery. Without history we remain intellectual children, with opinions but no ideas.

The importance, therefore, of the history of philosophy becomes evident; it is almost as important as the study of philosophy itself. It reveals to us the struggles men have endured in the conquest of truth as known by reason. It is thus an important factor in shaping one's intellectual and philosophical knowledge and general culture. As philosophers, therefore, seeking to know things by their causes, let us examine the meaning of the history of philosophy in terms of its causes.

§ 1. *The WHY of the History of Philosophy*

As truth, philosophy has no history in itself, for truth is eternal and unchangeable. But it does have a history because philosophy exists in the minds of men who are influenced by one another, by crosscurrents of thought, the mental outlook or *Weltanschauung* of their age. And man is a philosopher because he is a rational animal.

The Existence of Philosophy. Perhaps the best way to begin the study of our subject is to adopt the approach used by the first historian of philosophy, Aristotle, the first book of whose *Metaphysics* is in a way the original history of philosophy. Why, asks Aristotle, is there such a discipline as philosophy?

There is in man as a rational being, he tells us in answer, a natural desire for knowledge: "all men by nature desire to know."[2] The need for knowledge is a law of our mind: as hunger and thirst are natural appetites which lead men to seek bodily nourishment, so in a nobler way there is a natural appetite which stimulates our intellect to seek knowledge and to come to the truth. There are, however, ascending degrees of knowledge, in proportion to our penetration of the subject. First of all, there is common empirical knowledge or experience: a practical knowledge based on or drawn from a series of phenomenal experiences,

[1] De oratore, II, ix, 36: *Historia vero testis temporum, lux veritatis, vita memoriae, magistra vitae, nuntia vetustatis.*

[2] *Metaphysics*, I, 1, 980a23 ff. (This method of citation has reference to the pages of the I. Bekker edition, Berlin, 1831 ff. For a handy English edition of the important texts, cf. R. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* [New York, 1941].)

a spontaneous, prescientific form of human thinking, the aggregate knowledge of a man who has not received any specific intellectual formation.[3] Higher than experience is art, technique, know-how. This is practical knowledge also, but involves, in addition to experience, some insight into the nature and purpose of things. "Men of experience know *that* a thing is so, but they do not know *why*; on the other hand, the others, those possessed of art, know the *why* and the cause. Thus we deem the master-workers in each trade as more honorable and as knowing in a truer sense and as wiser than the manual laborers, for they know the causes of things that are done."[4]

To know, therefore, through causes is a higher type of knowledge than that gained simply through experience. But Aristotle goes further, distinguishing more noble types of knowledge gained through art. Some arts, as Aristotle notes, are directed to the necessities of life, to action, whereas others are directed to leisure and contemplation.[5] Of these two types of art the latter is the more noble. The contemplative type of life is the most noble for man.[6]

Among the arts that lead to theoretical or contemplative knowledge, one issues in knowledge based upon interior and proximate causes. This Aristotle calls science or *epistēmē*. The other reaches knowledge of things through their first causes, and this is wisdom. Philosophy, then, is the pursuit of knowledge according to ultimate natural causes; and he who so seeks to know things is the truly wise man. The desire to know, arising out of wonder, as both Plato and Aristotle point out, has thus led some men to penetrate deeply into things and grasp their highest causes; they are the philosophers.[7]

Why the History of Philosophy? The answer to this question is already contained in the foregoing. Men desire to know; this thirst for knowledge leads to philosophy. Since philosophy thus exists in the minds of men and is subject to all the woes of human nature, it has a history. Precisely because men accept or reject it, despise or love it, use or abuse it, philosophy has a history. The way that philosophy achieves its rights or fails to be acknowledged through the centuries is the matter for the history of philosophy.[8] Human reason varies with individuals; our minds are influenced by circumstances of birth or fortune and the mental horizon of our age; political, social, economic conditions are not without their effects on the intellectual interests of an era.

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[3] *Meta.*, I, 1, 980b25 ff.

[4] *Ibid.*, 981a27 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*, 981b13 ff.

[6] Cf. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7–8, 1177a12 ff.

[7] Cf. Plato, *Theaetetus*, 155. (The Dialogues are usually cited according to the pages of the H. Stephanus edition, Paris, 1578. For an English edition, not always exact, cf. the translation of B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, 2 vols. [New York, 1937].) See also Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 2, 982b11 ff.

[8] An apt illustration of this is the vision of philosophy had by Boethius (470–525) and described in his *Consolation of Philosophy* (Book I, prosa I; *Patrologia Latina* [*PL*] 63, cols. 587–590). Philosophy comes to him in prison as a woman of grave countenance, with glistening clear eye, old yet of unabated vigor, in ancient yet beautiful garments, in her right hand books and in her left a scepter. She tells Boethius of the fortunes she has endured through the centuries as some despised her and others loved and followed her (prosa III, cols. 603–610). The poet-philosopher has here caught a glimpse of the organic unity of the history of philosophy (*infra*).

§ 2. *The WHAT of the History of Philosophy*

What the History of Philosophy Is Not. Philosophy transcends the individual philosopher, so that the history of philosophy is by no means reduced to the biographies of various philosophers. This is not to deny that the milieu, life, and training of a particular philosopher are often of great value in understanding his contribution to philosophy; therefore, such auxiliary knowledge must also be considered to some degree. The same must be said of other aids, such as the literary history of philosophical writings or the work of editing correct texts or of rejecting unauthentic works, lest we credit an author with something he did not say. These are important tools for the historian, but they do not make up the essence of his work. Lastly, the history of philosophy is not the history of a philosophy. Undoubtedly, we shall have occasion to enter into the history of a particular school of philosophy and its influence down the centuries. Thus we may study the meaning of Platonism and the fate it experienced in the centuries that followed, or again, the Peripatetic philosophy of Aristotle, and its development by St. Thomas (1221–1274); we may study the Franciscan school of St. Bonaventure (1217–1274) and Duns Scotus (1265–1308). Yet none of these makes up *the* history of philosophy, though they are all included.

What the History of Philosophy Is. Here we can essay a definition of our subject: the history of philosophy is the record of mankind's pursuit of natural wisdom, of the highest naturally knowable truths, and the good or bad fortune attendant thereon. It is that branch of learning which shows the vital and organic development of philosophical thought in the past. The latter description stresses the vital and organic unity of the historical development of philosophy, as we shall explain presently.

There is a problem intrinsically connected with this study, the problem of the right approach, the right method of handling the matter of history; and on its solution depends the real meaning of the history of philosophy for us. Actually, it is a problem involved in all historical study: the actual events of history provide the matter, the historian imparts the form. Of these two, the matter and the form of history, the latter presents the problem: How are we to deal, in writing or in teaching, with the facts of history? Specifically, in the history of philosophy, what is the basis of the historian's interpretation of the story? For the particular history of philosophy set down by an individual historian is going to be conditioned by his own approach, ultimately by his own philosophy.

Some historians are content to be *fact-finders*, working on the lowest level of historical abstraction, in the fundamental work of ferreting out the facts from masses of original source materials. Their work is of utmost importance, indeed. Others may be called *synthesizers*, elaborating the facts into a general synthesis in the form of a textbook or a larger historical work, such as J. B. Bury's *History of Greece* or Msgr. Philip Hughes' *History of the Church*. Such books deal largely with facts, what took place and how it happened. Beyond such work lies the search for historical causes, for a

deeper analysis of history. And this search for the *why* of history in general is the work of the philosopher and/or the theologian of history.

The *philosopher of history*, in the strict sense, is one who seeks to explain history through reason and reason alone. Voltaire (1694–1778) was the first to use the term and to attempt a purely natural philosophy of history. His work was antireligious in principle, since it attacked Bossuet's theology of history and tried to destroy the notion of a providential design in history. Other philosophers of history of modern times are more positive; of these, Hegel and Marx form two extremes. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), an idealist and a monist, considers history as the unfolding of the one reality, the *Geist*, the march of the Spirit through the world according to set patterns or apriori principles. Karl Marx (1818–1883), on the other hand, holds to dialectical historical materialism as his philosophy of history. On his own admission, he turned Hegel upside down: the ideal is nothing else, he says, than the material world reflected by the human mind, and all history is to be explained in terms of economic conditions; the nature of society and its ideology in any given age is the direct result of the current mode of production.[9]

The *theologian of history* does not abandon the use of reason, but supplements it by the help of revelation in interpreting the ultimate causes of history; the theology of God's providence, the nature and destiny of man, the meaning of the world, all help him to see the finger of God in history. Classic examples of the theology of history are the *City of God* and other works of St. Augustine (354–430), the *History against the Pagans* of Orosius (c. 418), Bossuet's *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1627–1704). In our own day, Christopher Dawson may be rightly considered as combining philosophy and theology in his interpretation of world events.[10]

§ 3. *The HOW of the History of Philosophy*

In keeping with the foregoing problem, our approach will be that of a synthesis governed by a Christian philosophy of history, in the endeavor to give an overall picture of the story of ancient philosophy. In this we shall rely as much as possible on the texts of the philosophers themselves, to let them present their own thoughts and doctrines. In addition, we shall seek to show how various systems are related and to point out the general organic unity of history; and for this it will be necessary to make some study of the underlying causes. Some of the principles that shall guide us in our study are set forth in the following paragraphs.

An Organic Concept of History. The

[9] Cf. K. Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago, 1949), for the historical survey only; J. Daniélou, "Marxist History and Sacred History," *Review of Politics*, XIII (1951), 503–513.

[10] Cf. J. Mulloy (ed.), *The Dynamics of World History: Selections from the Writings of Christopher Dawson* (New York, 1957); cf. Geo. B. Flahiff, "A Catholic Looks at History," *Catholic Historical Review*, XXVII (1941), 1–15; H. I. Marrou, *L'ambivalence du temps de l'histoire chez saint Augustin* (Montreal, 1950); P. Guilday (ed.), *The Catholic Philosophy of History* (New York, 1936); J. Daniélou, "The Christian Philosophy of History. The Conception of History in the Christian Tradition," *Journal of Religion*, XXX (1950), 171–179.

medievals, under the guidance of St. Augustine, considered the human race under the aspect of one person (as the Jews had done in calling their nation Israel); therefore, they looked on history as resembling the life of a single man and as possessed of a constant organic unity.[11] As a human life does not consist of isolated events unconnected with one another, so history is not something static, but is living and dynamic, organic. It has a sequence and an interplay of events, all moving along and influencing one another, with the hand of God behind the scenes. Thus, in the formation of our Western civilization the various forces at work are by no means unrelated: the old Roman Empire, the so-called barbaric invasions, the Byzantine Empire, the Church and the Papacy, the new Carolingian dynasty, the threat of Mohammedanism. All are important, all mutually influential; all bring about the making of Europe.[12]

In like manner, the history of philosophy is not a mere congeries of opinions, an unrelated narration of isolated bits of thought that have no connection with one another. We must, therefore, endeavor to show the relationship of philosophers and schools of philosophy to one another. This implies that we must study a philosophy not only in itself but in its historical setting. We must try to see how it is related to the past and how it has influence on the future. Thus, we cannot understand Socrates unless we know the Sophist movement, Aristotle unless we know Plato and the pre-Socratics, the thirteenth-century Scholastics unless we see their antecedents in the twelfth century and the influx of new philosophical literature, the so-called Renaissance unless we know the whole history of classical culture back to the days of the Greeks.

The Intellectual Nature of Man. We must not, however, so emphasize the historical background of individual philosophers that we lose sight of man's essential liberty. We must not be like Hegel, who saw such a continual progress in the history of philosophy, such a succession of philosophical systems, that he posited a necessary connection and sequence between them. They represented for him the necessary states of the development of philosophy, just as Karl Marx was later to hold to the necessary sequence of the stages of human society.[13]

That a philosopher is influenced by his predecessors and contemporaries is undoubtedly true. He is also under the influence of his own temperament, background, and education. But it does not follow that he is determined to choose any particular starting point, or that he must react in a particular way to some particular preceding philosophy.

[11] St. Augustine: "*Sic proportione universum genus humanum, cuius tanquam unius hominis vita est ab Adam usque ad finem huius saeculi, ita sub divinae providentiae legibus administratur, ut in duo genera distributum appareat* [the two Cities: of God and of the world]" (*De vera religione*, XXVII, n. 50; *PL* 34, 144). So also he compared the history of the world to a poem or song (or what we would call a symphony) with God as the moderator (*Epist.*, 138, I, 5; *PL* 33, 527). In this he is followed by St. Bonaventure: "*Sic igitur totus iste mundus ordinatissimo decursu a Scriptura describitur procedere a principio usque ad finem, ad modum cuiusdam pulcherrimi carminis ordinati*" (*Breviloquium*, Prol., § 2, n. 4; *Opera omnia* [Ad Claras Aquas, 1882–1902], tom. V, p. 204).

[12] Christopher Dawson, *The Making of Europe* (New York, 1953), well illustrates the interplay of these elements.

[13] Cf. E. Gilson, "Franz Brentano," *Mediaeval Studies*, I (1938), 1–10, for an illustration of Hegelian methods.

Hence, we shall approach our subject with a firm belief and confidence in the rational nature of man, that he has the ability to grasp truth, that reason is the source of man's dignity as man. This belief is central in Western culture, and when it is lost our culture is doomed.

Appreciation of Our Christian Heritage. Duns Scotus voices the thought of our medieval predecessors when he says that in the development of the human race the knowledge of truth has always increased.[14] The men of the Middle Ages were very conscious of their position in the history of philosophy and culture, deeming themselves heirs of those who had gone before them. As a result, they were willing to accept from their predecessors the truths these had discovered, and in turn felt bound to push forward the horizon of knowledge. One of them, Bernard of Chartres, was to say: "We are like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants. We see more things than the ancients, and things more remote, not because of the sharpness of our sight or the greatness of our stature, but because they have lent us their own."[15] We, too, will accept what has been accomplished in a spirit of gratitude and also of healthy criticism, because it is true, not because someone said it. We too shall try to push on to new fields, to find new solutions to the problems of our own day. Our motto should be: *Nova et vetera.*

Appreciation of Truth Wherever It Is Found. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri* is an old proverb that must guide us in our study, though we would by no means call those with whom we disagree our enemies! But we must have an attitude of docility, a willingness to be taught by all philosophers, the ancients, the medievals, and the moderns.[16] Each has a contribution to make to the growth of philosophical truth: *semper crevit notitia!* We can benefit from both the true teachings and the false starts of our predecessors.[17] To this end, we must approach philosophers objectively and sympathetically, taking facts as they are, not as we might like them to be. We must study a man in himself, in his own thought and outlook; by putting ourselves in his place, as it were, to see his thought from within, we shall attain a deeper appreciation, a real sympathy.

What truth we gather thence is ours. Truth, wherever it is found, belongs by right to the Christian, as St. Augustine, Origen, and others have held: "By whomever truth is said, it is said through His teaching who is the Truth."[18] This led St. Augustine to draw much from the

---

[14] "*In processu generationis humanae semper crevit notitia veritatis*" (*Opus Oxoniense*, IV, d. i, q. 3, n. 8; ed. Vivès [Paris, 1891–1895], tom. XVI, p. 136).

[15] Quoted by John of Salisbury (c. 1110–1180) in his *Metalogicus*, III, 4; *PL* 199, 900C.

[16] Cf. Jas. Collins, "Olgiati's Concept of Modern Philosophy," *Thought*, XVIII, n. 70 (September, 1943), 478–502. Professor Olgiati (of Milan) himself says: "History is not in the devil's hands, but God's. The fundamental doctrines of scholasticism forbid the summary condemnation of several centuries of history, and impose upon us the obligation of examining modern speculation and modern history, in order to see what progress they have marked or are destined to mark in the upward struggle of humanity" (*L'anima dell'umanesimo e del rinascimento* [Milano, 1924], p. 22).

[17] Taking a cue from Aristotle, St. Thomas remarks: "*Necesse est accipere opiniones antiquorum quicumque sint. Et hoc quidam ad duo erit utile. Primum quia illud quod ab eis bene dictum est, accipiemus in adiutorium nostrum; secundo, quia illud quod male enuntiatum est cavebimus*" (*In I De anima*, lect ii; cf. also *In II Meta.*, lect. i).

[18] St. Augustine, *Ep.*, 166, iv, 9; *PL* 33, 724.

Neoplatonists for his own doctrine: "Whatever those called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, may have said true and conformable to our faith, is not only not to be dreaded, but is to be claimed from them, as unlawful possessors, to our own use."[19]

We thus realize the immense help afforded us by the study of the history of philosophy. On the one hand, philosophical truth becomes more intelligible, because we see the way that knowledge of it has been acquired. On the other hand, philosophical error, when seen in its historical context, becomes more understandable than when presented summarily in a text of systematic philosophy. Our own philosophical formation takes shape as we make serious progress in the study of the philosophers of the past. "I give you samples of one philosophy after another [Socrates says to Theaetetus] that you may taste them; and I have the hope that in the end you may come to know your own mind."[20] We grow in the knowledge, love, and appreciation of truth; and finite truth will lead us to uncreated, eternal Truth, God Himself!

§ 4. *The Contents of the History of Philosophy*

It has well been said that man is a metaphysical animal, who by his very nature is impelled to seek the highest and deepest causes of things. The history of philosophy might almost be identified, then, with the history of the human race. In the proper sense, however, it began when the Greeks became conscious of the autonomous character of philosophy as distinct from religious knowledge or belief. It has continued to our day in an irregular and somewhat sporadic development which it is usual to divide into three large periods: ancient, medieval, and modern.

Ancient Philosophy. Men possessed philosophical concepts before the Greeks, but they were not seen in their true character since they were hardly distinguishable from popular religion. To illustrate this, we begin our study of ancient philosophy with a brief survey of philosophic-religious notions of antiquity, as exemplified in the peoples of the Near and Far East. Against such a background (found also in early Greece), we can more easily appreciate the efforts of the first Greek philosophers to explain the world on a rational basis. It was only after a long struggle to rid their minds of the mythical outlook of the poets that they were able to make human experience the starting point of a new and autonomous approach to reality.

In what is called the *pre-Socratic period,* men began to philosophize primarily about the basic causes and principles of the physical world. They are, as a result, called the *Physikoi,* since the wisdom they sought was largely of the external, material world. Then came the *Sophists,* who professed a wisdom of words, teaching men how to speak well on all questions. Their merit lay not only in the education they gave Greece, but also in the reaction they provoked in Socrates. In contrast to their ideal, he sought to *think* well, thus turning to a

[19] *De doctrina christiana,* II, xl, 60; *PL* 34, 63.

[20] *Theaetetus,* 157.

wisdom of the inner man. Many followed him, but only Plato and Aristotle merit the title of true Socratics.

Plato's wisdom was to be deeper and broader than all his predecessors, whom he sought to reconcile through his doctrine of the Ideas and to surpass through his ideals of the place and role of philosophy in human life. While *Aristotle*, his pupil, found much to criticize in his master, he too held fast to a deep wisdom of the whole man within the society of the city-state.

Post-Aristotelian philosophy kept pace with the broader view of the world induced by the conquests of Alexander the Great. As the *Stoics* pursued an ethical wisdom that emphasized the unity of all mankind, the *Epicureans* seemed to wish to flee both city and world and concentrate on the individual. Then, as Hellenic culture spread East and West, philosophy journeyed with it, to influence and be influenced by the people among whom it found a new home. Such *Hellenistic syntheses* are exemplified in *Roman philosophy*, which was largely eclectic, practical, and moral in content; in the *Jewish philosophy* of Philo, in which religion rather than reason held the primacy as the guide of life; and in the mystical movements that blended West and East into *Greco-Oriental philosophy*, particularly in the *Neoplatonism* of *Plotinus*, in whom Plato lives again in a new and original synthesis.

To pursue these cultural trends to their full development, we depart from the traditional arrangement of histories of philosophy, to consider at this point *Oriental Scholasticism* among the Arabians of the East and of Spain and among the Jews of the early middle ages.[21] Such *falasifa* were the heirs, directly and through the Christian schools of Syria, of the treasures of Greece. Yet the Aristotle they knew was tinged with a certain Neoplatonic interpretation, which makes for interesting developments in such men as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroës. *Jewish philosophy*, inspired by contact with Moslem thought, finds its chief expression in Ibn Gebirol's metaphysics of the world, and the *Guide* which Moses Maimonides wrote for those perplexed on the relation of faith and reason.

Christian Philosophy. Both East and West witness an entirely new trend of philosophical thought with the coming of the Gospel. Christian (and Jewish) revelation is indeed not a philosophy, nor can it be a foundation for philosophy, since it is accepted by faith and not by reason. Nevertheless, philosophy and its history must reckon with Christianity as a historical fact which in definite ways influenced the thought of philosophers who were also believing Christians.

This influence is evidenced first in *Patristic philosophy:* while some of the Fathers of the Church opposed philosophy as profane and even as evil, the majority felt they were better Christians because of their use of philosophy and better philosophers because they were Christians. Examples of this attitude are found among the *Greek Fathers:* Clement of Alexandria, who defined and defended the role philosophy could play in the life of a Christian; Origen, who made use of Platonism to achieve a philo-

[21] To avoid certain difficulties in the teaching of the history of philosophy, a certain amount of this section will be repeated in summary fashion in our treatment of medieval philosophy in Volume Two of this series.

sophical penetration of the faith (though this led him to some hazardous positions); while in the three Cappadocians three phases of Christian philosophy were developed: Gregory of Nazianz probed our natural knowledge of God; Basil, the problems of cosmology (and the Christian use of the classics); Gregory of Nyssa, the view of man to be taken by a Christian philosopher. Platonism manifested itself in Nemesius, and Neoplatonism in pseudo-Dionysius.

In the West, Augustine and Boethius merit detailed study. The former is the "Teacher of the West," whose motto was: "Understand, that you may believe; believe, that you may have understanding."[22] The Christian does not despise philosophy and rational knowledge, but puts them to use in understanding Christian doctrine even as what he believes helps him grasp more clearly what reason itself can attain. Through *Boethius*, on the other hand, the West came to know some of the logical works of Aristotle and the bare elements of metaphysics.

The use of the dialectical method of Aristotle in theology and canon law as well as in philosophical problems gradually gave rise to the movement known as *Scholasticism*. In the *early period*, after the rebirth of learning under Charlemagne, we meet *Scotus Eriugena*, who used the Platonism of the Greek Fathers to write a daring treatise on nature; the extreme dialecticians of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, such as *Abelard;* the first great Augustinian of Scholasticism, St. *Anselm;* and in the twelfth century, the scientific studies of the *School of Chartres*, and the spiritual renaissance of *St. Bernard* and of the *Victorine School* of Paris.

After 1150, the West was enriched by a whole series of translations which brought the complete Aristotle to the Scholastics. Planted in the intellectual milieu of the newly founded universities, this seed burgeoned into the *Golden Age of Scholasticism* of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The new mendicant orders produced such teachers as Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and Ockham, among the Franciscans; St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas among the Dominicans. At the same time, a radical and almost uncritical adherence to the letter of Aristotle produced a grave crisis in the arts faculty at Paris, while the condemnations it provoked seem to have changed the direction of Scholasticism. Eventually, this intellectual movement lost its vitality and failed to meet new needs in philosophy, the sciences and classical learning. It gave way before the Renaissance and the ravages of the Reformation.

Modern Philosophy. The philosophy of the great Scholastics had been rooted in that of Aristotle, and thus centered on being and our knowledge of the external world. Without neglecting the nature of the thinking subject, it was inclined to be almost completely objective in its approach. Later, declining Scholasticism became bogged down in logic, which to some extent provides a passage to modern philosophy, where attention is focused largely on the knowing subject and not on the thing known.

The *Renaissance*, which must be considered here primarily as a reaction to Scholasticism and a return to classical

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[22] Sermon 43.

culture, produced little philosophy. It saw a rebirth of Platonism through new translations and the abandonment of the formal methods of Scholasticism. The *Reformation*, on the other hand, denied any value whatever for man's existence in the pursuit of rational wisdom.

The chasm between Scholasticism and modern philosophy, however, may be traced more directly to the *Discourse on Method* of *Réné Descartes*. Endeavoring to offset the skepticism of *Michel de Montaigne*, Descartes evolved a new approach, which placed the mind (or ego) and not matter (the world) at the center of thought, and so created the problem of passing from thought to existence. This central question pervades the whole *Cartesian cycle*, in Geulincx, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, all of whom in divers ways posit God as the solution; and the reaction to Descartes in the *British philosophers*, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Begun in the skepticism of Montaigne, the cycle came to full circle in the new skepticism of David Hume.

The latter's denial of all metaphysics awoke a German philosopher from his "dogmatic slumber," and caused *Immanuel Kant* to inquire more fully into the nature of human understanding. By answering the question: "How do I know?" he hoped to restore traditional metaphysics. Instead, he came to hold there was no transcendental knowledge above physics and mathematics; things which metaphysics had once assured were now taken as assumed by practical reason or moral sense. The consequences of his system of knowledge are evolved in the *Kantian cycle* through the *transcendental idealism* of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and carry over into most philosophies of the nineteenth century.

Thus, in the *contemporary picture*, *Marxism* appears as the offshoot of Hegel; the *positivism* of Comte, with its applications to sociology, education, etc., is a reaction to idealism and more positively the outgrowth of a new scientific spirit; but it in turn leads to a new philosophical skepticism. Lastly, in the face of such movements, *anti-intellectualism* attempts to reach reality and re-establish metaphysics not by sense experience, or pure reason, or the ego, but by some internal and more intimate way: in *Henri Bergson*, by the intuition of the mystics; in the various forms of *existentialism*, by some immediate self-awareness (Kierkegaard), or philosophical faith (Jaspers), love (Marcel), or ends in pure nihilism (Sartre).

Apart from current dogmatic philosophies (in *Communism* and in *New Scholasticism*), all independent liberal philosophies thus appear individualistic, man-centered, subjectivist, and even skeptical. Yet philosophy need not, and will not, end in tragedy! There is hope for the future, since the death of philosophy is regularly attended by its revival. It always buries its undertakers!

PART I: ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

SECTION I: ANCIENT ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy begins with the Greeks, as they react to the mythical and anthropomorphic accounts of the gods and the origin of the world. Only with the Greeks did philosophy achieve self-consciousness, so to speak, of its nature as a rational investigation of all things. The so-called primitive races either had no philosophy or failed to perceive its proper character. This is pre-eminently true of the Orientals, who had indeed basic philosophical concepts, but embodied them for the most part in their religious beliefs and myths. Inasmuch as a knowledge of the culture of these people will help us to appreciate the autonomous and self-conscious philosophy of the Greeks, they serve as an invaluable introduction to our history. Taken in themselves, however, the beliefs of these ancient people belong to the history of religion, even more properly to that study called comparative religion.

What we shall study in this opening section, therefore, is philosophy, or pre-philosophy as it has been rightly called, in a religious atmosphere: first among the Hebrews, the races of Babylon, and the Egyptians in the Mideast; second, among the peoples of the Far East, the Chinese and Indian philosophies and the doctrines of the Persians.*

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* Cf. Bibliography, p. 227 ff.

CHAPTER I: Philosophies of the Ancient Mideast

In this chapter we shall survey the philosophical concepts of the peoples who inhabited the ancient Mideast. Thus we shall consider the thought of the Hebrews, the peoples of the Mesopotamian valley, and the Egyptians.

§ *1. The Hebrews*

The Hebrews do not belong to the history of philosophy, but to that of religion and revelation, for they fulfilled a definite religious purpose in the providence and design of God. They were a people set apart to preserve through supernatural means the knowledge of the one true God and mankind's relation to Him as Creator and Lord. Thus possessed of the truth from a higher source, the Jews were scornful of human wisdom and the achievements of pure reason; it is not until after their return from the Babylonian captivity (538 B.C.) that the inspired writers make appeal to reason to reinforce revelation. Because of the knowledge of the one true God brought to them by Moses and the prophets, the Hebrews stand in direct contrast to their neighbors. Many of the peoples in adjacent lands reached a much higher stage of material and even intellectual civilization; yet almost all of them practiced a gross form of polytheism and as gross a form of external cult and morality.

Although the Jews from the days of Abraham (c. 1800 B.C.) to the Babylonian exile (586 B.C.) had a rather full doctrine on God, the distinction of soul and body, the worship of God, and a moral code, it is only with the return from Babylon (538 B.C.) that the sacred books advance anything that resembles philosophy. The prophets were replaced by the sages of the sapiential books, who spoke in proverbs and made appeal to tradition, conscience, and reason. Thus the author of the *Book of Wisdom* realizes that reason itself justifies belief in one God: "For all men were by nature foolish who were in ignorance of God, and who from the good things seen did not succeed in knowing him who is, and from studying the works did not discern the artisan" (Wisd. 13:1).

At the same time, the sages distinguished in man the breath of life (*ruah*), the soul (*nephesh*), and the body (*bašar*). The breath of life is a vital force which God gives to every living being, the divine element without which man cannot live (cf. Eccles. 3:19–21). The *nephesh*, on the other hand, is considered primarily as the subject of the lower vital activities on the vegetative and sensitive plane; but it was also used to designate man as an individual. This is a distinction of two aspects of vital activity rather than one of two substances: it emerges in the Greeks as the distinction of spirit and soul, *pneuma* and *psyche*.

Toward the end of this latter period some Jews came under the influence of Greek philosophy and the culture of

Hellenism, as is evident from the *Books of the Maccabees*. Whether the Sadducees, a political group among the priests, were influenced by Greek philosophy is doubtful; their denial of the resurrection of the dead and the immortality of the soul stems rather from their refusal to accept new dogmatic teachings apart from the Torah. The Essenes, on the other hand, a sect dating from the second century B.C., show foreign influence, most probably derived from the revival of Pythagoreanism. A kind of religious order, they engaged in agriculture and lived according to practices that were definitely not Jewish in origin or temperament, such as almost complete abstention from marriage and animal sacrifice, vegetarianism, the pursuit of mysticism and mystic states, and insistence on things of the spirit.

Conclusion. Apart from a few of the sapiential books, perhaps *Ecclesiastes*, and more surely *Ecclesiasticus* and *Wisdom*, and the peculiarities of the Essenes, the Jews show little influence of outside philosophies. In general, their doctrines rest on divine revelation, with little appeal to reason.

§ 2. *The Mesopotamians*

The Mesopotamians literally were the peoples between the rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, inhabitants of a vast plain east of Syria and northeast of Arabia, almost coextensive with modern Iraq. When the Semites invaded the region about 3000 B.C., they found two cultures flourishing, Accadian in the north, Sumerian in the south, dating back another thousand years.[1] Later, about 1720 B.C., the Semites under Hammurabi became masters of the country, with their center at Babylon.

It was formerly believed that the Sumerians held to shamanism, a doctrine that made the gods, demons, and ancestral spirits responsive only to the incantations and prayers of the shaman or priests. However, more recent discoveries show that the Sumerians were polytheists of a refined sort.[2] Each city had its patron god and goddess conceived as the king and the mother of the territory. The god of the city had his counterpart in the ruler, who was his vicar and representative, priest as well as king. However, the Sumerian religion was highly anthropomorphic, for the gods were endowed with all the faults of men; it was a cult of fear not of love, but a fear confined only to the present life, for the gods seem to have had nothing to do with a future life for man.

About 1720 B.C. or earlier, Babylon rose to first rank among the cities, under the leadership of Hammurabi, and Marduk became the chief god. To glorify him, a whole tale of cosmogony was constructed from earlier legends. The Seven Tablets of Creation give a lengthy poem on the Babylonian epic of creation.[3] In the beginning there existed only Apsu,

[1] For the prehistory of Babylon, cf. E. A. Speiser, *Mesopotamian Origins* (Philadelphia, 1930). The original inhabitants, whom the author calls ancient Japhethites, were neither Semitic nor Sumerian; ethnically, they furnished the foundations on which the invading races were to build (p. 171).

[2] Cf., for example, C. L. Woolley, *The Sumerians* (Oxford, 1928).

[3] Cf. G. Ring, *Gods of the Gentiles* (Milwaukee, 1938), p. 27 ff.; for text, see M. Jastrow, *The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria* (Philadelphia, 1915), pp. 427–443. There were other forms of this myth, but this is most important as establishing Marduk's right to be chief god in the pantheon of Babylon. See also Réné Follet, "Les aspects du divin et des dieux dans la Mésopotamie antique," *Recherches de science religieuse*, XXXVIII (1952), 189–208.

the ocean of fresh water (male), and Tiamat, ocean of salt water (female); these mixed their waters to result in the chaos, out of which came the gods. The latter, however, make so much noise and trouble that Apsu decides to destroy them. Apsu and Mummu, his messenger, are conquered by Ea, the god of the deep, while Tiamat remains at large. Marduk, one of the gods, undertakes to do battle with Tiamat, who personifies evil, on condition that he become chief god. He slays her, cuts her body in two, and uses one half to cover the heavens, in which he sets the stars, moon, planets, and sun . . . (the Tablets break off here). Marduk makes man because the gods demand worshipers, and is named Lord of the world.

To a certain extent, since Marduk is overlord of the other gods, we may consider this belief a monarchical polytheism or even henotheism. From a philosophical viewpoint, we note three concepts involved in the account that are common to many of the ancient myths: water is taken as an original principle; chaos enters as a negative factor or principle in production; and the agent or efficient cause, the god, is regarded as a formator, not a creator; but no explanation is given of the origin of the material cause.

Finally, the *Code of Hammurabi*, dated c. 1720 B.C., discovered in A.D. 1901, provides some notion of the morality of the Babylonians. It is not a religious set of laws, though there is little distinction made between the legal and the religious aspects, since the laws are considered the decisions of the gods; it is rather a codification of immemorial Sumerian and Semitic civil and criminal law, rather harsh and unbending, providing detailed punishments for every manner of misdeed.[4] Fear is thus the motive behind observance, as it was the motif of Babylonian cult and worship. Although some prayers show a high respect for the deities, most moral precepts and prayers reveal that these people worshiped their gods to avoid divine anger, and kept from sin to ward off illness and punishment.[5]

In the Babylonians, therefore, we have a typical example of the *Weltanschauung* of the ancients: a mythological account of the origin of the universe and a religion based on equally primitive and mythical concepts.

§ 3. *The Egyptians*

From the beginning, the Egyptian was influenced by two unforgettable elements that entered his daily life, the sun and the Nile. Nowhere in the world does the sun play the role it does in rainless Egypt, while the land, as Herodotus said,[6] is the gift of the river. Add to this his further saying[7] that the Egyptians were the most religious of men, and we can understand why Egyptian religion centered on the sun-god and the river-god, Ra (Atum, Horus) and Osiris. The latter became the god of the other world as well as the god of fertility, because the Egyptians soon acquired a passion for immortality.

Little is known of the prehistoric Egyptians, in the days before the First

[4] See M. Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 283 ff.; G. Ring, *op. cit.*, p. 54 ff.

[5] For text of prayers, cf. M. Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 464 ff.

[6] Herodotus, *History of the Persian Wars*, ii, 5.

[7] *Ibid.*, 37.

Dynasty (c. 3500 B.C.). Each tribe was independent, with its own gods, temples, and priests. Unity was achieved under either Narmer or Menes (Mena), possibly his son, and lasted through centuries until Alexander the Great. Political unity carried with it some semblance of religious unity, a syncretism of the tribal religions that resulted in a religion of nature. Not that the Egyptian was a materialist sunworshiper, rather, he took material things as symbols or images of the deities that he served. For our history, the beliefs of the Egyptians relative to the origin of the world and the end of man are of some importance.

Cosmogony. There were four great systems of cosmogony, taught in as many cults or temples: Heliopolis, Memphis, Hermopolis, and Thebes.[8] Of these, the most important was that of Heliopolis, not far from modern Cairo; the most sublime, perhaps, was that of Thebes. According to the cosmogony of Heliopolis, ocean and darkness alone existed in the beginning, the primeval waters and a chaos called Nu or Nun. In this dwelt Atum, who was to be the organizer of the chaos. He appears as the sun-god, Ra; on the horizon at dawn as Ra-Khopri; again as Ra Scarab (the scarab beetle was the symbol of new birth). From him come the other gods — of the sky, fire, earth — eight in all. These, with Ra, became the national gods worshiped in most temples. At Memphis, the chief god was Ptah, represented in human form, standing upright, in mummy clothes, with only the hands emerging: this was a symbol of his work as creator of gods and men, organizer of the universe; in himself he remains hidden and invisible.

The Egyptians thus appear polytheists for the most part, but not idolaters or animal worshipers. Perhaps many of the common people made little distinction between the symbols (sun, scarab, etc.) and the gods; to their credit, however, they were in general deeply religious. In the cult of Amen-Ra at Thebes, popular during the eighteenth dynasty of the Pharaohs (c. 1580–1322 B.C.), there is some hint of monotheism.[9]

Man and his destiny are made to depend on Osiris rather than on the sun-god. Osiris, son of Atum-Ra, was slain by his brother Set and completely dismembered. Isis, his wife, gathers and buries his remains; whereupon Osiris begins to live once more, in the other world, as king and judge of the dead. This implies that man, in some part at least, survives the tomb.

According to Egyptian thinking, man was made of many elements: the flesh (*aifu*), the "double" (*ka*), the "shadow" (*haibit*), the "ghost" (*ku*). The functions of these elements are vague, but stress was laid on the *Ka*, a kind of invisible genius or shadow, born with a man but also surviving him. The survival

[8] J. Baikie, *A History of Egypt* (New York, 1929), II, p. 359; G. Ring, *Gods of the Gentiles* (Milwaukee, 1938), p. 113.

[9] Thus a hymn to Amen-Ra of Thebes prays: "The august god, the Lord of all gods, Amen-Ra: The august soul which was in the beginning; The great God who lives of truth, the god of the first cycle who begat the gods of the other cycles, and who made all the gods: The unique One, who made all that exists when the earth began to be at the Creation. . . . Sovereign Lord of existence, all that exists is because He is, and when it began to be, nothing existed except Him" (quoted by A. Mallon, *The Religion of Ancient Egypt* [*Studies in Comparative Religion*, ed. E. Messenger, Vol. IX], p. 12).

and happiness of a man depended on the preservation of the body and a dwelling place for the *Ka*. The latter lived in the region of the dead (*Tuat*), but at pleasure returned to the tomb to enjoy the things provided for it therein.

The *Ka*, or perhaps some other part of man, was considered as subject after death to judgment, usually before Osiris and the forty-two judges. An ancient picture represents the scene: Horus or dog-headed Anubis holds the scale: on one side is a leaf, the symbol of righteousness, on the other the heart of the deceased. Before the scale stands the deceased, who is allowed to plead his own cause.[10] Justice is then rendered. The wicked were devoured by the judges or by monsters, or reincarnated in unclean animals. The righteous entered Amenti, the kingdom of the dead, which was considered a new and better Egypt, free from pain and suffering, but filled with the same occupations and recreations as earth.[11] To offset work in the new kingdom, statuettes, which archaeologists call respondents, were placed in the tomb; these were to be magically animated to do the work of the dead.

Such was the religion of the ancient Egyptians and the philosophical concepts it contained on the world and man. Our survey shows that they had some knowledge of God and of His attributes, but failed to unite these attributes in one single Being. Later, around 700 B.C., a genuine decadence set in, when animals were no longer regarded as symbols of the gods, but as divine beings themselves. Serpents, crocodiles, birds, cats were treated as sacred objects, given divine honors, and embalmed at death, while men were considered subordinate and subject to them. After the conquest of Alexander the Great, Greek culture and religion turned the northern Egyptians from such aberrations; and by the advent of Christianity, northern Egyptian religion was a hodgepodge of Greek and Egyptian elements.

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[10] Cf. W. C. Hayes, "Daily Life in Ancient Egypt," *National Geographic*, LXXX (1941), 475; the whole article (pp. 419–515) is a popular yet helpful study. Further details may be gathered from W. Price, "By Felucca Down the Nile," *National Geographic*, LXXVII (1940), 435–476.

[11] Cf. G. Ring, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–130; and W. C. Hayes, *art. cit.*, p. 420 (picture of *Ka*), p. 471 (pictures of afterlife).

CHAPTER II: Philosophies of the Ancient Far East

IN THIS chapter we shall turn to a brief study of the chief philosophical concepts in the ancient Far East, considering in turn Chinese thought, Indian philosophy, Buddhist speculation, and the ideas dominant in Persia.

§ *1. The Chinese*

At the dawn of Chinese history, the people show a high degree of civilization and culture and are monotheistic in their religion. Their books (*Wu-ching*) contain many references to a Superior Being whom the emperor and the people venerate above all minor gods and spirits. He is called Shang-Tien or Tien (the Sublime Heaven) in reference to his being, and Shang-Ti (the Sublime Sovereign) when considered as lawgiver, judge, and all-powerful ruler. However, only the emperor, the Son of Heaven, offered sacrifice to him as his sole representative on earth; and this only once a year. Such a practice opened the way to local cults of a polydemonist nature on the part of local rulers, and ancestor worship (improperly so called, for it was rather the continuance of filial veneration and piety) on the part of the ordinary people. Primitive Chinese religion was thus monotheistic with additional worship of local spirits as inferior protectors of particular places. From the so-called ancestor worship we may conclude that there was some belief in the immateriality and immortality of the human soul or the survival of some part of man.

A decline in religion and morals set in under the Chow Dynasty (1122–255 B.C.). It was characterized by polytheism, extreme anthropomorphism and superstition, decay of the imperial power, and the rise of feudal lords who took upon themselves the worship of Shang-Ti and appeared to multiply the Supreme Being. About 535 B.C., the philosopher *Izu-Chan* offered a new theory on the soul, which reduced it to something material. The soul (*kui*) was considered as divided into the inferior or vegetative soul (*p'ai*), which evolved from the body, and the superior soul (*hun*), formed at birth by breathing. Both were said to survive the body, with the *p'ai* capable of doing harm unless it were somehow extinguished. This theory has been practically admitted by the Chinese until our day.[1]

Confucianism appears in the sixth century B.C. as a reaction to such conditions and as a restoration of ancient ideals. The work of K'ung Fu-tzu (Great Master K'ung; *Confucius* is the Latin form bestowed by Jesuit missionaries in the seventeenth century), is not a religion in

[1] Cf. J. Mullie, *The Religion of China* (*Studies in Comparative Religion*, ed. E. Messenger, Vol. IV), p. 4; G. Ring, *Religions of the Far East* (Milwaukee, 1950), p. 39.

the Western sense and puts forth no claim to be supernatural or theological. Confucius was not agnostic or atheistic; he simply took for granted the old religion of the Chinese, the creed and cult of Tien, the survival of the soul, and did not try to explain them. His doctrine is of the earth, the good earth; his is a return to ancient wisdom based on the age-old traditions of the Chinese race. "I transmit and comment on the teachings of the ancients; I do not invent anything new. I give my confidence to the ancients and I love them much," says Confucius.[2] Hence he preached an ethical reform of the individual that would lead to the reformation of the family and eventually of the whole society. This implied a mild totalitarianism, for the individual is subordinated to the social organism, that is, to the family and the traditions of the past. In practice, the ideal advocated is the "middle way," the way of practical opportunism, an avoidance of extremes, a withholding of judgment, to do whatever seems best as new situations arise.

Confucianism has had an untold influence in shaping the character of China and the Chinese. Its moral teaching and the influence of its learning have so permeated the social life of China that they have become second nature to the Chinese people, molding every thought and feeling from within. To a great extent this is due to the fact that the only learning in China, apart from importations from the West and the Marxist indoctrination of the present, has been Confucian learning. In 213 B.C., the Emperor Chin Shih Huangti, angered at intellectual opposition to his reforms, ordered the whole of ancient Chinese literature to be burned. Brave scholars hid a few books, chiefly the works of Confucius. As a result, almost the whole literary tradition has been in the hands of the Confucian learned class.

Taoism, a more metaphysical philosophy, has traditionally been considered the work of Lao-tse (or Lao Tzu), supposed author (c. 600 B.C.) of the *Tao-Te-Ching* (the book of the Principle and its Action). Authorities now say that there is good evidence to show the work is later than that of Confucius and is not the writing of a single author. In essence, the doctrine is the revolt or reassertion of the individual, a metaphysics of being with ethical conclusions. *Tao* is the first principle, preceding and suppressing Shang-Ti. In itself, Tao or Ta Tao, the Great Tao, is unknowable, invisible, unchangeable, everlasting: it is *Wu*, nonbeing, or Chien. From this proceeds *Yu*, being, or Chuen, as knowable activity. Thence comes the world, all beings of which must return after death to *Wu* and there enter eternal rest, emptiness, nonacting. From such a metaphysics is derived an ethics, the Way, that impersonal method all men must observe if they are to attain goodness and success. Concretely, it implies that self should not intrude in our actions: we must not act with strain, eagerness, artificiality, for these things are fruitless. This detachment is called *wu wu*: it is a means of union with the nonself. And the calmness of action, *wu wei*, is the only road to *Nibban*, complete cessation of all activity, absorption into nothingness.

Although Taoism helped shape the Chinese spirit, as a metaphysics it was never a public philosophy. But it also became a religion, vitiated today by

[2] *Lunyu*, vii, 1.

superstition and humbug. Philosophical Taoism underwent some innovation of doctrine between the third and sixth centuries A.D., under T'ao Hung-king (d. 536) and others. Under the Sung Dynasty, in the tenth century, it was used by the emperors to prove their celestial origin. Finally, *Chu Hsi* (1130–1200), a materialist Taoist, attempted to destroy the old Chinese belief in a supernatural deity and the survival of the spiritual soul. Despite his radical position, the doctrine was officially declared (1241) to be the old true Confucian doctrine, and as such was required knowledge for Mandarin examinations until 1905. It kept its hold on the lettered class, and it was among them that Christianity found its most bitter enemies.

The average Chinese today (abstracting from the presence of Communism and perhaps hidden beneath an exterior acceptance) is neither pure Confucianist, Taoist, or Buddhist, but usually a combination of all of them.

§ 2. *Indian (Hindu) Philosophy*

The ancient scriptures of India are the *Vedas*, the oldest portions of which date back to c. 2500–2000 B.C., according to some estimates. Each of the four *Vedas* contains sacred texts or hymns (the *Mantras* or *Samhitas*), ritual commentaries (the *Brahmanas*), and philosophical commentaries (the *Upanishads*). Each division represents, so to speak, corresponding stages of Hindu thought.

The *Mantras* reflect the teachings of the Aryan tribes that settled in the Punjab more than three thousand years ago, and show the beginning of the caste system: three of the books contain the religion of the higher classes, the priests, and the warriors (the *Rig-*, *Sama-*, and *Yagur-Veda*), while the fourth (the *Atharva-Veda*) embodies the animistic and magical beliefs of the common people. The gods are gods of nature and sacrifice, numerous, vague, anthropomorphic; there is little or no philosophical content in the doctrines presented.

The *Brahmanas* (800–700 B.C.), treatises of a ritualistic and sacrificial character, contain the beginnings of philosophical speculation. They show a tendency to speak of the many gods as forms of an all-god or all-power, the Absolute or Brahma, underlying the world of gods and men. Emphasizing ritual and symbolism, the *Brahmanas* exalt the priestly caste as possessing the Brahma nature, and thus strengthen the caste system.

The *Upanishads* (650–500 B.C.)[3] develop what the *Brahmanas* began in an increasing rationalism on the part of the priests. They are elaborate attempts to formulate a speculative system of the universe and to solve the problems of the nature, origin, and destiny of man. The doctrine thus presented is essentially a philosophy, a metaphysic, though clothed in the trappings of the sanctuary and endowed with the sanctions and attributes of a religion. In one way or another, the *Upanishads* are the chief inspiration of subsequent Hindu philosophy to our own day.

From previous tradition, the *Upanishads* adopt the notion of an Absolute or

[3] *The Upanishads*, translated by Swami Pradhadananda and F. Manchester (Boston, 1950); *Upanishads, Katha, Isa, Kena and Mundaka*, translated from the Sanskrit by Swami Nikilananda (New York, 1949); *idem*, *A Second Selection* (London, 1954).

First Principle, *Brahman* (the occult and sacred force of all), also called *Atman* (immanent yet transcendent principle of life). Brahman constitutes in itself the intimate reality of everything that truly exists: it involves an uncompromising monism. *Brahma eva idam viśvam:* "Brahman, indeed, is this world-all."[4] Multiplicity and individuality are thus only appearance (*Maya*); everything known by the senses and even by concepts is illusion. "Brahman alone is; nothing else is. He who sees the manifold universe and not the one reality, goes evermore from death to death."[5] From this it follows that individual existence is evil and the cause of suffering; knowledge of things in their isolated state, apart from Brahman, is worthless ignorance.

From such premises, the *Upanishads* develop their program for human life. Man must struggle to be free from individual existence and the suffering it implies, and seek union with Brahman within the lotus house of his heart. He thus comes to realize that the Self (Atman) within and Brahman without are identical: the Self is Brahman and Brahman is all. The wise man does this by following the yoga (way) of renunciation and of contemplation, to attain that knowledge which destroys Maya and ignorance and leads to union. If he is successful he thus attains immortality in this life, and when death overtakes the body, the *karmas* and the individual soul are lost in Brahman.

This last doctrine, that of the *Karma*, the Law of the Deed, is perhaps the most fundamental in Indian thought. Indian philosophy is one of redemption, deliverance — but of a redemption dependent on man alone. What a man has sown in his previous lives, he reaps in the present and future; he alone, therefore, can achieve his redemption by controlling his *karmas*, his deeds. If he has proved himself a wise man, he attains to Brahman after death, or returns again to purify himself yet more. If he is foolish and lives out his desires now, after death he reaps his deserts by falling (*samsara*) to the animal or plant level. Therefore, self must be denied, desires must be stilled; such is the fundamental practical program of Brahmanism.[6]

Conclusion. Hinduism is the most searching quest for God and salvation, on a natural plane, that the world has ever known. An existential philosophy, a wisdom of salvation, its essential character consists in a movement upward, an escape from human existence, and a merging in some superior being in which man attains liberty and happiness. It thus includes a pessimistic view of man's present existence as something empty and evil, with transmigration as an ever present threat and deterrent unless man by himself

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[4] *Upanishad Mundaka.*

[5] *Upanishad Katha*, ed. Pradhabananda, p. 32.

[6] *Upanishad Brihadaranyaka:* "As a man acts, so does he become. . . . As a man's desire is, so is his destiny. For as his desire is, so is his will; as his will is, so is his deed, and as his deed is, so is his reward, whether good or bad. After death he goes to the next world, bearing in his mind the subtle impressions of his deeds; after reaping there the harvest of his deeds, he returns again to this world of action. Thus he who has desire continues subject to rebirth. But he in whom desire is stilled suffers no rebirth. After death, having attained to the highest, desiring only the Self, he goes to no other world. Realizing Brahman, he becomes Brahman" (ed. Pradhabananda, pp. 177–178). *Upanishad Swetaszatara* (XI), *ibid.*, pp. 187–204, is a good summary of Hindu doctrine.

achieves a superhuman end by merely natural means.

From the general doctrine of the *Vedas* and the commentaries has come a long development of Indian philosophy or theosophy, divided into some six or seven theological systems or elaborations of the same basic doctrines. These usually admit as fundamental the law of Karma, transmigration, monism or fundamental identity of the Absolute and the apparent. Indian philosophy is by no means a dead letter, but a power today in Hindu thinking. Mahatma K. Gandhiji (Gandhi) was a firm adherent of ancient Indian philosophy: "I have ventured to place before India the ancient law of self-sacrifice."

§ 3. *Buddhism*

After the period of the *Upanishads* but during the great age of the Brahmanistic doctrines, another school of religious thought arose in India and spread throughout the East: Buddhism. It is a doctrine that may be considered the corruption and dissolution of Brahman philosophy, inasmuch as it is essentially negative in character and directed to practice rather than to speculation and contemplation. Like Brahmanism, it is a philosophy of natural self-salvation. Unlike Brahmanism, it is essentially atheistic and entirely anthropocentric.

Beneath a mass of legends and later stories that show borrowings from Christian history, we reach the picture of the *founder of Buddhism*, Sakyamuni or Siddhartha Gautama (d. 483 B.C.). The son of a petty rajah in north India, he left wife and child and became a hermit to seek the lost truth: how to be delivered from suffering and human misery. According to tradition, he dwelt at first among Brahmanist solitaries, religious living in the forests, to study their doctrine of ritual and ecstasy. This, he found, was no solution, for he was the same after ecstasy as before. Then for many years he tried penance and severe austerities, but again found no solution. At last came the Great Enlightenment. After a night beneath the Bodhi tree, spent in meditating on the mystery of death and rebirth, he reached Nirvana and found the remedy for human pain. Henceforth he was the Buddha, the Enlightened One, possessed of illumination on the Way of Escape.

The core of the Enlightenment, which the Buddha set out to preach to others, is that desire is at the root of all suffering. One must therefore rid himself of all desire, especially the desire to exist. The final goal is complete nonexistence or the negation of self (Nirvana). Fundamental to this position is the doctrine that the soul is not something permanent and substantial; karma alone is permanent and constitutes a kind of pseudo ego that continues through stages of transmigration.[7]

Now, the cause of transmigration is simply an urge toward life, a desire to live. The four noble truths of the Enlightenment, however, stand against this and show us the way of escape: (1) existence is sorrow; suffering is inevitable because all is becoming and nothing ever

[7] "There are acts, but no agent; there are fruits of that act, but no one who eats the fruits; there are sensations, but no being who senses. . . . The body . . . is empty and without soul, and arises from the action of the chain of causation. This chain of causation is the cause of existence and its cessation" (Buddha, *Sermon on the Wheel of the Law*).

is; (2) sorrow is caused by desire, earthbound desire; (3) to conquer sorrow, a man must annihilate all thirst for and attachment to life; (4) to attain this cessation, he must follow the eightfold path: right belief, right aims, right speech, right action, the pursuit of right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right meditation. The wise man, therefore, who by knowledge unlocks the inner spirit of the harmonies of life, will destroy in himself the natural longing for existence, getting rid of acts and thereby of existence itself. The means he will use are abstinence and continence (hence Buddhist monasticism) and meditation on the transitory and empty character of desirable objects. In this life he will attain to a kind of beatific *ataraxia* (as the Greeks would call it), a suspension of activity. After death, deliverance is achieved through Nirvana (literally, blowout). The full import of this was never explained by Buddha, who refused to answer questions on Nirvana. Nor was there need of answer, for release from present existence is all that is sought, whether that be by annihilation of self, absorption into some positive entity like the Hindu Brahman, or simply timeless, unconditioned existence.

Conclusion. We find in Buddhism the same effort to scale the heights as in Brahmanism, the same naturalism and morbid pessimism. Salvation is from the very things we would say human nature strives for by a natural God-given desire. In both there is a lack of love, for all emphasis is placed on the intellect, in a pseudo mysticism of a purely intellectual character. In addition, Buddhism has become a form of Oriental religion, with Buddha raised to the dignity of a god.

§ 4. *Persian Philosophy*

The last Oriental philosophy that we shall study, the doctrine prevalent among the Persians, was a dualism that admitted two positive principles, one of good, the other of evil. It was another effort to solve the problem of evil, without the pessimism that marked Hindu and Buddhist teachings.

Its beginnings are shrouded in the mists of time, and the first clear figure to emerge is that of Zarathustra (or Zoroaster, in the Greek form of his name), dated variously as 1000, 800, 660 B.C., or even contemporary with Cyrus the Great and Darius (c. 550 B.C.). Authorities are agreed, however, that he purified the older traditions of materialistic qualities, abolished polytheism and idolatry, to fix attention on Ahura Mazda, the good principle. At the same time, it would not be correct to consider the whole doctrine of Mazdaism as the product of Zoroaster. He began in the *Gathas*, or hymns, what others completed in the *Vendidad* (laws) and *Zend* (commentary), all of which make up the *Avestas*, the Persian scriptures. Mazdaism was the popular religion in Persia until the coming of Mohammedanism, and still lives on in the Gheber communities of Persia and the Parsees of Bombay.

Dualism is perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the Mazdaistic teachings, a system of two principles independent, hostile, essentially opposed to each other, each with his hierarchy of underlings. Ahura-Mazda (or Ormazd), the good principle, is characterized as omniscient, omnipotent, supreme, beneficent, merciful; he is not infinite because he is limited by the evil principle, Anro-Maínyav (or Ahriman or Angra Mainyu). Mazda creates the six Amesha-Spenta,

the Immortal Holy Ones, who govern the world; they are more or less aspects of Mazda, rays from the central fire of Mazda. Below these come the Yazatas, beings worthy of veneration: old deities reduced to the rank of auxiliary angels. Then come the three judges: Mithra (god of contracts, patron of soldiers), Sraosha (obedience), and Rashnu (justice); and lastly, the Fravashis (Roman genii; guardians of individuals). Opposed to the foregoing is the kingdom of Anro-Maínyav, who is the creator of darkness, sin, and suffering; ignorant and afraid of Mazda, he tries to lead the creatures of Mazda to sin. Under him are the Daevas (demons of sloth, opposed to the Amesha-Spenta), the Yatus (sorcerers, against the Yazatas), and the Pairikas (spirits of seduction, contrasted to the Fravashis).

All of these enter into the *drama of "creation,"* since world history is interpreted by the Avestas in terms of the opposition between the two opposing principles and their cohorts. Before "creation," nothing existed save Infinite Time, while "creation" covers a cycle of 12,000 years. In the first quarter of this period, only the spiritual and immaterial is brought into being, while Ahriman lies prostrate. This is followed by the first fight between Mazda and Ahriman, in which Mazda is victorious. Between 3000 and 6000, the material world is made, but is deeply injured by Ahriman, who slays the primordial bull and the first man, from whose bodies proceed animals and men. This is followed by a golden age, which is ended by a sin committed by Yima the king. The last period opens with the revelations of Zarathustra and the other prophets; it will close with a general resurrection, the victory of Mazda over his enemy, and a new period of Infinite Time.

Man is thus at the center of the Persian world, the focus point of the battle between the two principles. By virtue he must place himself on the side of Mazda and become *ashavan*, righteous; it is his duty to worship Ahura-Mazda and the good spirits, preserve the sacred fire, which is the symbol of Ahura, the divine fire (Atar), and venerate the dead. Of personal virtues he should cherish especially honesty and straightforwardness, personal purity, charity. After death, the soul is judged by Mithra and the other judges. If faults and good actions are found to counterbalance, the soul proceeds to a state of equilibrium, where it will suffer only from heat and cold. If virtue is triumphant, the soul goes to a place of bliss, the home of eternal light; or, if condemned, to the abode of the damned, infernal darkness, until the general resurrection and restoration.

Persian doctrine is a mixture of religion, mythology, and philosophy in a nonscientific form. It arouses in us a certain admiration for its monotheism, a fairly lofty outlook on human life, and generally coherent doctrine. But it also contains some fundamental errors, the most radical of which is the concept of evil as something positive which demands a positive cause. As a result, its monotheism is vitiated, for Mazda cannot be infinite, nor indeed omnipotent, because he is basically limited by the presence and power of Ahriman. Such was the doctrine most likely held by the Magi who came to Bethlehem.[8]

[8] Cf. G. Ricciotti, *The Life of Christ* (Milwaukee, 1947), pp. 249–255. A Magus is a

In Christian times, Mazdaism was not without its influence. First of all, the cult of Mithra became quite prominent. Honored as the judge of the dead, the god of oaths and promises, the god of honor, he was esteemed and cultivated by the mercenary troops of the Roman Empire; thence his cult spread to civilians throughout the Empire. However, it is utterly absurd to find in Christ a parallel to Mithra, or to say that the Apostles took over doctrines and practices from Mithraism, as some so-called scholars claim. On the other hand, the real influence of Mazdaism is found in Manichaeism, whose founder, Manes (c. A.D. 240), a Persian Christian, preached a doctrine that was a real syncretism of Christian, Zoroastrian, and Buddhist elements. He thought of himself as the successor of Christ, Zoroaster, and Buddha, and proposed to enrich Christianity with borrowings from the others. From the Persians he accepted the theory of dualism; from Buddhism, perhaps, the theory that matter and material things are evil, and the severe asceticism which he inculcated. His metaphysics was weak, and when St. Augustine, who was captivated by the doctrine for some years, proposed questions and difficulties, the leading Manichaeans could give no logical answer. The doctrine was quite influential in the early Middle Ages, and was revived among the Albigensians of the thirteenth century.

"sharer of the gift," that is, the teachings of Zoroaster. There is evidence to show that the Magi of Persia knew of the Jewish Messias and prophecies concerning Him, and connected Him with the "helper" who will assist in the final triumph of Mazda.

SUMMARY

1. In none of the Orientals whom we have considered in the foregoing pages is philosophy found as a separate, autonomous knowledge or discipline, as it will be among the Greeks. In India, it is true, the doctrine of the Brahmans, particularly in the *Upanishads*, is a product of genuine philosophical speculation, but it remained the almost exclusive trust of the priestly class and was embodied in the religious books. Oriental philosophy, therefore, was in general not adequately distinguished from the religion of the people. It was nonscientific, since it was proposed without regard for logical order and demonstration; it was prephilosophic inasmuch as it was a knowledge without an autonomous character. Hence, we may well describe the material we have covered as a *prehistory of philosophy*.

2. Though philosophy had not yet taken shape as an independent discipline, the great philosophical problems were already formulated and pondered within this period, and too often in answer fundamental philosophical errors intruded themselves. The great questions of being and becoming, the origin of man, the concept of God, the problem of evil, faced man from the beginning, but were too often given wrong answers, in the dualism of Zoroaster, the pessimism and monism of the Hindu, the atheism and nihilism of Buddha.

3. Our study should show that truth, at least in the realms of higher knowledge, is not given to man ready-made, but is reached with difficulty, is bought by labor, and is retained only by constant effort. We should be grateful to the providence of God for that divine revelation which has helped us to see the truth even of naturally knowable things (to which we may then ascend by our own reason), and for the example and teaching of the Greeks, who made the West realize the powers of human reason and proposed the basically correct answers to the problems of philosophy.

*SECTION II: GREEK PHILOSOPHY**

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

To SAY that "nothing moves in this world of ours which is not Greek in origin" is to say too much. Yet it must be admitted that the Western world owes a great debt to Greece and Greek culture. The medievals were conscious of this, and spoke of the passing of wisdom from Greece to Rome, and from Rome to France and the West.[1] We are indeed the heirs of the past; the faith of the Jewish race elevated by Christian revelation and the long quest for wisdom and truth on the part of the Greeks together enter into Western Christian thought and life, to form and mold the pattern of Christian culture. We stand here at the beginning of the long road which Greek thought was to walk in the search for wisdom.

BACKGROUND

Ideals of Culture. The history of Greek philosophy cannot abstract from the general culture and ideals of Greece itself. Greek ideals of education (*paideia*) antedate the early physical philosophers, provide them with a background, and are interwoven into the thought of the philosophers of the golden age: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The poets, particularly Homer and Hesiod, were not without their influence even on the philosophers, and the religion of the Greeks provides, to a certain extent, the starting point of philosophical thought.

Fundamental in Greek culture, in marked contrast to the self-abnegation of the Orient, is an awareness of the position of the individual and his personal freedom. The beginning of Greek history marks the beginning of a new conception of the value of the individual. Coupled with Christianity, this concept will become a basic tenet of our Western culture, and when that is lost our civilization is in danger. Equally important, however, is the feeling of the Greeks for the place of the individual as part of the whole. Theirs was what has been called an architectonic outlook, a sense of the organic unity of the whole, with an appreciation of the individual as an element of such a living whole. This will be manifest in the most marvelous creation of the Greek mind, philosophy, since the Greek will seek therein the permanent rules that underlie all events and changes in nature and human life. Poet and philosopher alike looked for the *harmonía*, the bonds that held all things together.

These two aspects, the individual and the whole, enter deeply into the concept of *paideia*, the shaping or educating of the man to his true form, the real and genuine human nature, according to the ideal of human character.[2]

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* Cf. Bibliography, p. 230 ff.

[1] The theme of the *translatio studii* or the *translatio sapientiae* runs through the whole of the Middle Ages, from Notker Balbo's ninth-century *Chronicle of St. Gall* (*PL* 98, 1371 ff.) to Jean Charlier de Gerson († 1429) and Nicholas de Clamanges († 1437) in the Paris of the fifteenth century. Cf. E. Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris, 1951), pp. 193–196.

[2] W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York, 1943), I, xvi–xxv.

The Ancient Teachers of Greece: the Poets. Until the coming of the sophists, the poets were the teachers of Greece. Ancient Greece was divided into many peoples and little states, with different dialects, customs, and religions. The one general influence felt in most of Greece was that of the poets, who were thus a source of national unity. Of these, the two most influential were Homer and Hesiod.

Homer, whom many believed to be the educator of all Greece,[3] "from whom all have learnt from the beginning,"[4] was indeed the first and greatest creator and shaper of Greek life and character. He was the teacher of morality through the creation of an aristocratic ideal shaped by deliberate cultivation of the qualities befitting a nobleman and hero. His work likewise is inspired by a comprehensive view of human nature and the eternal laws of the world-process, and to that extent the Homeric epics contain the germs of all Greek philosophy. They manifest the anthropocentric tendency of Greek thought, as contrasted to the theomorphic philosophy of the Orient. Homer created a complete human world, and this made the Greeks conscious for the first time that they were a nation.

Hesiod, on the other hand, depicts a world very different from that of the Homeric nobility. He himself is a shepherd, and his song is of the life of the peasantry and of work as the basis of civilization. Heroism is tried and virtues developed, not in knightly battle, but in the incessant struggle against the elements and the hard earth. Thus his *Works and Days*,[5] a didactic poem, pictures everyday life in the plains of the mainland, teaches virtues and a whole philosophy of life by means of myths, and imparts much practical wisdom. In his *Theogony* or *Descent of the Gods*, on the other hand, he ventures to arrange all mythology into a comprehensive system involving a whole cosmogony. Chaos (empty space), Earth and Heaven (the foundation and roof of the world respectively), and Eros (love, as the cosmic force that produces life) are the three principles of the world. Such a doctrine is not based on experience or on reason, but rather on past traditions and ancient myths. We gather that the gods have nothing to do with the formation of the world, though once it is founded it is subject to their rule.[6]

The Religion of the Greeks. The lack of political or national unity among the ancient Greeks is paralleled by a certain elasticity and lack of uniformity or definite dogma in Greek religion. There was all manner of cults, for each district or city-state had its own local deities and temples. Pallas Athena was the goddess and patron of Athens; Apollo of Sparta; Artemis, and later Diana, of the Ephesians. Even in the works of Homer and Hesiod there is no agreement on the number of gods, their interrelations, and their role in the universe.

Many of these gods were highly anthropomorphic, in form like to men, some male, some female, endowed with all the passions of men and given to actions that were poor example for mortals to follow. The *Iliad* tells us that Zeus went to dine with the Ethiopians, while other stories bear on the jealousy and hatred rife among the gods, their lust and general immorality. The common man often had more fun at the expense of the gods than a real reverence for them. Nevertheless, over and above these manlike gods the Greeks were conscious of something or someone to which even the popular gods of Olympus were subject: the immortal powers of the universe. The gods had come into being, as Homer and Hesiod taught; even mighty Zeus had his parents and his youthful years. And all the gods were subject to destiny or fate, sometimes identified with Zeus, which was pre-eminently divine, the source of all events, the power that ruled the world.

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[3] Plato, *Republic*, 606E.

[4] Xenophanes, fragment 10.

[5] See the text in F. M. Cornford, *Greek Religious Thought from Homer to the Age of Alexander* (London, 1923), or in *Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homerica*, tr. by H. G. Evelyn-White [Loeb Classical Library: *LCL*] (New York, 1929).

[6] W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, I, 35–36, 57–76.

Hence the Greeks looked beyond their anthropomorphic deities to the real source of being, to their ultimate rulers: to Okeanos or Chaos (in Hesiod) as the source of being, Ouranos (Heaven) and Gaia (Earth), and Zeus as fate.[7]

Throughout the myths and theogonies, then, it is evident that for the Greek a god of either group was one who was a living force having power over the universe or some part of it, who was immortal (though not necessarily eternal), and who had a place in the history of the universe as begetting or begotten.[8] The Greeks were conscious of the connection between the gods and their own lives and destinies; every human action and suffering, man's feelings, passions, virtues, and vices, his very will, were controlled by the gods.

The Orphic movement in Greek religion of the sixth century B.C., though it does not properly belong to the general current of Greek religion based on the poets, must be mentioned here. It was a powerful religious revival centered on the oracle of Apollo at Delphi and the cults of Dionysus at Corinth and elsewhere, which were respectively strict and lax in their accompanying morality. The Delphic form stressed self-knowledge, personal religion, the noble concept of the human soul as a guest from heaven and a creation of the gods sent to sojourn on earth, with a high morality consequent upon such doctrine. This was not without definite influence on the philosophers. Pythagoras seems affected by the way of life of the Orphics; Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles are familiar with their theory of the soul; without this doctrine Plato and Aristotle could never have developed their theory of the divine nature of the soul or mind, or the theory of human destiny that is so vital in the thought of Socrates and Plato.[9]

Rational Thinking. It is hard to fix the point when rational (i.e., scientific) thinking began in Greece. While there is a certain amount of it in the Greek epic, it is hardly possible to separate myth from reason in Greek poetry. Homer is as rational as Thales, the first Greek philosopher, in claiming that Okeanos is the origin of all things. Hesiod, though vague and confusing, tries to produce a theogony that is a rational system interpreting and synthesizing the older myths. Even in the Ionian physicists we find mythological overtones, and the use of myth is retained in some Platonic dialogues.

Greek philosophy begins, let us say, when men take their starting point no longer from mythological tradition but from the data of human experience. This does not imply such a break with past religious conceptions of the universe that the Ionians could be classed as the first atheists. It means that reason replaced the epic concept of the universe by a natural and logical explanation. In terms of what we have said before, the old polytheistic, anthropomorphic gods were abandoned, and a new and rational investigation of the true powers of the universe was undertaken.[10] As a conse-

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[7] The distinction between these two sets of gods, and therefore between the ultimate and the lesser divinities, is marked by Aristotle (*Metaphysics*, XII, 8, 1074b1 ff.), and a long tradition is crystallized in St. Augustine's distinction between the *dei naturales* and the *dei ab hominibus instituti*, the first being the powers of the universe, the latter the gods of mythology and of the state religions (*De civitate Dei*, VI, 6; cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Thinkers* [Oxford, 1947], pp. 1–4, and notes, p. 191 ff.).

[8] Cf. R. K. Hack, *God in Greek Philosophy* (Princeton, 1931), p. 21; E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven, 1941), pp. 6–9.

[9] W. Jaeger, *The Theology*, etc., pp. 55–89; and K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 1–18.

[10] Such was the ideal proposed to the poets by Plato in *Republic*, 379A. See also Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 8, 1074b1–15.

quence, we shall reckon the pre-Socratics as theologians no less than physicists.

The Divisions of Greek Philosophy. Greek philosophy, as distinct from the Hellenistic philosophies which spring from it, is usually divided into *three main periods*, a division we adopt here. In the first period, that of the pre-Socratics, men came to philosophize chiefly about the basic principles of the physical world. In the second, the Socratic or golden age, attention was focused not only on the world without but also on the world within man. The Sophists and Socrates turn men to think on man himself, though in different ways; Plato centers man's attention on the citadel of his heart, the knowledge of the Ideas, the attainment of destiny; Aristotle, more earthy and yet more metaphysical, will deal with the whole knowable world as his field. Lastly, in the post-Aristotelian period, emphasis is laid largely on the relation of man to God as his final end or, with the Epicureans, on the pursuit of happiness in this life. Later, in the Hellenistic philosophies of the Romans, the Alexandrian Jews, and the revival of Platonism in Plotinus, we shall find Greek philosophy mixed with other currents of thought.

The First Period: THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS

THE pre-Socratics represent the period of formation of Greek philosophy, a time when this emerged as a new intellectual approach to the great problems of man, the origin of the universe, the nature and destiny of man. The men who fill this period are thus important for the far-reaching change in Greek thought which their new intellectual attitude was to introduce.*

INTRODUCTION: THE APPROACH

There is a definite problem connected with the pre-Socratics, occasioned by the very scarcity of texts that remain and their fragmentary and hence oftentimes incoherent character. This problem also arises from the use made of them by later Greek philosophers. Should these men be considered, for example, solely as forerunners of Aristotle, as stages in the continuous development of philosophical thought until they reach their perfection, as Aristotle sees it, in his thought? Or should they rather be considered independently, in their own right, without neglecting either their contribution to Aristotle or the cultural milieu in which they themselves lived?

Aristotle's Approach. Aristotle had a method of his own when he delved into the great problems of philosophy, for his custom was to preface his works on such questions by reviewing the theories of his predecessors. This is evident if we examine the opening chapters of his works: *On the Soul,* the *Physics,* the *Metaphysics,* and the *Politics.* His intention was to profit by their good points and to avoid their errors. But he tended to adapt the ideas of the pre-Socratics within the framework or categories of his own thought, translating their theories into the terms of his own technical vocabulary and seeing how far these men could be regarded as anticipating his own peculiar teachings.

Aristotle follows this procedure throughout most of the first book of the *Metaphysics,* which thus provides an almost complete analysis of the pre-Socratics in terms of his own thought. He remarks that we cannot expect great clarity of thought from them; they seek the truth, but attain it only vaguely. "For the earliest philosophy is, on all subjects, like one who lisps, since it is young and in its beginnings."[1] He then proceeds to analyze the work of his predecessors as a gradual progression toward a knowledge of the four causes.

According to Aristotle, the earliest Greek thinkers, the *Ionians,* discovered only the *material* cause of things and made material principles the only principles of all things: water, the boundless, air, or fire.[2] However, the very facts of nature, Aristotle goes on, soon forced men to go beyond this stand to some principle responsible for the change that the substratum undergoes. Men were led to find a principle of movement. Thus they attained some notion of an *efficient*

* Cf. Bibliography, p. 230 f.

[1] *Metaphysics,* I, 10, 993a15.
[2] *Ibid.,* 3, 983b7.

cause, either simply as the cause of motion and generation, or also as a principle of the good and evil of things; in this way they achieved a vague concept of the *final* cause also. When, therefore, Anaxagoras "said that mind was present . . . as the cause of order and all arrangement, he seemed like a sober man in contrast to the random talk of his predecessors."[3] But even this gain was very vague, since Anaxagoras and his followers did not achieve it on scientific principles, using it as an artificial device to explain order, without realizing its real importance.[4]

Finally, the *Pythagoreans* rather vaguely recognized the notion of *formal* cause, since they held that "numbers are by nature first among the principles."[5]

The *Eleatic* philosophers (Parmenides and his followers), on the other hand, were less interested in causes, since they considered the universe as unchangeable; they are without interest here for Aristotle. Lastly, he passes to a study of Plato, attempting to show how his own master was influenced by the earlier men and tried to mediate between them.[6]

A Broader Approach. There is no gainsaying the fact that Aristotle is thus established as the first historian of philosophy. He shows, to some extent at least, what these men taught, and endeavors to bring out the organic nature of the development of philosophy. But merely to consider the pre-Socratics by viewing them in their pursuit of causes is obviously to abstract from the full picture. These men were early philosophers, it is true, but they were also the heirs of a mature civilization and culture and to some degree reactionaries against it. They revolted against the mythological, imaginative view of the universe and its origin, and endeavored in a scientific, free, and unprejudiced spirit to answer the problem in a rational way. Trying to account for the external world, for the facts of change, birth, growth, decay, and death, they sought to transcend sense and outward appearances in order to find the key to the hidden structure of reality. Therefore, they sought to discover the nature (Φύσις) of things. For them nature was not, as it is for us, essence endowed for action, but it is that which is the principle or source of growth.[7] Since they thus start with the universe and its origin, Nature or *Physis*, they are usually called the *Physikoi*, the physical philosophers; but this does not necessarily mean that they began with a mere material cause and progressed slowly to a dim knowledge of all the four causes. Nature or φύσις itself was also the efficient cause.

Nature was the center of their thought,

[3] *Ibid.*, 984b15.

[4] *Ibid.*, 4, 985a12 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*, 5, 985b23.

[6] *Ibid.*, 986b9 ff.; 6, 987a29 ff. Cf. Jos. T. Clarke, "Aristotle's Feeling for Development in Philosophy," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXV (1952–1953), 1–20; however, see also A. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (Berkeley, 1945), pp. 30–59.

[7] W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), p. 20: "φύσις is one of those abstract formations with the suffix -σις which become fairly frequent after the period of the later epics. It denotes quite plainly the act of φῦναι — the process of growth and emergence; that is why the Greeks often use it with a genitive, as in φύσις τῶν ὄντων — the origin and growth of the things we find about us. But it also includes their source of origin — that from which they have grown, and from which their growth is constantly renewed: in other words, the reality underlying the things of our experience."

rather than man, because the Greeks did not think of human nature as a problem for speculation until, through their study of the external world, they had established a technique on which to base a study of the inner nature of man. What they did say of man was mostly within the framework and pattern of their teaching on Nature. To this extent, the early speculations of the Ionians were not intended to contribute to *paideia*; they were not meant to educate Greece, as were the epics of Homer and the theogony of Hesiod. They were, rather, a fresh attempt, amid the chaotic growth of a new society and the collapse of the old mythical concept of the universe, to solve the deepest problem of life, the problem of being itself.[8]

This was the innovation of the pre-Socratics, the attempt to discover the origin and nature of the universe from a rational viewpoint. This is the true origin of scientific thought. This is the beginning of the Greek quest for wisdom, in the pursuit of a progressive wisdom about Nature, in which later thinkers make distinct advances over their predecessors. The organic progress of thought is truly there, but it is not limited, as Aristotle would lead us to believe, to the search for causes.

[8] W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York, 1943), I, 152–153.

CHAPTER III: The Ionians: Wisdom as the Truth About Nature

This new type of thinker, the philosopher, appears for the first time in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., in the Greek colonies on the coasts of Asia Minor.[1] Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, all of Miletus in Ionia, are considered the first physicists or philosophers of nature. Of these, Thales left no written account of his doctrines, while Anaximander and his successor, Anaximenes, are credited with works later called Περὶ φύσεως, *On Nature*. Since only a sentence or two of their writings survive in quotation, we must rely on secondary sources for knowledge of their teachings. As a result, it is somewhat difficult to get the perspective of the Ionians themselves. If we rely on Aristotle, their doctrine is a foreshadowing of his own teaching on the material cause. However, even his account hints at the object of their search: the principle of all things, a nature out of which all other things come to be, while it itself is conserved.[2] Though each advances a different answer, all three agree in holding to one original principle whence everything evolved, the universal substratum from which is born everything that exists; and this substratum is Nature or *Physis*. Consequently the wisdom they seek is the truth about nature.

§ *1. Thales*

Thales (c. 640–562) is reckoned as one of the Wise Men of Greece, a combination of philosopher and practical scientist, economist, astronomer, and mathematician. He is likewise considered the founder of European science, since he introduced into the West the astronomy of the Babylonians and the mathematics of the Egyptians.[3]

Aristotle calls him "the founder of this type of philosophy," that is, the search for nature, and says that he advanced the theory that *the first principle is water*. He may have derived this notion from seeing that the nutriment of all things is moist, from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature,

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[1] On the Greek colonization of the west coast of Asia Minor, cf. J. B. Bury, *A History of Greece*, 3 ed. (New York, 1951), pp. 56–66. The colonies came under the rule of Croesus of Lydia (560 B.C.), only to fall later before Cyrus and the Persians. When the Ionians revolted against their conquerors, Miletus was sacked in 494 and its glory destroyed. Over a century later it was captured by Alexander the Great in the beginning of his conquest of Asia Minor (*ibid.*, p. 208 ff.).

[2] *Metaphysics*, I, 3, 983b6 ff.

[3] Cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Companion to Diels, Fragmente*, 2 ed. (Oxford, 1949), pp. 49–55; and texts in M. C. Nahm, *Selections From Early Greek Philosophy*, 3 ed. (New York, 1947), pp. 61–62.

and from observing that water is the origin of the nature of moist things. At the same time, Aristotle hints that another source may have been the Homeric tradition that Okeanos and Tethys are the parents of all things.[4] Thales is also credited with the enigmatic statement that "all things are full of gods,"[5] which Aristotle interprets as perhaps meaning that soul is intermingled with the whole universe to account for the homogeneity of the whole and its parts. In the same way, Aristotle quotes Thales as believing the soul to be a motive force, since he said that the magnet has a soul in it because it moves iron.[6] What Thales actually meant by either expression is by no means clear, and authors give various explanations.[7] At best, he would seem to hold that water is the one divine substance and that all things show signs of its pervading power. His "lisping" philosophy scarcely allows much further exegesis.

The essential point of Thales' doctrine is that he conceived "things" as varying effects of one primary ultimate nature; he thus discovered unity in evident diversity, and so earns his place as the first philosopher.

§ 2. *Anaximander*

According to tradition, Anaximander (c. 610–546) was the first to commit his philosophy to writing. A pupil of Thales, he tried to push further into the structure of nature, and decided it could not be any one particular kind of matter or one determinate element. Hence, he went beyond water to a principle that would explain water itself. This he called *the Boundless* (τὸ Ἄπειρον), without beginning and end, "the principle of other things," a substance "immortal and imperishable," "which encompasses and governs all things."[8]

Anaximander's concept of the Boundless is not to be understood in terms of Aristotelian matter, as distinguished from form or even efficient cause. That the Boundless governs and contains all else shows that Anaximander regarded it as something active, indeed, the most active thing in the world. In lisping speech another philosopher is speaking of the nonanthropomorphic god who is the divine principle of the cosmos: "And this is the Divine, for it is immortal and imperishable, as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers maintain."[9]

The doctrine of Anaximander makes more explicit the genesis of things. The Boundless is that from which everything takes its rise and to which everything returns. Things arise through the separation of opposites caused by eternal motion. This is a separation of the Boundless, with our universe as one part among many worlds. The world as we

[4] *Metaphysics,* I, 3, 984b20 ff. Simplicius seems to imply that Thales may also have learned this from the Egyptians, which is not improbable in view of Egyptian cosmogony (Diels, *Fragmente,* Thales A 14; Vol. I, p. 78, 1–5).

[5] Aristotle, *On the Soul,* I, 5, 411a7.

[6] *Ibid.,* 2, 405a19.

[7] Cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), p. 198, n. 10.

[8] See texts in K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1948), p. 19; M. C. Nahm, op. *cit.,* pp. 62–63; cf. also Aristotle, *Physics,* III, 4, 203b6.

[9] Aristotle, *Physics,* III, 4,, 203b13; cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology . . . ,* pp. 30–33, 203–204.

know it is formed by a vortex movement, with the heavier elements, earth and water, remaining at the center to form the present earth, which is a cylinder with flat ends; fire goes toward the circumference and separates into the spheres, the sun, moon, and stars; and air remains in between. The process is circular, eternal, and necessary.[10] Living things are considered to have sprung from the moist element in the earth as it is evaporated by the sun. Man came originally from an animal of a different species — from a fish, according to one account.[11]

Anaximander thus strives to find the *hidden structure* of reality behind appearance. Since his doctrine of the Boundless implies the notion that the universe is a cosmos, an ordered whole, we must credit him with the first unified, all-embracing world picture however foreign it may seem to actuality.

§ 3. *Anaximenes*

An associate of Anaximander, Anaximenes (588–524) kept the notion of the Boundless, but attempted to make it more precise by saying that it was air.[12] At first sight, this may seem a retrogression. Yet Anaximenes appears guided by the thought that limitless air will explain the presence of life, movement, and change in the world, as well as the unity of the cosmos: "As our soul, which is air, governs and holds us together, so do wind [breath, πνεῦμα] and air surround the whole cosmos." Perhaps, though the fragments are not explicit here, the doctrine is meant to explain also the presence of intellectual life and movement.[13] Finally, according to Cicero's interpretation,[14] air would be, like the *Apeiron* or Boundless, the divine, the source of both gods and the world.

To explain the origin of things from air, Anaximenes introduced the notion of condensation and rarefaction. Air in itself is invisible, but becomes visible through such changes. As it is dilated (rarefaction), it becomes fire; as it is condensed, it becomes wind, cloudy vapor, water, earth, stones, and other things in order. Perhaps it was the thought that air lies midway between hot and cold that led Anaximenes to make it the prime principle.[15]

Conclusion on the Ionians. All three of the first Greek philosophers sought one original substance which explained the rest of the world. This was the *Physis*, the principle or *Archē* of all things. Their importance, therefore, lies in the fact that they raised the question of the ultimate source of things, rather than in their individual answers to this question. For this they are reckoned philosophers, the first philosophers in the Western world. We shall not interpret them wrongly if we say that for them this substance was divine: a principle over and beyond the anthropomorphic gods, the source of the gods themselves. Viewed from the standpoint of Aristotle, these men are unconscious

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[10] For secondary accounts, cf. M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–65.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[12] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 3, 984a5; other texts in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[13] Cf. fragment 2, in K. Freeman, *Ancilla . . .*, p. 19; W. Jaeger, *The Theology . . .*, p. 36.

[14] *De natura deorum*, I, 10, 26; in H. Diels, *Fragmente*, I, 93.

[15] Cf. M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–67.

materialists; but taken in themselves, they are theologians, seekers of the divine principle. Lastly, by way of contrast to the Orientals, the early Greek philosophers sought knowledge of the cosmos for its own sake, not to base thereon a philosophy of redemption. They sought nature or the universe simply to know it, not to flee it as evil or to immerse themselves in it as the Absolute. This will be one of the characteristics of Greek philosophy in comparison to what we met among the thinkers of the Far East.

CHAPTER IV: The Pythagoreans

ARISTOTLE follows his analysis of the early Ionians with that of the later group of physicists: Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. Only then does he study the "Italians," the Pythagoreans, as pursuing the notion of formal cause.[1] However, geographical classification of philosophers, as Ionian, Italian, Milesian, etc., is somewhat superficial; nor is such a separation of Pythagoreans from a doctrinal viewpoint entirely justified. The philosophers of southern Italy, which came to be called Magna Graecia from the number of Hellenes living there,[2] were Ionian in their ancestral and intellectual background. Pythagoras had come from the island of Samos, in revolt against the tyranny of Polycrates (c. 526 B.C.); Xenophanes was from Colophon on the coast of Asia Minor, which he abandoned after it was conquered by the Medes (545 B.C.); Parmenides was the son of emigrants from Asia Minor who had founded Elea on the west coast of southern Italy (540 B.C.). The "Italian" school was thus Ionian in its roots, showing kinship with Anaximander and others in seeking the structure of the Physis as a whole. Therefore, their contribution enters at this point.

§ 1. *Historical Background*

The Pythagoreans were noted for their mathematical studies.[3] The original character of this group of philosophers or early scientists, however, was rather ethico-religious, since its early primary interest was not in philosophy for its own sake, but in wisdom as a way and source of salvation: there is some relation between the Orphic religion and the way of life followed by Pythagoras and his adherents.

Pythagoras (fl. c. 530 B.C.), the founder, is the subject of many legends and varied interpretations. He was born on the island of Samos, on the west coast of Asia Minor. According to some accounts, he was a disciple of Anaximander and acquainted with the lore of Babylon and Egypt. Migrating to Crotona in southern Italy, he founded a school or society for moral and religious reform, perhaps in reaction to the world around him. The aim was ethical culture, with mathematics and music as aids to spiritual purification and elevation. Gradually, however, the school began to pursue *mathémata*, "studies," such as numbers, acoustics, the theory of music, elements of geometry, Ionian natural philosophy, for

[1] *Metaphysics*, I, 5, 985b23.

[2] Its name, according to Jamblichus, derives from the fact that Pythagoras filled it with philosophers, poets, and statesmen (K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* [Oxford, 1949], p. 245). This seems an exaggeration. Cf. J. B. Bury, *A History of Greece*, 3 ed. (New York, 1951), p. 98.

[3] Cf. T. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics* (Oxford, 1921), Vol. I.

their own sake. The Pythagoreans became mathematicians of high rank, and were the first to advance the study among Europeans.[4]

We are rather hard put, however, to determine what Pythagoras himself taught. He left no writings of his own and seems to have imposed secrecy on his followers; later testimonies disagree on his influence. However, several doctrines seem to emanate from him, teachings that inspired those who called him master.

Thus, the basic principles of what Plato calls the "Pythagorean way of life,"[5] a kind of eclectic asceticism, would derive from him. This was a program of life based to some extent on taboos connected with sacrifice and food, some religious belief, and, as developed later at least, a fairly high code of manners and morals.[6] Behind this, as motive and goal, is Pythagoras' teaching on the survival and transmigration of the soul. He claimed himself to have inhabited the bodies of earlier men, including some heroes of Greece; although he held that survival is common to all men, he promised his followers a better series of transmigrations. His wisdom, therefore, was one of salvation through asceticism.

At the same time, there can be little doubt that he was also responsible for the interest in mathematics that inspired his school for some centuries. How he came to hold that the whole universe is subject to the eternal rules of numbers and figures is not known with certainty. Some accounts say he discovered the ratio between the length of a lyre string and the tone produced, and proceeded to apply this finding to the Physis; others state that he was the first to discern the law of the movement of the sun, thence perhaps the course of the moon and planets, and so generalized on the cosmos as such. That number is the first principle, and harmony the law, may therefore be rightly attributed to Pythagoras. We may argue also that such a teaching appears more likely to be the intuition of one man than the net result of the researches of a school.[7]

§ 2. *The Pythagoreans and Nature*

Aristotle is the most extended source of our knowledge of the Pythagoreans. Were we to possess his lost work *On the Pythagoreans*, a more coherent report might be made than the one which can be derived from the individual points discussed in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* and in later sources. The difficulty increases when Aristotle speaks of groups or sects among the Pythagoreans themselves, with divergent opinions on the role of number. We know from other sources also that Philolaus (c. 450 B.C.), the first to commit Pythagoreanism to writing, taught a cosmic system that was opposed or modified by Hicetas of Syracuse (date unknown). Evidently, in the two centuries that elapsed between Pythagoras and Aristotle, the school continued to grow and to develop the doctrines received from its founder.

In all Pythagoreans, their interest in mathematics had a far-reaching effect on their philosophy. "Having been brought up on mathematics, they came to believe that its principles were the principles of all things."[8] The results may seem strange, yet like the physicists "their discussion and investigations are all about the physical world,"[9] and do not descend

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[4] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 5, 985b23.

[5] Plato, *Republic*, 600B.

[6] For some examples, cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 79 ff., 254–260.

[7] See the account of Hippolytus, in M. C. Nahm, *Selections from Early Greek Philosophy*, 3 ed. (New York, 1947), pp. 77–80.

[8] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 5, 985b25.

[9] *Ibid.*, 8, 989b29, and 990a15 ff.

(at least directly) to a study of the things of perception and experiment. If their use of numbers seems puzzling, we should remember that number meant more to them than it does to us, or even to Aristotle. For them, number was not pure quantity, but rather quality, an inner unity and harmony.

Nature in the Pythagoreans. Like Anaximander and Anaximenes, the Italians look for one cause or principle of all things. The cosmogenetic god, which they call the One, *τὸ ἕν* or *ἡ μονάς*, in contrast to the many, *τὸ πλῆθος* or *τὰ πολλά*, is not identified by them, according to Aristotle,[10] with any definite element, such as fire or earth, but is "a first principle existing by itself, not connected with anything else [as an attribute of the latter], but being the infinite in its essence . . . and outside the heavens."[11] This, he adds, they identify with number.

Perhaps the doctrine can be explained by the fragment attributed to Philolaus, that nature in the universe and in everything within it is fitted together from the Non-limited and the Limiting.[12] The Non-limited, the Infinite, or the Odd and the Limited, the Finite, or the Even together give rise to numbers and thus to things.[13] Perhaps the Limited is the void which enters the visible heavens from the infinite air beyond the cosmos and determines or limits natures, those of numbers first of all and then of things.[14] We must be satisfied with these enigmatic statements and examine the slightly clearer teaching of Philolaus on the formation of the world.

In this system, which Aristotle seems to take as representative of the school, since he speaks only of the Pythagoreans,[15] a sphere of fire and not the earth is at the center of the world. This immobile sphere is called the guardhouse of Zeus, or again, the dwelling of Jupiter, mother of the gods, measure of nature, principle of order.[16] Corresponding to it is another fire, the infinite fire or air beyond the confines of the universe. Between these two, in descending order, come the concentric spheres of Olympus, where the elements are found in a pure state, the place of the fixed stars; the Cosmos, containing the planets and the sun and moon; below the moon, the heavens (*οὐρανός*), which contain things subject to generation and corruption because composed of elements in diverse proportions. In the heavens are the earth, which rotates about the central fire in a manner different from that of the sun, and thus produces day and night; and the counter-earth, invented to bring the number of heavenly bodies to ten, which is conceived as the perfect and divine number.[17]

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[10] *Ibid.*, 5, 987a 14 ff.

[11] *Physics*, III, 4, 203a4 ff.

[12] Fragment 1, in K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1948), p. 73.

[13] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 5, 986a17 ff.

[14] *Physics*, IV, 6, 213b21 ff. According to Aristotle, another group among the Pythagoreans held that the first principles were ten in number, five sets of opposites (*Metaphysics*, I, 5, 986a21 ff.).

[15] *De caelo*, II, 13, 293a15 ff.

[16] *Ibid.*; see also K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, p. 225.

[17] The argument seems to be as follows: ten is the perfect number; but the celestial phenomena reveal only nine spheres: the seven of the major planets, the sphere of the fixed stars, and that of the earth. Therefore there must be a kind of counterearth which moves opposite our earth and is therefore invisible (so Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria*, ed. M. Hayduck [Berlin, 1891], pp. 40–41).

Lastly, in the analysis of *things of experience*, the Pythagoreans do not offer any details. They do not say whether fire or earth or the other elements enter into their composition. The elements of numbers are simply the elements of things. Hence Aristotle interprets them, in his own language, as holding that number is both the matter and the form of things that are: "Number is the principle both as matter for things and as forming both their modifications and permanent states."[18] This is rather farfetched unless odd and even numbers act as matter and form. What the Pythagoreans perhaps meant to emphasize was that things are modeled after numbers, that in each is a proper harmony of elements, so that things exist by imitation of numbers. The soul would thus be a harmony, a number; justice, another number, etc.

[18] *Metaphysics,* I, 5, 986a15 ff.; cf. St. Thomas, *In I Metaph.*, lect. viii.

Conclusion. The Pythagoreans showed a deepening of moral consciousness among the Greeks, the beginning of an interest in man. Their way of life, though not based primarily on reason, seems to have had influence in succeeding generations. On the other hand, they proposed a theory of nature that is not completely appreciated from the fragments that have been left us. Their doctrine seems to stress divine unity and divine causality. It was not without influence on the Platonists. At the same time, Aristotle criticized it for failing to account for motion in the world, for without motion and change there can be no generation and passing-away.[19]

[19] *Metaphysics,* I, 8, 989b.

CHAPTER V: Wisdom as the Vision of Being

HERACLITUS and Parmenides, who represent the next stage of Greek philosophy, are usually considered as direct opposites. Their concepts of the universe are indeed definite antinomies: Heraclitus sees the mobility of becoming, Parmenides the quiescent character of being. Nevertheless, there is a common ground on which their thoughts move. Both considered Ionian and Pythagorean physics as inadequate and the product of the imagination. Their predecessors attempted to speak of nature, the source and substance of all things, that from which things come and into which they dissolve; yet they ended by committing themselves to one of these very beings, to air, or water, or the like. And the primary basis of such a concept was the ordinary data of sense knowledge elaborated by the imagination.

A new approach was needed, the approach of reason, the logos, the approach of the truly wise man. One must go behind individual realities to what is real being and real unity, thus to attain the inner truth through the wisdom of the thinking mind, to abandon particular things as explanations and so reach nature in itself. The philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides are thus a wisdom that consists in the vision of being achieved by reason, the logos. Xenophanes, a forerunner of Parmenides, was to use reason to reach the true nature of God, who for us is the Supreme Being and cause of all being, and who for him seems to possess ultimate causality. Then Heraclitus will pierce behind the ceaseless change the Ionians had stressed to reach the eternal Logos that rules and unifies the world of change. For Parmenides, the vocation of the philosopher is no longer to walk in the realms of night and change and nonbeing, but to be instructed by the goddess of light in the ways of "that which is" (τὸ ὄν), which alone is being. But Parmenides is unfortunately entangled in the error of holding that τὰ ὄντα, the things we think we know, are illusion and appearance.

Heraclitus and Parmenides are thus united in demanding the use of reason to touch reality. On the other hand, the difficulties inherent to their teaching are known to all. For Parmenides, only that which has consistency and fixity truly exists; nonbeing is not and cannot be. To be is to be. For Heraclitus, to be is to come to be, and only the Eternal Law has fixity. But both in him and in Parmenides, the human logos arrives at being and sees its dynamic force. The wise man, the philosopher, is he who reads beneath appearance to discover that which truly is. This is the wisdom of the vision of being.

§ 1. *Xenophanes the Poet*

Xenophanes (fl. c. 540 B.C.) can hardly be considered the founder of the Eleatic school of Parmenides. Though Plato and Aristotle[1] do link him with the school, the latter even reporting that Parmenides was said to be his pupil, he was at most the precursor or unwitting founder. In himself, Xenophanes was an Ionian itinerant rhapsodist in Magna Graecia, who made his living by the public recital of his own poems. More particularly, he was a satirist[2] with a mission: to present to men a more rational approach to the gods. As such he enters into the history of philosophy, for he had no philosophical system in the proper sense.

Attack on Popular Mythology. Aristotle illustrates Xenophanes' approach when he states that "it was a saying of Xenophanes that to assert that the gods had birth is as impious as to say that they die."[3] The few extant fragments of his satires reveal the intensity of his attack on the anthropomorphic views of his contemporaries, beliefs he considered the product of Homer and Hesiod: "From the beginning all have learned from Homer," but unfortunately "both Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all such things as are shameful and blameworthy among men: theft, adultery, and mutual deception."[4] Making the gods possess human form, "mortals fancy the gods are born and have the same clothing, voice and appearance as themselves."[5] Each man represents the gods as he himself is: the Ethiopian as snub-nosed and black, the Thracian as blue-eyed and red-haired; and if oxen and horses and lions had hands and could paint, they would portray the gods to their own image.[6]

Xenophanes is thus an intellectual rebel, bringing into the open the clash between the old and foolish teachings of mythology, traced chiefly to the epic poets, and the new natural approach of the physical philosophers. In this he has his own positive contribution to make.

The One God. Xenophanes was by no means an atheist. He simply pleaded that men accept the way of reason, which will reveal to us the *form* of God, or at least show us that the form of God is not that of men. "There is but one God, the greatest among gods and men, neither in shape nor thought at all like mortal men."[7] The lower gods are not denied, though in accordance with his protests above they are not the anthropomorphic gods of Homer. More important for Xenophanes, however, was the one supreme God, who was a conscious, personal being, for he proceeds to say that all of Him sees, thinks, and hears; that without labor He sets all things in motion by the thought of His mind; and that He always remains in the same place, not moving at all, nor is it fitting for Him to go about from place to place.[8]

Perhaps Xenophanes does little more here than attack Homer, for in another fragment he laments that no one has certain truth and exact knowledge of

[1] Plato, *Sophist*, 242D; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 5, 986b21.

[2] Hence he is called the "sillographer" (σίλλοι, *satires*).

[3] *Rhetoric*, II, 23, 1399b6.

[4] Texts (fragments 10–11) in K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1948), p. 22, and M. C. Nahm, *Selections From Early Greek Philosophy*, 3 ed. (New York, 1947), p. 109.

[5] Fragment 14.

[6] Fragments 15 and 16.

[7] Fragment 23.

[8] Fragments 24–26.

the gods or of the things whereof he speaks. Even were a man to hit on the truth, he would have no means of knowing it were true. Opinion, then, is the most we have.[9] Yet even his negative approach is a contribution. His God has direct knowledge and needs no messenger to bring Him news of earth; nor does He travel from place to place, and His will is omnipotent. Hence Xenophanes has, by intuition, come to realize what things befit the divine nature and what must be denied. His teaching was to have lasting effect in Greek thought on the divine; traces of it are found in the Fathers of the Church, Clement of Alexandria being one who has preserved some of his *Silloi*.[10]

Philosophy and Culture. Moved by such convictions, Xenophanes was led to inveigh against the cultural ideals of his time. He made it his purpose to replace irrational mythology with rational theology, the old aristocratic culture of Homer with the new philosophical ideal of humanity, and to defend the value of philosophical knowledge for the city and its citizens. Perhaps he was spurred by the thought that among the Greeks the one real educator was the poet: if *paideia*, therefore, was not to collapse, it was imperative that the new philosophic ideas be injected into the intellectual bloodstream of his contemporaries. He became the champion of philosophy, and soon found himself in a conflict, the essence of which was: *Sport or Spirit?*[11] There is no justice, cries Xenophanes, in preferring physical strength to noble wisdom. For it is not the presence of a good boxer, or a victor at the Olympic pentathlon or at wrestling, that will bring a city-state better internal order or fill its storerooms.[12]

The conclusion to be drawn from the fragments is that the philosophical importance of Xenophanes lies chiefly in his teaching on the nature of God and his insistence on philosophy as a vital factor in life.

A new note, however, seems to be added to our interpretation by Aristotle, who says in his *Metaphysics* (I, 5, 986b21) that Xenophanes was the first of the partisans of the One and, a little too naïve, taught that in reference to the whole material universe the One is God. This passage, with the brief reference in Plato's *Sophist* (242D), has given rise to the belief that Xenophanes was truly the teacher of Parmenides. Actually, there is no ground for such a statement or for identifying the God of Xenophanes with the One of Parmenides or for predicating of that God the attributes of the One, which we shall consider presently.[13] Xenophanes cannot be considered either a monist or a pantheist, and Parmenides must be judged as original in his teachings.

[9] Fragment 34.

[10] Cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), pp. 45–51; and K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1949), p. 93 ff.

[11] W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York, 1943), I, 173.

[12] Fragment 2.

[13] Cf. K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn, 1916).

§ 2. *Heraclitus the Obscure*

Heraclitus, an Ephesian noble (fl. c. 504 B.C.), does not seem to have left Asia Minor despite the aftereffects of the Persian invasions. He is somewhat of an enigmatic and solitary figure, known from antiquity as the Obscure because of the cryptic style of his writings. The fragments of his book[14] (called Περὶ φύσεως with no degree of certainty) show that he spoke or wrote in pungent paradoxes or riddles in imitation of the oracle of Delphi whose lord "neither speaks nor conceals but indicates."[15] He wished to startle men, to awaken them, as he says, to the truth he would teach them.

He enters history at this juncture because he is later than Pythagoras and Xenophanes, whom he scorns, and is perhaps the object of an attack by Parmenides. Were we to follow the viewpoint of Plato and Aristotle, Heraclitus would be primarily another Ionian physicist, the philosopher of pure becoming, who held that fire was the first principle and who stressed the eternal flux of all things. However, surviving fragments show that his cosmogony is by no means central to his thought. He is the true philosopher in seeking unity in all things.

The Logos. The opening chapter of his work tells of the Word, the Logos or law, which Heraclitus proposes to teach. Though it is eternal and all things come to pass in accordance with it, men behave as if they never experienced it.[16] Indeed, he will say further on,[17] though men associate with it most closely, they are actually strangers to it. They are not aware of it because intellectually they are asleep.[18] In some men, perhaps, he would also blame the pursuit of factual learning in preference to wisdom: "Much learning does not teach one to have intelligence; otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus."[19] Wisdom, rather, is to have insight into the Logos and to speak and act with understanding according to nature.[20] We have a further appreciation of what the Logos effects in men when Heraclitus says cryptically that those who are awake have one cosmos (or ordered universe) in common, whereas the man who is asleep has a world of his own, his own private wisdom.[21]

What is this Logos which Heraclitus sets out to teach to the mob of contented, unknowing, sleeping men? It is the one divine law that prevails in all things, whether in the world as a whole or in the life of every man. The sun is governed by it and will not overstep its limits;[22] the world-process, from fire back to fire, proceeds according to it;[23] the soul has its own Logos;[24] the laws of the city must be based on it;[25] and men must live by it. Behind the physical world, Heraclitus thus discerns by intui-

[14] Cf. K. Freeman, *Ancilla* . . . , pp. 24–33; M. C. Nahm, *Selections* . . . , pp. 89–96.

[15] Fragment 93.

[16] Fragment 1.

[17] Fragment 72.

[18] "Other men (than I) are as unaware of what they are doing when awake as of what they do in their sleep" (fragment 1).

[19] Fragment 40.

[20] Fragments 112 and 116.

[21] Fragments 2 and 89.

[22] Fragment 94.

[23] Fragments 30–31.

[24] Fragments 45 and 115.

[25] Fragment 114.

tion an all-abiding, all-ruling Law, the inviolable law of the cosmos.[26] Although the fragments do not contain a direct definition of this Logos, its nature can be deduced from examples and some cryptic statements. When men are awake and know the Law, they possess one cosmos in common; or again, "when you have listened, not to me, but to the Logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one":[27] the Logos is obviously the principle of unity. On the other hand, the unknowing, the unwise, "do not understand how that which differs from itself is in accord with itself; harmony is in opposing tensions. . . ."[28]

The Logos, therefore, must be considered as that "reasoned purpose which steers all things through all things,"[29] that measure[30] which guards and confines and harmonizes the change and opposition present everywhere in the universe. It is that divine justice which allots each its place and balances one against another to produce unity in change.[31] The Law may thus be expressed: "That which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the fairest harmony."[32]

The World-Process. From the world-process, Heraclitus would say, let us illustrate the law of the unity of opposites, the law of the eternal harmony which governs all things. The Milesians had brought out the constant development of the physical universe, the primordial stuff being developed in what appeared a rectilinear process. Like them, Heraclitus senses the constant change of the cosmos; like them, too, he chooses a definite element, fire, as primordial; but unlike them he emphasizes a circular process in which coming-to-be and passing-away are a constant exchange or interchange of opposites.[33]

In his own words, "this cosmos, which is the same for all, neither any god nor man shaped it, but it ever was and is and ever shall be ever-living fire that kindles by measure and goes out by measure."[34] Fire lives by feeding, by consuming and transforming into itself other elements, or is changed into them. The process is circular, or, as he is reported to have said, the change follows the upward and the downward path, in which "there is an exchange: all things for fire and fire for all things, as goods for gold and gold for goods."[35] The heart of this cosmology is the exchange of opposites which goes to make up the

[26] Cosmos was originally a political term signifying the reign of justice; transferred to the universe, it came to indicate that the world is an ordering-together, a unity and harmony, a true universe.

[27] Fragment 50.

[28] Fragment 51.

[29] Fragment 41.

[30] Fragment 30.

[31] Heraclitus, in comparison to Xenophanes, says little of God. The concept of justice seems his idea of the divine (cf. fragments 32 and 67; and W. Jaeger, *The Theology . . .*, pp. 124 ff., 232, n. 55).

[32] Fragment 8.

[33] Plato (*Cratylus*, 402A) and Aristotle overemphasize this aspect of Heraclitus' teaching. The Philosopher (*Metaphysics*, I, 3, 984a7) includes Heraclitus among the Ionian physicists as holding only a material cause of the cosmos and as making fire the first principle. This is true, of course, but it is not primary in the intention of Heraclitus. It is very instructive to note the view of the Greek grammarian Diodotus, that the physical theories of Heraclitus are brought in only as *examples* of how the Logos operates (quoted by Diogenes Laertius, IX, 15, in H. Diels, *Die Fragmente*, Herakleitos A1, Vol. I, 142, 31–32).

[34] Fragment 30.

[35] Diogenes Laertius, IX, 8–9, in *loc. cit.*, 141; also in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

cosmos, according to a fixed plan. Things come-to-be and pass-away into something opposite. Tension and strife are therefore inherent in the whole process. "War is the father of all and the king of all";[36] or again: ". . . war is the common lot, and justice is strife, and all things come to be by strife and necessity."[37] Thus the physical world, in its transformations, illustrates the content of the divine law and shows us the unity that exists in the midst of opposites and changes. Though to the senses things seem different and distinct in their temporal succession, our insight (the knowledge of the logos in us) shows how unity maintains itself in such opposites. "The hidden harmony is better than that which is visible."[38]

The Logos and Human Life. Heraclitus seems to have had little patience with the men about him. Most of them are asleep intellectually, with "no comprehension even of such things as they encounter, and do not understand what they experience though they think they do."[39] Like an ancient prophet, he sought to stir them to an awareness of and insight into the divine Logos. To this end he propounded his theory of nature and the world-process; from the Logos that rules there and holds opposites in balance men should learn that the Logos is the operative principle in human life.

"We must not act and speak like men asleep,"[40] taken in by appearances, smug and content like well-fed cattle,[41] governed by impulse and a false scale of values, like "donkeys that prefer chaff to gold."[42] Fire is life in man, as it is at the head of all things; and that which is nearest to fire is nearest to life. Yet men run away from true life; what they think is life is really death: they take the downward path. "It is delight, or rather death, to souls to become wet,"[43] but the soul becomes wet when a man is drunk.[44] Mud (a mixture of earth and water) is fit for pigs to wash in,[45] but man is not to revel in the mud of bodily pleasures[46] or those shamelessly portrayed in some mystery cults.[47] Men are swayed by impulse; yet what impulse wishes it buys at the expense of the soul.[48]

The soul itself is an "exhalation" from fire.[49] Therefore, the closer it remains to fire, the truer will it be to its nature: "The dry soul is the wisest and the best."[50] In less cryptic terms, this means that we must cultivate what is best in man, the thinking part. "The thinking power is common to all"[51] indeed, but too few use or cherish it by seeking union with the Logos of all things. But we can and must examine ourselves and the Logos of the soul,[52] and then link ourselves to the universal Intelligence and follow its ways by speaking and acting the truth.[53] If we achieve this, then we shall know how to rule our own life. We cannot escape the opposites of life, the strife and tension it involves, the downward pull, yet we can learn from the Logos the law of balance and harmony: "mod-

[36] Fragment 53.
[37] Fragment 80.
[38] Fragment 54.
[39] Fragment 17.
[40] Fragment 73.
[41] Fragment 29.

[42] Fragment 9.
[43] Fragment 77.
[44] Fragment 117.
[45] Fragment 37.
[46] Cf. Fragments 5 and 13.
[47] Fragments 14–15.
[48] Fragment 85; cf. fragment 110.
[49] So Aristotle, *On the Soul*, I, 2, 405a25 ff.
[50] Fragment 118.
[51] Fragment 113.
[52] Fragments 45 and 115.
[53] Fragment 112.

eration" will become "the greatest virtue," and this is wisdom.[54]

Wisdom Is One. This may have been the conclusion of Heraclitus' lost treatise: "When you have listened, not to me, but to the Logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one."[55] Things are one, not in themselves, for they are opposites in constant strife, but because they are co-ordinated, balanced, harmonized in the Logos. Unity is thus found in the incessant flux of things, or rather in the Logos of that change, the Wisdom set apart from things,[56] which governs as it wills,[57] and steers all things through all things.[58] To understand this is to possess the one wisdom of human and cosmic life. This is the heart of Heraclitus, the answer to the riddle of life.

Influence of Heraclitus. It is often the bane of a philosopher to have disciples. Were they pupils only, they might merely repeat their teacher. But disciples often try to improve on their master. Heraclitus had imitators who tried to capture his epigrams, but were more interested in words than in thought.[59] Others, like Epicharmus and Lucian, comic writers, refer to the Heraclitean doctrine in jest and satire. Their stress is on the element of flux in all things, but used as material for a comic situation: a character repudiates a contract because, he says, he is no longer the person who made it; for this he is thrashed by the claimant who then pleads his innocence before the magistrate because he is not the same man as the assailant![60]

Among those who claimed to be serious disciples there was no organized school or any uniformity: they were "men who did not know how to listen or how to speak,"[61] and Plato pokes fun at their inconsistencies and mannerisms. They are so wrapped up in the theory of universal flux that they are always in a flutter. Ask them a question, and they shoot sayings brief and dark by way of answer; their great care is not to admit any settled principles in their arguments or in their mind, for they are at war with the stationary.[62]

Although it is true that Heraclitus delighted to discover opposites and paradoxes and gave place therein to the constant change of things,[63] it is evident that he did not make this the prime tenet of his philosophy. Yet this is the aspect of his thought that was accepted by Plato and Aristotle: πάντα χωρεῖ, "everything flows." The Heracliteans known to Plato suppose all things to be in motion, but do not agree on the nature of justice that rules all;[64] and Heraclitus is cited as saying that all things are in motion and nothing at rest.[65] Aristotle regards this thesis as the

[54] Cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 119–127, for an excellent picture of Heraclitus' philosophy of life.

[55] Fragment 50.

[56] Fragment 108.

[57] Fragment 114.

[58] Fragment 41.

[59] Examples can be found in pseudo-Hippocratic medical writings (cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 130–131; H. Diels, *Die Fragmente*, I, 182 ff.).

[60] K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 131–133.

[61] Fragment 19.

[62] *Theaetetus*, 179–180.

[63] Thus he says: "In the same river, we both step and do not step, we are and we are not" (fragment 49a); because "those who step into the same river have different waters ever flowing upon them" (fragment 12) and are themselves changing.

[64] *Cratylus*, 412–413.

[65] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 181: πάντα ῥεῖ; and *Cratylus*, 402A: ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει.

central doctrine of Heraclitus. The soul is an exhalation that is most incorporeal and in ceaseless flux, and all reality is essentially movement.[66] In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle asserts that Cratylus, a teacher of Plato, was the most extreme among the Heracliteans and that it is to him that the doctrine, *everything is in constant flux*, is to be attributed. At least, Cratylus is responsible for giving Plato such a one-sided view of Heraclitus: "Having in his youth become familiar with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrine that all things are in flux and there is no knowledge of them, these views Plato held even in later years."[67] What this interpretation of Heraclitus was to mean for Plato's own doctrine we shall consider later.

In the post-Aristotelian period, the Stoics claim Heraclitus as forerunner of their doctrine of the eternal fire. In early Christian times, St. Justin the Martyr will number him with Socrates, Abraham, and others among those who lived according to the Logos and were thus Christians before Christ.

§ 3. *Parmenides the Great*

Somewhat later than Heraclitus, whom he attacked,[68] Parmenides (fl. c. 475 B.C.) is thought to have met the young Socrates when he visited Athens c. 450. Born in Elea, he is said by Diogenes Laertius to have had the Pythagorean Diochetes as his teacher. If this is true, he soon abandoned anything resembling Pythagorean doctrine and propounded his own theory of being.[69] To this extent he is often called the founder of metaphysics or ontology. His greatness is attested by Plato, who called him the "great Parmenides," "my father Parmenides," "a man to be respected and also to be feared."[70]

The one work of Parmenides that has come down to us in large fragments is an epic poem later given the usual title of Περὶ φύσεως.[71] It is divided into the *Prologue*, describing the divine gift of knowledge; the *Way of Truth*, detailing the essence of Parmenides' doctrine; and the *Way of Opinion*, containing a variously interpreted cosmogony.

The Prologue. The use of the didactic epic as a vehicle of philosophy appears as a bold innovation, for none of the earlier philosophers had ventured beyond the use of prose. For Parmenides, however,

[66] *On the Soul*, I, 2, 405a24 ff.; see also *Topics*, I, 11, 104b20.

[67] *Metaphysics*, I, 6, 987a31 ff. In *Metaphysics*, IV, 5, 1010a5 ff., he portrays Cratylus as the flowering of such doctrines: "It was this belief (that the world of nature is in movement) that blossomed into the most extreme views of the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say anything (because all was so changing) but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying it was impossible to step twice into the same river, for Cratylus thought one could not do it even once."

[68] This is disputed by some, though the evidence seems to justify our statement (cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 461, n. 185; and *The Theology* . . . , pp. 101, 231, n. 54).

[69] On the supposed teacher-pupil relationship of Xenophanes and Parmenides, cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology* . . . , pp. 51–54, 92.

[70] *Sophist*, 237A, 241D; *Theaetetus*, 183E.

[71] A prose translation is given by K. Freeman, *Ancilla* . . . , pp. 41–46; one in verse, in C. M. Bakewell, *Source-book in Ancient Philosophy* (New York, 1939), pp. 11–20; neither is entirely free from ambiguities. Another in M. C. Nahm, *Selections* . . . , pp. 113–119, which is preferable; cf. also F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides* (introduction, translation, commentary), 2 ed. (London, 1957).

philosophy came as the result of an intuition akin to a religious experience, and to communicate it the epic alone seemed a worthy expression. His basic philosophical position, as he tells us in the Prologue, is described as a direct revelation from a divine source. May we not see, therefore, in this an attempt to supplant Hesiod, whose *Theogony* opens with an account of his inspiration received from the Muses? The Greeks would know thereby that Parmenides intended to offset the irrational theogony of Hesiod, the shepherd of Ascra. The "truth" that Hesiod received is to be replaced by the truth imparted to Parmenides.[72]

The Prologue, as extant, opens with the philosopher being carried by the daughters of Helios along a road leading from the palace of the Night toward the light. As they set out, they come to the walls of the palace in which are the gates separating the paths of Night and Day. Justice is the gatekeeper, and the goddesses cajol her into opening the door that leads to the highway of light. Along this they speed until they reach the goddess of light, who bids Parmenides welcome and then reveals to him his divine mission: to know all things, the motionless heart of well-rounded truth, and the opinions of mortals in which there is no true reliance.

What is the meaning of this Prologue? It is not a mere literary device. On the other hand, it is not necessary to find an allegory hidden in each detail, as did Sextus Empiricus.[73] It does, however, express the philosopher's intent to leave the city of the sense-world and rise to the light of reason and thereby learn to know all things. By claiming that he is following the road of "him who knows," he contrasts himself with other philosophers who tread the paths of the palace of Night and fall into errors.[74]

The Way of Truth. The goddess commands Parmenides to accept this word as true: there are only two ways of inquiry open to a seeker of the truth. One is the path of conviction, which follows the truth: it is that which holds that *being is* and *cannot not be*. The other is the path of error; it cannot be explored, for it cannot be the object of thought. It maintains that *being is not* and *that this not-being must be*.[75] The goddess draws these conclusions from the premise that *thinking and being are the same*.[76] Or again: "Thinking and the thing which is the ground [object] of thinking are the same."[77] But we cannot think of not-being; hence, it cannot be. Therefore, she adds, I bar you from the path of inquiry which would hold that not-being exists.

But I also bar you, she hastens on, from that (other) way along which perplexed men wander, that which thinks that both being and not-being equally exist: "by these men *to be* and *not to be* are considered as the same and not the same, and for them in everything there is opposing movement."[78] From all appearances, Parmenides here has Heracli-

[72] This is the suggestion of Prof. Jaeger (*The Theology* . . . , pp. 92–94), which is strongly bolstered by a comparison between the texts in question. Cf. "Theogony," lines 21 ff., in H. G. Evelyn-White, *Hesiod* . . . , p. 78 ff.

[73] Cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, p. 146.

[74] Fragment 1.

[75] Fragment 2.

[76] Fragment 3: "*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.*"

[77] Fragment 8.

[78] Fragment 6.

tus in mind, though this is denied by some. Finally, the goddess forbids him to judge by ordinary experience that relies on sense-knowledge, the eye, the ear, the tongue of man; he is to judge of being by means of reason alone.[79]

If he use his reason, he will find many characteristics of being: it is unproduced and indestructible, whole and indivisible, only-begotten,[80] motionless in the limits of mighty bonds, perfect; therefore, it is like a well-rounded sphere equally balanced from its center in every direction, with no void to break its continuity.[81] From this it follows that not-being has no existence; becoming is out of the question; destruction is inconceivable. "Therefore, all those things which mortals have made, thinking them true, are but a name: becoming and perishing, being and not-being, change of place and alteration of color."[82]

The Opinions of Mortals. The goddess had told Parmenides that he would also learn the opinions of mortals about the things-that-seem, so that no mortal might surpass him in understanding. The last part of the epic, then, of which fewer fragments survive, is devoted to a cosmogony, a theory of an apparent, not a real, world, a theory that yields only opinion. In this cosmogony, there are two principles, light and night (being is not a principle of this apparent world), and things are named or come to be according to the proportion of light or night in them.[83] However, authorities differ widely on the meaning of this section of the poem. The goddess, whose speech it records, calls it but a statement of the opinions of mortals, something Parmenides is to avoid. Hence, the way of opinion seems much like an eclectic account drawn from Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, and Heraclitus, all of whom thought that not-being could exist. It would be intended only to forearm the reader against such doctrines. Others take the theories here expressed as those of Parmenides himself.[84]

Understanding Parmenides. Having thus synopsized the epic, let us try to evaluate the position of Parmenides. Intellectually, he is a child of Ionia, though born in Elea. He therefore knew the Ionians and their naïve pursuit of the fundamental principle of the physical universe, the permanent source of things; he knew the cosmogony of the Pythagoreans and the teaching of Heraclitus on the Logos of opposites and the role of the logos in man. These predecessors had chosen some primal source or *archē* whence the world of things comes into being. For them, therefore, the things that are, individual realities, constitute true being, whether their source is water, air, the boundless, or fire, the chain of opposites (odd, even, etc.). In Parmenides' view, however, these men relied too

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[79] Fragment 7.

[80] This reading (μονογενές) of some manuscripts is not explained (perhaps it should be translated as "unique"). But this predicate, together with several other characteristics, would reveal that the being of Parmenides is not God. Thus, it is held captive by Justice, lest it come into being or pass away; it is spatially finite because so decreed by divine law; Fate has tied it down to be a whole and motionless (fragment 8).

[81] Fragment 8.

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] Fragment 9.

[84] For the first opinion, cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic . . .* , pp. 141–146; Ueberweg-Praechter, *Grundriss*, pp. 85–87. For the latter, see W. Jaeger, *The Theology . . .* , pp. 104–106; R. K. Hack, *God in Greek Philosophy*, pp. 88–92. There is an argument for this in Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 5, 986b27 ff.

much on sense-knowledge and imagination, whereas one must rise by reason beyond the sensibles. Particular things do not possess true being, for they are mixed with not-being, are manifold and changing; their substance is and is not that which comes from it.

Parmenides, then, has an intuition of oneness; there are not many beings, but only one being, which he reaches by the strict process of reasoning. There is only being; it must be, and not-being cannot be. If this does not agree with the data of the senses, the latter are deceptive and fit guides only in the pathway of night. Reason alone reveals the truth; the senses give only opinion.

But if we press Parmenides with the question: What is being? we shall not receive too satisfying an answer. He will describe it by denying to it the characteristics found in the first principle of his predecessors; and he will not posit it as the First Cause of anything.[85] By likening it to a sphere, he gives the impression that it is something material, yet not linked to the sensible. Logically, if thinking and being are one and the same, and if there is nothing real beyond being, then true reality is a pure object of the mind.[86] Perhaps this is his conclusion; he certainly is no longer talking about the first principle of the physical universe. But it is as hard to label Parmenides an idealist as it is to consider him a monistic materialist. Let us simply conclude that the burden of his thought is this: logos or reason proves that the existent cannot be what our senses reveal to us, something manifold and in motion. The inconsistencies and difficulties arise when we try to develop his thought in more systematic fashion; no one can hold this position without being involved in very devastating consequences. But we must thank Parmenides for focusing thought on being rather than on some element. Though this being is not being in the abstract, being as being, but something concrete, something actually more imagined than conceived, Parmenides founded the science of metaphysics. Above all, he introduced the use of logic into philosophy, for reason became the guide of his speculation.

Influence. In turn, Parmenides will have influence on Empedocles and Democritus, though they will not hold to his metaphysics. On the other hand, Plato and the Academy will use positions of Parmenides in forming their own idealism. The unchangeableness of being will be predicated of the world of Ideas, which alone will possess true being, to know which alone is true knowledge. At the same time, Plato will say with both Heraclitus and Parmenides that the world of sense is subject to change and therefore yields only opinion, i.e., sense-knowledge, and not science. As he views his own philosophy, Plato intends it to reconcile the Heraclitean flux and the Parmenidean fixity. Aristotle's solution will consist in admitting change with Heraclitus and accounting for the relative stability of things by the doctrine of potency and act, matter and form. He will try to solve the dilemma of Parmenides by the notion of potentiality and the analogical significance of being.

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[85] Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 2, 185a3.

[86] Cf. E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949), p. 9.

§ 4. *Followers of Parmenides*

ZENO THE DIALECTICIAN

Zeno of Elea (fl. c. 464–460 B.C.) was a pupil and favorite of Parmenides. In Plato's portrait of him (*Parmenides*, 127–128) Zeno tells the young Socrates that in his own youth he had written a work called *Epicheiremata* (Attacks), for the general purpose of disproving the existence of the many. This would imply that whereas Parmenides said, "The All is One," Zeno on the other hand says, "There is no many." Zeno is thus made to describe the work: "These writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose follow from the affirmation of the one." Zeno returns the attack with interest, for his own method is to show that the hypothesis of the many leads to even more ridiculous conclusions.[87]

Because of his skill in argument, Aristotle styles Zeno the discoverer of dialectics;[88] and as the arguments were current and popular in his own day, Aristotle undertook to study the problems involved, the nature of time, space, and motion, and show the fallacies hidden in the "Attacks." We shall not attempt to study Zeno's dialectics in any detail (it is said the work contained forty arguments), but content ourselves with a brief review. His arguments are all deductions from one premise, for he takes a postulate or hypothesis of his opponents and works it to the point of absurdity. They say there are many; there is space; there is motion. Grant these, and I shall show you how ridiculous and contradictory are the conclusions one may draw.

An Argument Against Plurality. If things are many, they must be as many as they are and no more nor less. If they are simply as many as they are, then they are *finite* in number. But at the same time, if things are many, they must be *infinite* in number: for there are always other things between those that are, and again others between these. And so things are both finite and infinite, an impossibility. Therefore being is one.[89] A simpler argument: A measure of grain, representing the many, makes a noise when it falls to the ground. But one grain does not. But if the parts of a measure do not make a sound, how can the whole make a noise?[90]

Argument Against Space. The opponent claims that there is space: here Zeno is probably attacking the Pythagoreans who held to the void or empty space. Space, says Zeno, is either nothing or something. If it is nothing, things cannot be in it. If it is something, it itself will be in something, and that which is in something is in some place; and this space is also in space; and so on indefinitely. Accordingly, there is no such thing as place.[91]

Arguments Against Motion. These are the most famous and popular, and are

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[87] At the same time, some of his reasoning seems to apply equally to the theories of his teacher. Simplicius quotes from Eudemus the remark of Zeno that if anyone would explain to him the nature of the One, he could tell him what the Many are (cf. T. V. Smith, *Philosophers Speak for Themselves* [Chicago, 1956], p. 17). Such a profession of agnosticism is corroborated by Seneca, who said: "If I accept Parmenides there is nothing but the One; if I follow Zeno, there is not even the One!" (*Ep.* 88, 45, in H. Diels, *Die Fragmente . . .*, Zenon A21; Vol. I, 254, 30–31.)

[88] According to Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 57 (in H. Diels, *op. cit.*, Zenon A10; Vol. I, 250, 1–2), one should not call him the founder of dialectics, for sciences are discovered in nature, not established by men, according to Aristotle.

[89] Fragment 3; in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 122; Freeman, *Ancilla . . .*, p. 47.

[90] Related by Simplicius; cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, VII, 250a20 ff., for a refutation of this in keeping with modern physics. For an extended study of the arguments, cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 154–159.

[91] Fragment 4; in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.* See Aristotle, *Physics*, IV, 3, 210b22 (place is not a thing in itself); and 7, 213b30 ff. (the void is not place with nothing in it).

treated at length by Aristotle. The basis of Zeno's thought is his axiom: *that which moves moves neither in the place in which it is nor in that in which it is not.*[92] The argument has to do with local motion in straight lines.

1. What is in motion must arrive at the halfway mark before it arrives at the goal. But to reach the halfway mark, it must arrive at the quarter mark, and so on. Therefore, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, the body will have to move through infinite spaces in a finite time. This it cannot do; therefore, there is no motion. — The error or sophism here, as Aristotle points out,[93] consists in confusing what is infinite in divisibility with what is infinite in respect to extremities. Although a body in a finite time cannot come into contact with things quantitatively infinite (if such were given) it can contact things potentially infinite in respect to divisibility.

2. The second argument is called the "Achilles," from the race between Achilles, the fastest runner, and the tortoise. In a race Achilles could never overtake the tortoise, if the latter is given a head start; for the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued started, but this he cannot do because again (as in the first argument) he would have to cross an infinite distance. Therefore, motion is impossible.

3. The argument of the flying arrow. The flying arrow is at rest because at each moment it occupies a given position in space; but to occupy a position is to be at rest. The error here is that Zeno considers time to be made up of moments, whereas it is continuous; in a similar way, movement is not composed of a series of starts.[94]

4. The fourth argument we omit because it is not very clear, owing to the ambiguous language of Aristotle and to doubts as to the readings of certain manuscripts of the original Greek.

Undoubtedly, Zeno was serious in his arguments. They became rather popular and not a little troublesome. Quite possibly, the Sophists used them as school pieces in training the youth of Greece. They had, besides, influence in arousing interest in philosophy and in developing physics and metaphysics.

MELISSUS OF SAMOS

It is usually said that, in contrast to Zeno, Melissus of Samos (fl. 444) offered positive support to the philosophy of Parmenides. Though he is grouped by Aristotle with Xenophanes and Parmenides,[95] there is no proof that he was an associate or pupil of the Eleatics. On the other hand, it seems exaggerated to claim that he was an "avowed follower of Anaximander,"[96] though there is reason to show some influence of the Ionians. Born in Asia Minor, he wrote his work "On Nature or the Being" in Ionian prose.

Instead of the basic axiom of Parmenides, that being is and not-being is not, which he accepts, Melissus preferred his own: "It is impossible for something to come into being out of nothing," or more plainly, "Nothing comes from nothing."[97] From this he deduces *in logical order* the characteristics of being: since being is and has

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[92] Fragment 4 (according to Diels' numbering): "*τὸ κινούμενον οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ ἔστι τόπῳ κινεῖται οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι*," preserved by Diogenes Laertius (H. Diels, Zenon B4; op. cit., I, 258, 9–10); for the four arguments, cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, VI, 9, 239b5 ff.

[93] *Physics*, VI, 2, 233a 21 ff.

[94] *Physics*, VI, 2, 231b18 ff.; and *ibid.*, 10, 241a 1 ff.: "Time is not composed of moments, just as a line is not composed of points, and motion is not composed of starts; for this theory simply makes motion consist of indivisibles in exactly the same way as time is made to consist of moments, or a length of points."

[95] *Metaphysics*, I, 5, 986b10 ff.; cf. *Physics*, I, 2, 185a25 ff. and I, 3, 186a6 ff.

[96] W. Jaeger, *The Theology* . . . , 27.

[97] Fragment 1: ". . . *οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός*" (K. Freeman, *Ancilla* . . . , pp. 48–50, and M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 265–268, for texts). This is the basic premise from which, complains Aristotle, the rest flows (*Physics*, I, 2, 185a11). See also his criticism of the fallacious character of Melissus' argument in *De sophisticis elenchis* 5, 167b13 ff.; and 6, 168b 35 ff.; cf. M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

no beginning, it is eternal and complete; therefore, it is without limit, infinite, one and unique, alike throughout, not subject to change or passion; and since there is no void, being is full and hence immobile.[98] On the other hand, the Many does not exist, and we do not see or know what really exists.[99]

The Parmenidean core is here, with perhaps more order in the deduction of the attributes of being. Melissus corrects Parmenides by excluding from being any note of limit which implies nonbeing. And it may well be that he took over from Anaximander the concept of the infinite. The latter, however, was a principle for Anaximander, the source from which things derive their existence and to which they return. There is no such concept in Melissus' theory of the infinite, as is borne out by the exposition of Aristotle. Some of his expressions carry a material connotation, but despite Aristotle[100] they do not force us to conclude that for Melissus the One is material. In fact, Simplicius comments that Melissus sensed before Aristotle that all matter was limited, from which we may conclude that by denying limit to the One Melissus was removing all matter; moreover, Simplicius quotes a fragment to the effect that if being is One, it cannot itself have body; and if it had bulk or thickness, it would have parts and no longer be a unity.[101]

Conclusion. The Eleatic school thus denied the reality of multiplicity and motion, the evidence of the senses, and the common concepts of mankind. Instead, they held to one being, which is not a principle or source of other things. Plurality and change are illusion, appearance, the matter of opinion; true being alone exists and is the object of thought. Slaves of being, they do not do justice to the Many and the problem of change, and as a result their philosophy was fallacious and one-sided, though it contributed to the formation of the true theory of being. Its immediate influence was felt by the last group of the physicists, whom we shall now consider.

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[98] Fragments 1–7.

[99] Fragment 8.

[100] *Metaphysics,* I, 5, 986b19: Parmenides fixed on that which is one according to reason, Melissus on that which is one in matter.

[101] Fragment 9, in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.,* p. 267.

CHAPTER VI: Wisdom as a Rational Science of Things

EMPEDOCLES, Anaxagoras, and Democritus represent the last of the physicists. Their common characteristic is an attempt to save both being and becoming by bridging the chasm between Parmenides and Heraclitus. To a certain extent, they are the philosophical expression of the culture of the times, inasmuch as their physical theories try to give a rational explanation of the ordinary world and the things it contains. All three of these philosophers seek the elements which make up the things of experience.

The age of Sophocles (496–406 B.C.), as the fifth century B.C. is often termed, the period after the Persian wars, showed a general tendency to divide human life into a number of special activities, each with its own purpose and theory, each covered by a particular body of knowledge called *technē* or technique: the "know-how" for each trade or art or theory. It was the age of technical treatises, when oratory and cookery were alike reduced to system, and the market flooded with special treatises on mathematics, music, medicine, gymnastics, drama, oratory. The Sophists belonged within this movement, for they advanced themselves as excelling in their special technique, the training of the statesman in the craft of statesmanship.[1]

The philosophers of this period followed the trend, turning from a search for the fundamental principle of the universe as a whole to a study of nature as found in ordinary, everyday things. They made it their task to explain the constitution of things by rational principles. Hence their wisdom is a technique, a rational science of the known world. In this, they were forced to find a *via media* between the teachings of Heraclitus and Parmenides; they had to explain the obvious motion and change in the world, and yet not abandon the Parmenidean thesis that being alone is and not-being is not. The result was a change in the meaning of φύσις or nature; no longer was it simply the principle or source of things, nor was it the hidden and unknown being that alone is; it was the totality of the things of the world. In this totality they would seek the basic principles, the elements or roots and their subsequent combination in the things of experience. Empedocles posits four basic elements as the roots of things; Anaxagoras makes the principles infinite in number and smallness, while the atomists propose elements of a fundamentally common nature arranged by blind force and necessity.

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[1] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York, 1943), I, 299–300; X. Zubiri, "Socrates and Greek Wisdom," in *The Thomist*, VII (1944), 27; cf. also J. B. Bury, *A History of Greece*, 3 ed. (New York, 1951), p. 369.

§ 1. Empedocles

From the legends that grew up about the figure of Empedocles, we may judge that antiquity accorded him more importance than he enjoys today.[2] He was a citizen of Akragas (Agrigentum) in Sicily (fl. 444 B.C.), the son of Meton, grandson of an Empedocles who was victor in the Olympic games of 496 B.C. Legend makes him a political figure, the champion of democracy, a miracle-worker and wizard. Such legends seem to have grown out of the two works of which long fragments are extant: a poem, *On Nature* (Περὶ φύσεως) in two parts; and a piece of Orphic pietism, the *Purifications* (Καθαρμοί).[3] From these poems Empedocles emerges both as a physicist of originality and as a deeply religious personality; interested in the search for the secrets of nature, he also sought a philosophy or theology of salvation. There is no need to see a contradiction or inconsistency in such a double viewpoint and say in answer that one poem is earlier than the other (and so represent the inner growth of his outlook). The philosophy of the Περὶ φύσεως is a genuine theogony, and therefore as much a religious as a scientific doctrine; hence, like the *Katharmoi*, it shows the divine at work in the world.[4]

[2] Cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 172–178, for narration and evaluation of the legends.

[3] These works are said to have covered some 5000 lines; there are indications that he also wrote prose treatises on medicine and other topics, and other poems. Aristotle thought little of him as a poet (*Poetics*, 1, 1447b17); yet he also called him the "founder" of rhetoric (*Sophist*, fr. 65; cf. Diogenes Laertius, in H. Diels, *Die Fragmente*, I, 250, 1–2; 278, 14–15). Plato styled him the Muse of Sicily (*Sophist*, 242DE).

[4] Texts in K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 51–68; M. C. Nahm, *Selections From Early Greek Philosophy*, pp. 128–141. Cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), pp. 129–134, and Ueberweg-Praechter, *Grundriss*, p. 92, for the relation of the two works.

The poem on nature covers Empedocles' doctrine on man, especially on knowledge, as well as his philosophy of nature. Our treatment will embrace these points, together with a glance at his Orphic beliefs.

The Philosophy of Nature. Plato sees in Empedocles a contrast to Parmenides and even a reconciliation between the latter and Heraclitus.[5] The fragments of Empedocles' work which we possess reveal that Plato's judgment is correct. Empedocles begins his poem with a plea to be delivered from the folly of his predecessors, who with little knowledge think that they have found the whole. Then, in contrast to Parmenides, Empedocles begs the goddess or Muse to come to him, not to give him an esoteric revelation never known to man before, but only such knowledge as divine law allows us, such learning as mortal mind can bear.[6] Her message, which is not proposed as her direct speech, concerns the world about him, its roots and its inner forces. In pursuing this knowledge of things, Empedocles urges us both to trust our senses and the impressions which they convey to us and, above all, to use our minds to check their correctness. This is certainly a repudiation of Parmenides' trust in reason alone.

The poem proceeds to give an explanation of the world that is original with Empedocles. The Ionians had held that being comes from non-being. This is merely a way of talking,[7] for it is impos-

[5] *Sophist*, 242E.

[6] Fragments 2–3.

[7] Fragment 9. See also the expressive fragment 11: "Fools! they have no long-range view, since they imagine that what did not exist comes into being, or that a thing dies and is completely destroyed."

sible for anything to come into being from what in nowise exists, and it is inconceivable that being should perish utterly.[8] Thus far Empedocles agrees with Parmenides. He will not, however, take the next step and state that becoming and perishing are illusions. These he explains as the mingling and the separating of that which *is*. Behind becoming is being, not the unique, unmoved, and solitary being of Parmenides, but several principles or roots of things. "Hear the roots (τὰ ῥιζώματα) of all things: vivid Zeus [fire], and life-giving Hera [air], and Aidoneus [earth], and Nestis who with her tears waters the spring of mortals."[9]

Empedocles has here taken the four primary opposite qualities of things, warm and cold, wet and dry, and argued that these originate in four basic substances or elements. Individual things "come into being" through the mixing of these elements, and "change" takes place through their separation. By personifying the elements, giving them the names of gods, Empedocles indicates that he considers them possessed of divine power. In themselves they are not personal beings, but simply the four unchanging substances which are the roots of apparent becoming.

When he comes to describe the cosmic process, Empedocles postulates two more powers, active forces that operate as efficient causes for the mingling and separation of the elements. These he terms *Love* and *Strife*, considering them as gods of equal rank with the four elements.[10] Love is the power that gives life and makes all things one, for under her influence things separate become united, whereas unity becomes multiplicity under the devastating power of Hate. Without descending to details, we may picture the cyclic process in this fashion: at the beginning (so to speak, for the cycle is eternal, i.e., in infinite time, according to fragment 16) the four elements are united in the reign of Love. This is the whole, unity in order, or, in a phrase borrowed from Parmenides, a rounded sphere reposing in peace and solitude. During this stage the Sphere is thus like the God of Xenophanes[11] or the Being of Parmenides, but it is not destined to remain such, for at the allotted time Hate begins to take over, the Sphere is subject to separation, and individual things come to be through the varied mixtures of the four elements. The full reign of Hate, a kind of chaos in which the four elements are completely separated from one another, comes at the bottom of the cycle;[12] and then, as Love begins to achieve the ascendancy, things appear once more and are finally brought back to the unity of the Sphere.[13] This is

[8] Fragment 12.

[9] Fragment 6.

[10] These two powers are often reduced to mere attraction and repulsion, or the compatibility and incompatibility of elements. Empedocles, however, makes them distinct from the four elements; this is also the interpretation of Aristotle (*Physics*, I, 6, 189a24 ff.).

[11] Fragment 29. In fragments 133–134, among the *Katharmoi*, the Sphere is called God, and, after Xenophanes, is called Mind, holy and ineffable, and only Mind.

[12] Though used in fragment 35, this is not an exact phrase. If one pictures the process as centrifugal, Empedocles is more easily understood. In the period of unity Love is at the center (fragments 17 and 35). Hate approaches and causes movement, separation, and mingling into individual things until the elements are rent asunder. Then Love regains her rule: individual things again appear, and at last are reunited in the perfect Sphere.

[13] Cf. fragment 17, in K. Freeman, *Ancilla . . .*, pp. 53–54.

comparable to the thought of Heraclitus on the "way up" and the "way down."

Judgment. It was in this way that Empedocles sought to keep both being and becoming: the four elements or roots alone have being, while things become through the mingling of the elements. Being is hidden beneath the surface of becoming. In this way he succeeds in mediating between his predecessors. His four elements will be accepted by Aristotle (though not as prime matter) and remain common doctrine until close to modern times.

Empedocles may appear to us as a mechanistic philosopher, positing four basic roots, some vague efficient causes, and the production of things simply by the combination of elements in certain proportions. But he is to be judged, Aristotle says, more by what he meant than by his lisping expression.[14] At the same time, Aristotle twice criticizes his lack of consistency in using the two extrinsic causes, Love and Strife.[15] In some fragments, he declares that Love and Strife reign in unaltered succession, prevailing in turn in the course of time,[16] for this is fixed for them by a broad oath,[17] which would require the existence of a higher power to determine them.[18] There is also some indication that Love at least is an intellectual cause, inasmuch as the Sphere is called God and Mind; elsewhere, however, Empedocles speaks as though chance encounters of elements brought together by Love sufficed to explain the formation of things.[19] It is not a wholly consistent position.

The Make-Up of Man. We leave aside the isolated fragments that present details of Empedocles' cosmogony to concentrate briefly on his anthropology. An expert in medicine, if we may so conclude from the opening of the *Katharmoi*,[20] he advanced several interesting theories in ontogeny and physiology, explaining conception, gestation, breathing, the constitution of the human body and its organs. The eye he compares to a lantern and its light,[21] the ear to a bell.[22]

His investigations into the problem of knowledge are quite detailed. Against Parmenides he affirms that the senses are to be trusted, although they are to be checked by comparing the data of each sense. On the part of the object, sensation is explained by means of effluences (ἀπορροαί) thrown off by things.[23] These enter the pores or organs corresponding to the different effluences.[24] Perception then takes place on the basis of the principle that like knows like; that is, in sense perception there is a union between an element in us and the like element in the object. "We see earth by means of earth, water by means of water, divine air by air within us, destructive fire by means of fire, love by means of love, hate by means of bitter hate."[25] Or again

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[14] *Metaphysics*, I, 4, 985a5.

[15] *Physics*, II, 4, 196a17–24; *Metaphysics*, I, 4, 985a21 ff.

[16] Fragment 17.

[17] Fragment 30.

[18] Aristotle interprets this as Necessity in *Physics*, VIII, 1, 252a7; there is some basis for this in the *Katharmoi*, fragment 115.

[19] Fragment 59. Other fragments would also show absence of design (e.g., 57, 58, 60, 61, 62). Plato interprets Empedocles as neglecting the role of design (*Laws*, 889B).

[20] Fragment 112.

[21] Fragment 84 ff.

[22] Fragment 99.

[23] Fragment 89.

[24] Cf. Plato, *Meno*, 76CD. See also the remarks of Theophrastus, in M. C. Nahm, *Selections . . .*, pp. 142–144.

[25] Fragment 109.

he writes: "From the elements are all things composed in harmonious bonds, and by means of these do men think and feel joy and sorrow."[26]

From this Aristotle concludes that for Empedocles the soul of man is composed of the same elements as nature,[27] and Aristotle had just grounds for his complaint that Empedocles failed to distinguish between thought and perception.[28] Such indeed is Empedocles' unconscious materialism that he thought the blood, in which the elements were best mixed, was the medium of thought: "[The heart] . . . is the place where is found for the most part what men call thought; for the blood about the heart is thought in man."[29] We conclude with Theophrastus: "Empedocles seems to have been in error on many points."

Orphism. The *Katharmoi* show the moral and religious significance of Empedocles' philosophy of nature, teaching that the soul's destiny is in accord with the rule of Love and Hate. Their author reveals his own "history" in terms of his cosmogony: his soul had been a divine spirit in the blissful reign of love, but because it cleaved to Hate it was condemned to thirty thousand seasons of exile, to be born throughout that time in all manner of mortal shapes, chased from one element to another.[30] "For I have already been a boy, a girl, and a plant, a bird and a dumb fish out of the sea."[31] Others share with him this sad plight (though there is no indication that he thought transmigration the lot of all; cf. fragment 113 to the contrary); therefore, he counseled abstention from animal food, for one might thereby eat the flesh of his own kin.[32]

Because he holds the pre-existence of the soul and maintains that knowledge was acquired in a previous existence, Empedocles terms this earth the joyless land[33] and longs for the bliss whence he has fallen. After all, the world of individual things is the work of Hate rather than of Love! From a few fragments, finally, we gather that he taught a theology that resembled Xenophanes' concept of a God beyond the reach of eyes or touch, who is mind and only mind.

Thus there is no opposition between the physical theories of Empedocles and his moral doctrines: they make one theology. The cosmogony shows the true character of the divine power operative in the physical universe; the religious exhortations reveal the divine powers as ruling in the soul and destiny of man. We must at least admire the high-minded character of this doctrine.

§ 2. *Anaxagoras*

Anaxagoras, nicknamed the *Nous* (Mind) from his doctrine and his sober, preoccupied manner, differs considerably from Empedocles. Born in Clazomenae, Asia Minor, about 500 B.C., he was older than Empedocles but did not begin his philosophic career until later. Whether he knew the theories of Empedocles is a matter of conjecture; at least, he differs from him in the number of elements and in his general theory of the origin of things. Above all, he is imbued with the scientific, empirical

[26] Fragment 107.
[27] *On the Soul*, I, 2, 404b11.
[28] *Ibid.*, III, 4, 427a21.
[29] Fragment 105.
[30] Fragment 115.
[31] Fragment 117.
[32] Fragments 136–137.
[33] Fragment 121.

spirit of Ionia, and is under the influence of Anaximenes (at secondhand), especially in his meteorological theories. As a young man he had come to Athens, perhaps because of the Persian invasions of Ionia, and there had Pericles as his pupil and protector. He is thus the first philosopher to make Athens his home. Toward the end of his life he was exiled on a charge of impiety, for claiming that the sun was not a deity but a natural body; perhaps political reasons were behind such a move. He retired to Lampsacus, near Miletus, and died there in 428 B.C.

Authorities attest that he wrote one book in prose, the title of which is not known. Diogenes Laertius says it was written in a pleasing and lofty style; apparently it was quite popular in Athens and could be bought at the Orchestra book mart for a drachma.[34] From the fragments and secondary sources, it is evident that Anaxagoras taught a dualism, two distinct sets of principles: matter (the "seeds") and the mind (*Nous*).

The Origin of Things. The key to Anaxagoras' method of reasoning is stated in fragment 21: "Phenomena, the things that appear, are the sight (or vision) of things hidden."[35] Thus he proceeds from empirical observation to his theory of the cosmos and its origin. It is known that he was quite interested in meteors: a meteoric stone at Aegospotami captured his attention; he called the sun a glowing stone and so merited the charge of impiety; the moon receives its light, he said,[36] from the sun; comets are a concatenation of planets, etc. This led him to the belief that all these could be explained as coming from some original whirling mass in the air. On the other hand, he was interested in medicine, dietetics, nutrition: he wondered how the germ or sperm could contain all the ingredients of the developed animal: hair, nails, veins, sinews, bones; or again, how the animal could acquire these from the food it ate. "How can hair come from not-hair, and flesh from not-flesh?"[37]

The thesis of Parmenides, that being cannot come from not-being, lies behind the answer of Anaxagoras. Empedocles, too, may have influenced him, for Anaxagoras states: "The Hellenes have a wrong belief concerning coming-into-being and passing-away. No thing comes to be or passes away, but is mixed together or separated from things that are. Thus they would be correct if they termed coming-to-be a mixing and passing-away a separation."[38]

He concludes that the things we know originated from a *primeval mass* in which was contained not one substance (as the Ionians held) nor four (as did Empedocles), but an infinite number of elements in infinitely small size: "All things[39] were together, infinite both in number and in smallness. . . . And all things being together, no thing could be distinguished because of the smallness."[40] Elsewhere,[41] he speaks of these things as "seeds," though not in our sense of seed, whether of plant or animal, because that is already composite and contains potentialities to

[34] Plato, *Apology*, 26D.

[35] *ὄψις γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα*. For texts, cf. K. Freeman, *Ancilla* . . . , pp. 83–86; M. C. Nahm, *Selections* . . . , pp. 149–152; F. M. Cleves, *The Philosophy of Anaxagoras* (New York, 1949).

[36] Fragment 18.

[37] Fragment 10.

[38] Fragment 17.

[39] *χρήματα*. Whenever Anaxagoras uses this word, he refers to the original elements in the mass, for they are the true "things." What we call things are an agglomerate of these original elements.

[40] Fragment 1.

[41] Fragment 4.

be developed. For Anaxagoras, "seed" has the sense of a simple substance or element. It is not a question, therefore, of things existing in a seminal or embryonic state. Seeds are, rather, things existing in actuality and as individual particles, like each other but yet distinct.[42] Air and ether predominate in the total mass, both in size and number,[43] though there is also a great quantity of earth in the mixture together with the seeds.

The process whereby the cosmos originates is a revolution of the mass, set in motion by Mind or *Nous*. The things that were mixed are now separated out by the speed of the revolution, which produces the centrifugal forces that send things forth.[44] The air and ether leave the mass, apparently to provide a medium for the separation. Then the elements that are dense and moist, dark and cold, collect toward the earth which solidifies from the water from the clouds, while the elements that are rare (thin), hot, and dry fly out into the ether to become the celestial bodies.[45] On the earth, particles coagulate together to form "simple" substances, and these in turn make up the things we know.[46] Each individual thing is (and is called) that substance which most predominates in it. But in each individual all the elements are to be found: "As it was in the beginning, so now also all things are together";[47] "in everything there is a portion of everything."[48] These are hard sayings, for it is difficult to see how a "portion of everything" can be in all things.

Anaxagoras' intention is clear enough. He is trying to show how things come to be, as the Greeks commonly use the expression. They cannot become from what is not; therefore, things come to be out of existent things, things already present but imperceptible to our senses because so small in bulk. But for this to happen, what "comes to be" is already in that from which it comes. Thus the sperm of an animal must contain, actually and in miniature, and not merely potentially, what later becomes discernible to the senses. Aristotle will provide the answer to these difficulties in his doctrine of the potency of matter.

Mind. If Anaxagoras does not propose too consistent a theory on the elements, he does make a definite contribution to philosophy in the efficient cause he introduced to explain the process of the cosmos: the *Nous* or Mind. He is led to this undoubtedly by the place of mind in the life of man: "things seen give sight of things unseen."[49] But he is very careful to conclude that Mind is free from the mass of things, though he uses terms that show he has not reached the concept of the spiritual: "Mind is the finest of all things and the purest."[50] At the same time, Mind always is;[51] it is infinite, self-ruling, mixed with nothing (that is, it does not, as do the things we experience, contain a portion of every-

[42] Hence Aristotle calls them *homoiomerē* (ὁμοιομερῆ), the "like things" (*Physics*, I, 4, 187a25; and *Metaphysics*, I, 3, 984a12).

[43] Fragment 1.

[44] Fragments 9 and 12.

[45] We should note that, in contrast to Empedocles, this process is not cyclic; there is no indication in Anaxagoras of a final return to the primordial state (so Aristotle notes in *Physics*, I, 4, 187a23).

[46] Thus for inorganic things and the first-born of living things. The latter then reproduce their kind (so Diogenes Laertius, II, 9; in H. Diels, *Die Fragmente*, Vol. II, 6, 5–8).

[47] Fragment 6.

[48] Fragments 11–12.

[49] Fragment 21a.

[50] Fragment 12.

[51] Fragment 14.

thing); it is alone, by itself, independent. It knows everything perfectly, has the greatest power, and rules over all. It has arranged all things, determining what they are to be, both things that existed in the past and those which exist now, the present course of the stars, the sun and moon. . . .[52]

In the original Greek, this description has a hymnlike arrangement, a form used already by Anaximander in speaking of the *Apeiron* or Boundless. From this and from the attributes of Mind, we rightly conclude that for Anaxagoras it is God.[53] Parallels, of course, are found in Xenophanes and Empedocles, both of whom speak of God as Mind. But here we have the added note that the Mind rules, guides, arranges all things in the mass and in the process of separation according to a preconceived plan, a doctrine of teleology which no thinker had yet proposed.[54] It is not a perfect doctrine, for it does not account for the origin of the "seeds" (no Greek ever explained the existence of matter), nor does it say what prompted Mind to set the mass awhirling. But it is for all that a remarkable advance: the first clear dualism in Greek philosophy. Little wonder that Aristotle remarks that in comparison to his predecessors and contemporaries Anaxagoras spoke like a sober man.

§ 3. *Diogenes*

A man of small stature in comparison to Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, a colony of Miletus (fl. c. 425 B.C.), is one of the last of the Ionian physicists. His theories do not rank much attention from Aristotle, though they are the butt of the dramatists Aristophanes and Euripides.[55]

In reaction to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, Diogenes returned to Anaximenes, to hold that there is but one primal substance, "that all existing things are made by alteration of the same thing, and are the same thing."[56] It is evident that he is arguing in a non-Parmenidean framework, since he admits becoming and postulates a kind of prime matter of which things are a derivative. Only thus, he claims, can things come to be. To this extent he prepares for Aristotle's doctrine of prime matter and is praised by Aristotle for holding one material principle.[57] But it becomes clear, as we read the fragments, that this common ground of change is Anaximenes' air. The reasons for this choice are his own: the importance of air in the life of things.[58] It is life and

[52] Fragment 12. Mind is still operative in the process of unfolding the mass of seeds (fragment 14); nor is its work limited to this world, since there are or can be many other worlds (fragment 4).

[53] W. Jaeger, *The Theology* . . . , pp. 161–162. The same is found (*infra*) in Diogenes of Apollonia (*ibid.*, 243, n. 59).

[54] The doctrine thus endows Mind with a definite *technē* in keeping with the trends of the century. The criticism of Plato and Aristotle does not seem, therefore, to have much textual basis. Plato pictures the disappointment of Socrates on first looking into Anaxagoras: "My extravagant expectations were shattered when . . . I found that the man made no use of Mind at all. He attributed no causal power whatever to it in the ordering of things, but to airs and aethers and waters and a host of other strange things" (*Phaedo*, 97B ff.). Aristotle claims that Anaxagoras does not make sufficient use of the doctrine (cf. *Metaphysics*, I, 4, 985a18 ff.).

[55] Cf. K. Freeman, *Ancilla* . . . , pp. 87–90, for texts; *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 279–284, for a study.

[56] Fragment 2.

[57] *De generatione et corruptione*, I, 6, 322b 12. Aristotle corrects him, inasmuch as Diogenes makes his principle applicable to all things; it should be limited to those in which there is mutual action and passion.

[58] Fragment 5.

intelligence in men and animals; it is in everything and is the one element that can most easily take various forms, for it can be hot or cold, wet or dry, etc.

He thus identifies soul and intelligence with air,[59] and intelligence and air with God because air is everywhere and arranges everything and is in everything.[60] From this we may conclude that Diogenes sponsors a theory that will reappear later, that God is the world-soul; if pushed far enough, he must plead guilty of material pantheism.

§ 4. *The School of Abdera*

The last men to speculate on the physical universe are commonly called Atomists because of their physical theories. Leucippus and Democritus are given as the founder and popular leader respectively of what seems to have been a school at Abdera in Thrace (northeast of Macedonia).[61] Even in antiquity it was acknowledged that not all the writings attributed to Democritus were his work, and Diels remarks that there was a whole corpus *democriteum* put forth without distinction of author, though Aristotle and Theophrastus, who knew the school at firsthand, acquired some notion of the differences between Leucippus and Democritus. To Leucippus (fl. c. 430 B.C.) is ascribed *The Great World-Order* (Μέγας διάκοσμος) and *On Mind*; in the former the basic terminology and doctrines of atomism were proposed; of the latter book but one sentence survives.[62]

Democritus, whom Aristotle praises as a deeper thinker than the other physicists,[63] is pictured as a sober, retiring student, paradoxically called the laughing philosopher from his ridicule of human folly. In distinction to Leucippus, he wrote a *Small World-Order* (Μικρὸς διάκοσμος); he is considered the author of a large group of works covering many branches of learning: ethics, natural sciences, mathematics, music, and a series of technical treatises on medicine, farming, painting, warfare.[64] It is quite possible, as we have mentioned, that some of these were produced by disciples.

Strangely, the fragments attributed to Democritus[65] make but a few passing references to atomism. For the most part they are concerned with natural phenomena, moral and political opinions and maxims. The secondary sources, on the other hand, show most interest in the cosmic principles and the psychology of the school.[66]

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[59] Fragment 4; cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul*, I, 2, 405a21.

[60] Perhaps the last statement is a misreading of the manuscripts; cf. H. Diels, *Die Fragmente*, II, 61, 6–7, and notes. Yet secondary sources confirm this identification (H. Diels, *loc. cit.*, 53, 14–23).

[61] Later members are said to include Nessas and Metrodos of Chios, Diogenes of Smyrna, Anaxarchus, Pyrrho of Elis, the skeptic (who learned the term *ataraxía* from the school and through Nausiphanes influenced Epicurus). See K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 326–332, for details.

[62] Fragments in K. Freeman, *Ancilla . . .*, pp. 90–91; and M. C. Nahm, *Selections . . .*, pp. 160–161.

[63] *De generatione et corruptione*, I, 2, 315a 34 ff.; *De partibus animalium*, I, 1, 642a24–31. Others praised the breadth of his knowledge; cf. Diogenes Laertius, IX, 37, in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–163, and 40, *ibid.*, p. 164; and Lucretius, *ibid.*, pp. 180–181.

[64] See the grouping, perhaps of earlier origin, supposedly made by Thrasyllus, a Roman scholar of the first century A.D. (M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–168).

[65] Texts in K. Freeman, *Ancilla . . .*, pp. 91–118; and M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 208–219 (incomplete).

[66] A number of these are cited by M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 161–208.

The Atomist Theory. The relation of the Atomists to their predecessors is brought out by Aristotle in discussing the origin of action and passion, or movement, between physical objects. The most systematic and consistent theory is that of Leucippus and Democritus, and by it they mediate between those who foolishly admit only being and those who follow only the data of sense-perception and admit only becoming. Leucippus, Aristotle goes on (thus implicitly pointing to the founder of the system), thought he had a solution that harmonized with sense-perception and did not abolish coming-to-be and passing-away or motion and multiplicity. Such concessions he made to the facts or phenomena of experience, while on the other hand he agreed with monists such as Parmenides that being does not come from not-being and that there can be no motion without empty space (the void).[67]

Consequently, Leucippus, and after him Democritus, posited two elements, which they call the full (τὸ πλῆρες) and the void (τὸ κενόν), and which they designate as being and not-being, though both are real.[68] The full is not one, but is made up of an infinite number of indivisible, small, and imperceptible units which they term atoms (ἄτομον: indivisible). These have the same basic nature and inner qualities and differ, according to Aristotle, only in shape, order, and position. For example, *A* differs from *N* in shape, *AN* from *NA* in order, and *H* from ⌶ in position.[69]

From the combination of these atoms things come to be; by their separation things pass away. Coming-to-be, therefore, is merely alteration.[70] The atoms move in the void (either falling or floating; at least, there is some constant motion), and unite with one another or separate off. The Cosmos, which is but one of many or even unnumbered worlds, comes into being as atoms of different shapes separate off from the original infinite mass and come together in a great empty space. There they form an eddy or whirl;[71] some interlock, others form the outer limits of the heavens, while the earth and its inhabitants come to be from the central mass. The atoms that thus form things cling to one another and cohere until some stronger necessity shakes and scatters them.[72]

Judgment. This is not a very satisfying explanation. If there are only atoms which "combine" by juxtaposition alone, no substantial union will ever result; and therefore no new thing will have real being of its own. Furthermore, the theory does not offer an adequate explanation of motion, cause and effect, and purpose. Inasmuch as it is based on purely natural and physical causes, it is atheistic, excluding any divine operation, unless the

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[67] Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione*, I, 8, 324b35 ff., 325a23 ff.

[68] Fragment 156: μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι (H. Diels, *Die Fragmente*, II, 174, 18). Note the play on words (δέν and μηδέν, *Aught* and *Naught*). Cf. also Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 4, 985b4 ff.

[69] *Metaphysics*, I, 4, 985b14 ff. See also the explanation of Simplicius and his quotation from the lost *On Democritus* of Aristotle, in M. C. Nahm, *Selections* . . . , nn. 37–38, pp. 169–170.

[70] Simplicius, *ibid.*, n. 37, p. 170.

[71] Fragment 167.

[72] See Aristotle as quoted by Simplicius, *loc. cit.*; and Diogenes Laertius, IX, 31; *ibid.*, p. 160.

natural necessity that rules the process is a divinity.[73]

Atomistic Humanism. The maxims and other fragments attributed to Democritus present scattered remains of a philosophy of life in keeping with the doctrine of atomism. It is decidedly earth-bound: there is no afterlife, for man's nature dissolves with the separation of the atoms of which he is composed. Therefore, one should not burden the period of life with anxieties and fears of the future.[74] This is not to say that Democritus is a pure material hedonist, for he does have a spirit of moderation, as we shall see.

Man, the center of his ethics, is a universe in little, a microcosm,[75] composed of body-atoms and soul-atoms. The soul is made up of smooth round atoms, such as compose the sun and moon; hence it is described as a sort of fire or hot substance. Because the soul-atoms are spherical, the soul penetrates the body and produces movement.[76] The conclusion is that the soul is a body within the body. To complete the materialism, Democritus identifies soul and reason.[77] The implications of this will be seen in studying Aristotle's doctrine; e.g., it means that there would be no distinction between sensation and thought. Moreover, sense-perception, through impact of atoms from the object, does not yield truth: "We know nothing in reality, for truth is in an abyss."[78]

Of the two principles, the soul is to be valued above the body, for he who chooses the goods of the soul chooses the more divine;[79] and perfection of soul corrects the weakness of the body, but physical prowess without intelligence does not improve the soul.[80] It belongs to the soul to guide human living and discriminate between pleasures and desires;[81] above all, happiness, which is the goal of man in life, is seated in the soul.[82] Happiness is considered as consisting in well-being, cheerfulness, the fruit of moderation in all things, sinning neither by excess nor by defect.[83] One must keep due measure in all things, for if he oversteps, the most pleasurable things will become the most unpleasant.[84]

Practically, such principles lead Democritus to advise men not to live in fear of any future life, yet not to give in unwisely to desire, to bodily pleasures; at the same time, with moderation as guide they should find pleasure in this life, for life without festival is a long road without an inn.[85] This is an ethics of this earth indeed; but were this life the be-all and end-all, his maxims and their

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[73] One should distinguish the roles of necessity and chance in this system. The movement of atoms in space is natural and therefore necessary; the concourse of atoms to form a world is fortuitous; the details, finally, of the cosmos are by design of nature (cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 4, 196a24 ff.; and K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, p. 303).

[74] Fragment 297.

[75] Fragment 34.

[76] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, I, 2, 404a1 ff.; 3, 406b15; and also Diogenes Laertius, IX, 44, in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 165 and 185.

[77] "ψυχὴν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν." See Aristotle, *On the Soul*, I, 2, 405a5; and 404a27; and the commentary of John Philoponos in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, n. 101, p. 185, and n. 113, p. 187.

[78] Fragment 117. See also fragment 9.

[79] Fragment 37.

[80] Fragment 187.

[81] Cf. fragment 159.

[82] Fragments 170–171.

[83] Cf. fragments 191, 3, 174, 198, etc.

[84] Fragment 233.

[85] Fragment 230.

prudent application to individual, family, and political life would provide a rather noble code of action. Many of them are valuable even in a supernatural setting.

Influence. Plato and the Early Academy ignored Democritus, though no reason is known, while the later Academy, according to Cicero,[86] ridiculed him. Aristotle and his school, on the contrary, seemed to think highly of Democritus, for they gave careful and critical studies and summaries of his teachings. Epicurus owed much to him, both in his physical theories and in his hedonism; but late in life he repudiated his debt.[87] The axiom that man is the microcosm, a mirror of the great world, becomes a keystone in Neoplatonism, a frequent saying of the Scholastics, and influential in our own times. On the other hand, the roots of later skepticism may be found in his teaching on sense-perception.

SUMMARY

With the Atomists we conclude our study of the pre-Socratics. While the Sophists are usually included in that term, they are so different from the physicists and so intimately linked to Socrates himself, that their study is reserved for the following chapter. We must now attempt to retrace our steps and achieve a *general retrospect* on the physical philosophers, to reach thereby an over-all organic picture of their contribution.

1. **Motion and the Logos.** History of philosophy exists because philosophy has its existence in the minds of men. Men are children of their times; and as a result a philosophy is intimately bound up with the mentality of the age in which it emerges. It is often limited by the mental horizon, the cultural background, the *Weltanschauung* of the area and epoch in which the philosopher is born. Such elements were at work in shaping the philosophy of the pre-Socratics. They were captivated by "movement" in the widest sense of the word: movement in the heavens, in the coming-to-be and passing-away of the things of experience, in the incessant change of human life, individual and political. "It is owing to wonder that men both now and at first began to philosophize: they began by wondering at the more obvious difficulties, and then gaining ground slowly they came to more intricate questions, such as the phases of the moon, the phenomena of the sun and stars, the genesis of the universe."[88]

Men thus began to philosophize out of wonder, to escape from ignorance. The Greeks showed thereby a true appreciation for another important element of their mental horizon: the reason of man. Not only was man subject to change, as other beings of the universe, not only did he possess life with other animals, but he also had the power of directing this life, the power of understanding what he did and of communicating his experience to others. The logos thus enabled man to know what things are and what are their causes (philosophy), to live with others in harmony in the *polis* or city-state, to direct his life toward higher things in a more rational way, and to attain the ultimate, the "always," the unchangeable.

However, captivated by movement, these men concentrated on the external world. When they studied man, it was within the pattern of the external world, not as forming a world of his own. It was not until Socrates that man became the center of thought, and the transition was provided by the Sophists. The knowledge sought by the pre-Socratics, their wisdom, was the wisdom of nature, the *Physis*. Hence they are rightly called the *Physiologoi*, those who think and speak about the physical world.

2. **The Wisdom of the pre-Socratics.** It is in terms of wisdom that we can best

[86] *Academica priora*, II, 17, 55; in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

[87] Cf. Cicero and Plutarch, in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, nn. 51–53, p. 174.

[88] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 2, 982b13 ff.

interpret Greek philosophy, especially the early period, which is not easy to understand. Our analysis has attempted to picture the pre-Socratics as seeking after wisdom as contrasted to the myths of the poets and the fables of the herd.

a) The earliest philosophers, the Ionians, and to some extent the Pythagoreans, beginning in wonder to philosophize, sought to reach the genesis of the universe through that which was the principle or source whence everything came. Nature as the ultimate source, not nature as individual things, was their primary interest. Their answers were primitive, without scientific proof or demonstration, resting on imagination and what might be called an intuition of cosmic unity. Theirs, then, was a *wisdom* that consisted in *the truth about Nature*, a metaphysical intuition which constitutes their glory and their claim to a place in history.

b) To Heraclitus and Parmenides, such speculation appeared as very inadequate and defective, because it looked too much to the world around us and did not penetrate to the true character of Nature, its inner structure or being. Radically opposed to each other, Heraclitus and Parmenides both agreed that the logos, the reason of man, must ascend to the unity behind all things. Heraclitus found it in the Logos governing all change; Parmenides in unchanging Being, with the loss to philosophy of the external, changing world. Theirs was *wisdom as the vision of being.*

c) In the last group of physicists interest centers once more on the constitution of concrete things. Questions left unanswered before now engage attention, to be solved by the theory of elements. Under the influence of Parmenides, who however never meant his being to be a principle, the later philosophers rationalized that things of experience were produced by the combination of unchanging elements: Empedocles, through the combination of four basic roots; Anaxagoras, by the unfolding and commingling of the seeds infinite in number and smallness; Leucippus and Democritus, with more logic, by means of the atoms uniform in nature. In all these thinkers we find the human mind seeking a rational knowledge rather than a vision or intuition, a *wisdom* that is *the rational science of things.*

The Second Period: THE GOLDEN AGE

LOOKING back over the physicists, we may be surprised to note that with the exception of Anaxagoras and the School of Abdera none of them lived on the mainland of Greece. Evidently, the setting there was not too propitious for philosophy: Anaxagoras was cast out of Athens, as Socrates was later to be there condemned to death; Democritus visited Athens once, more or less incognito, perhaps not finding the city to his liking. Too, the Athenians give us the impression of being deficient in powers of philosophical concentration, although ever anxious to hear something new, delighting too in feats of oratory, in flow of rhetoric, in drama, and in public affairs. There were indeed thinkers or students among them, musicians, mathematicians, economists, politicians in the original sense of the term; but no philosophers.

It is only in the second period of Greek thought that we shall find philosophy more or less at home in Athenian circles, there reaching its highest development in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, in the Academy and in the Lyceum. This period is characterized by a transition from the almost purely physical philosophy of the preceding period to the more truly metaphysical and universal philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

In this development the Sophists serve to shift attention from the physical world to focus it on man as the thinking subject.[1] They thus prepare the way for Socrates, who took what was best in the Sophist movement and far surpassed them in the depth and originality of his thought.

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[1] Cf. Aristotle, *De partibus animalium,* I, 1, 642a27 ff.: "In the days of Socrates . . . men gave up inquiring into the works of nature, and philosophers directed their attention to political science and the virtues which benefited mankind."

CHAPTER VII: The Days of Socrates

§ *1. The Sophists*

In itself, the term *sophist* does not apply to any definite philosophical trend or school. Originally σοφιστής meant a skilled craftsman, and was so used of musicians, poets, horsemen; more simply, it meant a wise man, and was thus given to the Seven Sages of ancient Greece and to some of the philosophers; sometimes too it was used sneeringly of those who made a show of wisdom.[1] Later, in the period after the Persian wars, it took on a special reference to the wandering teachers of Greece who made a profession of knowledge in either practical or theoretical subjects. Plato revolted against the name, and because of his attacks and those of Aristotle the term came to have a derogatory connotation. We should not be misled thereby into a wholesale condemnation of the educational movement carried on by the Sophists. They answered the needs of the times and actually prepared the way for Socrates and Plato, and through them for Aristotle.[2]

Wisdom as Rhetoric and Culture. The Sophists were intimately associated with the new forms of political life that arose in Greece and particularly in Athens in the fifth century, for they became the first schoolteachers of the new democracy. The age saw the rise of a new ideal of civic life, the *polis* or city-state, a democratic institution in which all were to take part. Athens became a democracy about 508 B.C., attained its glory under Pericles (443–429), and continued under such popular government (with some vicissitudes) until Philip of Macedonia conquered the city in 338. The city, however, lacked a regular program of educating its young men for the new state, and the Sophists arose to answer this need, to prepare men for public and political activity. They became the professional teachers of *areté* (which does not connote virtue as such, but rather civic training).

Their instruction aimed at imparting a comprehensive culture embracing politics and the arts needed for the juridical and legal professions, especially eloquence, grammar, rhetoric, dialectic. Since this implied a general education, the Sophists were the "encyclopedists" of Greece. But at the same time, stress was put primarily on rhetoric: the ability to speak well,[3] the art of disputing about all things.[4]

[1] Cf. K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1949), p. 341; and the testimony of Aristides, in M. C. Nahm, *Selections from Early Greek Philosophy*, 3 ed. (New York, 1947), p. 232.

[2] For a general and very helpful study of the movement, cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York, 1943), I, 286–331; also, M. Untersteiner, *The Sophists* (New York, 1953).

[3] Plato, *Gorgias*, 449.

[4] Plato, *Sophist*, 232.

We may, therefore, say that the Sophists introduced a new type of wisdom to replace wisdom about the physical universe. The Sophists looked on wisdom as rhetoric and culture.

Unfortunately, rhetoric was too often a means of persuasion rather than a vehicle of the truth. Added to this was the fact that many Sophists were incipient skeptics in philosophy (the result, perhaps, of the conflicting doctrines of the pre-Socratics). We can readily see, then, why Socrates and Plato were quick to attack them. The philosophers accused them of three specific faults: (1) they were ready to talk on all things and desired their pupils to be able to speak on many subjects and persuade others, whether what they said was true or not;[5] (2) they imparted their learning at a price, and admitted students on a money basis rather than because of intellectual ability;[6] (3) they did not pursue knowledge for its own sake but for practical purposes, and were teachers of other men's doctrines, not their own.[7]

Value of the Sophists. Though such opprobrium was deserved, perhaps, by some Sophists, it should not blind us to the over-all value of the movement. The Sophists are of importance for turning men's minds to consider man himself on his own terms and not as a mere part of the physical universe to be studied in terms of the cosmos. Human life came to be appreciated in its fullness, as the object of *paideia*. Thus the Sophists posed questions of ethics, politics, religion, grammar, and other human affairs. Men discovered the world of man. Yes, and the Greeks discovered the world of Greece, for the Sophists as wandering scholars helped the Hellenes to realize their unity as a people. One of them, Gorgias, forcefully tried to bring political harmony among the city-states, arguing that the Greeks should turn their military energy against the barbarians instead of against one another.[8]

Again, we cannot underestimate the contribution made by the Sophists to the history of culture. Heirs of the poets, they were the new teachers of Greece, the new medium of Greek culture. They did not, indeed, give that culture its final form of the seven liberal arts, but they did inaugurate the trivium, as it was to be called later, of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, and popularized mathematics and other subjects. Others were to perfect their work, but theirs is the honor of having begun the classical tradition. Much later this would be transferred to the Romans, systematized by Cicero and Quintilian, Christianized by the Fathers of the Church: it was to be the culture of the Western world, the background and backbone of Western civilization.[9]

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[5] *Gorgias*, 447.

[6] *Sophist*, 225.

[7] *Protagoras*, 313. Hence Aristotle makes a sweeping condemnation: "Now for some people it is better worth-while to seem to be wise than to be wise without seeming to be (for the art of the Sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality, and the Sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom); for them, then, it is clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so" (*De sophisticis elenchis*, I, 165a19).

[8] Cf. M. C. Nahm, op. cit., p. 246.

[9] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 314 ff.

§ 2. *Individual Sophists*

There is very little by way of direct account of the formal philosophical teachings of individual Sophists; more fragments are extant of their rhetoric than of their philosophy. The Sophists most remembered are those attacked by Plato and Aristotle, and the meaning of their teachings is often quite open to debate.

Protagoras of Abdera (fl. 440). The first Sophist, or at least the first to accept money and proclaim himself a teacher of culture or civic virtue,[10] was Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490–411). Embarked on his career at thirty, he spent long years at his profession and gained considerable repute in Greece. Some early authorities[11] made him the disciple of Democritus, but the chronology Plato gives of his life would preclude this. Comparison between the two men, however, shows surprising parallels in doctrine, so that, though no authority seems to warrant the conclusion, it is probable that Protagoras taught Democritus, or both learned from Leucippus. Considered in this setting, some of the doctrines of Protagoras do not seem so strange and new.

The goal of his teaching was to impart "prudence" (*εὐβουλία*) in regard to one's own house, "how best to put it in order, and in matters also of the city-state, so that one will be able to act and speak for the best in the affairs of the city."[12] This is the art of politics, whereby men are made good citizens. In this teaching, however, Protagoras put most stress on rhetoric, long speeches, a show of knowledge whether one possessed it or not.[13]

Of philosophical doctrines ascribed to him, the most important and the most debated is the axiom: "Man is a measure of all things, both of those things that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not."[14] This dictum is given divers interpretations; many saw in it pure subjectivism and resultant relativism in all fields of thought; others, a denial of the principle of contradiction.[15] Yet, is it so strikingly different from Democritus, to whom (and Empedocles likewise) Aristotle also refers,[16] and who held that we perceive nothing strictly true but only what changes with the conditions of the body? Moreover, Protagoras found such varied opinions among the physicists that none of them provided him with a real standard of judgment or scale of values. Therefore, he might logically consider man, the center of his thought, as the true measure of all. Did not Democritus[17] bid a man hold to his own opinion first?

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[10] Plato, *Protagoras*, 349A; Diogenes Laertius, IX, 52; both in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 237, 239. The value of the Platonic dialogues as a source of our knowledge of the Sophists must be judged to some extent in the light of the problem of authorship and the interpretation of the individual dialogues evoked by J. Zürcher (to be considered later). There are, however, other sources which help us evaluate the historical value of the dialogues, and these we have endeavored to use.

[11] Diogenes Laertius, IX, 50; in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 237; others, *ibid.*

[12] *Protagoras*, 318.

[13] *Ibid.*, 334, 336.

[14] *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν*" (fragment 1). See also Plato, *Theaetetus*, 151E; Sextus Empiricus, in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 239, 242.

[15] For the former, cf. Plato, *Cratylus*, 385E; *Theaetetus*, 166D; for the latter cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV, 5–6.

[16] See also John Philoponus, quoted in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

[17] Fragment 264.

In other teachings, Protagoras shows further similarity to Democritus: the identification of soul and mind,[18] with the "thinking" part residing in the breast; the ideals of education; the place allotted to justice, reverence, virtue, and moderation, in human life;[19] and agnosticism in respect to the gods.[20]

Although we will not disagree with the common opinion that relativism, a certain agnosticism, and skepticism are characteristic of Protagoras, we will not hold that he was alone in promoting such views. He is a child of his time, and no better or worse than the last of the physicists. Unlike them, he advances no physical theories, and tries to turn men to virtue and *paideia*, and in this lies his merit. His importance is shown in the serious study of his views by both Plato and Aristotle; his influence, in the refutation they elaborated under the impetus of his errors.

Gorgias of Leontini (c. 480–372). "Rhetoric is my art," declares Gorgias in Plato's dialogue.[21] This is indeed the characteristic of Gorgias; he cannot be considered a philosopher. Born in Leontini, Sicily, he had been a pupil of Empedocles and taught some of his doctrine. But the greatest contribution of his extremely long life as a Sophist was to rhetoric, the art of extempore oratory, the grand manner for the grand theme.[22] Unfortunately, he seems to have stressed form at the expense of matter, appearance for truth.

Besides speeches and a text in rhetoric, which consisted more of set models to be memorized than a scientific exposition, he authored a work *On Nature* (also called *On Non-Being*) which won him the title of the Nihilist. The burden of the book, as Sextus Empiricus preserves it,[23] is to establish three points: (1) nothing exists; (2) even if anything did exist, nothing could be known of it; (3) even if knowledge were possible, it could not be communicated to others. Perhaps Gorgias was serious in this piece of dialectic; but the more plausible explanation sees in this either a joke at the expense of the physicists and Parmenides — a bombastic demonstration of wit — or more probably a piece of mental gymnastics to make his pupils think.

The real importance of Gorgias is best seen in the reaction he (and other rhetoricians) provoked in Plato and Aristotle.[24] The rhetorician, the latter claimed, must know whereof he is talking and not make a show of words; he must as well be concerned about truth and justice as about the nonessentials of his trade. Later, Cicero was to hold up the ideal of the *doctus orator*, who possessed *sapientia* as well as *eloquentia*.

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[18] According to Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV, 5, 1099b13 ff., and Diogenes Laertius, IX, 51, in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[19] Cf. Democritus, fragment 178 ff., and the picture of Protagoras in Plato's dialogue of that name. It is interesting to see the emphasis he lays on training (fragments 3, 11).

[20] Protagoras begins his "On the Gods" (Περὶ θεῶν) with the statement: "As to the gods, I do not know either that they exist or do not exist. For many are the obstacles to knowledge, both the obscurity of the question and the brevity of human life" (fragment 1; M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, p. 243).

[21] *Gorgias*, 449A.

[22] Philostratus, therefore, salutes him as the father, in a sense, of the art of the Sophists (in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–246).

[23] Summary of the text in K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1948); complete in M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–252.

[24] Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 459CD, 504E, 521–527; *Phaedrus*, 268; and Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I, 1–2, etc.

Other Sophists. Of the numerous Sophists who roamed through Greece, a few are important for their connection to the philosophers to come. Thus PRODICUS, a rival of Gorgias in popularity at Athens, emphasized "correct terminology" in his special fifty-drachmae course, and thus paved the way for preciseness and accuracy in philosophical terminology. THRASYMACHUS compiled, among other works, a text on the "Great Art," rhetoric, the technique of which he developed; possibly Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, II, owes something to him. HIPPIAS was a genuine polymath and an independent, self-reliant sort of genius, vain boastful, acquisitive, the direct opposite of Socrates. At the same time, he seems to have made new discoveries in mathematics.[25] More of a philosopher, ANTIPHON of Athens discussed the problems of the Eleatics and is credited by Aristotle[26] with the basic distinction between natural and artificial forms. Finally, CRITIAS, pupil of Socrates and later leader of Athenian oligarchy, is most interesting for his theory on the origin of religion. In his *Sisyphus*,[27] he pictures human society as originally in a state of anarchy. Men then established laws to punish open crimes. When this led to secret violence, some shrewd man invented fear of the gods and introduced religion, teaching there was a God who is mind, who hears and sees all things and will avenge justice. Evidently, for Critias the gods were man-made.

§ 3. *Socrates**

Socrates is one of the imperishable figures of history who have become symbolic, almost mythical. The real man, the citizen of Athens (c. 469–399 B.C.), lost most of his personality as he entered history and became the model and exemplar of those who suffer death for the truth.[28]

Life. Son of Sophroniscus (a mason, perhaps) and Phaenarete (a midwife), Socrates was born at Athens in the heyday of its splendor. Of particular physical robustness and powers of endurance, he led an abstemious and hardy life. In his early days, he seems to have engaged in some study of the physicists; some say he was a pupil of Archelaus, the successor of Anaxagoras at Athens. However, he revolted against the study of physics, owing perhaps to the famous incident of the Delphic oracle. Chaerephon, a devoted friend, asked the oracle if there was any man living wiser than Socrates. From the negative answer to this question Socrates concluded that the god meant he was wisest because he recognized his own ignorance. He then came to conceive his mission as being the search for the stable and certain truth, true wisdom.

In the year 400–399, Socrates was brought to trial by political enemies on the charge of teaching new and unfamiliar religious practices, directed against the State-worship of the gods, and of corrupting the young. The first charge was never clarified; the second was really a charge of infusing into the young a spirit of criticism against the Athenian democracy, especially in Alcibiades and Critias, who had revolted against the State. Instead of going into

[25] Cf. the Platonic dialogue *Lesser Hippias* 368–369, and *passim*; also K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, pp. 385–389.

[26] *Physics*, II, 1, 193a9 ff.

[27] Text in K. Freeman, *Ancilla . . .*, pp. 157–158; and M. C. Nahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 263–264.

* Cf. Bibliography, p. 231.

[28] In later times, Socrates was almost reckoned as a pre-Christian martyr; e.g., Saint Justin gives him special attention for his share in the Divine Logos. The great humanist of the Renaissance, Desiderius Erasmus, boldly invoked him: *Sancte Socrates, ora pro nobis*. This was a prayer in the spirit of the anti-Aristotelianism of the times, of course, but it is significant of the position Socrates has held in history (cf. R. Marcel, " 'Saint' Socrate," *Revue internationale de philosophie*, V [1951], 135–143). Cf. Bibliography for further studies.

exile, Socrates stood trial and made his own defense. When, on his condemnation, he set himself a fine of free meals, he was again found guilty and sentenced to death. He refused a chance to escape and drank the cup of hemlock. "This is the end of our friend, a man, we should say, who was the best of all his time that we have known; and, moreover, the most wise and just."[29]

The Socratic Problem. The death of Socrates made a profound impression on his disciples, and many soon set about recording what they knew of their master. There thus arose a large Socratic literature, which aimed at re-creating his personality. Some of these pieces were undoubtedly produced as themes in the schools of rhetoric, so that to some extent the character of Socrates became stylized and his portrait even self-contradictory in the tradition of conflicting schools. As a result, scholars have difficulty in reaching the historical Socrates.[30] In particular, Xenophon, the Platonic dialogues, and the *Corpus Aristotelicum* present strikingly different views of his character and the contents of his conversations.[31]

Xenophon, a man of practical interests, pictures Socrates almost as a dull and sometimes boring homespun philosopher discoursing on moral subjects: "Socrates (in contrast to the physicists) would hold discourse on what concerned mankind, considering what was pious, what impious. . . ."[32] Such moral interests, moreover, were always within the framework of the problems of the city-state and its citizens: what is a *polis*, what the citizen, his principles and duties.[33]

On the other hand, Plato depicts him as an inspiring, provocative, even exasperating character, who loved to engage men in verbal combat and force them to a confession of ignorance as he led them gradually to the truth. At the same time, the dialogues make him appear as the source of Plato's own views, even of the theory of the Ideas, and as the teacher of an ethical intellectualism. If, as is likely, in this he is nothing more than the official mouthpiece of the Academy, he is no longer the historical Socrates, and we cannot attribute to him the doctrines he is made to voice. Something of the true Socrates, however, emerges from the *Apology*, though even this presents him as already glorified in a school tradition. Lastly, the Socrates so frequently cited in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* is for the most part the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues. Only a few references, which can be verified by comparison to Xenophon, are to the actual hero of history.[34]

The comic dramatists who mention him, e.g., Aristophanes (*The Clouds*, 224–228), are witnesses only to the reaction of the average Athenian to Socrates and the philosophers. What they knew not they blasphemed.

SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER

Socrates described his activities as "philosophy" and "philosophizing," but these expressions cannot be taken in a strict sense. His philosophy is not a system or a discipline, a method of abstract thought detached from his own personality. There are indeed certain philosophical doctrines attributed to him; and he was definite enough in his attitude toward previous and contemporary philosophy. But his own philosophy is rather a new type of intellectual life, a new kind of wisdom which we shall call *wisdom as ethos*, con-

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[29] Plato, *Phaedo*, 118.

[30] Cf., for example, A. H. Chroust, "Socrates: a Source-problem," *The New Scholasticism*, XIX (1945), 48–72; W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, II, 17–27; Ueberweg-Praechter, *Grundriss*, 133–140; F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Westminster, Md., 1946), 99–104.

[31] Cf. A. D. Lindsay (ed.), *Socratic Discourses by Plato and Xenophon* (New York, 1954); and Xenophon, *The Memorabilia of Socrates*, tr. by J. S. Watson (Philadelphia, 1899).

[32] *Memorabilia*, I, 1, 16.

[33] *Ibid.*, and IV, 6, 13.

[34] See A. H. Chroust, "Socrates in the Light of Aristotle's Testimony," *The New Scholasticism*, XXVI (1952), 327–365.

sisting primarily in his attitude toward life and the moral element of human living.

Particular Ethical Doctrines. Socrates is not important for any special philosophical tenets, though some have been ascribed to him. Thus he is said to have held that *virtue is knowledge*, in the sense that the wise man, he who knows what is right, will also do what is right.[35] In fact, Socrates is credited with the saying that *no one does wrong intentionally*. This would amount to ethical intellectualism and, because it fails to account for free will, psychological determinism. Aristotle is quite correct in stating that "in thinking all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom Socrates was wrong, but in saying that they implied practical wisdom he was correct."[36] There is an intellectual content to virtue, but this does not mean identity.

Socrates is also said to have adopted a *utilitarian* norm of virtue and moral goodness. At least, Xenophon would have him base moral precepts on the motive of utility. However, it would seem that by *useful* Socrates meant what is truly useful for man, determined by some absolute standard of the good of human nature, not by passing pleasure.

The doctrine of immortality and that of the pre-existence of the soul (as found in Plato's *Meno*) have both been attributed to Socrates. They are, however, clearly Platonic in origin. Probably his own opinion is set forth in the *Apology* (40 ff.). Condemned to death, he tells his judges that some "divine faculty within him" (δαιμονιόν τι) in no way opposed him when he chose death to exile; hence, even his condemnation to death is good for him. Death is no evil; he hopes it is a good, though he does not feel it proven. "We go our ways: I to die, you to live. Which is better, God only knows."[37]

Socrates and the Physicists. In the *Apology* (19) Socrates declares: "The simple truth is, O men of Athens, I have nothing to do with physical speculations." Aristotle remarks of him that he neglected the world of nature, to busy himself about ethical matters.[38] Yet in his youth he had studied geometry and astronomy and, seemingly, the works of the physicists.[39] Theophrastus even claims that he was a member of the school of Archelaus, the successor of Anaxagoras.[40] We may thus find an element of truth in the words he is made to speak in the *Phaedo* (96): "When I was young I had a prodigious desire to know that part of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature. To know the causes of things, and why a thing is and is brought to be and passes away, appeared to me a lofty profession." Thus he was attracted to the doctrine of Anaxagoras on Mind, expecting to find in it a genuine teleological view of the cosmos, that the rule of nature must be directed to a useful end.[41] He was delighted with such a

[35] Plato, *Protagoras*, 357C, 358BC, 361B; Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, III, 9, 4; and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV, 13, 1144b15 ff.

[36] *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV, 1144b20 ff.; cf. also Book III, 7, 1113b14–17.

[37] *Apology*, 42.

[38] *Metaphysics*, I, 6, 987b1–3.

[39] See Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, IV, 7, 2 and 6; I, 1, 14; and A. H. Chroust, "Socrates and Pre-Socratic Philosophy," *Modern Schoolman*, XXIX (1951–1952), 119–135.

[40] *Physical Opinions*, fragment 4.

[41] According to the testimony of Xenophon, likewise, Socrates was deeply interested in teleology and is quoted as saying: "Whatever exists for a useful purpose is the work of an intelligence" (*Memorabilia*, I, 4, 4).

thought, and said to himself: "If Mind is the disposer and cause of all, Mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular thing in the best place."[42] His expectations and hopes, however, were soon shattered, for he evidently looked for too much in the sober Clazomenean.

As he grew older, he lost interest in the physicists, because he came to see that the study of nature caused him to neglect the real question of philosophy, the knowledge of things human. "I was fascinated by them to such a degree [in my youth] that my eyes grew blind to the things I had seemed to myself and to others also to know quite well; I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths."[43] His true interest lay not in nature but in man. At the same time, he evidently did not disparage the study of nature nor show contempt for those who pursued it.[44]

Socrates and the Sophists. Both Socrates and the Sophists were interested in man and in human problems, but there was a vast difference between them. Externally, perhaps, Socrates was so like the Sophists, except for the fact that he took no fees, that a superficial observer like Aristophanes was led to number him among them. And in fact Socrates did use the Sophist technique while actually waging a real battle against their teachings.

The difference lay within, in his methods and in his ideals. The Sophists were professional teachers who boasted of their knowledge and their own success, and were given to long discussions on the problems of life, with particular care for the rhetoric exercised in such harangues. Socrates, on the other hand, professed ignorance and a willingness to be taught, for his heart was set on seeking the truth. His own discussions were simple in appearance but in content and purpose extremely subtle. Their goal was not his own glory, but the improvement of the souls of men, for this he considered the command or mission given him by the god.[45] Therefore, in his approach to a problem he came to develop his own method of "conversation," a dialectic aimed at the true good of his "opponent."

The dialogue would usually embrace two steps, the first cleansing the mind of false or sophistical knowledge, the second leading to the truth and the formation of a concept and perhaps a definition. Socrates would humbly begin with a confession of his own ignorance on the subject and declare himself eager to learn. Then he would craftily entangle his interlocutor in a net of questions and make him eventually cry for mercy and acknowledge his actual ignorance of what he thought he knew. This step is called Socratic irony. Then, more positively, Socrates would begin to exercise his "intellectual midwifery," in imitation of his mother's "trade." By a series of questions, he would lead his questioner to discover for himself the truth of which he had admitted his ignorance. Through such ma-

[42] *Phaedo*, 97.

[43] *Ibid.*, 96.

[44] *Apology*, 19. Xenophon is a little extreme, therefore, in the conclusion to his statement: "In contrast to others, Socrates set his face against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of the Universe: how the Cosmos, as the wise men term it, came into being; or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To trouble one's brains about such matters was, he argued, to play the fool" (*Memorabilia*, I, 1, 11; cf. also IV, 7, 6).

[45] *Apology*, 29.

ieutics (midwifery was called the μαιευτικὴ τέχνη), he would lead by induction from particular instances to the formation of a concept and sometimes of a definition.[46]

We are thus brought to realize the deep contrast between Socrates and the Sophists. In place of their sham display of learning he sought true knowledge, and to their constant chattering he opposed thought-provoking discussion. In a word, he preferred *thinking* to *talking*. The Sophists made knowledge a public thing, with intellectual frivolity as a result. Socrates in reaction withdrew into the world of thought and reflection, to recover his own intellectual stability; and when he then emerged into public life, it was to bring to men his own form of wisdom.[47]

Wisdom as Ethos. We come at last to the true worth of Socrates. His individual doctrines are of small value; he has nothing to offer in place of the early physicists, for his whole attention is centered on "wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul."[48] He was thus occupied, says Aristotle, with ethical matters and ethical virtues.[49] This is the key to the wisdom of Socrates, but it must not be interpreted in a narrow sense to mean that Socrates was primarily interested in morality or in man and his activities. Rather, *Ethos* has a broader meaning here, for it embraces primarily man's attitude toward life, his character and customs, and with these the moral element. The term, therefore, stands for a way or manner of life, indicating that Socrates adapted a new manner of life: meditation on what the things of life are. Socratic wisdom does not center on the ethical; it is itself ethical, an *Ethos*, a living in meditation and contemplation, the life of the spirit and the mind. It was a philosophical existence: his life was his philosophy and his philosophy was his life.[50]

In this, then, lies the basic importance of this rough-cut diamond: the *new philosophical attitude* he revealed to his true followers. To his "friends," as he called his disciples, he was the exemplar of the true philosopher pursuing wisdom, whether of the cosmos or of man, within the framework of a philosophical life. Undoubtedly, he also brought about a *reform in philosophical method*, since he laid the foundation of induction and opened the way to a genuine penetration of the problem of knowledge. Yet these are slight in comparison to the lesson he taught by example, of what a philosopher *is* as well as does.

§ 4. *The Minor Socratic Schools*

It is only by his faithful disciples, Plato and Aristotle, that we may judge the greatness of Socrates. They alone caught the spirit of Socrates and sought to penetrate reality and life as lovers of wisdom, to come to a rational knowledge of all things ac-

[46] See *Euthyphro*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Phaedrus*, 262; and Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, IV, 6, 1, and 13–15.

[47] Cf. X. Zubiri, "Socrates and Greek Wisdom," *The Thomist*, *VII* (1944), 40–45.

[48] Apology, 29E.

[49] *Metaphysics*, I, 6, 987b1; XIII, 4, 1078b 17 ff.

[50] "The 'philosophy' to which Socrates dedicated his life was not metaphysics, nor logic nor ethics nor yet rhetoric. In fact, it was not knowledge in the popular sense. It was a search for a personally moral life" (H. Maier, *Sokrates, sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung* [Tübingen, 1913], pp. 294–295; cf. also X. Zubiri, *art. cit.*, pp. 45–52).

cording to ultimate principles.[51] Most of his followers, unfortunately, took his attitude, his *Ethos*, as a manner of life. They tried slavishly to imitate him in externals instead of living socratically the problems which things pose for human intelligence.

The minor Socratic schools, which are the result, have however some transitional value. Their own doctrines are a combination of pre-Socratic and Socratic elements; and their work lives on to some extent in post-Aristotelian thought. Thus the Megarians show signs of Eleatic influence, and in turn affect the later Skeptics and the Stoics. The Sophists find a reflection in the Cynics, who are also forerunners of Stoicism, while Protagoras influences the Cyrenaics, who in turn are part of the background of the Epicureans.

The Megarians. Euclid of Megara (not the mathematician, who lived a century later) is considered one of the oldest of Socrates' pupils. After the latter's death, he took refuge with Plato and others at Megara. There he founded a school in which he taught an Eleatic metaphysics modified by the ethic of Socrates, identifying the One and the Good. The One, he asserted, is called by many names: Intellect, Reason, God; and what Parmenides predicated of the One, the Megarians applied to the Good.[52] That Euclid held the Ideas to be the only reality, as some have said, seems improbable.

As Zeno defended the teaching of Parmenides by his dialectic, so the followers of Euclid developed the art of disputation (eristic), but carried it to excess. Eubulides in particular delighted in dilemmas, while Diodorus Chronos (d. 307 B.C.) identified the actual and the possible. Such reasonings were not without effect on the logic of the Stoics and the later Skeptics.

Lastly, Stilpo (who taught at Athens c. 320 B.C.) attacked the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas. His chief interest, however, was in ethics, wherein he claimed apathy or indifference to be the goal of moral life. The wise man must be so self-sufficient as to need no friend for happiness.[53] Zeno, the founder of Stoicism (c. 336–264), was his pupil; we shall see later the importance of apathy in that post-Aristotelian philosophy.

Paralleling the Megarians was the Elean school of Phaedo of Elis and the later school of Eretria, neither of which offered anything novel.

The Cynics. Of longer duration and greater influence, the "school" of Antisthenes lasted until the second century after Christ. It had about it always a note of roughness and ruggedness, even to the point of crudity and vulgarity, and almost invariably manifested opposition to the morals and outlook of the common run of men.

The name *Cynics* (*κυνικοί*, "disciples of the dog") is perhaps derived from the gymnasium of Kynosarges (White Dog's Village), a suburb of Athens, where Antisthenes taught after the death of Socrates. More likely it comes from the nickname Antisthenes received (*ἁπλοκύων*, "simple-minded dog"), and from the unconventional mode of life practiced by Diogenes of Sinope and later members of the school. They seemed to welcome such an epithet.

ANTISTHENES, the founder, had been a pupil of the Sophist Gorgias, which explains the cultivation of rhetoric among the Cynics. Later he met Socrates and was so taken by him that he bade his own disciples become his fellow students. However, what struck him most was Socrates' independence of character and courage of convictions; and this self-sufficiency he set up as an ideal in itself. Virtue thus came to mean renunciation and Socratic independence. Virtue alone and ethical knowledge were all-important; all else, worldly goods, scientific learning, the arts, were worthless; the authority of the State and its law were denied and traditional religion abandoned as so many human conventions that impeded the pursuit of virtue.[54]

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[51] Cf. X. Zubiri, *art. cit.*, pp. 52–64.

[52] Diogenes Laertius, II, 106; Cicero, *Academ.*, II, xlii, 129.

[53] Seneca, *Ep.*, IX, i.

[54] To the credit of Antisthenes, he did not profess atheism, but decried the current poly-

This is a far cry from the true Socrates, and shows that Antisthenes has overstressed one facet of the life and outlook of his hero. Socratic mannerisms have been adopted in exaggerated fashion as a way of life. This bore fruit in such a figure as DIOGENES OF SINOPE, who carried these principles to their extreme and remains for all time the typical Cynic, the "Dog," as he called himself. He had no use for material things beyond the bare necessities, deliberately flouted convention and even the moral law, and made himself obnoxious to all. Though legends on him may be exaggerated, he shows in all this the constant Cynic opposition of nature to law and custom: the ideal was to follow nature (in the raw!).

In the later, post-Aristotelian period, the Cynics continued their crudeness and vulgarity, and cultivated rhetoric through the "diatribes" they composed in sarcastic polemic against the mores and outlook of the majority (hence, perhaps, the modern connotation of cynic). The school was not without influence on Stoicism, for the founder of the latter, Zeno of Citium, had been a pupil also of the Cynic Crates of Thebes, who with his wife Hipparchia had given his fortune to the city and embraced Cynic mendicancy with "no one city . . . but the whole world to live in."[55] Later, in the time of the Roman Empire, the Cynics became more religious in temperament and resembled the Stoics to some extent. As the latter taught moral ideals to the cultured classes, the Cynics became popular "preachers" to the masses. Influenced by the higher ideals of Stoicism and the temper of the times, some of the Cynics of this period appear to be the best of the whole school.

The Cyrenaics. The first glimpse of ARISTIPPUS OF CYRENE is the report Xenophon furnishes of his dialogue with Socrates on the goal of *paideia*. Socrates would make all education political, that is, directed to the good of the *polis:* teaching men how to be good rulers or good citizens and subjects. Aristippus, however, has no desire to be trained for either task; for him, the goal is to live in ease and pleasure. Nor will he be caught by political ties and duties, for he will not shut himself up in any one state, but will be a traveler everywhere.[56] Liberty and self-sufficiency are thus for him the path that most surely leads to happiness, that is, ease and pleasure.

The hedonism which was a basic part of Aristippus' philosophy as it was of his own character thus antedates his association with Socrates. Supposedly, he was taught or at least influenced by Protagoras and in turn is reckoned a Sophist by Aristotle.[57] From Protagoras, perhaps, he derived a theory of relativism and sensualism: that sensation is the only thing known to us. Hence, if one's individual sensations are the norm of practical conduct, the end of one's conduct should be to obtain pleasurable sensations. Aristippus thus adapts Socratic eudaemonism, the pursuit of happiness as man's goal, to his own views. The Cyrenaics end by holding sense pleasure as the highest good, to be valued above intellectual goods. Yet even in such doctrine, Aristippus saw the necessity of Socratic *autarkia*, independence, and prudence. Possess pleasure, he would say, but do not let pleasure possess you.

His disciples did not give unanimous interpretation to his doctrine, and their pupils in turn split into sects, so that beyond the central doctrine of pleasure as happiness there was no unified school of Cyrenaics. There is no direct link between them and the Epicureans, but this group undoubtedly had some influence on these later hedonists.

Like all the minor schools, this group professed a one-sided Socraticism that was unfaithful to the true figure of the great forerunner of Platonism and the Peripatos.

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theism of the official (political) anthropomorphic religion. "There are many gods in name," he is credited with saying, "but only one God in reality" (κατὰ νόμον εἶναι πολλοὺς θεούς, κατὰ δε φύσιν ἕνα).

[55] Fragment 17.

[56] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, II, 1, 1–13. On Aristotle's views of metics, strangers, and their way of living, cf. *Politics*, VII, 2, 1324a16 ff.

[57] *Metaphysics*, II, 2, 996a32. He is perhaps the object of Xenophon's remark that there were some who received fragments from Socrates and then sold them at great price to others (*Memorabilia*, I, 2, 60).

CHAPTER VIII: Plato and the Academy

MORE than two thousand years have passed since Plato* stepped forth from the disciples of Socrates to take the lead in the intellectual life of Greece. Yet to this day the character of any philosophy is determined, in part at least, by the relation it bears to him. We shall not go to the lengths of Professor Alfred N. Whitehead, that "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists in a series of footnotes to Plato."[1] It is true, nevertheless, that beginning with Aristotle, Plato has had an undying influence on the thought of the West. Thus, at the close of antiquity, the Greco-Roman world was dominated by the intellectual philosophic religious edifice called Neoplatonism. St. Augustine was deeply though indirectly imbued with Platonic doctrines, while the other Fathers of the Church, if they advanced any philosophy, showed the effects of Platonism or Neoplatonism. If the Scholastics knew little of Plato at firsthand, they received something of him through secondary sources.[2] In the Renaissance Plato returned with greater vigor than ever, and in our own times interest in him continues unabated.[3]

* Cf. Bibliography, p. 231 f.

[1] *Progress and Reality* (New York, 1929), p. 63; cf. A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Greeks* (Milwaukee, 1939), p. 92, n. 7.

[2] Cf. R. Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, Outline of a Corpus Platonicorum Medii Aevi* (London, 1939). Dr. Klibansky is general editor of the *Plato Latinus*: Vol. I: *Meno* (London, 1940); II: *Phaedo* (1950), *Parmenides; Procli Comm. in Parmenidem* (1953).

[3] Cf. P. Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (Chicago, 1938); and R. S. Brumbaugh, "Plato Studies as Contemporary Philosophy," *Review of Metaphysics*, IV (1952), 314–324.

THE ACADEMY

Life of Plato (428/7–348/7). Heredity, environment, and education played each its part in Plato's formation. He was born at Athens or Aegina of a distinguished and wealthy family; his father, Ariston, was said to be a descendant of the Attic king Codrus, while his mother, Perictione, a lateral descendant of Solon, was the sister of Charmides and cousin of Critias, both of whom were political figures. In her family, apparently, was a long tradition of culture and devotion to poetry and philosophy,[4] and from her Plato inherited the poetic temperament which gave his philosophy a lyrical and religious character. Though born in an aristocratic household, his actual political career was short-lived. Throughout his life, however, he held to aristocracy as the better form of government, provided that the ruler be a philosopher-king. His bias against democracy seems to have been induced by the influence of Socrates and the fate of the latter, as well as by the sad experience that democracy could too easily be a rule by demogogues.[5]

His education appears to have been truly liberal. He is said to have studied painting and the poets and to have written lyrics and tragedies.[6] Of more importance, he was

[4] *Charmides*, 155A.

[5] Cf. *Epistle VII*, in the Loeb Classical Library volumes on Plato, VII, 476–565. To what extent the letters attributed to Plato are genuine is a matter of dispute among scholars; most admit that some at least received later revision, and that others perhaps are the work of Xenocrates *et al.*

[6] Diogenes Laertius, III, 5. His instructor in gymnastics, Aristocles of Argos, is supposed to have given him the nickname of Plato because of his broad shoulders; his original name was Aristocles, if we can believe the story (Diogenes Laertius, III, 4).

acquainted in his youth with Cratylus the Heraclitean and also, according to Diogenes Laertius, with Hermogenes, a Parmenidean.[7] A decisive turning point in his intellectual development came with his acquaintance with Socrates. He became his "pupil" at the age of twenty, though he must have known him earlier, since his uncle Charmides was already in the Socratic circle. To what extent, however, he became a "disciple" cannot be determined; he was present at the trial of Socrates,[8] but was absent through illness at the death scene.[9] After the execution (March, 399), Plato went to Megara, but soon returned to Athens and composed some of his early works.

His culture was further broadened by travel, though legend is mixed with facts in the accounts of his journeys. It is not certain that he went to Egypt; a medieval legend pictures him as acquiring his philosophy there from the books of Moses! On the other hand, he did visit Italy and Syracuse when he was forty years old. There he met the Pythagoreans and at Syracuse resided at the court of Dionysius I until his outspoken criticism of tyranny caused him to be sold into slavery. He was rescued from the slave mart of Aegina by Anniceris, a stranger from Cyrene, and returned to Athens.[10]

In the years that followed, Plato founded his "school" in the sheltered suburb northwest of Athens known as the Academy (from the nearby sanctuary of the hero Academus). In this pleasant cloister Plato lived, talked, and wrote for the next twenty years, until he was called to Sicily in 367 after the death of the tyrant Dionysius I. The latter's brother-in-law, Dion, had become Plato's disciple and lifelong friend on the earlier visit and now hoped that Plato would advise and train the tyrant's son, Dionysius II, to be a worthy ruler. But the journey was in vain, for in suspicion and jealousy the new king had banished his uncle and refused to submit to the intellectual discipline Plato required of him. Hence Plato returned to Athens in 366, though he remained in touch with Dionysius by letter. A third journey, in 361, at the urgent request of the king himself, was an utter failure. Dionysius desired the company of Plato, but would not undertake the studies the philosopher demanded, nor would he do justice to the exiled Dion, who was now in Athens at the Academy. There was never to be the ideal philosopher-king, and Plato withdrew to his homeland.

Though troubles in Syracuse were to disturb his remaining years, he gave himself wholeheartedly to his own work until his death in 347. Cicero says he died writing in his eighty-first year; Diogenes Laertius agrees on the year, but claims he died at a wedding feast.[11] He was buried on the grounds of the Academy.

The Academy. Other schools, it is true, preceded the Academy: the Pythagoreans were a kind of philosophico-religious body not without influence on Plato; Antisthenes had begun a school at Kynosarges after the death of Socrates; and Isocrates, a pupil of Gorgias the Sophist and later of Socrates, had set up a school of oratory in Athens itself which for several decades was to be a rival of the Academy.[12] Yet none of these schools ever attained the intrinsic greatness and the perduring existence that marked the Academy. Begun by Plato about 387 B.C., it lasted as a corporate body of philosophers and scientists until A.D. 529. Since it had never become a Christian group, the Academy was suppressed and its endowments confiscated when the Emperor Justinian in 529 disbanded all pagan religious societies.

Though it thus lasted over nine hundred years, the Academy left little evidence of its internal structure or history. Tradition has it that Plato erected in his garden a shrine to the Muses, which would indicate that the Academy was a kind of religious

[7] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 6, 987a32–35 (on Cratylus); and Diogenes Laertius, III, 6.

[8] *Apology*, 34A.

[9] *Phaedo*, 59.

[10] W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York, 1945), III, 197–212; and L. Marcuse, *Plato and Dionysius: a Double Biography* (New York, 1947).

[11] Cicero, *De Senectute*, V, 13; Diogenes Laertius, III, 2 and 45.

[12] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, III, 46–70.

fraternity not unlike that of the Pythagoreans. In addition, it was certainly a school or at least the home of a group of scholars and writers. The *paideia* there achieved was broad and deep, in the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom for their own sake and for the making of the inner man. The school, whether formal or not, stood in marked contrast to the Sophists and their students, and to Isocrates in particular, for these envisaged an education of practical bearing on the things of the moment, and so stressed rhetoric and eloquence; the Academy, on the other hand, like the Peripatos of Aristotle, which soon became its rival, strove to be free from the trammels of the law courts and the market place, to keep its gaze fixed on the region above the common man.[13]

But to project modern concepts into the Academy and see in it the first European university, with a regular program of lectures and studies under a systematic organization of all the sciences, is a bit farfetched and entirely without historical foundation.[14] Perhaps later, in emulation of the Peripatos which did give formal courses, a more definite curriculum was introduced, though of this again we have no proof, unless some texts of the seventh book of the *Republic* are a mirror of the Academy. Nevertheless, current opinion does picture Plato as the general director of studies, writing his dialogues and giving formal lectures to the students. These lectures, it is usually said, propounded an esoteric doctrine at odds with the dialogues. Specifically, he is supposed to have taught orally that the Ideas are identified with numbers, and are derived from two ultimate principles, the One and the Dyad (i.e., the pair) of the great and the small. All this, however, is a fabrication to explain later mutations of the theory of the Ideas and is without a shred of evidence.[15]

On the other hand, there is evidence of a change of doctrine within the Academy itself as the immediate successors of Plato transformed or adapted his teachings to their own ways of thought.[16] Their master does not seem ever to have imposed his own philosophy, specifically his own position regarding the Ideas, as the official doctrine of the school. Plato indeed maintained that the only answer to the basic questions of knowledge and being was that there is a mind which can apprehend reality, and that this reality somewhere has absolute and unchanging existence. But the pursuit of truth and the personal solution of such problems claimed more attention than history or ipsedixitism.[17] In view of such changes of doctrine on the part of his disciples and successors, we may here anticipate the later history of the Academy by a brief glance at its early development.

The Personnel of the Academy. By reason of doctrinal trends among its members, which were often the outcome of the doctrinal positions of the current leader, the scholarch, historians usually distinguish three or even five periods in the history of the Academy. The Early Academy was made up of the more immediate disciples of Plato (347–250 B.C.), some of whom changed his doctrine considerably. The Middle Academy (250–90 B.C.) was marked by a wave of skepticism directed against Stoic dogmatism, while the New

[13] Cf. *Theaetetus*, 173–176.

[14] H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (Berkeley, 1945), p. 61 ff.; and W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* (Oxford, 1934), p. 18 ff.

[15] Cf. H. Cherniss, *op. cit., passim*; and G. Boas, "Ancient Testimony to Secret Doctrines," *Philosophical Review*, LXII (1953), 79–92. On the basis of some vague references in the Corpus *Aristotelicum*, ancients attest to a lecture Plato is said to have given on the Good, in which he supposedly changed his doctrines. The testimonies have little apparent value, though admittedly the problem needs further study (cf. Aristotle, *Selected Fragments* [*The Works of Aristotle*, tr. D. Ross, Vol. XII], Oxford, 1952, 115 f.).

[16] This is certainly suggested by the words of Aristotle: "Now, regarding the Ideas, we must first examine the ideal theory itself, not connecting it in any way with the nature of numbers, but treating it in the form in which it was originally understood by those who first maintained the existence of the Ideas" (*Metaphysics*, XIII, 4, 1078b10 ff.).

[17] H. Cherniss, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–85.

Academy (after 88 B.C.) showed a return to dogmatism and was linked to Roman philosophy, since both Varro and Cicero studied at Athens in this period. This gave way to what is usually called Middle Platonism, an eclectic type of doctrine in a transition period which prepared for Neoplatonism and Plotinus. The adoption and adaption of the latter's doctrine mark the last days of the Academy. For the present, however, our study is limited to the Early Academy, in what few fragments history has left us of its thought.

The immediate successor of Plato was his nephew SPEUSIPPUS (c. 407–338 B.C.). This choice, made by Plato himself, is considered by many historians as the reason why Aristotle left the Academy. Facts, however, point to the reasonableness of the choice: Aristotle was only thirty-seven years old at Plato's death, Speusippus close to sixty, a long-time student of his uncle and a philosopher in his own right to whom Aristotle was deeply indebted. By Athenian law, moreover, it seems likely that Plato had to bequeath possession of the Academy to a citizen, rather than to a stranger from Macedonia.[18]

Only fragments remain of Speusippus' many works, and these yield fairly little on his real differences with Plato.[19] They do indicate that he abolished the Platonic distinction between knowledge and opinion by introducing besides scientific reasoning a scientific perception, that is a sense knowledge that yielded certainty in regard to sense objects.[20] How far the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* correctly reports his teachings seems debatable.[21] From several parallel passages, however, it seems evident that there were three distinct and successive positions in the Academy: the original theory of Plato, holding to Ideas, sensible things, and (perhaps) abstract mathematical objects; a second "version" which abandoned ideal numbers and held only to mathematical numbers as having the independent existence previously attributed to the Ideas; and a third teaching, that the Ideas and such numbers were identical.[22]

The second of these positions is identified as that of Speusippus. So enamored was he of mathematics to the detriment of metaphysics that he completely rejected the Ideas as such, substituting instead the separate and independent existence of mathematical numbers, after the manner of the Pythagoreans. These he would thus make the principles of all things.[23] This marks a distinct Pythagorizing tendency not found in Plato himself.

This tendency continues in XENOCRATES (396–315 B.C.), successor of Speusippus.[24] After Plato's death, Xenocrates had gone with Aristotle to Asia Minor and later to Mytilene, but returned in 338 (at the request, it seems, of Speusippus) to become scholarch for some twenty-four years.[25] From all accounts, he was a man of singular austerity and asceticism, so that Cicero later called him the *gravissimus philosophorum*.[26] To him quite definitely is ascribed the third "version" recounted above, an attempt to reconcile Plato and Speusippus. Returning to Plato's Ideas, yet retaining Speusippus' numbers, he proposed the identity of the Ideas and the numbers. Accordingly, he claimed that numbers were the blend of

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 82. The author suggests also that the curriculum of the Academy was by now largely devoted to mathematics, dear to Speusippus but distasteful to Aristotle. The validity of this reason is conjectural.

[19] Cf. Diogenes Laertius, IV, 4–5, for a list; and J. Stenzel, "Speusippos," in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Zw. Reihe, VII (1929), cols. 1636–1669; P. Lang, *De Speusippi Academici scriptis* (Bonn, 1911); G. A. Mullachius, *Fragmentorum philosophorum graecorum* (Paris, 1879), tom. III, 62–99.

[20] Fragment 203 (in Mullachius, *op. cit.*, 93b–94a).

[21] Cf. H. Cherniss, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–43.

[22] Cf. *Metaphysics*, XIII, 9, 1085b34 ff.; 6, 1080a12 ff.; and VII, 2, 1028b17 ff.; and note 16 above.

[23] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, 2, 1028b21 ff.

[24] Cf. R. Heinze, *Xenocrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig, 1892); and G. A. Mullachius, *op. cit.*, III, 100–130.

[25] Diogenes Laertius, IV, 1.

[26] *Tusc. Disp.*, V, 18.

the One and the indefinite Dyad (the pair) of the great and the small.[27] This would mean he posited a certain matter in the Ideas as the origin of things, a definite throwback to Pythagoreanism. Again, following the Pythagoreans, he taught that things have a real participation in the Ideas; no longer are things mere copies since they are composed of numbers or Ideas and matter, as the formal and material causes.[28] From such a premise, lastly, he proceeded to define the soul as a self-moving number. This is often quoted later as Plato's doctrine; but it is actually Xenocrates' attempt to fill what he considered a lacuna in Plato's thought.[29]

Other members of the Early Academy are not as well known, and some are of less importance for philosophy. Heraclides of Ponticus (390–310) and Eudoxus are known for their astronomy; neither was scholarch, and both departed from the teaching of Plato. The scholarchs Polemon (who ruled 315–270 B.C.)[30] and Crates (270–268) have left little historical record of their type of Platonism. Lastly, Crantor (contemporary with Polemon) wrote a *Timaeus* or perhaps some kind of a commentary on the Platonic dialogue of that name. Thereafter Arcesilaus became the head of the Academy (268–241), which history was to call henceforth the Middle Academy.[31]

THE DIALOGUES

The dialogue, with its dialectic, its movement of thought or clash of opinions, its "hunt" for the truth, was truly a new vehicle of philosophy. Most of the pre-Socratics had used prose as a mode of expression; a few, as we have seen, used epic poetry; whereas the dialogue, as Aristotle is reported to have said, is midway between prose and poetry, and had not been used to any extent by philosophers.[32] Yet it was almost inevitable that it should become the literary medium of Plato's thought, precisely because it had been a living part of his own philosophical experience as he listened to Socrates. The power of his master had resided in the spoken word, the dialogue, wherein minds were stripped bare of their fallacies and taught to think aright and search for the truth. Plato, with a talent for the dramatic, adopted the dialogue to make his readers share the same influence he had felt. Philosophy would again be at grips with the problems of life, it would be "the living word of knowledge which has a soul."[33]

The Problem of Authorship. As might be expected, the dialogue became a popular form of philosophical exposition in the Academy.[34] This very popularity resulted later in confusion and controversy over the authenticity of many of the forty-two pieces or more that make up the Corpus *Platonicum* or, as some prefer to call it, the Corpus *Academicum*. Thrasyllus, a member of the Middle Academy, was to list nine tetralogies (groups of four) to include only thirty-four dialogues, the *Apology*, and the *Letters*. Thus even in antiquity some works were rejected or considered doubtful; they were not regarded as forgeries, but simply as

[27] See note 22 above; and *Metaphysics*, I, 6, 987b19 ff., which would refer to Xenocrates and the Academy of his day, and not to Plato himself. So also *On the Soul*, I, 2, 404b16 ff. This implies that the "Plato" of the Corpus *Aristotelicum* is sometimes the Academy and not the historical Plato (cf. H. Cherniss, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15).

[28] *Metaphysics*, I, 6, 988s8 ff.; ascribed to Plato in the sense given in the preceding note.

[29] Cf. *On the Soul*, I, 2, 404b22–29; and G. A. Mullachius, op. cit., III, 120 ff.

[30] K. von Fritz, "Polemon," in *Paulys Realencyclopädie*, Bd. XXI (1952), cols. 2524–2529.

[31] Diogenes Laertius, IV, 6, 28.

[32] Cf. Diogenes Laertius, III, 37 (in *Aristotle, Fragments*, p. 74); and III, 38 (*ibid.*, p. 72) for instances of use before Plato.

[33] *Phaedrus*, 276A.

[34] Xenophon used the same literary device, as we have seen, with the direct intent of capturing the *tropos*, the manner, of Socrates, and something of his thought. Within the Academy, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Cicero, and others too numerous to mention give grounds to the statement that the dialogue form becomes the sign of a Platonist. Few dialogists, however, achieve the ideal; their works are often pedestrian conversations with a yes-man.

products of the Academy rather than of Plato himself. Later Proclus, a Neoplatonist, went so far as to reject the *Republic*, the *Laws*, and the *Sophist*. In our day, for the past century and a half, scholars have written libraries on the problem to arrive at widely different conclusions.[35] Some have held as few as nine, fourteen, or twenty-one dialogues to be authentic. On internal and external grounds (that is, on the basis of the works themselves, and of ancient testimonies) the following are now generally rejected: *Alcibiades II*, *Erastai (The Rivals)*, *Theages*, *Hipparchus*, *Clitophon*, *Minos*; and the authenticity of six others is often disputed: *Alcibades I*, *Hippias Maior*, *Ion*, *Menexenos*, *Epinomis*, and the *Letters*. There are thus at least twenty-four genuine works in which to discover the thought of Plato.

Chronology. Coupled with this investigation has been the problem of the order in which Plato composed the dialogues and the still more delicate question of the inner development of his philosophical thought. Some fifty years of literary activity elapsed between the death of Socrates and that of Plato. It is to be expected that the latter's language and style would undergo great changes within such a span of years. Nor would his own thought and philosophy have been shaped from the start or have remained static throughout that half century.

On the basis of style alone, the technique of the dialogues, and the use of set expressions, historians distinguish three broad periods in Plato's life and assign the various dialogues to each period. Allied with this, however, is the deeper and more important problem whether the chronological order reflects the inner development of Plato's own thought. This in turn rests on the fundamental question: What is basic in Plato's own teaching, the metaphysics of the Ideas or the larger framework of *paideia* and the training of the statesman?

The latter alternative, as we shall see, appears the more acceptable; and though we here present a chronology that essays to show the genetic order of his thought, we shall not deny that from the beginning Plato had in mind the problem of education (*paideia*) and the city-state, a problem indeed that was itself to assume new aspects as he matured in wisdom.[36]

a) *The period of youth.* The early dialogues of Plato are usually called the Socratic dialogues. Not that they are the only ones built around the personality of Socrates, but that in their short, simple style and unaffected charm they show Socrates practicing his maieutic method, his own species of dialectic. They are all concerned with *areté* (virtue in a broader sense than we attach to the world) and therefore with the analysis of moral concepts. We would err, however, if we considered these early pieces merely as historical dramas of Socrates which contained little of Plato's own thought, or even as indicative of a purely ethical interest on the part of Plato. They are primarily political in character; that is, they treat of the virtues required in the polis, the city-state.[37] They do not always reach a definite conclusion, for Plato is but setting a riddle which the intelligent reader can answer himself.[38] To this period belong:

1. *The Apology:* Socrates defends himself at the trial.
2. *Crito:* Socrates after the trial. He refuses to escape, and will abide by his principles.
3. *Euthyphro:* Socrates about to be tried for impiety. A discussion of the nature of piety.
4. *Ion* (if authentic): a judgment on poets and rhapsodists.
5. *Laches:* from the art of fighting in armor the dialogue proceeds to *areté*, and specifically to courage.
6. *Charmides:* a discussion on temperance or moderation.
7. *Lysis:* on friendship and human relations.

[35] For details, cf. Ueberweg-Praechter, *Grundriss*, pp. 187–222; F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Westminster, 1946), I, 135–140.

[36] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, II, 93 ff.

[37] Cf. *Apology*, 36C.

[38] See A. Koyré, *Discovering Plato* (New York, 1945), pp. 1–7.

Most authors include the first book of the *Republic* (*Politeia*) in this period; but this is an hypothesis, brilliant indeed, but not proven.[39]

b) *The beginnings of a battle.* The earlier dialogues are limited in their scope, since each undertook one facet of virtue. The dialogues that follow, which it is impossible to date with accuracy as before or after the first journey to Sicily, occupy a broader stage and show Plato coming to grips through Socrates as his mouthpiece with the greater questions of the day: What educational ideal is to predominate, the Sophist or the Socratic? What is knowledge? What is the good life? Here, too, the doctrine of the Ideas, hinted at in *Euthyphro*, begins to make its appearance.

8. *Protagoras* (usually placed in the group above): the educational ideal of the Sophists and their theory that *areté* can be taught vs. the Socratic *paideia*, the thesis that all virtue is one and that it cannot be taught.[40] This evokes questions of knowledge (*Meno*) and the good life (*Gorgias*).
9. *Gorgias*: a serious, almost gloomy, continuation of the foregoing, since it shows how the Sophist *paideia* would affect the city-state through rhetoric. Rhetoric gives power, but not justice; it cannot propose the *technē* of right conduct: justice and virtue. The dialogue contains much on the soul and its destiny, the Good, and related questions.
10. *Meno*: if virtue is knowledge, we must discover what kind of knowledge it is. We are born with knowledge acquired in a previous existence.
11. *Euthydemus*: against the later Sophists, on the knowledge (i.e., *phrónesis*: prudence or wisdom) that makes for happiness.
12. *Hippias Minor*: which are the better: those who err voluntarily or involuntarily?
13. *Cratylus*: a special problem, the theory of language. Some philosophical problems on the soul, essence, knowledge as of the abiding or unchanging.
14. *Menexenus* (if authentic): a funeral oration which parodies the art of rhetoric.

c) *Works of maturity.* Metaphysical doctrines have received little attention up to this point. In the succeeding dialogues, assigned to the later period of Plato's life, his philosophy is given fuller treatment. Here the Ideas are the central theme, and the ramifications of this doctrine, in what we would call epistemology, psychology, ethics, politics, aesthetics, are set forth.

15. *The Banquet* (*Symposium*): an oratorical contest in praise of Eros (Love). Socrates delivers the final speech, on the true Eros of the soul, the love of *areté* and the pursuit of true beauty: therefore the inspiration of philosophy. (There is some possibility that this dialogue is dated c. 385–384, in the early days of the Academy.)
16. *Phaedo*: an account of Socrates' last day on earth, climaxed by the hemlock; in reality, it becomes a long discussion on the Ideas, the soul, its immortality and destiny.
17. *The Republic*: shows even more clearly the center of Plato's thought; yet it is not the *polis*, but the building of the soul and the citadel within man: the formation of the philosopher-king.
18. *Theaetetus*: from the opening incident, the mortal sickness of Theaetetus, we may date the dialogue as 368–367. It contains a long discussion of knowledge: it is not perception (a review of Protagoras' theories

[39] W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, II, 95.

[40] "The reader closes the book with the realization that Socrates' creed, that virtue goes back to the knowledge of true values, is to become the foundation-stone of all education" (W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, II, 122; cf. also A. Koyré, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–33).

and those of Heraclitus; the philosopher *vs.* the lawyer); nor is it right opinion.[41]

19. *Parmenides:* a supposed conversation between the young Socrates and the elderly Parmenides and the dialectician Zeno, on the Ideas (Forms) and their relation to things. A long discussion after the manner of Zeno on participation.
20. *Phaedrus:* an important advance in regard to rhetoric. From speeches on Eros, the dialogue turns to the question: Which is the best way to write and speak? It develops into the theme of the philosophical training needed by the orator: the inspiration of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Cicero's ideals. A long passage likewise (245 ff.) on the soul, its parts and passions.
21. *The Sophist:* an example of the analytical method applied to the search for the definition of a Sophist. Formally, the dialogue is important for scientific logic; materially, for its estimation of the Sophists and the doctrine of Parmenides. The dialogue is considered to be the first of those written after Plato's third journey (360). Like those which follow, it lacks dramatic verve, since there is no clash of minds in dialectic.
22. *The Statesman (Politikos):* the same method of division is applied to the definition of a statesman. Formally, a lesson in logical method; materially, an answer to the fundamental problem in the theory of government: which type of rule is best for mankind. Important for its classification of the sciences and for its ethical theories.
23. *Philebus:* by a discussion of what is the good, pleasure or thought, the logical method is demonstrated. However, the dialogue is most valued for ethical content and its teaching on the life of the mind.
24. *Timaeus:* a "likely account" of the physical world. The only work (more of a discourse than a dialogue) on cosmology. It includes the doctrine of the Demiurge, his relation to the Ideas, his work in forming the world.
25. *Critias:* a fragment, continuing the story of the Atlantid kings sketched in the *Timaeus.*
26. *Laws:* written in Plato's old age and published after his death. A discussion of the State, of law, morals, and culture, all subordinate to *paideia.* If the *Republic* represents the *polis* on the level of the Ideas, the *Laws* is more concrete and on the level of opinion.
27. *Epinomis:* an appendix to the *Laws,* on the wisdom of the ruler. It was furnished by Philip of Opus, a disciple, from his knowledge of Plato's plans.

A New Position. The foregoing presentation of the authenticity and chronology of the dialogues represents the position which has become more or less traditional in the past fifty years. It is not only challenged but completely discarded by a thesis recently advanced by the late Professor Joseph Zürcher.[42] This new position sees the present *Corpus Academicum* as the work primarily of Polemon, the scholarch who succeeded Xenocrates, and therefore as having been composed primarily in the years 310–270. Basic to such a position is the thought that the literary remains of Plato underwent development and revision at the hands of his successors as the Academy grew and faced new problems evoked by the Peripatos and the new rival schools of Epicurus and the Stoics. To keep the Academy abreast of such developments, Polemon (according to this theory) purposely and consciously modernized and adapted the ancient text

[41] Cf. A. Koyré, op. *cit.*, pp. 33–52; and F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (New York, 1952).

[42] J. Zürcher, *Das Corpus Academicum* (Paderborn, 1954); cf. I. Brady, "The Corpus Academicum," in *The New Scholasticism,* XXX (1956), 357–371.

of Plato, particularly to align the scientific content of the dialogues with new discoveries; at the same time he composed fresh works of his own which were thus made part of the *Corpus Academicum*. As a result, we would possess little of the original works of Plato himself beyond some remnants surviving beneath the revisions of Polemon; and what knowledge we would have of the true thought and teachings of Plato must perforce be derived very indirectly.

This is not an entirely novel solution of the difficulties inherent in the dialogues, since almost the same thesis had been proposed in 1919 by Professor Wilamowitz.[43] However, until such an hypothesis has been more critically examined by competent scholars and accepted or rejected, it cannot be made the basis of an historical interpretation of the philosophy of Plato and the Academy. We can retain as certain, of course, that the disciples of Plato produced dialogues in imitation of him; and it is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility and even probability that they introduced some changes or additions to his original writings.

Such problems, however, are not of primary importance for our history. Platonism, whether as the philosophy of Plato himself or as the philosophy of the Academy, influenced future philosophers as a true corpus of doctrine, a living whole, embodied for the most part in dialogues generally accepted as genuine. It is as such a body of doctrine that we shall endeavor to study it in the pages which follow.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO

In the pre-Socratic age, philosophy had in the main been considered the science of discovering the fundamental principle of the visible universe: its task was to explore the cosmos and solve the riddle of the universe. Socrates had turned philosophy from the outer world to the world of man and the human Ethos, and thus had set for it a new task, to impart to mankind the knowledge of the true standards of human life. Such an inspiration was to motivate the whole philosophy of Plato. Philosophers alone are the lovers of the vision of the truth;[44] they alone are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, while those who wander in the region of the many and the variable are not philosophers.[45] Therefore, only the philosopher should be the ruler of the city, for no one else possesses that fairest wisdom which can order the State.[46]

This we must consider the heart of Plato. The philosopher is not merely the metaphysician, though the theory of Ideas is of the substance of his philosophy. He is rather the man whose whole life is his philosophy, whose soul is noble and good, who has built within himself a city which he rules in peace, and who therefore is alone fit to rule others. The *paideia* of the soul is thus the goal of Plato's whole thought, and it is within such a framework that we must study his philosophy.[47]

§ 1. *The Two Worlds*

The Cave: an Allegory and a Key. In the early part of the *Republic*, Book VII, Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates a parable that provides for us the key to

[43] Cf. J. Zürcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 22, 161.
[44] *Republic*, 475D.
[45] *Ibid.*, 484B.
[46] *Symposium*, 209.
[47] See the inspiring pages of W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, II, 258 ff.

his thought. Once we have appreciated the strange picture here presented we shall be able to grasp more easily the essence of Plato's doctrine. To make this clear, we shall paraphrase the story at some length.

Having just concluded (in Book VI) a long discussion on the vocation of the philosopher, his nature, his ideals, his training, Socrates now wishes to symbolize the purpose of philosophy in vivid imagery. "And now," he said, "let me show you in a figure how our nature is affected by *paideia* and by the lack of *paideia*."[48] He goes on to picture men held captive in an underground cave or den which has a broad opening toward the light.[49] Here men have been chained since their childhood with their backs to the opening so that they cannot move or turn around. At some distance above and behind them a fire is burning, and its rays fall on the back wall toward which the prisoners are looking. Between the fire and the prisoners is a road along which runs a low wall. On this road there pass men carrying all sorts of objects and figures; some of the men are talking, others are silent. (Plato suggests that if we recall the manipulators in a puppet show we shall catch his meaning.) The prisoners, however, see not these objects but their shadows as cast on the back wall by the fire. They therefore take the shadows for reality and the echo of the voices for the speech of the shadow figures.

Such is the first stage of the allegory. Now see what will happen, Socrates continues, if a prisoner is released and compelled to stand up, turn around, and look toward the light. He will be dazzled and unable to see the objects of which he has previously seen only the shadows. If he were then told that what he saw before was all an illusion and that he is now looking at things that are more real, he would not believe. Likewise, he would not be able to name the objects as they pass along the wall, and would fancy the shadows he had seen were more true than the things now shown him. Were he, finally, forced to look directly at the light, his smarting eyes would quickly cause him to turn back and take refuge in the shadow-pictures.

Beyond the fire is an opening to the upper world of daylight and sunshine, reached by a steep and rough ascent. If the prisoner is now forced into the light of the sun, he will again be so dazzled that he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called the true realities. He would need long practice before he could see: at first, he might discern shadows, then the reflections of men and other things in water, and then the things themselves. Thereafter he could look at the sky and the stars by night, and last of all would be able to see the sun, not in its reflection in the water, but in itself in the heavens, and contemplate it as it really is. Then he would reason that it is the sun that gives the seasons and the years and controls the visible world, and is somehow even the cause of the things he used to see in the cave.

Prizing his freedom, he would pity his former fellows and their beliefs. "Better," he would say with Homer,[50] "to be the lowly serf of a poor master," than to

[48] *Republic*, 514 ff.

[49] There is a good diagram of the cave in *Great Dialogues of Plato*, tr. W. H. D. Rouse (New York, 1956).

[50] *Odyssey*, XI, 489.

think and live as such prisoners do. Lastly, if he were to go back into the cave and compete with prisoners in identifying the shadows, he would be laughed at, so incompetent had he become; and if he tried to set them free from the cave, they would put him to death if they could lay hands on him.

This is an allegory, as Plato had Socrates begin the tale, of the difference between ignorance, the lack of *paideia*, and the gradual liberation and ascent to the truth which is the fruit of *paideia* and philosophy.[51] More than this, as the *Republic* proceeds to explain,[52] it is a figure of two cities or two worlds: the cave or prison house is the world of sense; the upper region of true light is the intelligible world (as Philo will call it later). The prisoners represent the majority of mankind, the multitude of those who remain all their lives in a state of shadow-knowledge, seeing only the reflections and hearing only the echoes of truth. Theirs is the world of becoming and opinion only. He who is freed from his chains and has turned from the shadows and leaves the cave ascends to the world of true knowledge and true being, where gradually he will come to see being, and finally to the best and brightest being, the Good.

It is this *conversion*, this "turning around of a soul from a day that is little better than night to the true day of being,"[53] which Plato demands of those who would guide the city-state. Statesmen and rulers who dwell in the shadows with the prisoners are the blind leading the blind. The true ruler must be taught to flee the world of shadows, error, prejudice, and ascend to the bright light of truth, goodness, justice.

The Two Worlds. Plato had early come to grips with the problem of being and becoming, which had so tantalized the pre-Socratics. He had Cratylus, a follower of Heraclitus, as a teacher before he met Socrates, and perhaps also Hermogenes the Parmenidean. Whether he had an adequate view of Heraclitus is questionable, yet from both of these pre-Socratics he could have learned that it is the *logos* which the philosopher must use to read beneath appearances and discover that which really is. He was strengthened in such a position by Socrates' conviction that true knowledge exists and is unchangeable and necessary in character.

The doctrine Plato achieved is in reality a reconciliation of Parmenides and Heraclitus as far as he knew the latter. The visible world is not denied as an illusion. Like the world of the cave, it does exist, though it has no true being, since it is the realm of becoming and perishing, the world of twilight full of objects blended with the darkness of nonbeing. Above this, so to speak, is another world, the "intelligible world,"[54] the region of being, of stable, fixed, abiding reality, of that which is "really real."[55]

But if Plato asks: "What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is?"[56] he is not accepting purely and simply the crude position of Parmenides, that being is and nonbeing is not. Such a juxtaposition excludes any

[51] Cf. *Protagoras*, 358C.
[52] *Republic*, 517.
[53] *Ibid.*, 521.
[54] ὁ νοητὸς τόπος, *Republic*, 517B.
[55] ὄντως ὄν.
[56] *Timaeus*, 27D.

middle ground for becoming, whereas the latter, for Plato, is midway between absolute being and utter nonbeing.[57] It is and yet it is not; or as someone has said, it is, yet not quite, nor yet not quite is not.[58] Even in what is becoming there is a modicum of reality.

The allegory of the cave reveals this doctrine on being. As the prisoner is liberated from his chains and turns toward the fire and the things of which he has seen the shadows, he is said to be approaching nearer to being and toward things which have more real existence. For Plato, therefore, there are grades or degrees of being. Some things have a greater share of pure being, namely, those which are possessed of the unchanging, immortal and true; whereas those which are variable and mortal have far less of true being, and of them it cannot be said that they are "really real."[59]

Now, the argument proceeds, the degree of being will determine the degree of truth things will possess; and proportionately also the degree of knowledge or intelligibility they will contain. From the question of being and nonbeing, therefore, Plato proceeds to the problem of knowledge. The ontological determines the epistemological aspect of his doctrine; that is, the degrees or divisions of knowledge will correspond to the degree of being: "For there is a proportion: as the objects share in truth [which is determined by their share in being], to the same degree the powers [of the soul] possess clearness."[60]

Such is the conclusion of a long discussion on the divisions of the two "worlds" and our knowledge of them.[61] Let us divide a line, Plato says, into two unequal parts, to correspond to the worlds of the visible and of the intelligible. Divide each segment again in the same proportion, to give the subdivisions on the basis of clearness or unclearness and the degrees of truth.

Now, to return to the allegory, the prisoners in the cave certainly had no true knowledge, for they saw but shadows and reflections and lived by prejudice, passions, and sophistry; for want of a better word we shall dub their knowledge shadow knowledge. When freed and faced toward the light and the things carried along the way, the prisoners saw the world of bodies, living or man-made as the case might be. Because these things are passing, they have no true being and so yield no genuine knowledge; yet what the prisoner in his new-found freedom knows may well be true, so we shall call this knowledge belief because it is not infallible and is accepted without evidence.[62] Therefore, neither of these species of knowledge is truly knowledge, for they are not of being nor has the intellect entered into them; they are sense percep-

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[57] *Sophist*, 258.

[58] *Republic*, 477; cf. E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949), p. 16.

[59] Republic, 585.

[60] *Republic*, VI, 511D. According to Aristotle, the argument seems to proceed rather from the knowledge of something other than the particular to the existence of the Ideas as an object of such knowledge (cf. *On Ideas*, fr. 3, in *Fragments*, p. 125; and *Metaphysics*, I, 9, 990b10 ff.). See S. Mansion, "Deux écrits de jeunesse d'Aristote sur la doctrines des idées," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* (*RPL*), XLVIII (1950), 400.

[61] *Republic*, 509 ff.

[62] This is the burden of *Theaetetus*, 151–165, and 186–189; and *Symposium*, 202A; see also *Meno*, 98: "That knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture to me. There are not many things I [Socrates] profess to know, but this is certainly one of them."

tion, which after Parmenides we shall call opinion.

On the other hand, when the freed man leaves the cave and comes to the upper world, he cannot immediately proceed to look at the sun, but must content himself again with shadows and reflections, that is, with the objects of geometry and the arts (or sciences), which are reflections of true being (e.g., the absolute square). In addition, he must use images, such as the visible forms of the square, triangle, and so on, to reason about them.[63] In a word, such sciences use visible figures as images and reason by hypotheses about them: yet their conclusions are intended to be valid for the abstract figure rather than the concrete. Since this process is a "thinking through," we shall term this knowledge reasoning and consider it as true intellectual knowledge.

[63] *Republic*, 510C.

Having engaged in the propedeutic of mathematics and kindred subjects, the free man will at last be able to ascend to the absolute and the "really real," the principles of all things, by the pure intelligence. This will be the goal of the philosopher: the contemplation of the supremely intelligible, the Ideas, and at their peak the Idea of the Good.

Following Plato's device, we may draw up the following table of the "divided line." On the left side, according to their share in being and truth and intelligibility, are things; on the right are the corresponding degrees of knowledge, proportionate in clearness to the being and truth of things. As we ascend the scale, we may well parallel each step with the experiences of the prisoner and the free man.[64]

[64] Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 509 ff. and 511; VII, 533–534.



Such in brief fashion are Plato's two worlds, and their characteristics. Later developments will enable us to grasp specific points in greater detail. To retain the allegory that furnishes the key to Plato's philosophy, we turn now to study the cave, the lower world of becoming and opinion.

§ 2. *The World of the Cave*

It was no mere figure of speech that Plato used in comparing the sensible world to the prison house of the cave.[65] For him, this world was, at it were, a place of punishment for the soul until virtue made it fit to return to its original happy state. Most mortals likewise are held captive in the visible world, being immersed in sense knowledge and swayed by ignorance, prejudice, and passion, without an Ethos or purpose in life, or true care for their souls.[66]

But to understand the soul's origin and present state and future destiny, it is necessary to see man within the framework of the physical world, and for the latter we shall turn to a study of the *Timaeus*.

The World-Order. The dialogue begins with a recapitulation by Socrates of the first five books of the *Republic*, as though this new dialogue (which is more a series of discourses) were a continuation of that "conversation." Then Critias (judged to be Plato's great-grandfather) gives a tale of the defense of Athens against the kings of Atlantis.[67] Finally, Timaeus of Locri launches into a long discourse that covers the whole ground of natural science, from cosmogony to medicine and pathology.

He will discuss (his part begins) that which is always becoming and never really is, the visible world conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without that of reason. This implies that he will not be able to adduce more than a "likely account" of the gods and the generation of the universe and of man; we are to accept the tale as probable and inquire no further.[68]

From this premise, that the world is ever becoming, Timaeus proceeds to argue to some cause, a divine Craftsman or Demiurge (i.e., Public Worker). Because this best of causes puts order into the world and makes it fair and perfect, he must have worked according to an eternal and ideal pattern. He fashioned the world-soul and made the body of the world into a "living thing with soul and reason." Thereupon he made the lesser gods and human souls, but assigned to the former the task of making what is mortal in man, the body, and the lesser living things of the cosmos.

Such is the general account of Timaeus. But before going into detail, we may well ask whether this Demiurge is a creator or a formator and whether he is actually supposed to have imposed order on a pre-existent chaos. To the first question we would say that no Greek ever achieved the notion of creation out of

[65] *Ibid.*, 517.
[66] *Ibid.*, 519C.
[67] *Timeaus*, 20–26D.

[68] *Ibid.*, 29C. For Plato, what we would call metaphysics or first philosophy is thus the only part of true philosophy; he would not recognize as "science" the later addition of physics or second philosophy.

nothing; at most, this divine Artisan is simply the Mind that orders the universe.[69] The other question involves something of a problem: if there was a historical period when there existed only a disorderly chaos, then the formation took place in time and both time and the world had a true beginning. The Peripatetics objected to this,[70] while most of the Platonists adopted the view of Xenocrates that the world did not have a beginning but that for didactic purposes the *Timaeus* merely describes the world as though it were formed from pre-existent chaotic matter.[71] This would not militate against Plato's teaching that the Demiurge does give order and form to things.

The Demiurge. Plato does not allow Timaeus to say much about the nature of the divine Artificer. "The father and maker of all this universe is past finding out; and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible."[72] He is led by love to make this world of generation: "He was good, and the good can never be jealous of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be. . . . Wherefore, finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular fashion, out of disorder he brought order."[73]

The *Timaeus* gives a cosmogony, not a theology, and we must look elsewhere for Plato's doctrine on God, particularly in the tenth book of the *Laws*. Here and elsewhere is developed the thesis presupposed in the *Timaeus:* the world is not the result of mere chance or blind necessity, the product of a spontaneous and unintelligent cause; things, men, animals, all are produced by "a divine reason and a knowledge that comes from God"; therefore, they are "the work of divine art."[74]

The *Sophist*, by declaring that the world is fashioned in accord with a knowledge "that comes from God," evokes the doubt whether the Demiurge is the Supreme God or a lower god commissioned to fashion the universe. In the *Timaeus* at least, the Demiurge is viewed primarily in his work and not in his inner being: he is the Author of nature rather than the Supreme Being. Of more importance is the thought, by implication at least, that the Demiurge must "create" to fulfill and attain his own perfection; the process is necessary, without any essential liberty on his part. Lastly, unless the Ideas are themselves his creation (a point that is very unclear and even unlikely), the Demiurge is limited by the Ideas which he must copy and for which he is not responsible; he is similarly limited by the "matter" in which he works, for it is given, and is not of his workmanship.

To a Greek, perhaps, it was not an important question whether there was only one God or many. Yet, inasmuch as the Demiurge produces the lesser gods, he would seem to be the "supreme God"[75] and the "best soul,"[76] that is, the self-moved origin of all motion, and the oldest of all things.[77] This is not

[69] Cf. *Laws*, 966D.

[70] Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII, 1, 251b17; *De caelo*, I, 10, 280a30; *Metaphysics*, XII, 6, 1072a1 ff.

[71] Cf. Aristotle, *De caelo*, I, 10, 279b35.

[72] *Timaeus*, 28E.

[73] *Ibid.*, 29E–30A.

[74] *Sophist*, 265–266; cf. *Laws*, 889.

[75] *ὁ μέγιστος θεός*, *Laws*, 821.

[76] *ἡ ἀριστὴ ψυχή*, *Laws*, 897C.

[77] *Ibid.*, 896B.

monotheism, yet it does point up a monarchical polytheism or henotheism.[78]

In his older years Plato appears to have become remarkably theocentric and God-conscious, with the result that his theology surpasses that of his predecessors. God, not man, is the true measure of all.[79] God is good, and ever immutably remains one and the same.[80] He is holy, just, and wise, perfect righteousness;[81] he has absolute knowledge, even of human affairs.[82] Therefore, the Gods (!) care for the small as well as the great,[83] for God (!) is the wisest of beings, willing and able to take care of what he has made, nor will he turn his back on his labor.[84]

The Order of "Creation." Following the pattern of the universe, the "ideal living thing,"[85] the Demiurge so forms the world that it is a unified living animal[86] with body and soul. The soul of the cosmos or universe is his first production;[87] it is the most important element and the ruler of the world.

This world-soul is fashioned out of three elements: sameness, otherness, and essence.[88] This is unintelligible until we understand that "the same" is that "element" whereby the most divine things remain ever unchanged in their self-identity,[89] which is the characteristic of the "really real." "Otherness," however, is that which characterizes the things of the visible world: it is the reason for their changeableness, why indeed they can come to be. "Essence" here is taken as a compound of the foregoing, an intermediate kind of being. Thus the world-soul shares in both the divine manner of being and that of material bodies, and can act as mediator. This compound the Demiurge divides into certain proportions (one must imagine, apparently, the compound as spun out like a long ribbon with certain intervals marked on it), and again divides lengthwise into two parts which are crossed like a *chi* (χ) and their ends brought up to form two circles. To the inner circle he affixes the seven planets.

Within this invisible soul the Demiurge now forms the visible, corporeal universe consisting of fire and earth, with water and air as the mean and bond between them,[90] all in proper harmony and proportion. To this compound he gives a spherical shape, both to fit "within" the soul and to provide a most perfect figure. The soul itself is interfused everywhere, from the center to the circumference. Then, that this "blessed god" might more completely be like the ideal and eternal, he creates a moving image of eternity which we call time.[91] Lastly, to complete the world after the ideal pattern, the Demiurge makes the living things of the universe: the heavenly gods, the birds, creatures of the deep and those which live on land. The first, the so-called gods, are the fixed

[78] The texts are of little help, for in one sentence Plato speaks of God, and in the next of the gods; cf. *Laws*, X, 900, vs. 902E–903A.

[79] *Cratylus*, 386A; *Theaetetus*, 152A; *Laws*, IV, 716D.

[80] *Republic*, II, 380; yet he speaks of "gods" in 381.

[81] *Theaetetus*, 176B.

[82] *Parmenides*, 134; *Laws*, 899E.

[83] *Laws*, 900.

[84] *Ibid.*, 903A.

[85] νοητὸν ζῷον, *Timaeus*, 39E.

[86] ζῷον ἓν ὁρατόν.

[87] *Timaeus*, 34B ff.

[88] ἔκ τε ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας, *Timaeus*, 35B.

[89] *Statesman*, 269.

[90] *Timaeus*, 31E–32B.

[91] *Ibid.*, 37D.

stars; yet there is some intimation that other divinities were also made, to which would be assigned the production of the bodies of men and the lower living things. The last divine production is the souls of men.

Such is the account of the cosmos, we may say, as considered from the viewpoint of its intelligent causes, those endowed with mind; but it must be completed by studying those causes which are without intelligence and which, without mind, produce chance effects without order and design. For the genesis of this cosmos is mixed, being made up of necessity and mind.[92] Necessity is also called the variable or errant cause; it therefore signifies the purposeless or unintelligent cause rather than something absolutely determined and fixed. In short, it would be the "matter," to use an Aristotelian term, which the Demiurge took over and shaped to the ideal pattern.

The description of this "material cause" is very halting, for it cannot be identified with any definite element, such as fire or earth. These are rather qualities which make their appearance within this "matter." It cannot, therefore, be apprehended by sense knowledge (opinion), as is the visible world. On the other hand, this cause is eternal and indestructible, yet is not "really real," since it is not divine: hence it cannot be perceived by knowledge. Rather, it is hardly real, and at best is apprehended by a kind of "spurious reason."[93] Invisible, formless, unchanging in itself, yet all-receiving, it is the "mother and receptacle, and in a manner the nurse, of all things visible and produced";[94] hence it assumes the forms or impressions of what enters it, and appears different from time to time by reason of them.[95] Finally, Plato describes this "receptacle" as space.[96]

Interpreted in later language, this would be the doctrine of a prime matter that is a matter *in which*, but not *from which:* a substratum which never actually exists of itself, but which can be thought of by abstraction only. It is by no means identical with the Peripatetic matter, which receives forms and is perfected by them. In this doctrine Plato at once surpasses and corrects his predecessors. Mere material elements must not be considered the prime causes of things (e.g., the four elements of Empedocles), for they are without mind and therefore without purpose. Nor can either blind chance or absolute necessity be accepted as the first reasons for the ordered cosmos. The Logos of Heraclitus, that "reasoned purpose which steers all things through all," and the *Nous* of Anaxagoras emerge into a more definite First Cause which operates more efficiently and thoroughly than their vague deities. The teaching on the Demiurge and/or God is carried over by Plato to the climax of his philosophy, the divine goal of the soul.

The Nature of Man. Such is the story of the formation of the world, and in particular of the earth which is our nurse.[97] There follows the story of the human race, which either had no beginning or began a very long time ago.[98] In the *Timaeus* Plato writes as though it had a beginning, since he describes the formation of human souls and that of bodies. The account also shows the value

[92] *Ibid.*, 48A.
[93] λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ, *Timaeus*, 52B.
[94] *Ibid.*, 51A.
[95] *Ibid.*, 50BC.
[96] *Ibid.*, 52A.
[97] *Ibid.*, 40C.
[98] *Laws*, 781E.

he set on the soul as something almost divine within us, something immaterial and spiritual. It has a divine origin, for the Demiurge produced all human souls at once,[99] and a divine destiny, despite its present "imprisonment" in the body.

When the Demiurge had made the world-soul and fitted together the body of the universe, he commissioned the lower gods to make the living creatures of the earth but reserved to himself the "creation" of the human soul, "that part worthy of the name immortal, which is called divine and is the guide of those who follow justice."[100] Then he poured the remains of the elements of the world-soul (the same, the other, and the essence) in the mixing cup and mingled them in much the same manner, save that the mixture was not as perfect. At the end, he divided the mixture into souls equal to the number of stars, assigned each soul to a star and showed it the nature of the universe, that is, the vision of the Ideas, of true being.[101] At the same time, the Divine Craftsman gave them an intimation of their destiny. They were to be implanted in bodies by necessity, and their first birth was to be one and the same for all (to do justice to all, and make all men the most religious of animals); they would all have the power of sensation, love, fear, and anger and the other passions. If they conquered these, they would live in justice and would return to dwell in happiness on their appointed stars. If a soul failed, it would be subject to a second birth as a woman; and if it continued in evil, it would come again as a brute.[102] Some souls were put on earth, others on the moon and the planets.

[99] Cf. *Republic*, 611A.
[100] *Timaeus*, 41C.
[101] *Phaedrus*, 249C.
[102] *Timaeus*, 42C.

Meanwhile, the lower gods busied themselves with the formation of the human body, taking portions of the four elements and welding from them a body around the soul as its vehicle. Then they constructed within the body a soul of another nature, mortal and subject to passion. The immortal soul, the divine, they placed in the head, while the lower mortal soul was encased partly near the heart and partly below the midriff.[103] The account proceeds to discuss in great detail the senses, their organs, the physiological make-up of the body, and some diseases of soul and body.

Man the Prisoner. While thus learning the constitutive elements of man, we begin to sense why he is a prisoner in the cave of the sense world. His nature is so composite that he is in constant inner conflict and captivated by things of sense.

The *soul* itself, that is, the immortal soul in man, is said to be made of the same elements as the world-soul; it is therefore half of heaven and half of earth. The "same" makes it akin to the gods and the world of true being and capable of knowing the Ideas; the "otherness" makes it a part of the world of becoming and change. Its pre-existence and primordial happiness indicate it is not made primarily for union with the body, but for its own independent existence as a complete self-moving principle. Yet its very otherness drags it down and makes it turn away from the Ideas even in its happy state. This seems the correct interpretation of the myth of the *Phae-*

[103] *Ibid.*, 69–70.

drus,[104] of the charioteer and the two-winged horses, one of which seeks always to mount on high, while the other, unruly and changing, is constantly a drag as the soul pursues its course in the heavens. If the latter horse is triumphant, the soul is carried to earth and finds a home in an earthly frame as a man.

Union with the body, never intended as an immortal union,[105] is thus a kind of fall of the soul beyond the design of the Demiurge. The latter had said souls would be implanted in bodies out of necessity, which can be interpreted (as above) as "without purpose or design." Though indeed in the union the soul comes "bearing life"[106] and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body,[107] the latter seems more of a prison house of the soul than its natural abode. It is composed of "the turbulent and irrational mob" of elements, all "otherness" and becoming. With some approval, therefore, Plato cites an Orphic doctrine: "Some say that the body (σῶμα) is the grave (σῆμα) of the soul . . . probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name . . . under the impression that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (σώζηται), as the name σῶμα implies, until the penalty is paid."[108] The union, consequently, does not seem natural to the soul, and is more accidental than substantial.[109]

Man, "that double nature which we call the living being,"[110] is himself the seat of conflict through the diversity of elements within him. Outwardly, in body, he seems a unity; inwardly, in reality, he is a trinity: a monster possessed of a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild; a lion; and a man.[111] In his head is seated the rational soul (τὸ λογιστικόν), the "man within man,"[112] which is his pride and glory, which distinguishes him from the brute and is immortal and akin to the divine.[113] In his breast, guarded by his heart, is the higher part of the irrational soul (τὸ θυμοειδές), which is endowed with courage (of the lion) and passion, and which loves contention: it is so placed that it may be under the rule of reason and join the latter in controlling the monster beneath it. For this beast is the appetitive soul (τό ἐπιθυμητικόν), full of desires both good and wicked, the seat of the foolishness of man.[114]

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[104] *Phaedrus*, 246 ff.

[105] *Ibid.*, 246C.

[106] *Phaedo*, 105C.

[107] *Cratylus*, 400A.

[108] *Ibid.*, 400.

[109] This is brought out by the definitions of soul and man common in Platonic circles. The soul is simply "the self-moving" (τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν: *Phaedrus*, 245E; *Laws*, X, 896A; XII, 966E), which Xenocrates changed to read: ψυχὴ ἀριθμὸς ἑαυτὸν κινοῦν: "the soul is a self-moving number" (fragment 29 ff., in G. A. Mullachius, *op. cit.*, III, 120b). To Xenocrates, likewise, is generally attributed the dialectic of *Alcibiades I*, 129–130, which concludes that man is not the body or the union of soul and body, but is the soul using the body. *Homo est anima utens corpore* becomes a definition with many repercussions in history.

[110] *Timaeus*, 87; cf. *Phaedrus*, 246C.

[111] *Republic*, 588.

[112] *Ibid.*, 589A.

[113] *Timaeus*, 69.

[114] *Timaeus*, 69D–72B. There is considerable difference of interpretation over the distinction of these three "souls." Are they actually three distinct souls (or rather two, one from the Demiurge, the other from the lower gods) as suggested by *Timaeus*, 69DE (cf. *Laws*, V, 762A) and so understood by Cicero as the rational and the nonrational (*Tusc. Disp.*, IV, 5, 10; cf. also Seneca, *Epistle*, 92, 8)? Or, again, are they three parts of one soul, the ψυχὴ μονοειδής of the *Phaedo*, since Plato sometimes uses μέρος, part (*Republic*, IV, 444B), or speaks of two parts (*Laws*, V, 762A)? Or are they simply three principles of action in the

The ideal relation of these three principles or souls is so to speak and act that the "man within man" somehow achieves complete mastery over the entire human being, watching the monster like a good husbandman, to cultivate the gentle qualities and prevent the wild ones from growing, and making the lion his ally and uniting all parts harmoniously with one another and with himself.[115] Yet such a goal is not the fruit of any inborn peace and harmony. Even though the soul beheld being and truth in its former state, in joining the body it lapses into forgetfulness of such knowledge. It comes to birth lacking justice or virtue, the health, beauty, and well-being of the soul;[116] it is in a stage of ignorance, *apaideusia*, a deformity of the soul.[117] Unless man is freed from these bonds by education, he is condemned to a life little better than death and to a day little better than night. He is almost bound to be governed by the beast within him and by the impressions of his senses, the will of the majority, and ignorance of his true goal and final destiny. He is a prisoner in the visible world, bound hand and foot in the den, to gaze on mere shadows of the images of true being and to hear but the echoes of the truth.

§ 3. *The Liberation*

The very nobility and greatness of man's soul, that divine element within him, demands that he be freed from such an imprisonment. He is made for something higher than enslavement to the sense-world. Did not the god form him, his soul, out of "sameness" as well as "otherness" and decree his final happiness to be the return to his blessed star? This will be determined in judgment in the world below, when the "naked soul," stripped of all pretense and earthly rank, wealth or power, shall be examined, with all its natural or acquired qualities, its wounds, its scars, its blemishes.[118] To go thither with one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of evils,[119] for there shall justice of soul, nurture, and *paideia* alone avail.[120]

The Work of Paideia. Men must be liberated from the cave, or at least be made free of their bonds and chains. Yet, as Socrates says, there is "no release or salvation from evil except by the attain-

soul (as definitely suggested by *Republic*, V, 435C: τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἴδη ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ; and IX, 589D: αὐτὰ εἰς ἓν τρία ὄντα)? Whatever the correct interpretation, Plato wishes to explain the rival sources of action found within man and the conflict they engender, and to emphasize that the rational soul has the moral duty to subdue the irascible and concupiscible.

[115] *Republic*, 589A.

[116] *Ibid.*, 444.

[117] *Sophist*, 228D.

[118] *Gorgias*, 523–524.

[119] *Ibid.*, 522A.

[120] *Phaedo*, 107D. Here Plato is to some extent following the myths. Yet there is every indication that he accepts an afterlife, judgment, and retribution. Such a doctrine rests on the immortality of the soul, for which he several times advances proofs. None of these is too convincing, and he does not think we have more than a "likely account" of it, because "of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man" (*Phaedo*, 107A). Of the arguments of the *Phaedo* (70D ff.), none is very important save that from the spirituality of the soul (78–80), that the soul is indissoluble (cf. also *Republic*, X, 608–611; *Phaedrus*, 245C). Philosophy has not since gone much beyond improving such a proof; it cannot give a complete demonstration of immortality, any more than it can of creationism.

ment of the highest virtue and wisdom,"[121] for "the best way to life is to practice justice and every virtue in life and in death."[122] Now, if *apaideusia*, or the lack of genuine culture, which has produced such evil in man, consists in being deceived on those matters which are of utmost importance[123] through misjudgment of true values, it follows that virtue rests largely on *paideia*, which imparts a knowledge of such values. Was not the allegory of the cave proposed as a picture of the contrast between *apaideusia* and *paideia?*

But what paideia? The Sophists professed to give an education, to teach men the political *technē*, to give them values, to teach virtue. But the historical Socrates had combated their education as superficial and faulty, and tried to turn men within to their souls, to lead them to think rather than to speak. So the dramatic Socrates of the dialogues again takes up the struggle, to show that virtue requires true values,[124] that the rhetoric of the Sophists will produce power but not justice,[125] that the ideal of Isocrates prepares men for the things of the moment only, and not for life and death.[126] True *paideia* is the culture of the soul;[127] it is inspired by Eros, the desire of the good, the true, the beautiful,[128] must lead to true knowledge of real being,[129] and provide a way of life in which the care of soul is foremost.[130] That *paideia* alone is of value which leads to virtue[131] and to God as man's end.

The Conversion of the Soul. *Paideia* cannot mean, as the Sophists think, that knowledge can be poured into the ignorant soul from without so as to effect a cure. It must start from within the soul, by its conversion from shadows to things. The prisoner, when first liberated, must stand up and turn completely around; so the soul must begin by a complete conversion;[132] it must turn first from shadows to things in the sense world, and thence to the world of intelligible real being.

The allegory implies *three stages in this conversion:* first from shadows to sensible things; thence the passage to the intelligible world, where the soul will first pursue the sciences; finally it will come to contemplate true being and, last of all, the Good. We should not conclude, however, that all men are so to be trained by *paideia* that they will pass through all three stages. Faced with the realities and limitations of human nature, Plato and the Academy seem satisfied if *paideia* will free most men from shadow-knowledge and bring them to true opinion. Wisdom and true knowledge are for the few; in the ideal city (of the *Republic* and *Laws*), it is only for the rulers and the council, who legislate for others according to their vision of the true and the just. The others must accept their regulations and teachings on faith. Thus, in the *Republic* the education of the soldiers or guards is considered as limited to those qualities, virtues, and knowledge which do not require the use of true knowledge;[133] while in the *Laws*, on a

[121] *Ibid.*, 107D.
[122] *Gorgias*, 527E.
[123] *Protagoras*, 359C.
[124] *Protagoras.*
[125] *Gorgias.*
[126] *Euthydemus*, 304–306.
[127] *Phaedrus*, 241C.
[128] *Symposium.*
[129] *Theaetetus.*
[130] *Phaedrus*, 241C.
[131] *Laws*, 643A.
[132] *Republic*, 521C.
[133] *Ibid.*, 375 ff.

more practical level, such an education is required for all citizens.[134] From this we conclude that the first step of conversion is needed for all men if they are to live a good life in the service of God.[135]

The ascent to the intelligible world will thus be reserved to the few — in the ideal city, to the rulers who are the mind of the State[136] and who thus are to provide the standards for the guards and the people. Those who are to be the leaders must therefore be led to full conversion and given the fullness of *paideia.* Plato knew full well, however, that the City of the *Republic* or of the *Laws* was scarcely to be realized in any actual state. His program for the training of leaders, therefore, is extended to all who wish to reach true virtue and wisdom. The city must be built, indeed, but in the heart of man, by the formation of character. The man in whom the brutal part of nature is silenced and humanized, the gentler element liberated, the whole soul perfected by justice and temperance and wisdom, who looks at the city within him and takes care that no disorder occurs in it but that all is ruled in order and harmony — such a man and no other will be fit to rule other men and other cities.[137]

Content of Paideia. The allegory makes it plain that such a goal is reached only with effort and after many steps. The first of these will be the training of the reason in those *technai* and *epistēmai*[138] or arts which accustom the eye of the soul to the intelligible world. Here especially the dialogues consider the mathematical sciences "as drawing the soul to being"[139] because they deal with images, so to speak, of true being:[140] arithmetic and geometry show the distinction between the visible and the intelligible, the many and the one,[141] train in abstract thinking,[142] and create the spirit of the philosopher;[143] astronomy compels the soul to look upward, beyond the changeable heavens to true motion[144] and the Craftsman who set the stars; and the science of harmony leads to the nature of numbers.[145] All these are thus "helpers in the work of conversion."[146]

All these studies, however, are but the prelude to the hymn of dialectic, wherein by the light of intellect alone a person starts on the discovery of the absolute and comes at last by pure intellectual knowledge to behold the Good itself, the best and highest of the Ideas.[147] This is the acme of knowledge, for dialectic is the keystone of the sciences.[148] Yet the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant,[149] so great is the task and so demanding the vocation of the philosopher. He must be courageous and industrious, for philosophy requires his whole soul;[150] he must be a lover of true knowledge and true being[151] and possessed of great virtue.[152] He must slough off the pleasures of the body, equip himself with virtue,[153] and become a wise and orderly soul as like the divine as possible.[154] "Would you not say that

[134] *Laws,* 764, 788 f.
[135] *Republic,* 428–429; *Meno,* 97–99.
[136] *Laws,* 965.
[137] *Republic,* 591–592.
[138] *Ibid.,* 533D.

[139] *Ibid.,* 523A ff.
[140] *Ibid.,* 533C.
[141] *Ibid.,* 524D.
[142] *Ibid.,* 525D.
[143] *Ibid.,* 527B.
[144] *Ibid.,* 529C.
[145] *Ibid.,* 531.
[146] *Ibid.,* 533D.
[147] *Ibid.,* 532A.
[148] *Ibid.,* 534E.
[149] *Ibid.,* 496B.
[150] *Ibid.,* 535.
[151] *Ibid.,* 485.
[152] *Ibid.,* 536A.
[153] *Phaedo,* 114.
[154] *Theaetetus,* 176A.

he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body, and to turn to the soul. . . . (For) thought is best when the mind is gathered to herself and . . . when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it . . . (as) she aspires after true being."[155]

This is the purification, the *catharsis*, which is the condition of philosophy: the gathering of the soul to herself. The philosopher must study to live as near as he can in a state of death![156] Truly, "he is a rare plant seldom seen among men."[157] Yet he alone can contemplate the world of true being.

§ 4. *The World of the Good*

The philosophy of the Ideas has been called the center of gravity in Plato's thought; or, to adapt his own expression, it is the keystone of his work.[158] It alone, indeed, is truly philosophy; it alone teaches us true being; and to possess knowledge of the Ideas is alone true wisdom.[159] The theory is not discussed at length in any one dialogue, yet it is present to some degree in almost all.

The World of True Being. The allegory of the cave and the device of the divided line have revealed something of the reasoning that is at the basis of the theory of the Ideas. All is not flux and motion; above the world of constant change there must be something unchanging. Heraclitus had admitted this in proclaiming the place of the Logos; Parmenides had emphasized — to an extreme, indeed — being itself. Plato tried to keep both being and becoming. On a more limited plane, he asked how that could be a real thing which was never in the same state: it was now this, now that, always "other." Thus a passing good, a transient beauty, precisely because it is not lasting, "is" not in the full sense. And what makes it a good or something beautiful, save what is unchangeably good and beautiful?[160] Furthermore, if everything is in a state of transition and nothing abides, how can there be any knowledge, for knowledge must continue always to abide unchanging? But if that which knows and that which is known exist ever, then they are not in flux.[161]

Thus both ontological and epistemological difficulties induce Plato to conclude that there is "somewhere" true and unchanging being, the only object of true knowledge.[162] The doctrine is not without its inherent difficulties, as Plato must have realized, nor was the doctrine adhered to faithfully by his disciples. Speusippus, Xenocrates, Aristotle, each would adapt it in his own way. Yet for Plato it was the solution of the problem: Is there real and absolute being, and true knowledge?

His answer is that, to use a human expression, there is an intelligible place, ὁ νοητὸς τόπος, of Forms or Ideas, Essences (οὐσίαι), independent of the world of sense, existing apart. Ideas are not in

[155] *Phaedo*, 64–65.
[156] *Ibid.*, 68D.
[157] *Republic*, 491B.
[158] *Ibid.*, 534E.
[159] *Phaedo*, 79C.
[160] Cf. *Cratylus*, 439.
[161] *Ibid.*, 440B.
[162] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XIII, 4, 1078b10 ff.

the human mind only,[163] since they would then be subject to our own passing away and would not be absolute.[164] Are they then in the mind of God, as Christian Platonists following Seneca[165] have so interpreted him? There is some indication[166] that God is considered as the cause of the Ideas, but it is hardly possible to assert with definite certainty that the Divine Reason is for Plato the *locus idearum*. Whatever the answer, the Ideas exist apart from sensible things; each is a nature which is absolute (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό), separate (μεθ' αὑτοῦ), simple, everlasting being.[167] The *Phaedrus*, perhaps in a flight of rhetoric, speaks of reality and truth as existing in the heaven beyond the heavens: "There abides the colorless, formless, intangible essence, the essence which is really real."[168] Perfect existence, self-identity, oneness, and unchanging simplicity are thus the character of these beings.

Ideas and Things. It is difficult to determine Plato's exact thought on the *number* of the Ideas. They are usually spoken of in the plural, though the *Timaeus* represents the Demiurge as following the "ideal living thing" in producing the world, as though it were but one Idea. There are distinct Ideas, however, of natural things — man, animal, plant — and apparently (though the thought fluctuates here) of abstract things such as justice, goodness, nobility, piety, and the like. Whether there are Ideas for artificial things, man-made objects like a house, a ring, a bed, and so forth, is not clear.[169] There is, moreover, a certain hierarchy among the forms, an organic unity, with the Idea of the Good as supreme.

This indefiniteness is partly removed and partly increased by the answer given to the relation of the Ideas to the things of the sensible world. Things are what they are by *partaking* somehow of the Ideas. "Nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of the beautiful . . . as to the manner, I am not certain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful."[170] The *Parmenides* makes it clear, however, that the Idea as such is not found in things, for this would imply a division and a separation to achieve a "one in many" (ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν). Instead, Socrates is made to conclude simply that the Ideas are *patterns* fixed in nature, and that other things are like them and are resemblances of them. Participation, therefore, of other things in the Ideas is really assimilation.[171] There is no physical participation of things in the Ideas; one cannot, therefore, speak of the Ideas as intrinsic formal causes, since logically the sense world would then be the source of true knowledge. On the other hand, the *Sophist* seems to hint at least that the Ideas possess some efficient causality.[172]

Our Knowledge of the Ideas. At the end of the allegory of the cave Socrates draws a startling conclusion on our knowledge of the Ideas: "If these things

[163] As Natorp and the Marburg School of Neo-Kantians conclude (cf. Ueberweg-Praechter, *op. cit.*, p. 332).

[164] *Parmenides*, 133.

[165] *Ep.*, 65, 7.

[166] *Republic*, 597.

[167] *Symposium*, 211A.

[168] οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, *Phaedrus*, 24D.

[169] This seems to have been debated in the Academy even after Plato's death (cf. H. Cherniss, *The Riddle*, p. 78).

[170] *Phaedo*, 100D.

[171] *Parmenides*, 132D; *Timaeus*, 50C.

[172] *Sophist*, 247E, 249DE, 252E.

are true, then *paideia* is not what certain of its professors claim; for they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes."[173] He seems to imply that the knowledge of the Ideas is already in the soul — and this is precisely what he does mean. "The truth about beings always exists in the soul."[174] The soul, we recall, had the vision of the Ideas in its previous existence, though this knowledge gave way to forgetfulness upon the soul's union with the body. But because sensible things are copies of the Ideas, sense knowledge sets up a chain of associations which *recall* to the soul the Ideas it once beheld.

To some extent, therefore, learning is *recollection*,[175] the recovery of what had been forgotten through time and inattention.[176] The proof of this is afforded by questions: if you put the question skillfully, a person will give a true answer of himself. Thus Socrates elicits a solution in geometry from the slave boy in the *Meno*,[177] the questions and a diagram supplying the means of "recollection." Unfortunately, though many thus get a glimpse of the Ideas, they do not appreciate what they see or recognize them as eternal truth[178] or retain them for long.[179]

The philosopher, however, who has had greater vision of the Ideas in his pre-existence,[180] is cognizant of the true cause of his recollection, for he knows that the sensible is the copy of unchanging being. For him, recollection becomes the starting point of a prolonged effort of thought to reach the Ideas. He will not, indeed, come to see the Ideas in themselves, for "if we would have pure knowledge of anything, we must be quit of the body: the soul in herself must behold things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom we desire . . . not while we live, but after death."[181] However, by living in "a state of death," by withdrawing into herself, the soul can achieve here below a share of wisdom and know the eternal, immortal, and unchangeable[182] and the truth of things.[183] For when she does this, the soul is able to contemplate the one Idea which is reflected or copied in the manifold and variable particulars. In the graphic wording of the dialogues, she becomes truly synoptic, able to see the Idea behind the *ideata*.[184] This is the reason why such moral qualities as we have seen above are demanded of the philosopher: they are the price he must pay to reach the heights of wisdom.

The Idea of the Good. The climax of this flight into the world of the Ideas, the allegory concluded, is the contemplation of the Idea of the Good, the highest of all Ideas, the most perfect of all things. The last thing the prisoner coming out of the cave would see is the sun, which he would then reason to be the guardian and in a certain way the cause of all he had beheld even in the cave.[185]

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173 *Republic*, 518C.

174 ἀεὶ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: *Meno*, 86B.

175 ἡ μάθησις . . . ἀνάμνησις: *Phaedo*, 72E.

176 *Ibid.*, 73D.

177 *Meno*, 82 ff.

178 *Republic*, 476AC.

179 *Meno*, 98A; *Symposium*, 208.

180 *Phaedrus*, 248.

181 *Phaedo*, 67E.

182 *Ibid.*, 79CD.

183 *Ibid.*, 99E; *Theaetetus*, 249C.

184 Cf. *Phaedrus*, 265D: To see together in one idea the scattered particulars (εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα); and the *Republic*, VII, 537D: the comprehensive (synoptic) man is always the dialectical (ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός).

185 *Republic*, 516C.

Analogously, in the world of knowledge the Idea of the Good appears last of all, and is seen only with great effort. When seen, it is rightly reasoned to be the cause of all things right and beautiful, "parent of light and the lord of light in the visible world, and in the intelligible world the very lord and source of truth and mind."[186]

This parallel between the sun in the visible world and the Good in the world of mind is a repetition of an earlier discussion[187] where the analogy is made much more explicit, to show both the role of the Good in our knowledge and its intrinsic transcendence. The sun, Socrates is made to argue, is at once the cause of the power of sight in the eye[188] and of the visibility of the things of the sense world. The Good plays a like role in the intellectual world in relation to mind and to the things known. The soul is like the eye, for it receives its power of knowing from the Good, while the truth and being of the Ideas is derived from the same source. "When the soul looks to that on which truth and being shine, it perceives and understands and is possessed of intelligence; but when it is turned toward the twilight of becoming and perishing [the visible world], it has opinion only."[189] That which imparts truth to things known and the power of knowing to the knower, therefore, is the Idea of the Good; it is the cause of knowledge in the soul, and of truth and being in the Ideas.

The comparison is now developed to show the inner characteristics of the Good. "The sun is not only the cause of visibility; it is also the cause of generation, nourishment and growth, yet is not generation but transcends it. In like manner, not only the knowability of the intelligibles but likewise their existence (τὸ εἶναι) and essence (ἡ οὐσία) come to them from the Good: yet the latter has not essence but transcends essence in dignity and power."[190] By such a description Plato does not intend to rob the Good of actual existence, for he later speaks of it as the best in the realm of beings. But precisely because it is so transcendent the Good is the most inaccessible of the Ideas; little can be known of it because it so far surpasses its imitations that "synopsis" is well-nigh impossible. (In the *Philebus*, 65, Plato suggests we seek to "capture" it by means of the ideas of beauty, symmetry, and truth.) But because it is the greatest of the Ideas, to know it is highest knowledge and wisdom; and it is on this that "he who would act wisely in either private or public life must fix his gaze."[191] It must be the wellspring of virtue and of action.

Is the Good to be *identified with God?* After such a description this appears an inevitable question. We would answer that while in Christian theology and philosophy the only rational interpretation is identity, in Plato's mind and thought such an equation is impossible. The Good is a Form, an Idea, a thing; therefore, it is a knowable but not a knower. God (or the gods, for we have seen that Plato is not definite) is invariably called mind and spoken of as a "soul," the "best soul," self-moving, the source of movement, none of which attributes can be predicated of an Idea.[192]

186 *Ibid.*, 517BC.
187 *Ibid.*, 508–509.
188 Cf. *Timaeus*, 45B, 67C.
189 *Republic*, 508D.

190 *Ibid.*, 509BC.
191 *Ibid.*, 517D.
192 There is considerable discussion current on

§ 5. *The Return to the Cave*

Socrates and his interlocutor, Glaucon, conclude the allegory of the cave by implying that the philosopher must return to the cave, to attempt the liberation of the prisoners even at the cost of his own life. Undoubtedly, the philosopher will prefer to remain in his happy state in the vision of the Good and the Ideas; and if he does pass from divine contemplations to the evil state of men, he will feel awkward and perhaps act not a little ridiculously, for he has just come out of the light into darkness and must deal with men who have not vision.[193] Yet return he must, though he dislikes to leave his solitude and has no desire for power, for he is needed for the health of soul in state and citizens alike. Moreover, in the Platonic republic the philosophers owe their training, *paideia*, to the city-state; therefore they must serve out of gratitude.[194]

They must return to the cave, to free men from shadow-knowledge, teach them true justice, and give them the laws and constitutions best fitted for peaceful government.[195] Yet, in the end, as we have seen, it is not the outward state that counts, but the city within man. Therefore, the philosopher must seek to better men's souls, and to perfect and enrich his own. As a result, he finds himself, so to speak, a citizen of two worlds: of the city-state in which he actually lives, and of the ideal state within his own soul. He does his duty as a member of the former, but it is in the latter that he finds his inspiration and his happiness. We are not transcending the thought of Plato if we call one the city of the world, the other the city of God.[196]

SUMMARY

The dialogues of Plato are transcendent of place and time, and rank among the great pieces of literature and human culture as classical expressions of Greek beauty and charm. Our primary interest in them has centered, however, on the philosophy which has come down to us as the thought of Plato, with its deeply religious character and its presentation of an *ethos* for human living.

Plato and His Predecessors. Plato attempted to use the best in the thought of the pre-Socratics and Socrates, and to solve the problems and contradictions that existed in the physicists. While all his predecessors except Democritus are, at least in a general manner, molded into his own philosophy, his own doctrine stands in

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the question, yet this seems the only plausible answer. To say that Plato left the identification to his readers is to pass over the distinction between a thing and a personal being. There is an unsolved conflict, perhaps, in Plato's thought; the adjustment is made in Neoplatonism, wherein the Good is the One, the First Principle. Thenceforth the doctrine finds application in numerous ways; e.g., in the theory of illumination, the relation of the world to God, etc. — Cf. K. F. Doherty, "God and the Good in Plato," *The New Scholasticism*, XXX (1956), 441–460; and A. Diès, "Le Dieu de Platon," in *Autour d'Aristote* (Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain, 16, 1955), pp. 61–67.

[193] *Republic*, 517E–518A.

[194] On the other hand, the *Republic* (520B) makes the condemnatory remark that in other and actual states, e.g., Athens, the philosophers are self-taught and owe nothing to the *polis*.

[195] *Republic*, 518–521. Cf. A. Koyré, *Discovering Plato*, p. 53 ff., and W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, II, 321–347, on the origin of society, the best form of government for a state and similar issues.

[196] Cf. W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, II, 347–357; and E. des Places, "The Social Role of the Philosopher in Plato," *Thought*, V (1930–1931), 556–572.

marked contrast to their unwitting materialism. It is a clear-cut dualism, almost too sharply contrasting the sense world of matter and the spiritual and invisible world of the soul, the Ideas, immaterial Being.

On the one hand, as we have seen, he agreed with the Heracliteans that sensible things are in flux; yet this was but one aspect of the problem. Therefore, on the other hand he admitted with Parmenides that there is true, unchanging, eternal being, which can be known by true and certain knowledge. The Nous of Anaxagoras is seen as all-pervading, ruling, ordering, and not as a vague force of nature. This implies forthright opposition to the blind necessity of the Atomists, without the denial of some matter and the four elements of Empedocles. His more immediate adversaries were the Sophists and their utilitarian *paideia* and wisdom, to which he opposed true (Socratic) education, virtue, and wisdom.

Combining thus the cosmological problems of the early philosophers and the ethicopolitical questions of the Sophists and of Socrates in a great system of thought, Plato stands head and shoulders above them all, to make them tributary to his own thought.

Plato's Doctrine. As *paideia*, his doctrine embraces much more than purely philosophical theories. It is a complete philosophy of life, teaching man his relations to God, himself, to his fellow men and the city-state. Its center is man and his formation into a perfect character. Thus his *paideia* contains much that will be incorporated into the aims and purposes of Christian classical culture.

As *philosophy*, his doctrine finds its basis and center in the theory of the Ideas, with its ramifications in the doctrine of the soul, the theory of knowledge, the goal of man, and so forth. Much of this indeed is unproven theory achieved more by intuition than cold logic; it creates many difficulties, some of which Plato tried to answer, others of which are insoluble since they stand or fall with the doctrine of the Ideas. Why, for example, must Ideas be separate from things? Why is it not possible to have an unchanging and certain knowledge (and not simply true opinion) of changing objects?

Plato's Spirit. While we thus criticize his doctrine in many points, we must admire the spirit of Plato, which is perhaps his most important contribution. Philosophy for him was essentially the life of the spirit, a striving through deep love of wisdom to come to the vision of the absolute, the divine. In its deepest meaning, therefore, philosophy is a *sophia*, a wisdom, a way of life; less of a doctrine in theory than the living of a doctrine in fact. The only true philosopher is he who, as a humble seeker after truth, does not presume to have apprehended already but is always reaching forth to the things that are before.[197]

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[197] Cf. *Symposium*, 204.

CHAPTER IX: Aristotle and the Peripatos*

THE most important of Plato's disciples, Aristotle was to surpass his teacher in the universality of his thought and the depth of his penetration. From antiquity he has been called "The Philosopher," a no mean indication of his place in the development of philosophy, since he was accepted as such by pagan and Christian alike. To Averroës, known himself as "The Commentator" (of Aristotle), he was the acme of human reason, a gift of divine providence that through him we might know whatever could be known.[1] To Dante, he was "the master of those who know."[2]

His influence was perhaps not felt immediately on the world of philosophy. But once his thought had taken hold, it was never wholly to die out. Every Western language is unconsciously filled with words and phrases that trace their usage directly or indirectly to him.

THE PERIPATOS

Life of Aristotle (384–322 B.C.). The Philosopher was born in Stagira (modern Stavro) in Macedonia, and in consequence is often called the Stagirite. His family background, however, was Ionian, and Aristotle inherited some of the daring and scientific spirit of that race.[3] This was further developed by family circumstances. His father, Nicomachus, was physician to and friend of King Amyntas of Macedonia, the grandfather of Alexander the Great. The medical profession seems to have been traditional in the family, so that the children were taught anatomy along with reading and writing.[4]

This scientific bent would be further developed and enhanced by the training Aristotle was to receive in philosophy at the Academy of Plato.[5] Tradition says that at the age of seventeen, after the death of his father, he came to Athens and entered the Academy. He was thus associated with Plato for some twenty years and became his greatest disciple and close friend. Slanderous legends of later date make their relations strained in the course of time; but though they differed in temperament and in doctrine, there is no evidence of any animosity.

At the death of Plato (348/347) Aristotle left Athens with Xenocrates. This move need not be interpreted as the result of antipathy to Speusippus, although undoubtedly the latter was far different from Plato in spirit and character. The two disciples went to Assos, in Asia Minor, where

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* Cf. Bibliography, p. 232 f.

[1] *In De anima III*, text. 14 (Venice, 1550, tom. VI, f. 169ra); *Paraphrasis in De generatione animalium I*, 20 (tom. VI, f. 216rb).

[2] *Inferno*, IV, 131: "*Il maestro di color che sanno.*" Cf. also *Convivium*, IV, 6: "*Maestro e duca de la ragione umana.*"

[3] "In any attempt to understand the mind of Aristotle, perhaps the most important thing of all to remember is that he was an Ionian, a member of that branch of the Greek race . . . distinguished by a devouring curiosity about the facts of nature and their explanation" (W. D. Ross, *Aristotle, Selections* [New York, 1938], p. v).

[4] "The second influence . . . he was the son of a physician, and a member of a family in which the practice of medicine was hereditary. It is not unlikely that as a boy he helped his father in dissections, and it seems certain that he practiced dissection in later life. Thus the racial tendency to minute observation was reinforced by a family bias" (*ibid.*, p. vi).

[5] See the remarkable lines of *On the Parts of Animals*, I, 5, 644b22–645a36, on the blending of the scientific and the philosophic approach to nature.

with other Platonists they opened an Academy under the patronage of King Hermias of Atarneus. After three years, they went to Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, accompanied by their pupil Theophrastus of Eresos (344–342). Philip, king of Macedonia, then invited Aristotle to Pella to undertake the education of Alexander (342–336). When the latter ascended the throne in 336, Aristotle returned for a year to his native town. Xenocrates had long since become the head of the Academy, while Theophrastus seems to have remained with Aristotle as disciple and collaborator.

The next period of his life was to be the most important. In 335, he came once more to Athens and opened his own school in the Lyceum, a place sacred to Apollo Lyceus, in the northeast part of the city. This may seem surprising in view of the flourishing state of the Academy presided over by Xenocrates. Undoubtedly doctrinal differences had some influence in this new venture. However, in view of what we know of the curriculum of the Academy, it seems more likely that Aristotle opened his school precisely because he wished to teach disciplines neglected in the Academy. The move, therefore, does not necessarily imply that he thus announced himself to all the world as the successor of Plato.[6]

Why this became known as the Peripatetic School is not precisely determined. Some speak of a path (περίπατος) in the garden of the Lyceum; others, of the corridor in the adjacent gymnasium, on the premise that as a non-Athenian Aristotle was unable to own property; perhaps the reason may have been their habit of walking up and down during discussions. At any rate, the disciples of Aristotle came to be called "those of the walk," the *Peripatetikoi.*

When Alexander, who had been patron of the school, died in Babylon in 323, a reaction set in among the Athenians against the imperialists and all connected with Alexander. A trumped-up charge of impiety was brought against Aristotle, who fled to Chalcis in Euboea, an island of the Aegean Sea. There he remained during the following months until his own death in 322, in the sixty-third year of his life.

The Peripatetics. Aristotle's last will reveals his deep attachment to THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESOS (371/370–288 B.C.), who succeeded him as scholarch.[7] It is not impossible, though hardly probable, that he came to the Academy as a youth. More likely, he joined Aristotle at Assos, and perhaps even influenced him to go to Mytilene on Lesbos, his native isle. Remaining with his master during the Macedonian and Athenian periods, he soon became his foremost disciple.

Meanwhile, the Peripatos or Lyceum came to be housed in a garden which Demetrius of Phaleron helped to obtain, and developed into a school of wide renown with great crowds of students and of such extensive learning that Cicero could later call it the workshop of all the arts.[8] It attracted many of the best scientists of the period: Aristoxenos, a musician and Pythagorean; Dikaiarchos, a geographer and physicist; Diocles of Carystos, renowned for his biological discoveries and teachings on embryology and gynecology; Eudemus and perhaps even Euclid, both arithmeticians and geometrists.

One or two incidents disturbed Theophrastus' long career. Between 319 and 316, a certain Agnonides attempted to prosecute him for impiety. Perhaps because of the general popularity of his victim, Agnonides was defeated and himself narrowly escaped

[6] Thus W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* (Oxford, 1931), p. 312. But cf. P. Merlan, "The Successor of Speusippus," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 77 (1946), 104–111, for evidence that the Academy at the death of Speusippus still claimed Aristotle as its own.

[7] Text given by W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 323. According to Diogenes Laertius (V, 39), Theophrastus was originally called Tyrtamus, until Aristotle bestowed a new name on him because of his graceful style. — Cf. O. Regenbogen, art. "Theophrastus," *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie*, Suppl. bd. VII, 1354–1562; for his biography, *ibid.*, 1355–1365.

[8] *De finibus*, V, vii; cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 39, 52.

the punishment he sought for Theophrastus. Later, his patron Demetrius was forced to flee Athens after political upheavals. Whether for this reason or because of a new law proposed by one Sophocles against philosophers,[9] Theophrastus (and all affected by the law) withdrew c. 306, most likely to his old home in Mytilene. A year later, the law was abrogated (since all philosophical schools were considered as religious unions), and Theophrastus returned to Athens. The remainder of his life, spent in Athens, was colored by disputes with Epicurus and with Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. "He died at the age of eighty-five, not long after he had relinquished his labors."[10] He was buried in the garden of the Peripatos, Neleus receiving his books[11] and Strato succeeding him in the school.[12]

Theophrastus was a "man of remarkable intelligence and industry,"[13] a judgment borne out by his work. Time, he would say, is the most expensive item in life, and his literary output, in the *Corpus Theophrasticum* and in his lost treatises and dialogues, would prove he used it industriously. He was, however, primarily an empirical scientist and more interested in research than in metaphysical speculation.[14] Thus he was at his best in logic, in the study of plants and animals, and in human psychology.

Of the other Peripatetics we have mentioned, Aristoxenos of Tarent, the musician,[15] was interested not only in the techniques of music, but also in its educational and psychiatric advantages. He was attracted to such practical pursuits by his deep attachment to Pythagorean doctrines, especially that of catharsis. But his music also led him to hold that the soul is only the harmony of the four elements of the body. Closely allied to him was Dikaiarchos (Dicaearchus) of Messina, pupil of Aristotle, philosopher, rhetor, and geometer.[16] Called by Cicero a *Peripateticus magnus et copiosus*,[17] he seems to have disagreed on some points with Aristotle. With Aristoxenos he denied the substantial character of soul and therefore its immortality,[18] and likewise reduced it to a mere harmony or consonance of the elements.[19] He produced, in addition to a Τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς *(Things Concerning the Soul)*, works on politics and history, geography and geometry (i.e., the measurement of the earth). Lastly, Diocles of Carystos, pupil of Aristotle and a famed medical student, brought to the school the scientific doctrines of the Sicilian school of Philistion.

Within the lifetime of these men, Epicureanism and Stoicism (to be considered later) had their beginnings in Athens. Their founders, Epicurus and Zeno (who came to Athens in 306 and 315 respectively), were influenced by some of the writings of Aristotle and the current discussions of the Peripatos. In turn, both may have had some bearing on the latter and the writings of Theophrastus.

THE WRITINGS OF ARISTOTLE

By the irony of fate, the only works Aristotle wrote for publication have been lost, save for scattered fragments, while his school notes and lectures, which he never intended to give to the public, have alone survived to form the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. With still further irony, only the former were known and read until the time of Andronicus of Rhodes (about 70 B.C.), while the great scientific works lay hidden away in a cellar.

The "Exoteric Works." What Aristotle himself called his "published works"[20] or

[9] Diogenes Laertius, V, 38; and Athenaeus, *The Deipnosophists*, XIII, 610 (Loeb Classical Library, tom. VI, p. 290).

[10] Diogenes Laertius, V, 40.

[11] *Ibid.*, V, 52.

[12] *Ibid.*, V, 58 ff.

[13] *Ibid.*, V, 36.

[14] O. Regenbogen, *art. cit.*, col. 1552.

[15] F. Wehrli, *Aristoxenos [Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar: II]* (Basel, 1945).

[16] F. Wehrli, *Dikaiarchos [Die Schule des Aristoteles: I]* (Basel, 1944).

[17] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 17.

[18] Fragments 7–11; in *ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

[19] Fragment 12.

[20] ἐκδεδομένοι λόγοι, *Poetics*, 15, 1454b18.

more often his "exoteric works"[21] included some eighteen or nineteen dialogues and other treatises.[22] From the fragments, the reports of antiquity, and the descriptions and imitations of Cicero, it seems that some of the dialogues were in three books prefaced by a procemium, with Aristotle himself often as the central figure of the discussion;[23] that, though couched in a noble style, they lacked the polish and drama of Plato's works;[24] and, above all, that they were a new type of dialogue, more truly a dialectic or battle of arguments.[25] Some were likely written during Aristotle's residence in the Academy; others, after his departure. Not all of these works are of equal importance for us. We single out the following for emphasis and later exploitation:

1. *Protrepticus:* This "Exhortation to Philosophy" is not a dialogue; it is addressed to Themison, king of Cyprus, to show how necessary philosophy is for the ruler and for true happiness in life.[26] Written in the Academy about 350 B.C., it proclaims the ideal of the purely philosophical life and its role as true culture or *paideia*. Wisdom and contemplation alone make for true happiness of soul, not the empty shadows men value so highly. The exhortation had wide influence on Cicero (*Hortensius*), Iamblichus the Neoplatonist (d. about A.D. 330), Clement of Alexandria, St. Basil, St. Augustine (through the *Hortensius*), and Boethius.

2. *On Philosophy* (Περὶ φιλοσοφίας) is one of the most important exoteric works. In contrast to the reconstruction by W. Jaeger, the latest study of P. Wilpert shows that it is centered on wisdom as "the knowledge of things divine, supramundane and entirely unchangeable."[27] The first book traced the various meanings men had attached to wisdom; the second examined the wisdom propounded by Plato on God, the Ideas, the principles of being, and the Idea of the Good; the third delineated Aristotle's own views on theology and cosmology. It is at least possible that this dialogue is identical with the one called *On the Good* (Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ), supposedly the report of a lecture Plato gave on the Good, in which he proposed the theory of ideal numbers.[28]

3. *Eudemus* (*On the Soul*). Beginning with a vision in which Eudemus, a fellow Platonist, was told he would return home in five years, a vision supposedly fulfilled in his death in defense of Dion of Syracuse, the dialogue dwells on the nature of the soul, its pre-existence, its final home. The soul is not a mere harmony of the body, that is, the product of their right arrangement; it is a substance, a form in itself. Pre-existent, it forgets what it knew, as one who falls sick forgets what he learned (therefore, the union with body is not natural for the soul).

4. *On the Ideas* (Περὶ ἰδεῶν).[29] Attested by several Greek commentators, especially

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[21] Cf. *Metaphysics*, XIII, 1, 1076a29; *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 13, 1102a26; VI, 4, 1140a 1 ff.; *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323a21 ff. The Oxford translation "in discussions outside our school" is inadmissible. The *Corpus Aristotelicum* (CA) also speaks of these works as τὰ ἐγκύκλια φιλοσοφήματα (*Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 4, 1096a3–4; *De caelo*, I, 9, 279a30 ff.), which cannot be rendered as "current discussions" or "popular philosophy." — Later writers distinguished these from Aristotle's acroamatic works, i.e., those intended for his listeners, οἱ ἀκροαταί, in the Lyceum.

[22] For texts cf. Bibliography.

[23] Cicero, *Ep. ad Attic.*, IV, xvi, 2 (in *Fragments*, p. 3); and XIII, xix, 3–4 (*ibid.*); *Ep. ad divers.*, I, ix, 23.

[24] St. Basil, *Ep.* 135 (in *Letters*, tr. by R. Deferrari, *LCL*, II, 308; and in *Fragments*, p. 5).

[25] Cicero, *De oratore*, III, xviii, 67; III, xxi, 80 (in *Fragments*, pp. 1–2).

[26] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 54–101, 232–258; and I. Düring, "Aristotle in the Protrepticus," in *Autour d'Aristote*, pp. 81–97.

[27] *Fragments*, n. 8, pp. 80–82 (basic). Cf. W. Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 124–166; and P. Wilpert, "Die aristotelische Schrift 'Über die Philosophie,'" in *Autour d'Aristote*, pp. 99–116.

[28] Cf. P. Wilpert, *art. cit.*, pp. 109–110; and H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (Berkeley, 1945), pp. 1–12.

[29] Cf. S. Mansion, "La critique de la théorie des Idées dans le Περὶ ἰδεῶν d'Aristote," *RPL*, 47 (1949), 169–202; and Paul Wilpert, *Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre* (Ratisbon, 1949), and summary by S. Mansion, "Deux écrits de jeunesse d'Aristote sur la doctrine des Idées," *RPL*, 48 (1950), 398–416.

Alexander of Aphrodisias and Syrianus (c. A.D. 425), it contained an exposé and criticism of Plato's teaching on the Ideas and the variations of the theory received from Speusippus and others.

These few exoteric works suffice to show an Aristotle who is Platonic in spirit and thought, and to some extent in doctrine. When, therefore, later Aristotelian commentators were faced with certain divergences between these dialogues and the CA, they were somewhat at a loss to explain the discrepancy. An extreme conclusion is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias (at the Lyceum in the second century A.D.), that in the acroamatic works (the CA) Aristotle states his own opinions which are true, while in the exoteric works he sets forth what appeared to others and is false. Elias (in Alexandria, fifth or sixth century) condemns this as unbecoming the Philosopher; instead, he suggests that Aristotle wished to help all men: therefore, in the CA he addressed those who were capable of philosophy, and used demonstrative proofs, while in the dialogues he had in mind those untrained in deep thought and so propounded only probable arguments.[30]

One solution current today sees the exoteric works as the product of Aristotle's younger days, his so-called Platonic period, while it considers the bulk of the CA as produced later, either at Assos and Mytilene or at Athens. This rests on the hypothesis (proposed by W. Jaeger) of a great intellectual development in Aristotle himself. The Platonic period would correspond to the twenty years he spent in the Academy, years in which he closely followed Plato both in form and in doctrine; it supposes that he accepted the theory of the Ideas, its metaphysical implications, its theory of knowledge and psychology, as well as Plato's ethics and politics.[31] The years in Asia Minor would mark a critical period (348–335), when Aristotle was forced to take his own stand on philosophical problems: "He now had to explain the Platonic philosophy on his own responsibility and according to his own conception of its nature."[32] As a result, he found himself in disagreement with some of the basic points of Platonism. Lastly, the Lyceum witnessed the period of maturity (335–323), in which Aristotle achieved his own realist philosophy and wrote the major part of the works we know.

That Aristotle underwent a great intellectual development, perhaps in the three general stages proposed by Professor Jaeger, seems admitted by most authorities.[33] But more recent studies on the dialogues tend to lessen the thesis of a complete break with Plato. Even within the Platonic period (as in the *On Philosophy*), Aristotle had criticized the theory of Ideas and had begun to shape the philosophical position later elaborated in the *Metaphysics*. The position thus achieved, however, is far less a departure from Platonism than Jaeger had imagined.

The *Corpus Aristotelicum* makes frequent reference to the exoteric works as though their doctrine was still valid. Moreover, contemporaries and others accepted the dialogues as expressions of the genuine thought of the Stagirite.[34] We can in justice, there-

[30] Cf. A. Busse, *Elias (olim David) in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias* (Comm. in Arist. Graeca, XVIII, 1, p. 114, lines 15 ff.); and Fragments, pp. 5–6.

[31] W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 44, 49, 90, etc. The author concludes, however, that Aristotle was independent of Plato in the sphere of logic and methodology (pp. 46–47).

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[33] For later theories on the intellectual development of Aristotle, cf. F. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1948), pp. 2–51; A. Mansion, *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne* (Louvain, 1946), pp. 1–37; J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto, 1951), pp. 25–47. See also the critical article by V. G. Foà, "Werner Jaeger e l'evoluzione del pensiero aristotelico nella Metafisica," in *Aristotele* (Milan, 1956), pp. 71–107.

[34] For example, Epicurus, who came to Athens in 306, accepts the argument of the *Protrepticus* in his exhortatory *Letter to Menœcesus*, and disputes Aristotle's concept of the soul, the role of justice as the health of the soul, and the meaning of the gods (cf. W. J. Oates, *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers* [New York, 1940], pp. 30–33).

fore, look on the dialogues as the more popular writings of an Aristotle who is amending (yet not rejecting) the doctrine of Plato, but who has not yet reached the maturity of his greater and more properly scientific works.

The *Corpus Aristotelicum*. The dialogues reveal the spirit in which Aristotle approached philosophy, but it is in the large group of scientific writings known as the Corpus Aristotelicum that we find the full and mature expression of his thought. Chronological problems abound, since the works were quite evidently not composed in the order in which they were later edited. It is more important, however, to know the titles and general contents of the volumes making up this complexus than it is to know their precise chronology.

1. *The Organon.* Logic is an instrument ("organon") of philosophy, a propedeutic that should be learned before one comes to study philosophy itself.[35] The *Organon* proposes to supply this need by its six treatises: the *Categories* (on simple terms, under ten general classes or categories, i.e., substance and nine accidents); *On Interpretation* or *Perihermenias* (on pairs of terms in propositions, which express truth or falsity); *Prior Analytics* (the syllogism as the expression of reasoning; its forms and rules); *Posterior Analytics* (on the conditions required for a syllogism to yield scientific and demonstrated truth); *Topics* (i.e., commonplaces: syllogisms based on generally accepted opinions give only probable conclusions); *On Sophistical Refutation* (how to know and judge fallacious reasoning).

2. *The Physical Works.* Philosophy was born of wonder and speculation on the phenomena of nature and what is more knowable and more obvious to us.[36] The physical treatises of Aristotle offer the needed correction and deepening of the insights of the physicists on the world of nature. The *Physics*, in eight books, considers the first principles of nature, the meaning of change and movement, place, time, and various forms of movement. *On the Heavens* (*De caelo*), in four books, discusses the composition of the universe, its eternity and limits, the stars and their movements, the earth, the gravity of bodies, etc. *On Generation and Corruption* (more properly translated as *On Coming-to-be and Passing-away*) contains two books on change, the origin of the four elements, and the various states of matter. The four books of the *Meteorology* discuss planets, comets, meteors, metals, minerals. The *CA* then advances to questions on organic life, with four different series on animals: the *History of Animals* (i.e., research in anatomy and physiology); the *Parts of Animals*; the *Generation of Animals*; the *Movement* (or *Progression*) *of Animals*. All such subjects are approached with a reverential combination of scientific research and philosophical interpretation. The rational animal becomes the primary subject of discussion in the three books of *On the Soul* (*De anima*) and the series of *Short Natural Treatises* (*Parva Naturalia*), which deal with problems relative to the senses, memory and reminiscence, dreams, length of life, youth and old age, life and death.

3. *Metaphysics.* There is a higher type of knowledge than any of the foregoing parts of philosophy and science, a wisdom which seeks the first principles of all things. This Aristotle called first philosophy or even theological wisdom, and embodied it in the work we know as the *Metaphysics*. It likely received that name because Andronicus of Rhodes or some early editor put it "*after* the *Physics*." (It has since been given the transferred meaning as the science which treats of things *above* and *beyond* physical problems.) Whether the editor is also responsible for the present order of the fourteen books is not clear; nor, indeed, are scholars in any agreement as to the original order of composition. Books I, III, IV, and VI to IX are fundamental, since they define this highest science and sketch its main problems. Book II (also labeled a) is a later

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[35] *Topics*, VIII, 14, 163b1; *Metaphysics*, IV, 3, 1005b4.

[36] *Metaphysics*, I, 2, 982b11; cf. *Physics*, I, 1, 184a16 ff.

though authentic addition;[37] V (Δ) is a philosophical lexicon for school use; X (I) is an independent treatise on the One and the Many; XI (K) is a series of summaries of the other books and some of the *Physics* (whether it was written down by Aristotle himself seems doubtful); XII (Λ) marks the climax of the *Metaphysics*, with its teaching on the Prime Mover. The last two (XIII, XIV) are a critique of Platonism and repeat parts of Book I; they are likely out of place.

4. *Moral Treatises*. Human thought is not only theoretical or speculative, as expressed in the foregoing works; it is also practical, pointed to action, and productive in the making of things.[38] Part of philosophy will therefore inquire into the principles of human action, whether of individuals or of society. The *Nicomachean Ethics* (*E.N.*), in ten books, is concerned largely with the moral good of the citizen, while the eight books of the *Politics*, as their title implies, consider the city-state in its smallest unit, the family. In addition, they consider the various theories of State, monarchy and other forms of government, and civil education. Whether the *Eudemian Ethics* (*E.E.*) is an earlier form of the *Nichomachean Ethics* (as Jaeger and others propose) or a later elaboration by Eudemus is an unresolved difficulty paralleled by that of the *Magna Moralia* (*M.M.*), which seems a compendium of the Eudemian work. Aristotle also wrote an encyclopedia of 158 constitutions of various states, but apart from the *Constitution of Athens* (discovered in 1891) only fragments survive.

5. *Poetic Philosophy*. In the field of productive (poietic) philosophy, the Stagirite left only a treatise on *Rhetoric* (eloquence) and a *Poetics* (an incomplete work on poetry and drama). The latter was not well known in antiquity and the Middle Ages, but became popular in the Renaissance and is widely used even today.

The Fate of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*. Aristotle had given his dialogues and other popular works to the general public, and they soon became well known. The more weighty lectures and school notes he had retained in the Lyceum and bequeathed them at his death to Theophrastus. In turn, Theophrastus deeded his library to Neleus of Scepsis, his disciple and relative.[39] As Strabo continues the account,[40] Neleus moved the books to his native city, and left them to his relatives. The latter, fearing the works would be seized for the royal library of Pergamum, hid them in an underground chamber. There they lay in dampness and mildew for a century or more, until bought by Apellicon of Teos (c. 100 B.C.) and published at Athens in a faulty edition. When the Romans conquered the city in 88 B.C., General Sulla carried the library to Rome, where Tyrannion the grammarian emended them and Andronicus of Rhodes catalogued and republished them.[41] This is not, however, the whole story. Athenaeus (end of second century A.D.) casually mentions in his account of ancient Greece that King Ptolemy Philadelphus had purchased the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus from Neleus and brought them with other Greek literature to the newly founded library at Alexandria.[42]

Both versions may well be accepted. The Alexandrian Library, founded about 300 B.C., did possess the works of Aristotle and of Theophrastus, as is proved from what we know of the Catalogue (*Pinax*) of Callimachus, an early librarian.[43] It was from

[37] The books of the *Metaphysics* are often numbered after the Greek alphabet. Because Book II is called a minor or *elatton*, III becomes B; IV, Γ; etc. We have followed the numbering of R. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York, 1941).

[38] *Metaphysics*, VI, 1, 1025b27 ff.

[39] Cf. Diogenes Laertius, V, 52.

[40] *Geography*, XIII, 1, 54 (transl. by H. L. Jones, *LCL*, tom. VI, pp. 108–113).

[41] *Plutarch's Lives: Sulla*, xxvi, 1 (transl. by B. Perrin, *LCL*, tom. IV, p. 406).

[42] *The Deipnosophists*, I, 3 (*ed. cit.*, tom. I, p. 3).

[43] Cf. O. Regenbogen, "Πίναξ," *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie*, XX–2 (1950), cols. 1408–1482, esp. 1420, 1430–1431. See also P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1951); and summary by G. Verbeke, in *RPL*, 30 (1952), 90–102.

this Catalogue, through Hermippus of Alexandria, that Diogenes Laertius derived the lists he gives of the works of both philosophers. We may, therefore, suppose that Neleus had copies made and sold to the Library. Ptolemy's agent, perhaps, was Demetrius of Phaleron, an Athenian Peripatetic, who fled to Alexandria between 305–290 B.C., after political upheavals, and there became a leading figure in the founding of the Library.[44]

The Study of Aristotle. The *CA* thus came to later generations as a whole, and was considered to present a body of doctrine as its author intended it to be studied. Only within the past century have scholars attempted to probe its literary form and ask whether the sequence of the treatises is that designed by Aristotle or is perhaps the construction of its early editors. Coupled with this have been several serious studies of the works as reflections of Aristotle's own intellectual development.

As a result, particularly since the penetrating researches of W. Jaeger, the method of historical development has been widely advocated for the study of Aristotle. This has indeed the advantage of presenting the Philosopher as he faced the problems of his historical environment, e.g., within the Academy in a Platonic atmosphere, or later in the more independent climate of the Lyceum. At the same time, ideal as such a method may appear at first sight, it labors under several defects. The chronology proposed is too often open to conjecture and uncertainty, so that it may portray an Aristotle who does not correspond to historical reality.[45] This method, moreover, frequently begins with the premise that the *CA* itself reflects the difficulties which its author experienced. Instead, it seems far more certain that the text, e.g., of the *Metaphysics*, reveals Aristotle's technique of presenting problems to his students, the solution of which (already known to him) he gradually unfolded to them as he positively developed his teaching.[46]

Since we too are "hearers" in the Peripatos, as we seek to know Aristotle's thought, it is best for us to adopt a humble "listening attitude" and let the treatises themselves show how the problems of philosophy are to be developed in a methodical rather than in a chronological manner. We thus come to study the *CA* in the order Aristotle himself wished us to read it. Chronology becomes of less importance, since an early work may be an expression of his more mature thought, or a later work may be written to give

[44] For a new interpretation of the whole problem of the dialogues and the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, cf. Jos. Zürcher, *Aristoteles' Werk und Geist* (Paderborn, 1952); and summary, "The New Aristotle," in *The New Scholasticism*, XXVIII (1953), 305–334. To explain the discrepancy between the lists of Diogenes Laertius (V, 22–27) and the *CA* as edited by Andronicus, as weli as to answer the internal problems of the *CA*, Father Zürcher proposed the radical theory that the *CA* is actually the work of Theophrastus. Diogenes' list (Pinax I) would present the works as they existed at Aristotle's death; whereas in the thirty years he survived Aristotle Theophrastus is seen as using his master's lectures, changing, deleting, augmenting at will the material bequeathed him. The conclusion would be that the *CA* is indeed the legacy of Aristotle, but much more of Theophrastus, since the substance of Aristotle would not form more than a quarter of its contents. — For one of many critical reviews, cf. G. Reale, "Josef Zürcher e un tentativo di rivoluzione nel campo degli studi aristotelici," in *Aristotele*, pp. 108–143.

[45] Cf. J. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–46, for a synopsis of four chronologies proposed by modern scholars.

[46] See *ibid.*, p. 27 ff., especially on the nature and role of the *logoi* as the basis of discussion in a Greek classroom.

more fullness to an early problem. If such is Aristotle's own method, then it is a truly philosophical method which we do well to adopt.[47]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

§ 1. *Philosophy and Life*

When St. Augustine exclaimed, "Mankind has no other reason to philosophize, save to attain happiness,"[48] he was re-echoing the Aristotle of Cicero's *Hortensius*. As a true Socratic, Aristotle would never separate philosophy and life. He had indeed a greater feeling than Plato for the scientific character of philosophy, yet with his master he considered it the instrument of human perfection and happiness, within the framework of the city-state.

***Paideia* and *Polis*.** The background of his thought, whether in the dialogues or his more scientific treatises, is thus ever *polis* and *paideia*. Philosophy is the means to virtue, and both are a key to wisdom.[49] "The virtue of the good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state . . . and the same paideia and the same habits will be found to make a good man and to make him a fit statesman or a king."[50] The *polis*, the city-state, must therefore care for virtue and make the formation of virtuous men its principal end.[51]

Yet this implies that those who are concerned with such a goal need philosophy: "the statesman must borrow from nature and reality standards by which he will judge what is just, noble or advantageous" for the state and its citizens. "This, however, he cannot do unless he has practiced philosophy and learned the truth."[52] Perhaps it is "not merely unnecessary for a king to be a philosopher [vs. the ideal of Plato], but even a disadvantage: but what he should do is to listen to and take the advice of true philosophers, since he would then fill his reign with good deeds, not with good words."[53]

What Is Philosophy? All men by nature desire to know, a truth shown by the delight we take in the senses, especially that of sight.[54] But rational knowledge is preferable to sense perception and even to true opinion, as the soul is greater than the body. Soul rules, the body is ruled; and in the soul, reason and thought are the most excellent and authoritative. If, then, man's being is ordered according to reason and intelligence, he has no function more proper to him than the attainment of the most exact truth, truth about reality. Truth, then, is the supreme work of reason.[55] But truth

[47] This is the technique used with great success by Fr. J. Owens in his lengthy study of the *Metaphysics*. We have not hesitated to make his conclusions our own.

[48] "*Nulla est homini causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit*" (*De civitate Dei*, XIX, i, 3; in *Patrologia Latina* [*PL*], 41, col. 623).

[49] *Protrepticus*, 3 ff., in *Fragments*, p. 29; *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 7; X, 7–8.

[50] *Politics*, III, 18, 1288a38 ff.; 4, 1277b13 ff.

[51] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 9, 1179b31 ff.; *Politics*, VII, 7, 1327b19 ff.

[52] *Protrepticus*, 13, in *Fragments*, p. 48.

[53] *On Kingship*, 2, in *Fragments*, p. 66.

[54] *Metaphysics*, I, 1, 980a21 ff.; *Protrepticus*, 6–7, 9, in *Fragments*, pp. 29, 36 f.

[55] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, esp. 1177b26 ff.; *Protrepticus*, 6, in *Fragments*, pp. 34–35.

about reality is attained from knowledge of the causes and principles of reality rather than from knowledge of what proceeds from them.[56] Philosophy or wisdom is the knowledge of first principles and causes, of those causes which are first and highest, the eternal and unchanging.[57]

For Aristotle, man is thus made to philosophize, "to know and observe . . . [so that] contemplation of the universe, the nature and reality of things, is to be honored above all the things that are considered useful."[58] This is the object of what will later be called metaphysics: to study and know the universe as *being*. There is a science which studies it as *moving*, and another that looks only at its *extension;* these form the physical and mathematical parts of philosophy, which precede metaphysics and are not wisdom in the full sense.[59] Only that deserves the name of wisdom which studies "things divine, supramundane and completely unchangeable."[60]

Philosophy and Beatitude. Man is born as a sort of god, Cicero quotes Aristotle as saying, for two things: for understanding and for action. The steps to happiness, which itself depends not on having many possessions but on the condition and well-being of the soul,[61] are philosophy, which gives the key to knowledge, and virtue, which is the fruit of that knowledge and "makes the condition of man good."[62] The link between them, the power which enables one to frame his life according to his theoretical knowledge, is prudence, which can procure all that conduces to the good life,[63] to judge rightly as to what is good or bad and what is to be sought and avoided in life, to live honorably with all men, to appreciate the fitness of things, the sagacious use of word and action, to retain the experience of all that can be of use to us.

For man, then, the life according to reason and philosophical wisdom is the best and most pleasant, "since reason more than anything else is man."[64] If the true pleasure of life is that which comes from the exercise of soul, which is the true life, men of sense ought to practice philosophy.[65]

§ 2. *The Disciple of Plato*

The mantle of Plato fell upon the shoulders of Aristotle, and the spirit of Plato rested upon him rather than on Speusippus or Xenocrates. He alone seems to have carried in true philosophic fashion the torch of knowledge received by his master from Socrates. Whereas others perverted the doctrine of the

[56] *Physics*, I, 1; *Protrepticus*, 5.

[57] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 7; *Protrepticus*, 13.

[58] *Protrepticus*, 11–12; *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 8.

[59] *Metaphysics*, IV, 3, 1005a18 ff.; VI, 1, 1025b25 ff.; XI, 3, 1061b5 ff.

[60] *On Philosophy*, 8; *Protrepticus*, 13.

[61] *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 7.

[62] *Ibid.*, II, 6, 1106a21–24. Cf. *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323b21 ff.: "Each one has as much happiness as he has of wisdom and virtue and of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature." Happiness is essentially and primarily virtue: ἡ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις [εὐπραγία] ἐστι (*Politics*, VII, 3, 1325a33).

[63] *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 5.

[64] *Ibid.*, X, 7, 1178a6 ff.; cf. the lengthy form of the argument in *Protrepticus*, 11, in *Fragments*, pp. 44–46.

[65] *Protrepticus*, 14.

Academy to the point of contradiction, Aristotle preserved its spirit, thoroughly purified it, and renewed it.

The reverence in which he held Plato is suggested by what we know of the work *On Philosophy*. The first book sketched the historical development of "wisdom" from earliest times, speaking of the Magi of Persia, the mathematicians of Egypt, and the ancient wise men of Greece. The wisdom offered by Plato occupied the second book (Wilpert). But, as Pliny reports, Aristotle considered Plato to have lived six thousand years after Zoroaster.[66] If we recall that according to the Persian philosopher all existence recurs in cycles, we can appreciate the force of this statement: both Zoroaster and Plato held the Good to be the primary principle, and both would see history as the story of the triumph of the Good. If, then, we suppose that *On Philosophy* also taught that human truths, and civilization as a whole, have their natural and necessary cycles,[67] the comparison would make Plato a "man of the ages," the culmination and acme of previous philosophy.

Criticism of the Ideas. Such esteem for his master, however, did not blind Aristotle to the defects of his system, particularly the central theory of the Ideas. If Speusippus and Xenocrates did not hesitate to introduce variations of the theory, Aristotle was to oppose both them and Plato.[68] Extreme care must be taken, of course, in determining his position. He is usually pictured as passing from an early Platonic period in which he subscribed to the doctrine, through a period of doubt, to a final rejection of any teaching on the Ideas. Yet "it looks as though there was nothing in Plato which Aristotle rejected so strongly as the teaching on the Ideas, not only in his works on logic, but also in his ethical and physical writings, and much more in his *Metaphysics* and his dialogues."[69] The *Metaphysics* itself is content to repeat the criticism offered earlier in the exoteric works, especially in the *On Ideas*.[70]

The Platonists, says Alexander of Aphrodisias (our source of these fragments), make use of several proofs from the standpoint of knowledge to establish the existence of the Ideas. These Aristotle examined at length, only to show that some proved nothing or too much, while

[66] Cf. *Fragments*, pp. 79–80.

[67] As suggested by fragment 18 (*Fragments*, p. 88), and taught in *De caelo*, I, 3, 270b16 ff.; *Politics*, VII, 10, 1329b25; *Meteorology*, I, 3, 339b20 ff. See also *Protrepticus*, 19, in *Fragments*, p. 55, on the Great Year, when all things return to full cycle. This interpretation is given by W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 128 ff.

[68] On his personal reaction to the need of such criticism, cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 6, 1096a11 ff.: "such an inquiry is indeed uphill and difficult, since the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. . . . Yet piety requires us to honor truth above our friends."

[69] Proclus, as quoted by John Philoponus (*On Philosophy*, n. 10; *Fragments*, p. 82); the latter says elsewhere that even in Plato's lifetime Aristotle opposed the theory of Ideas (not quoted in *Fragments*; cf. Ae. Heitz, *Fragmenta Aristotelis* [in Didot edition of *Aristotelis Opera Omnia*, iv–ii], p. 34a).

[70] A refutation of the doctrines of the Academy is offered in *Metaphysics*, I, 9, and again in XIII, 1, 4–5 (plus other incidental references). Both versions are almost identical in certain sections; Book XIII is more precise, since it is careful to distinguish three different forms of the Academic doctrine. Both parts of the *Metaphysics* are apparently excerpts from the exoteric works, as indicated by XIII, 1, 1076a27 ff., with some additions to include the doctrines of Speusippus and Xenocrates. Scholars have not fully solved the literary problems involved. Cf. J. Owens, *op. cit.*, p. 324, n. 17; and note 29, above.

others were open to serious objection.[71] Thus, one of their first arguments states: if every science concerns one self-identical thing and not some particular thing, there must be, corresponding to each science, something other than sensible things, something that is eternal and is the pattern for the particulars. Such an argument and two parallels which accompany it, Aristotle answers, do not prove that there are Ideas; *but they do show* that there are things other than sensible particulars. It does not follow, however, that if there are things other than sensible particulars these are Ideas; for besides particulars there are universals, which we maintain to be the objects of the sciences.[72]

The Platonists also use the following argument: If each of the many men is a man, and each of the many animals is an animal, this implies something predicated of all but identical with none of them; therefore, there must be something which belongs to all of them but which is separate from the particulars and is eternal, for in each instance it is predicated alike of all the numerically different singulars. But what is "one-over-many" (ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν), separated from them and eternal, is an Idea; therefore there are Ideas. Were such an argument valid, answers Aristotle, it would prove too much, for it would involve the Platonists in Ideas of negations and nonexistents. For example, "not-man" is predicated of house, dog, etc., and is a "one-over-many"; yet it is absurd to suppose the Idea of such a nonexistent. The argument, therefore, does not prove the existence of Ideas, but tends to show that what is predicated in common is different from the particulars of which it is predicated.[73]

If we weigh Aristotle's words in these passages, we discover that he is merely attacking the arguments advanced for the separate existence of Ideas, not the theory of Ideas itself. He does not deny but admits the basic premise that the object of knowledge must be something above the individuals, that it must be universal, unchanging, eternal. He does deny, however, the conclusion that the object is therefore a subsistent and separate reality. Yet this is not a denial of the Ideas.[74]

Serious Objections. Other arguments of the Platonists, he proceeds, open the way to serious objection. Thus there is one that would establish Ideas of relative terms.[75] In summary, this argument goes as follows: When we predicate equality of things in this world, we do not mean that the nature of the equal belongs really to these things. Since the quantity in sensibles is always changing and is not determinate, there is none in which the notion of "equal" is found in strict fashion. Therefore, among sensibles none can be considered as the model of equality of which the others are copies; all, then, must be images of that which is

[71] The extant pieces of the dialogue are found in *Fragments*, pp. 124–133. The editor follows the researches of P. Wilpert on the fragments (cf. n. 29, above); one must be careful, however, to distinguish between the doctrine of Plato and that of the Platonists, not always immediately evident in the fragments or in *Metaphysics*, I, 9.

[72] *On Ideas*, 3, in *Fragments*, p. 125.

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] Cf. S. Mansion, "La critique . . . ," *loc. cit.*, 177–178.

[75] E.g., *Phaedo*, 74A–75B, 102DE; *Parmenides*, 133CE, 160DE; *Sophist*, 245E.

strictly and truly equal, an equal-in-itself, a transcendent model. But do not the Platonists say that the Ideas exist in their own right as substances? It is absurd, therefore, and contradictory to posit Ideas of relatives-in-themselves, since relatives have existence only in their very relationship to one another. Finally, this argument leads to the conclusion that there must be more than one Idea of the equal: if the equal-in-itself is not equal to something, it is not equal; therefore, the equal-in-itself is equal to the (second) equal-in-itself.[76]

The foregoing argument rests on accidental predication of something shared in varying degrees (as "greatness" in *Parmenides*, 132AD). The final argument, that of the "third man," touches substantial and univocal predication. If what is predicated truly of several things exists separately from them (e.g., man-himself, they say, is truly predicated of the many particular men and is other than they), there must be a third man. For if the "man" which is predicated (i.e., the Idea) is different from those of whom it is predicated and exists independently, and "man" is predicated both of the particular men and of the Idea, there must be a third "man" predicated of both and apart from both, and a fourth predicated of all three objects, and a fifth, and so on *ad infinitum*.[77]

The conclusion is identical with that reached above: such arguments, instead of establishing the existence of the Ideas, destroy these first principles.[78]

Character of the Attack. Philosophy seeks the causes of perceptible things. Plato was misled in his search for an answer by accepting the Heraclitean position that sensibles are ever in such flux that there is no knowledge of them. If knowledge or thought is to have an object, he argued, there must be other, abiding entities apart from what is sensible.[79] Unfortunately, the conclusions he reached provide no true cause of perceptible things or account for their substance; instead, they annihilate the whole study of nature. We cannot, therefore, accept the doctrine of the Academy in any version, whether of Plato, Speusippus, or Xenocrates. Each stands and falls by the same specious reasoning, and the latter forms are worse than the original.[80]

Philosophy must therefore make a new start in the pursuit of truth. Yet it will seek to answer the same problems faced by Plato. At no time in his criticism of the Ideas does Aristotle ever deny the starting point of his master. He is equally convinced that knowledge, scientific knowledge, is not concerned with the particular and sensible as such, but the essence of things and the concepts which embody it. He refuses, however, to see the necessity of establishing a separate world of unchanging Ideas to answer the problem. His attack does no more than deny, on epistemological rather than metaphysical grounds, the superstructure Plato had built.

This done, he can turn again to sensible things, to make a fresh beginning on his own doctrine of suprasensible being. His criticism of Platonism is thus an introduction to a new metaphysics.

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[76] *On Ideas*, 3, in *Fragments*, p. 129.
[77] *Ibid.*, 4, in *Fragments*, p. 129.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 130.
[79] *Metaphysics*, XIII, 4; I, 6.
[80] *Ibid.*, XIII, 8.

§ 3. *The Science of Being*

A New Start. The search for the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. It is hard, inasmuch as the individual is unable to attain the truth adequately by his own unaided efforts; it is easy, to the extent that our predecessors help us by their own problems, their discoveries, their errors.[81] So we may well make a new start by recalling what they, and especially Plato, were seeking: not passing experiences, but the causes and principles of the things that are, thus to attain the abiding elements of necessary and universal knowledge.

Perhaps the cause of our difficulties lies not in the facts but in us, for sometimes our reason is as blind to what is of itself most evident as a bat is to the blaze of day.[82] With a view to the truth we are seeking, we must begin again to ask questions and discuss the difficulties involved, and then remove the *aporiae* or mental blocks that so often hinder our going forward. What, for example, is the precise character of the science we are undertaking? Is it a unified science of all the causes of things? Will it be limited only to the world of sensible beings, or can it lead us to suprasensible entities? Are entities the central point of this science, or will it study their basic attributes as well? What, moreover, are the principles of entity? Will matter alone give the answer, or is there something more or something apart from the concrete thing? Are "the one and being" separate (as Plato thought) or are they the substance of existing things? None of these and similar questions are easy to answer, but they must be faced.[83]

Since the goal we are seeking is no less than the first causes of things — which in the highest sense would be the object of knowledge — it would appear that the science of entity[84] is the wisdom we look for, and that the investigation of being must be foremost in our inquiry. Do we not say that he knows a thing more fully who knows what it is by its being so and so, than he who knows only its quantity or quality or what it can do or what we can do with it?[85] This science will, therefore, deal with being precisely as being, together with the attributes that belong to it by its very nature. It thereby differs from those other sciences which study only one part of being: mathematics, which looks only at extension; physical philosophy, which considers being as moving or being moved; or, on a lower plane, grammar, which investigates articulate sounds; or (on a more modern plane) any of the so-called exact sciences, which study but one phase of being. If, then, we are looking for the first principles and highest causes, we must seek the elements of being precisely as it is being.[86]

The Nature of Being. It is therefore of "being *qua* being" (ὂν ᾗ ὄν) that we

[81] *Ibid.*, II, 1.

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] Cf. *Metaphysics*, III, 1, for the list of aporiae and succeeding chapters for their development; Jos. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–146; and S. Mansion, "Les apories de la Métaphysique aristotelicienne," in *Autour d'Aristote*, pp. 141–179.

[84] "Entity" seems a better translation of οὐσία than substance, essence, or even beingness (cf. J. Owens, op. *cit.*, pp. 65–75).

[85] *Metaphysics*, III, 2.

[86] *Ibid.*, IV, 1.

must grasp the first causes.[87] Plato saw this, but confined the "really real" (ὄντως ὄν) to the Ideas. We do better to distinguish the many ways in which things are said to be; e.g., to act, to be acted upon, to be straight or crooked, all imply various forms of being.[88] To take a more obvious example: many things are called *healthy*, one because it preserves health, another because it produces health, a third thing because it is a symptom of health, or again another because it is susceptible of health. All, however, are called *healthy* because in some way they are related to health itself, which is the primary instance and use of the word. So too "being" is expressed in many ways, but always with reference to one central point or primary instance of being (πρὸς ἕν): some things are said to be because they are entities, others because they are affections of entity, or a way toward entity, generative or even destructive of it, and so on.[89] It is by being an affection or habit or disposition or motion or whatever else of this sort of being qua being, that each of these is said to be,[90] and indeed to come under this one science.[91]

Now, of these that which "is" primarily is the "what": a man, an animal, a god, which indicates the very entity of the thing. To ask, as the older philosophers did, and as we do now, what being is, is to ask what entity is.[92] Entity is thus the "one," the central point toward which all other instances of being are related. But if we ask what it is, we get many answers: it is considered as belonging most obviously to bodies, whether living (animals, plants) or natural (fire, water, earth) or composed of both (the physical universe, the stars, moon, sun). Some say only sensibles are entities; others, that there are eternal entities, which are more real and more numerous.[93]

The word entity (οὐσία), however, is predicated of at least four main objects: the whatness (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of a thing,[94] the universal, the genus, and the substratum. This last would seem at first sight the best example of entity: it is the underlying matter (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) of which all else is predicated. When everything else has been stripped off — affections, products, potencies, length, breadth, depth — only matter remains. Nevertheless, merely as matter it cannot be entity, since of itself it is not a particular thing, a "this."[95] In like manner, neither the universal nor the genus (or species) can be a cause or principle or the entity of a thing; the entity of each thing is proper to it alone, whereas the universal and genus are such as to belong to more than one thing.[96]

Is then the whatness or essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) the entity or beingness (οὐσία) of a thing? By way of answer, let us agree first that the essence of a thing is what that thing is said to be *per se* and primarily: the "being-you" is not "being-musical," since you are not "musical" by your very nature but by

[87] *Ibid.*, 1003a1.
[88] *Ibid.*, I, 9.
[89] *Ibid.*, IV, 2; cf. VII, 1.
[90] *Ibid.*, XI, 3.
[91] *Ibid.*, IV, 2.
[92] τί τὸ ὂν τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία, *ibid.*, VII, 1, 1028b4 ff.

[93] *Ibid.*, VII, 2.
[94] This is rendered by Prof. Owens as "what-IS-being," in order to make clear the "timeless Being" of the whatness or essence (*op. cit.*, pp. 93–95).
[95] *Metaphysics*, VII, 3.
[96] *Ibid.*, VII, 13.

accident and training. Rather, what-you-are by your very nature is your essence. Again, wherever there is an essence, a what-IS-being, it can be expressed in a definition. But entity alone is definable in the proper sense, for all else is defined by the addition to entity of some determinant: cold and hot cannot be defined apart from a subject, male or female apart from animal, odd or even apart from number.[97] Therefore, the essence belongs to entities either alone or chiefly and in the primary and unqualified sense;[98] it is the entity of each thing, for the subsistent thing and its entity are one and the same.[99] It follows from this that to know a thing is to know its what-IS-being; the latter is the principle of knowability in the thing, its intelligible content.[100]

But whence is the essence? It does not come from the matter, the underlying stratum, for this is a passive principle, undetermined and potential. It must, therefore, derive from the active principle in the thing, which is the form (εἶδος). To show this, we may compare the coming-to-be which is effected by nature (e.g., man begets man) with what is produced by art or by thought (the product of a craftsman, the cure effected by a doctor, the plan of a comedy). In the latter, the active principle giving a whatness to certain material is the form in the soul of the artisan, doctor, writer. In natural coming-to-be, what is produced is produced by something (the efficient cause) from something (the substratum) by causing the form in the matter.[101] The form gives entity to the composite and makes it "what" it is. Form is, in consequence, the primary instance of being in the thing.

The Form as Entity. Are we presuming too much in reaching this conclusion? We are discussing, let us recall, things generally recognized as entities: sensible, material things. The substratum thereof is indeed entity, yet not of itself for it is only potentially a "this," some definite thing. The compound, that is, the sensible thing which alone is capable of separate existence (and which indeed alone is generated and destroyed), is posterior to the matter and form, and so can be neglected here. Therefore, whatever determination the matter has received, and whatever the sensible thing is, has come from the form. Hence the form is the primary entity and the primary cause of the being of a thing, "making it to be so and not so in a permanent manner."[102] Concretely, in Callias or Socrates, the man is the compound, the body is the matter, and the soul is the primary entity (πρώτα οὐσία): "for the entity is the indwelling form, from which [form] and the matter the concrete substance is derived."[103]

[97] *Ibid.*, 4.
[98] *Ibid.*, 5.
[99] *Ibid.*, 6.
[100] *Ibid.*
[101] *Ibid.*, 8, 1033a24, 1034a4–5.

[102] *Ibid.*, 17; VIII, 1.
[103] *Ibid.*, VII, 11, 1037a30. Aristotle presupposes in the "hearers" of his *Metaphysics* a knowledge of the explanation of becoming he had set forth in the *Physics*, I, 2 ff. From an analysis of motion he draws the conclusion by analogy that in becoming three principles are involved: matter, privation, form. Thus coming-to-be always supposes a substrate which undergoes the change from one contrary to another through the reception of form. But to be receptive, the matter must not only lack a perfection but require it; this exigency is called privation. Becoming is thus the transition from potency to act, the coming-to-be out of what is potentially (δυνάμει ὄν) to the state of actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν) achieved through the acquisition of the entelechy or form (cf. *Metaphysics*, XII, 2–4). Becoming is

If it is the form in virtue of which a thing is and is called a "this," some definite thing, then the form must be that something in the highest degree; thus it is the primary instance of "thisness" as well as of entity within a thing.[104] But does not such a conclusion engender many difficulties in respect to our knowledge of things? Only singular things exist in the sense world; yet the object of knowledge must be other or higher than the individual sensibles: "for all things that we come to know, we come to know in so far as they have some unity and identity and in so far as some attribute belongs to them universally."[105] On the other hand, our experience with Platonism has shown that universals as such cannot exist apart from individual things;[106] nor yet, indeed, can they exist as such in individuals, for that which is common is a "such," whereas entity is a "this."[107] So we are in a real *aporia:* if the form is a universal, it can be known but cannot make the matter a "this"; if it is purely and simply singular, it is indeed perceptible but intellectually unknowable.[108]

The only conclusion to be drawn is that the form (εἶδος) according to Aristotle is of itself neither singular nor actually universal. It is not singular but it is indivisible: "Callias and Socrates are different in virtue of their matter, for that is different; but the same in form, for their form is indivisible."[109] Because it is not singular, it is knowable and definable and can be the principle of knowability for the singular thing; and yet, because it is not universal, it can be the entity of the singular. When it is known, the thing is known, but without its singularity; and at the same time, the universal is known potentially. If the grammarian actually knows this *a*, his knowledge can be applied to any *a* whatever, and thus is potentially universal.[110] To know the form is, consequently, to know the singular and to know the universal.[111]

This puts us in a position, it would seem, to answer problems advanced by earlier philosophers (which indeed are *aporiae* for ourselves also), concerning the one and the many: Is there a one apart from the many, whereby we may know the many (for how will there be scientific knowledge if there is not to be

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therefore "midway between being and nonbeing, and that which becomes is always between that which is and that which is not" (*ibid.*, II, 2, 994a27 ff.).

[104] *Metaphysics*, II, 1, 993b24–26.

[105] *Ibid.*, III, 4, 999a28 ff.

[106] *Ibid.*, VII, 16.

[107] *Ibid.*, III, 6; VII, 13.

[108] Cf. *ibid.*, III, 6, 1003a8–17.

[109] ἄτομον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, *Metaphysics*, VII, 8, 1034a6 ff. This position has been the bane of some commentators (see references in J. Owens, *op. cit.*, p. 401, n. 60).

[110] "Knowledge, like 'to know,' has two senses, of which one is potential and the other actual. The potency, being, as matter, universal and indefinite, deals with the universal and indefinite; but the actuality, being definite, deals with something definite; being a 'this,' it deals with a 'this.' But *per accidens* sight sees universal color, because this color which it sees is color; and this a which the grammarian investigates is an a" (*Metaphysics*, XIII, 10, 1087a 15 ff.). What this means for the theory of so-called abstraction is considered by J. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 242–243, 272.

[111] Scholastic philosophers came later to make a distinction between the form (εἶδος) of the whole (e.g., humanity) and the form (μορφή) of the matter (the soul). They found a basis in Aristotle, of course, yet the Philosopher does not always so distinguish; e.g., "Your matter and form (εἶδος) and moving cause are different from mine, while in their universal definition (καθόλου λόγος) they are the same" (*Metaphysics*, XII, 5, 1071a28 f.).

a "one-over-all," ἓν ἐπὶ παντῶν)?[112] Or again, a question which is the hardest of all and the most necessary for knowledge of the truth: Are being and unity (ὄν καὶ ἕν) the entities of things or simply their attributes? Parmenides had argued that all things that are are one and that this is being; Plato and the Pythagoreans, that being and unity were something quite apart from individuals, and their essence simply unity and being; Empedocles said unity was love; Heraclitus found being and unity in fire, Anaximenes in air.

The first question we have already answered in part: since the entity of each thing belongs to it and it alone, no universal can be the entity of an individual thing.[113] Yet at the other extreme, we are also led to declare that no universal exists apart from its individuals, and that in consequence there is no one-over-many, as the Academy teaches.[114] Instead, there is a one-in-many (Aristotle does not use the expression) when the definition is one.[115] On such a premise it follows that neither being nor unity as universals have any existence apart from individuals. To be is to be something; to be one is to be a particular thing, and no more.[116]

Suprasensible Being. Our science has been conscious that its task is to consider all things, the things that are precisely as they are.[117] It began, as all human knowledge begins, with what is more obvious and known to us: the sensible things of experience. In these we have found entity to be the primary question, for in virtue of it all else is said to be, as attributes of entity, a way toward it or away from it, or even the negation of being. Our search has led us to see form as the primary instance of entity in sensible things, to consider matter as entity only when it is in possession of the perfection given by the form; previously, it was entity only in potency. In itself neither wholly singular nor yet universal, the form with and in the matter produced the singular, and yet provided the mind with such knowledge that with the passing of the individual from its experience it retained a formula, a concept, equally applicable to all things possessed of the same form.[118]

The being of the singular sensible is thus explained by these two intrinsic causes. Yet this is not the full answer. Since the singular is brought into being, at one time it existed only in potency: hence it required some being already in act to produce it. "Everything that is produced is something produced from something and by something which is in the same species."[119] This latter is the efficient cause, which produces in view of an end. There are thus four causes of the being of the singular sensible: the matter and form, the agent and the end.

Even as we propose the form in such things as the primary instance and cause of their being, we become conscious that we have not arrived at the very first and highest instance and cause of being. In sensible entities, the form is united to and embedded in matter which is subject to corruption; therefore, the form itself can pass away. Such beings are indeed

[112] *Metaphysics*, III, 4, 999a24 ff.; b25 ff.
[113] *Ibid.*, VII, 13.
[114] *Ibid.*, 16.
[115] *Ibid.*, X, 1 and 3.
[116] *Ibid.*, VII, 16; X, 2.
[117] *Ibid.*, IV, 2.
[118] *Ibid.*, VII, 15.
[119] *Ibid.*, IX, 8, 1049b27.

actual, yet because they are perishable they are also partly potential. But actuality must always be prior to potency and to any principle of change. Above and beyond the perishable, we are forced to conclude, there must be things which are fully actual and imperishable, on which corruptible things depend for existence. The most manifest instance of such imperishables is found in the heavenly bodies, the sun and the stars and the whole heavens, which are ever active in eternal movement.[120] They are, in consequence, a higher instance of entity because their form is united to incorruptible matter.[121]

Yet not even these celestial beings are the most perfect example of entity, for there is still within them a certain potency, not indeed to movement which is eternal, but to the "whence" and the "whither" of that movement.[122] In consequence, theirs is an imperfect act, which supposes something already completely in act. Hence there must be such a principle, whose very entity is act, and without matter, and eternal.[123] The very priority of act over potency thus demands and proves the existence of an eternal unmoved Entity beyond the perishable sensibles of earth and the imperishable sensibles of the heavens: "for entities are the first of existing things (*πρῶται τῶν ὄντων*), and if they are all corruptible, all things are corruptible." Since movement is eternal yet partially potential, beyond the moved must be an Entity "eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things," which is responsible in some way for that movement.[124] This *οὐσία ἀκίνητος* (unmoved entity) "must surely be the divine and the first and the most dominant principle," and thus the first and highest instance of entity and knowability. This is the one toward which indeed all other entity points.

The God of Aristotle. This being, for Aristotle, is the divine, though his God is far removed from the Judaeo-Christian concept of the divinity. On this divine Entity depend all the heavens and the world of nature,[125] yet they do not and cannot look to it as their efficient cause, for movement and the world are eternal.[126] Rather, it is their final cause only: they move toward that Entity out of love for it. The attraction which corruptible sensibles feel toward the incorruptible heavens leads them to imitate the latter,[127] while these in turn are drawn by love and desire toward the truly immaterial and separate divine Entity, "that, as far as their nature allows, they may partake in the eternal and divine."[128] The God of Aristotle is thus an Entity "which moves without being moved, since it is eternal, entity and actuality . . . the final cause (which) produces motion as being loved, while that which is thus moved in turn moves other things."[129]

To grasp this teaching, we must understand the Greek concept of the universe. It is a geocentric system: around the center, the earth, is a series of concentric spheres to which are attached

120 *Ibid.*
121 *Ibid.*, X, 10.
122 *Ibid.*, IX, 8.
123 *Ibid.*, XII, 6.
124 *Ibid.*, 7.

125 *Ibid.*
126 The first book of the *Metaphysics*, on the other hand, speaks of God as the Good and the cause of all (I, 4, 985a9). Cf. J. Owens, *op. cit.*, p. 422, n. 45, on the question of efficient causality in Aristotle's God.
127 *Metaphysics*, IX, 8.
128 *On the Soul*, II, 4, 415b1.
129 *Metaphysics*, XII, 7, 1072a25, 1072b63 ff.

the planets, stars, etc. To each star or planet is attached an intelligence, an immaterial knowing entity, as the mover of the sphere. Each sphere is thus moved by its mover; but that mover in turn, by its attraction to the mover of the immediately higher sphere, is itself moved to accomplish its task. The mover of the outer sphere is moved by an Unmoved First Mover (*πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*), the First Entity, which is God.[130] Since each of the movers is itself a god, divinity is predicated of a whole class of beings, even though one among them is first and unmoved and is the source of order and movement in the whole universe.[131]

Since the Unmoved First Mover is the highest and most perfect being, its very entity must be actuality, pure act.[132] The inner life of God must, therefore, far surpass that of man, for our life is but a fleeting moment. But since the highest life for man is in intellectual contemplation, the possession and enjoyment of knowledge, God must possess and be the actuality of thought, "for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality."[133] The object, however, of divine thought can be only that which is most divine and precious, and this in one eternal unchanging act. It cannot think of aught outside itself, for it would thus depend on something else (which would be higher), and be subject to change if it thought on more than one thing. It can only be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking (*νόησις νοήσεως*). God is Thought, a divine self-thinking Thought.[134]

Such a conclusion, however, entails dire consequences for God's relation to the world. Since he accounts only for movement in the world, no longer is he the Demiurge or efficient cause of things. Little place, if any, is left for teleology save as the work of nature, not of Mind; and any doctrine of providence is precluded, since the Prime Mover has neither knowledge, interest, nor care for the world: he does not enter into human life. Lastly, since the Prime Mover of the universe is also the supreme god, the Greek world gained a rational theology, but it lost its religion.[135]

The Unity of Metaphysics. Given such a climax to this science, we can understand why Aristotle will call it not only first philosophy,[136] but likewise the divine science,[137] and even more aptly theological science or wisdom.[138] This terminology, however, has led some to accuse the Philosopher of ambiguity and

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[130] *Ibid.*, 7–8.

[131] *Ibid.*, XII, 8; cf. J. Owens, *op. cit.*, pp. 287 ff., and 415, n. 41, on the question of plurality of movers.

[133] *ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια*: *ibid.*, XII, 6, 1071b20.

[133] *Ibid.*, XII, 7, 1072b26.

[134] *Ibid.*, 9, 1074b15 ff., esp. 30–34; cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, VII, 14, 1154b25 and X, 8, 1178b22. This conclusion reveals, it seems, a change in Aristotle's thought. He did not hold it in the *Eudemian Ethics*, VII, 14–15; and in the *Magna Moralia* he thought this divine self-contemplation was absurd, though he would not venture to draw any other conclusion (II, 15, 1213a1–8). The exoteric works reveal, perhaps, the more religious side of his thought. *On Philosophy* advances several important arguments for the existence of God (fragments 12a, 12b, 16, 17; p. 84 ff.).

[135] By contrast, the *Eudemian Ethics* states that God is the governor of the world and of man (VII, 14, 1248a25; 1247a27 ff.; 1249b 12 ff.); he is to be loved and served by man and gives love in return (VII, 3, 1238b27 ff.).

[136] *Metaphysics*, IV, 2; VI, 1.

[137] *Ibid.*, I, 2.

[138] *Ibid.*, VI, 1; XI, 7.

inconsistency: he is said to hold a double object in metaphysics: being *qua* being, and being as separate, independent, and unmoved, that is, the Unmoved Mover, God, and the intelligences.[139] Undoubtedly, the treatises do not clearly resolve the apparent problem, though they do give the key to its solution.

Aristotle has intended the highest part of philosophy to be *one* science. This was one of the first of the *aporiae*, whether one science deals with all entities, not only sensibles but others besides.[140] Since the only thing common to all things is the concept of being, it is precisely from the viewpoint of being as being that this science can and does study all things. Moreover, if this science is the search for the first principles and highest causes, then it is of being as being that we must grasp the first causes.[141] Though being has many meanings, entity is the primary instance of it; therefore it is more precisely of entity that the philosopher must seek the principles and causes. All else of which being is predicated will be studied in its relation to entity.

Once, however, we have analyzed sensible entity and discovered its intrinsic principles and causes, we soon realize that it cannot be the most perfect instance of being, since its form is immersed in matter and subject to passing-away. It is not sufficient of itself to explain itself. Therefore, we must go beyond sensible being to a still more primary instance of entities: the imperishable sensibles of the heavens. Yet these in turn point us on to the absolutely separate forms: not the Ideas of Plato or the Numbers of the Pythagoreans, but to the immaterial movers and the Prime Mover. Here at last we find the absolutely first and perfect instances of entity, and the perfect example of being *qua* being. Since all other beings depend on them, we have reached the truly first causes and principles of entity and being.

Thus this science reaches its climax not in a new and separate object but in the perfect exemplification of its one object, for the movers and the First Unmoved Mover, which is perfect act, are themselves discovered and studied in the science of being as being. The relational character of this science is the keystone that gives it unity and coherence.

§ 4. *The World of Man*

Aristotle's doctrine on man and the soul is intimately connected with his doctrine on being. Though there is no explicit reference to the *Metaphysics* in the *De anima* (*On the Soul*), it is evident that the latter work is dependent on first philosophy for its approach to the problems of psychology. In consequence, as in his philosophy of being we have sought to follow Aristotle methodically rather than chronologically, so the same principle must inspire us here. Un-

[139] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 217–220, who sees two fundamentally distinct trends of thought here interwoven: the one, Platonic, wherein the First Mover replaces the Ideas; the other, more authentically Aristotelian, based on the degrees of penetration and abstraction, which reaches being as being. We might add that the problem caused a division in Arabian thought (Avicenna *vs.* Averroës) and difficulties in Scholasticism.

[140] *Metaphysics*, III, 2.

[141] *Ibid.*, IV, 1.

doubtedly, Aristotle's teaching matured over the years,[142] but we must take *On the Soul* as representing his mature thought; as such, moreover, it has come down in history.[143] It has perhaps created as many problems and difficulties as it has solved, but we shall try to examine the text in itself, with some help from first philosophy.

The Metaphysical Setting. The first of the three books of the *De anima* lays open the grandeur and difficulty of the subject, with its inherent *aporiae* or problems (c. 1), and then proceeds to survey earlier opinions on the nature of the soul (cc. 2–5). The opening chapter places us squarely in the setting of the *Metaphysics* and the problem of entity. We must first determine what the soul is: is it a "this-somewhat" (*τόδε τι*) and an entity (*οὐσία*), or shall we place it in the genus of quality or quantity or some other category? Is it a being in potency, or is it not rather an actuality (*ἐντελέχεια*)? We must see if it is divisible or without parts, and whether it has the same form wherever found in living things. A further problem is presented by the affections of the soul: Do they all belong to the composite, or is any one of them proper to the soul alone? Thinking (*τὸ νοεῖν*), for example, seems to be peculiar to soul by itself; yet if this is true, then the soul would seem capable of separate existence, whereas generally such affections are accompanied, as in anger, by a concurrent affection of the body. To the extent that its affections have this psychosomatic character, the study of the soul belongs within the province of the physicist;[144] but if there is anything in soul separable from body in both fact and our thought of it, this the metaphysician is to consider.

If we take into counsel what earlier writers have taught on the soul, to profit by what they have said well and to avoid their errors, we shall find that quite rightly they ascribed movement and sensation to those beings which are ensouled. Their discovery of these characteristics, however, is often marred by erroneous opinions on the nature of soul. Some declared it originative of movement because it was self-moving; others, dwelling more on the problem of knowledge, considered it the subtlest kind of body, or simply the blend and harmony of the elements of the body, or again found it composed of all four elements (for like

[142] For a study (not completely accepted by scholars) of the development of Aristotle's thought on the soul, cf. the work of F. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1948), and the summary and criticism of G. Verbeke, *RPL*, 46 (1948), 335–351. The exoteric works do indeed show an Aristotle undecided in his teaching. The problem of "parts" of the soul (already suggested in the Academy) seems to trouble him, to leave the general impression that in man he distinguished in some way body, soul, mind. Yet the differences may not be as great as they appear at first sight.

[143] Some later chapters will show how the *De anima* came to the Scholastics and to us surrounded by a host of commentaries and related treatises all of which offered a variety of interpretations to problems suggested and/or left unsolved by Aristotle. The early commentators (e.g., Alexander of Aphrodisias), as well as the Neoplatonists, inspired new treatises and theories among the Arabians (Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroës). The Christian philosophers, moreover, approached the question with an outlook and concept of soul derived from their faith. Hence it was and still is difficult to read the original *De anima* with the mind and outlook of Aristotle himself. Yet we must try to do just that.

[144] The *Metaphysics* had already been clear on this point; "It belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e., so much of it as is not independent of matter" (VI, I, 1026a5).

is known by like). Their teachings are at odds, likewise, on the relation of soul (ψυχή) and mind (νοῦς): Democritus simply identifies them; Anaxagoras seems to distinguish them in theory but in practice treats them as one nature.[145] This, certainly, is a special problem. While we should avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or reasons, and say rather that it is the man who does this with his soul (to the extent that such actions begin from the soul or terminate in it), mind appears to be something different. It seems to be an independent entity and not subject to corruption but impassible by nature. Its activity (τὸ νοεῖν) would be contemplation (τὸ θεωρεῖν), whereas reasoning, loving, or hating belong not to mind but to that which has mind, that is, the composite; they cease when the composite perishes, but mind is perhaps something more divine and impassible.[146] This leads back to the problem whether there are parts to the soul, and whether different vital actions in man belong to the whole soul or to some part of it.[147] The problem of mind constantly reappears in the later books, and seems never to have been satisfactorily solved by the Philosopher.

Definition of the Soul. The second book marks "a new start to answer the question: What is soul?" The approach is directly dependent on the doctrine of entity, which is used to achieve a definition (c. 1) and then to justify it (c. 2). Entity is either matter (which of itself is not a "this"), or form, in virtue of which a thing is called a "this," or thirdly that which is compounded of matter and form. Matter is thus potentiality, whereas the form is actuality. Now, among entities are generally reckoned bodies, especially natural bodies. Of natural bodies, some have within them a principle of life, that is, of self-nutrition and growth; others do not.[148] Those which have a principle of life are entities in the sense of a composite: the body is the matter, and therefore entity only potentially; the soul on the other hand must be the entity as the form or actuality of the body. Since the body must be of such and such a kind, or else all bodies could be ensouled, the soul is the form of a natural body which has life potentially within it. Actuality, however, is taken in two senses: the possession of life and the exercise of life; since the second presupposes the first, we conclude that the soul is the first actuality. The body on its part must be not only natural but also possessed of organs and so capable of performing vital actions; e.g., the leaf of a plant can be considered an organ or instrument for some functions of life.

We thus reach the definition of soul: "Soul is the first actuality of a natural organic body having life potentially in it."[149] It is a definition completely in accord with and founded on the principles we established for the being of perishable sensibles, since the soul is truly the primary entity (πρώτη οὐσία) of the living thing, the animal.[150] It makes

[145] More likely their doctrine found its primary application in the relation of the world-soul to the Mind which rules all things, rather than in the relation of soul and mind in man.

[146] *On the Soul,* I, 4.

[147] *Ibid.,* I, 5.

[148] Cf. *Physics,* II, 1.

[149] ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος, *On the Soul,* II, 1, 412b5.

[150] *Metaphysics,* VII, 10–11; V, 18.

the matter to be a "this," and so with matter forms the living being.

In keeping with these principles, it seems hardly necessary to ask the question if soul and body are one. They are one, surely, in the same way that the wax and the impress given it are one, for soul is entity only as the essential whatness (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of such a body.[151] It would be useless likewise to ask how the soul came to be; only the composite is, in the proper sense, generated and destroyed, and only it is capable of separate existence.[152] Therefore, "no one makes or begets the form, but it is the individual that is made, i.e., the complex of form and matter that is generated,"[153] "the begetter making the product and causing the form in the matter."[154] Since, then, the living being and not the soul is begotten, the soul is but the actuality of a certain body; it cannot be without a body; it is indeed not a body, any more than the seal or imprint is the wax, but something belonging to the body, something in such and such a body,[155] distinguishable from body only by definition.[156]

Yet even as he advances this definition and its explanation, the Philosopher takes care to reserve a possible independent position in regard to the nature of mind: "From [the definition] it follows that the soul is inseparable from the body, or at least that certain parts are, if it is divisible . . . yet some may be separable because they are not actualities of any body," since "the mind or the power to think seems to be a different kind of soul and alone capable of existing apart, as what is eternal is separate from what is corruptible."[157]

The Activity of the Soul. What has soul in it displays life. To live, however, may mean many things: thinking, perception, local movement or rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay, and growth. If at least one of these is found in a thing, we may say it is living: plants have a certain grade of vital activity; animals possess in addition the power of sensation; and man, the prerogative of thought. Of each, the soul is the source or principle, so that in us we can say that "the soul is that by which primarily we live, perceive, and think."[158] Such vital activities are possible because the soul possesses the corresponding potencies or powers, which are known as distinct from one another through their respective operations and objects.[159]

Passing over the powers of nutrition and growth and the higher powers of sensation (of which Aristotle gives a lengthy and keen analysis), we arrive at what is most characteristic of the human soul: thinking, discriminating, perceiving.[160] Conscious of the immaterial character of thinking, since what sensation apprehends is individual but what intellection grasps is universal,[161] Aristotle rebukes those ancients who identified thinking and perceiving. Perception cannot be the same as practical thinking (τὸ φρονεῖν), because all animals perceive, but only man can plan. It must be distinct from speculative thought as well (τὸ νοεῖν), since error can be found in

[151] *On the Soul*, II, 1, 412b6 ff.
[152] *Metaphysics*, VIII, 1.
[153] *Ibid.*, 3, 1043b16 ff.
[154] *Ibid.*, VII, 8, 1034a4 ff.
[155] *On the Soul*, II, 2, 414a15 ff.
[156] *Ibid.*, 413b29.

[157] *Ibid.*, II, 1 and 2.
[158] *Ibid.*, 2, 414a12 f.
[159] *Ibid.*, 4.
[160] *Ibid.*, III, 3.
[161] *Ibid.*, II, 5.

thought, whereas perception of the proper objects of sense is always free from error. Sometimes, moreover, thought includes discursive reasoning (*διανοία*), which is absent on any sense level. At the same time, thinking is analogous to perception, since in both the soul discriminates and is cognizant of an existing object.[162] Such likeness helps us see the nature of the mind and of the process of thinking; mind is related to the intelligible as sense is to the sensible — though it is much easier to analyze sensation and enumerate its parts.

The thinking part of the soul, such an analogy shows, must be at once impassible or unchangeable and yet capable of receiving the form (*τὸ εἶδος*) of an object. To be receptive of all things, however, it must be free from any mixture or anything material, for the presence of something foreign to its nature would keep it from knowing all things; that is, since knowledge is a union of knower and known, the soul cannot be any of its objects before it thinks them (and can reflect on itself only after it knows other things); hence it cannot be body or blended with body, but must be unmixed and immaterial. Again, we might put it thus: as the things it knows are separated from actual matter in the process of knowledge, so the powers of the mind must be themselves free from matter and not blended with the body itself. Before it knows, then, the mind is comparable to a writing tablet "on which as yet nothing is written but which can receive all characters."[163]

Thinking thus takes place in a union of knower and known, wherein the form (or intelligible content) of the object is received by the mind. We must, therefore, posit in the soul, as in all other things in nature, not only a matter which is potentially all particulars of a class, but also a productive cause which can make them what they are. By matter, of course, we do not mean physical, extended matter, but the capacity in the mind by which it can become all things in its knowledge of them. But there must also be mind which can make things actually intelligible. This latter "is a kind of habit or positive state (*ἕξις τις*) like light, since in a sense light makes potential colors into actual colors." There is, then, the mind as receptive (*ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς*), which is united to and becomes its object in knowledge; and there is mind as active or as the productive cause (*τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν*), which somehow effects this union.[164]

On the basis of this distinction we can explain *the process of knowledge*. Sense-knowledge is the starting point, for no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense.[165] The senses present the images (*φαντάσματα*) to the intellect. Though the objects of thought are in these sensible forms,[166] the latter are not entirely disengaged from matter and are only potentially intelligible.[167] Therefore, the form must be liberated from the conditions of matter, and this somehow by the transforming action of the

[162] *Ibid.*, III, 3.

[163] *Ibid.*, III, 4, 429b30 f. This similitude was later rendered as *tabula rasa* (a writing tablet wiped clean), which is an inexact rendition.

[164] *Ibid.*, 5, 430a10 ff. This is the origin of the doctrine of the so-called possible and active intellects.

[165] *Ibid.*, 8, 432a6.

[166] *ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθησι τοῖς τὰ νοητὰ ἐστι*, *ibid.*, 432a4.

[167] *Ibid.*, 430a6 ff.

intellect as active. The mind as passive is then acted upon by the *eidos* or form of the object and identified with it. Thus is achieved knowledge of the form of the thing, that which we have said to be the very entity and essence of the individual, yet which at the same time is potentially universal because it is definable.[168]

The Constitution of Man. There have been several indications thus far that Aristotle found difficulty in assigning the place of mind in the make-up of man. Plato (and even Aristotle in certain dialogues) had considered the rational soul (or the rational part of soul) as pre-existing the body and coming to it from without; Anaxagoras, in contrast to Democritus, had distinguished between soul and mind. Aristotle himself faced problems raised by the immateriality of thought: What was mind in relation to soul, and therefore in relation to body? What was its origin? and What its destiny? Commentators in turn, both ancient and modern, have sometimes confused rather than clarified his position.

If only the composite, man, is the end-product of generation and alone without qualification capable of independent existence,[169] then clearly the soul as such is not generated (or much less, created) nor does it come from without. But is mind from without, or is it a part of the soul produced in the composite through the action of the male parent?[170] Certain qualities attributed to mind almost make it seem an extraneous part of man: it is separable, impassible, unmixed, alone immortal and eternal, and even divine. The key to the problem, many have thought, is furnished by the words of *De generatione animalium*: "Mind alone enters [the composite] from without and it alone is divine, for no bodily activity has any connection with that of mind."[171] As a result, they conclude that for Aristotle man is composed of body-soul-mind, the first two produced by generation, the third something eternal that comes to man at birth and leaves at death.[172]

It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that this is not Aristotle's true position. For him, it would seem, mind is definitely a part of man, a power of the soul which comes into being together with the soul, and yet somehow is not dependent on the body for its exercise or existence and is thus capable of surviving after death. It is a power, however, that is not immediately apparent in the newborn man but is the last of the powers of the soul to achieve actuality. This, indeed, is the teaching of the *De generatione animalium*, despite the opposite exploitation of the passage above, for a few lines later (737a11–16) Aristotle concludes that all the powers, even that which is separate from the body, the mind, are contained potentially in the sperm and transmitted by it to the being which is formed in the uterus of the mother. A closer examination of the text shows it is actually the second half of an *aporia* Aristotle had advanced on the

[168] The concrete thing, on the other hand, e.g., this circle, of which there is no definition, is not known by such abstraction but, according to the *Metaphysics*, is grasped by intuition (νόησις) or by perception (VII, 10, 1036a2 ff.): this text seems to have given rise to the theory of intuitive knowledge in the late Scholastics.

[169] *Metaphysics*, VIII, 1.

[170] Aristotle assigns the mother only a passive role in generation.

[171] *De generatione animalium*, II, 3, 736b27–29.

[172] Among the moderns who have held this view is Prof. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 45 ff., 332.

question, and does not represent his own thought.[173] Again, we must not be misled by such adjectives as eternal and divine, since for Aristotle they designate necessary beings in opposition to contingents, or what is better and more important.[174] They apply to the mind as the more important element in man, and as capable of survival after the passing-away of the contingent composite. "Reason is (therefore) divine in comparison with the man," that is, the whole composite; and because it is "the better part of man," it "above all else *is* man," raising him above the level of the brute animal to lead a life more like that of the gods.[175]

The conclusion that mind is not distinct from soul does not remove all difficulties in Aristotle's thought. He seems never to have attained a satisfactory position on the relation of the mind to the human psyche or to the body. He hesitates to say that the soul has parts, yet at once admits there must be some parts which are separable because they are not the entelechy of the body.[176] Again, he grants that one element in soul is without reason, whereas another has a rational principle.[177] But he leaves many questions unanswered, and on others he is so hesitant that commentators and later disciples arrived at widely different answers.

The Goal of Man. As an individual composite substance, man does not survive after death: "Callias is resolved into flesh and bones."[178] If death does not come by violence from without, it will result from the loss of heat in the heart.[179]

The soul disappears, for there is no way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul apart from body, and it cannot be without a body.[180] The fate of mind, however, is different, since it is impassible and incapable of destruction.[181] Its survival is at least implicit in the fact that it is not immersed in the body as the entelechy of any part,[182] or blended with the body.[183] Nor does the philosophy of entity contradict this position, "for there is nothing to prevent some form surviving afterward; e.g., the soul may be of this sort, not all soul, but the reason."[184]

On the other hand, Aristotle is cautious in surmising what future life awaits the mind. When it is separated from the body, it will be just what it is and nothing more.[185] But we do not know if a man is happy when he is dead, or whether

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[173] This is the conclusion of a very long and careful analysis made by Dr. Paul Moraux ("A propos du νοῦς θύραθεν chez Aristote," in *Autour d'Aristote*, pp. 255–295). The *aporia* is rather loosely and awkwardly phrased by Aristotle, yet it is evident enough: he is opposing his own stand on the origin of the mind to the dualistic viewpoint of those of his predecessors who considered soul as an entity which entered the body from without (cf. conclusions, *art. cit.*, p. 283 ff.).

[174] Cf. *De generatione animalium*, II, 1, 731b24 ff. (necessary vs. contingent); 732a3–9 (the man is the better and more divine cause in generation). Any confusion in the *On the Soul* (I, 4, 408b18 ff.) which might be caused by the Oxford translation, "implanted within the soul," is clarified by examination of the Greek: ἐγγίνεσθαι can just as well mean "born" or "growing" in us (so used several times in *De generatione animalium*, II, 3).

[175] *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 1177b26 ff.

[176] *On the Soul*, II, 1.

[177] *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 13; *Metaphysics*, IX, 2.

[178] *Metaphysics*, VII, 10, 1035a32.

[179] *De respiratione*, I, 478b24; 479a9 ff. and 32 ff. In the *Parva naturalia* the soul is constantly considered as centered in the heart (*De iuventute*, 467b10 ff.; *De respiratione*, 474a29; etc.).

[180] *On the Soul*, I, 1, 403a10 ff.; II, 2, 414a17 ff.

[181] *Ibid.*, II, 4.

[182] *Ibid.*, 1.

[183] *Ibid.*, III, 4.

[184] *Metaphysics*, XII, 3, 1070a26; cf. XI, 2.

[185] *On the Soul*, III, 5.

the dead are merely blessed in being at last beyond evils and misfortunes, though the general belief would point to future happiness or misery.[186] Philosophy cannot give the answer, and Aristotle is justified in his caution. Happiness, therefore, which is the goal of man, is primarily and perhaps exclusively of this earth and this mortal existence.

We sense immediately how different will be the ethics of Aristotle from that of Plato (and why in Raphael's painting Aristotle points to earth with one hand even as he holds the *Ethics* in the other). For Plato, and indeed for Aristotle in the *Eudemus*, the soul or mind returned "home" at death: therefore, this life was largely a preparation for the next. Here, said Plato, the philosopher must slough off the body, withdraw within, and live in a state of death. Here, says Aristotle, man's task is indeed to acquire virtue, for in virtue and wisdom alone lies his true happiness. To imitate the divine is still the norm of human happiness, but it is to be sought primarily for this life as well as in this life.[187] Happiness is thus indeed an activity;[188] but whereas for Plato this activity lay in virtuous action that in the life to come we might be happy in contemplation, for Aristotle such contemplation itself becomes the acme of happiness on this earth.[189] The activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, is contemplation; therefore, of human activities that which most resembles this will be of the true nature of happiness.[190] All else in life should point to this goal: the contemplation of truth, of the highest things, of the First Mover and the other divine movers of the world.

[186] *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 10–11.
[187] *Ibid.*, X, 7.
[188] *Ibid.*, 6.
[189] *Ibid.*, 7.
[190] *Ibid.*, 8, 1178b21 ff.

SUMMARY

The vigor of Aristotle's thought can hardly be experienced without direct contact with his works themselves. In them, we come to appreciate the rigor of his logic, the breadth of his vision, the depth to which more than any of his predecessors he probed the problems of philosophy. While his scientific knowledge is marred, unfortunately, by great errors of fact, despite his keen powers of observation, his philosophy perdures because it is built on self-evident principles. To estimate his worth, we should consider not only his relation to earlier thinkers, but the advances he himself made to the fuller development of philosophy.

Aristotle and His Predecessors. Though much of earlier philosophy is, on all subjects, like one who lisps, for it is young and still in its beginnings,[191] and contains many vague concepts and much random talk, Aristotle summons to his aid those who before him had attacked the investigation of being and philosophized on reality.[192] What they have said well can be accepted as the starting point of further knowledge, while their very errors instruct and warn us what false leads to avoid.

Even as he thus depends on his predecessors and makes constant reference to their teachings, Aristotle provides the needed correction to their thought. His pluralism replaces the monism of Parmenides: it is impossible for all things to be one in the unique sense which the latter had attached to oneness and being.[193] Since becoming is explained in terms of being, potency and act, matter and form, and is posited as midway between being and nonbeing, we avoid the further position of Parmenides that becoming is an illusion, and rid ourselves of the mechanism of the Atomists. If the Heracliteans, on the other hand, are so

[191] *Metaphysics*, I, 10.
[192] *Ibid.*, 3.
[193] *Physics*, I, 3.

fascinated by the flux of all things that they deny that knowledge is possible, they are answered not by the doctrine of the separate Ideas but by that of the *eidos* intrinsic in things, which yields unchanging knowledge of changeables.

The Doctrine of Aristotle. Thus, as a system, the philosophy of the Stagirite is the synthesis and culmination of the thought of the past. It is far more, however, than a simple epitome or summary or even a mere attempt to balance opposing positions (which somewhat explains the imposing edifice of Platonism). Instead, it is the fruit of vigorous, critical, and independent thought that does not hesitate to pass severe judgment on the errors of the past even as it accepts gratefully whatever truth such mistakes may have contained.

Aristotle was the first to set forth an adequate classification of the sciences and to mark off the field of philosophy, on the basis of their respective approach to being. He failed, let us admit, to provide a place for the empirical sciences in his degrees of knowledge, but in this he was a child of his age. Again, in Aristotle, philosophy becomes fully conscious of its own specific nature, its scope, object and method, as a rational and scientific knowledge, an achievement which unfortunately did not have the immediate influence it deserved. Lastly, philosophy itself was enriched by the wealth and depth of his metaphysics, as well as his teachings on nature and on man. He did indeed leave many problems not fully solved, and many difficulties in which the Scholastics, Arabian and Christian, would become entangled, yet he is the giant on whose shoulders the dwarfs of future generations would climb to view the universe.

THE SUCCESSORS OF ARISTOTLE

Something remains to be said of the work of Theophrastus,[194] and then of later leaders of the Peripatos under whom it dwindled in importance and influence.

According to Cicero and St. Basil, Theophrastus as well as Aristotle wrote several dialogues. These Cicero characterizes as eloquent and charming, St. Basil as lacking the Platonic graces.[195] Which opuscula, however, in the ancient catalogues are dialogues, it is impossible to determine; some suggest that these were chiefly his ethical works.[196] Cicero also says that in general he was interested in the same problems as Aristotle, and wrote similar works.[197]

The Logic of Theophrastus. According to ancient sources, Eudemus and Theophrastus seem to have collaborated in extending the logic of the *CA*, while the latter appears as the actual author of several treatises that bear his name. These contain no great innovations, but systematize, develop, and correct the *Organon*. In particular, Theophrastus develops the hypothetical syllogism and puts more order and form into the topics. He can be said therefore to be the logician who systematized most of the theses taught in "classical" logic. He was perhaps influenced by Zeno the Stoic in this development, and seems in turn to have prepared for later Stoic logic by his tendency to greater formalism in the syllogism and by his doctrine on the logic of propositions.[198]

[194] I. G. Schneider, *Theophrasti Eresii opera*, I–IV (Leipzig, 1818–1821); F. Wimmer, *Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia*, I–III (Leipzig, 1854–1862).

[195] Cf. Aristotle, *Fragments*, pp. 1–2, 5.

[196] Cf. O. Regenbogen, art. "Theophrastus," *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie*, Suppl. bd. VII, cols. 1363–1370 and 1377–1378, on the list of Diogenes Laertius (V, 42–50); col. 1481, for the *Eroticos* as possibly a dialogue; perhaps also the *On Happiness* (col. 1492).

[197] *De finibus*, I, ii, 6 (*LCL*, p. 8): *Quid? Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos?* — *Ibid.*, V, iv, 10 (*ed. cit.*, p. 400): *Persecutus est Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras: Theophrastus autem stirpium naturas, omniumque rerum, quae a terra gignerentur causas atque rationes.*

[198] See the studies of I. M. Bochénski, *La logique de Théophraste* (Fribourg in Suisse, 1947), esp. p. 125 ff.; *Elementa logicae graecae* (Rome, 1937), pp. 9, 76–82; *Ancient Formal Logic* (Amsterdam, 1951), p. 72. On Aristotelian syllogistics, cf. J. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic, from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, second ed. (New York, 1957).

The *Metaphysics*. A work which presents a continuation of the problems of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* III and XI has often been attributed to Theophrastus.[199] Indeed, in some manuscripts and ancient editions it appears as the fifteenth book of the *Metaphysics* of the *CA*. It does not seem, however, to be authentic: a scholion at the end of the text states that it was rejected by Andronicus of Rhodes and Hermippus in their Pinakes or lists, though accepted by Nicholas of Damascus (20 B.C.–A.D. 40), as the work of Theophrastus.[200]

Scientific Work. Of great interest in the history of science are two works on plants that are assigned to Theophrastus: *The Causes of Plants* and *Enquiry into Plants*.[201] They show that the author was a naturalist inclined to great scientific detail and precision, with less of the philosophical analysis found in Aristotle's scientific writings. The *Corpus Theophrasticum* contains besides several other scientific works, in whole or in fragment: *On Winds*, *On Stones*, *On Odors*, etc., together with a short treatise *On Sensation and its Object* (*De sensu et sensato*). It is possible, of course, that some were written in collaboration with Aristotle or as continuations of his work.

Ethics and Religion. Too little has survived to show with any clearness what ethics Theophrastus developed apart from that of Aristotle. Undoubtedly, with the fresh interest in moral questions aroused by Zeno and Epicurus, he had to re-examine more than once the fundamental problems of human life.

One change does seem evident: whereas Aristotle had found happiness primarily in virtue and wisdom, in the soul of man, Theophrastus was satisfied with a lesser ideal. His work *On Happiness* (Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας), according to Cicero, assigns considerable importance to *fortuna* (τύχη) and this world's goods, as though wisdom of itself could not guarantee a happy life. This in turn lessens the beauty and virility of virtue.[202] It is quite possible that such a position reveals an influence of Epicurus on Theophrastus, since Cicero says again that his views show a dread of and shrinking from pain.[203]

With Dikaiarchos, his fellow Peripatetic, he engaged in more than one dispute arising perhaps from the scientific and materialistic outlook of his colleague. The Περὶ βίων (*On Lives*) discusses the purpose and goal of life, an important question when we recall that Dikaiarchos held the soul to be mortal and no more than the harmony of bodily elements. Perhaps it also touches on the "endless controversy" between them on the desirability of the active vs. the contemplative life.[204] Theophrastus gave highest place to the life of retirement devoted to contemplation and study, as most resembling the life of God. The heart of the dispute would seem to lie in the question whether the philosopher should actively engage in politics or be content with theory alone.[205]

Theophrastus also wrote a few works on religion: *Encomia of the gods*, *On piety*, etc., but little is known of their content or the place of religion or mythology in his thought.[206]

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[199] W. D. Ross-F. H. Fobes, *Theophrastus' Metaphysics, with Translation, Commentary and Introduction* (Oxford, 1929).

[200] Ross-Fobes, *op. cit.*, p. 38, 12a4 ff.; and O. Regenbogen, *art. cit.*, col. 1389 ff.

[201] The latter (Περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορίας) is edited and translated by Arthur Host (*LCL*, 2 vols., 1916). The second volume also contains two minor works: *On Odours* and *On Weather Signs*.

[202] *De finibus*, V, v, 12 (*LCL*, p. 402; or in Aristotle, *Fragments*, pp. 54–55). Cicero quotes him as saying in his *Callisthenes*: "*Vitam regit fortuna, non sapientia*" (*Tusc. Disp.*, V, ix, 25).

[203] *Tusc. Disp.*, V, ix, 24; X, xxx, 85 (Aristotle, *Fragments*, p. 54).

[204] Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, II, xvi, 3 (*LCL*, p. 154).

[205] Cicero, *De finibus*, V, iv, 11 (*LCL*, p. 402); Plutarch, *An seni gerenda res publica*, xxvi (in F. Wehrli, *Dikaiarchos*, p. 18).

[206] Cf. O. Regenbogen, *art. cit.*, col. 1511 ff. See the long fragment of the *De pietate* in E. Bevan, *Later Greek Religion* (London, 1950), pp. 47–51. Mention should be made of the interesting *Characters* (translated by J. M. Edmonds, *LCL*, 1929), a "study" of thirty types of evil or displeasing human traits. The work

The Later Peripatos. When Theophrastus died in 288/7, his library passed to Neleus, who carried off all the books to Skepsis. As a result, Strabo says in relating this, the earlier school of Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus had no books at all, with the exception of a few, mostly exoteric works.[207] Thus STRATO OF LAMPSACUS, his successor (c. 287–269 B.C.), had to go on the quest to fill the empty shelves. Probably he found that Eudemus of Rhodes had a copy of an *Ethics;* Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle (or his mother Herpyllis) another *Ethics;* Pasicles of Rhodes a piece of a *Metaphysics* (Book II, or a); etc. These he (or Andronicus later) named after their donors.

The school does not seem to have maintained the high standards set by Aristotle and Theophrastus, though it did not go into immediate decline. Strato was devoted more to a careful study of natural philosophy than to metaphysics, and was therefore generally known as the physicist. His doctrine shows the influence of Democritus. He bequeathed the school to LYCO OF TROAS, who directed it for forty-four years. Unfortunately, he proved a poor leader, and with ARISTON OF KEOS, his probable successor, did little to develop Peripatetic learning.

With ANDRONICUS OF RHODES (c. 70 B.C.), the Peripatos experienced a renaissance. To him we owe the editing and publication of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and the *Corpus Theophrasticum*, after the work of Tyrannion the grammarian. He paid particular attention to questions of authenticity, composed a new *Pinax* or list of the works, and wrote commentaries on many of them. Such an undertaking, which now gave to scholars who had known only the exoteric works of Aristotle and Theophrastus their esoteric (acroamatic) works as well, produced a whole new school of commentators. Its climax is reached in ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, who taught at Athens between A.D. 198 and 211. He is a prime source of our knowledge of the exoteric works of Aristotle, and had a deep influence on all later commentators.[208] Above all, his study of the mind, in an endeavor to clarify the third book of *On The Soul*, marks the beginning of a long series of variations on this theme.[209]

Later Peripatetics, whom we shall meet later, were deeply imbued with Neoplatonism, which colored their interpretation of the writings of Aristotle.

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reveals Theophrastus as a keen judge of men and somewhat of a wit.

[207] *Geography*, XIII, 1, 54; *ed. cit.*, tom. VI, p. 110. See also the remark of Plutarch: "Older Peripatetics were evidently of themselves accomplished and learned men, but they seem to have had neither a large nor an exact acquaintance with the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus, because the estate of Neleus of Scepsis, to whom Theophrastus bequeathed his books, came into the hands of careless and illiterate people" (*Lives: Sulla*, xxvi, 2; *ed. cit.*, p. 406).

[208] The great commentators have been edited by the Berlin Academy: *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berlin, 1891 ff.).

[209] For a survey of this history, including an examination of Alexander himself, cf. E. Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, IV (1929), 5–158; for Alexander, pp. 7–22.

The Third Period: Post-Aristotelian Philosophy

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Little has been said, in surveying the golden age of Greek philosophy, of the general history of Greece or of the political conditions which prevailed. It has been evident, however, that the mental horizon, the *Weltanschauung*, of this period had its center in the *polis*, the city-state. Men lived and worked and thought within that community of which they were part through common ancestry and religious cult. But a change was gradually taking place, manifested already in the reaction of the Cynics and in the Pan-Hellenism of Isocrates. If "to do without the πόλις was unthinkable in the fifth century, it was not so difficult at the end of the fourth,"[1] when the κόσμος, the world, became the city and universal brotherhood supplanted the narrower ties of family and people.

The Cynics had already broken through the confines of older thinking, but the general broadening of the mental horizon is due more directly to Alexander the Great and to the Stoics. The Macedonian leader had never been captive to the narrow thinking of the city-state, and soon broke with the advice that Aristotle had given him on statesmanship and conquest. The latter's thought was centered on the *polis* and on Greece,[2] and he is said to have advised Alexander to divide the human race into two groups, Greeks and barbarians, to treat Greeks as friends and be their leader, to regard barbarians as beasts and enemies and be their master. Instead, Alexander behaved alike to all,[3] perhaps in the conscious thought of his role as world ruler in a universal society. Whatever his political thought and ideals may have been,[4] his career of world conquest brought many gradual changes in the whole Near East. It led to the movement of *Hellenistic* culture, a Grecian veneer that colored the lands he had touched (as contrasted to the *Hellenic* culture of Greece proper), the spread of the Greek language, the decline of the city-state and the growth of the commune (κοινόν) or commonwealth, and a greater consciousness of the unity of mankind.

Philosophy kept pace with these developments and was, in the Stoics at least, a co-cause of the new outlook. Stoic roots indeed were in the Cynics, who professed a statesmanship no longer centered in the city and who became the popular preachers of the new order. But whereas Cynic cosmopolitanism was individualistic and tended to dissociate its adherents from human society, the Stoics

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[1] T. A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought* (London, 1952), p. 246.

[2] Cf. *Protrepticus*, 3 and 13, in *Fragments*, pp. 30, 48; and *Politics*, VII, 7, 1327b27 ff.; 13, 1331b24 ff.

[3] W. D. Ross, *Aristotle: Select Fragments* (Oxford, 1952), p. 67.

[4] A point much discussed by historians. Cf. W. Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," *Proceedings of the British Academy* XIX (1933), 123–166. A glorified portrait of his hero is given by Plutarch, *De Alexandri fortuna*, I, 8 (*Moralia*, tr. by F. C. Babbitt, *LCL*, IV, p. 404), and the *Life* of Alexander, c. xxvii, 5–6 (*LCL*, III, pp. 304–306).

were conscious of the unity and brotherhood of men and deliberately exchanged the *polis* for the *kosmos*. Unlike the modern cosmopolitan who belongs indeed to one nation yet appreciates and is at home in the culture of other nations, the Stoic was a man without a country because he transcended city and nation to become the citizen of the world as a whole.[5]

On the other hand, the Epicureans reflect this new trend to a lesser degree. There is no stress indeed on the city, nor yet on the cosmos, for their ethics is centered on the individual and his needs and tends rather to retirement than to public life. "Live unknown" (λάθε βιώσας) was a favorite maxim of their founder, who was unknown, says Seneca (perhaps none too historically), to the Athens in which he lived.[6]

[5] Cf. a later Stoic, Seneca, *De tranquillitate*, iv, 4 (*Moral Essays*, tr. by J. W. Basore, *LCL*, II, p. 228).

[6] *Epist.*, 79, 15 (*Epist. ad Lucilium*, tr. by R. M. Gummere, *LCL*, II, p. 208).

For both Stoics and Epicureans, philosophy was primarily ethical in purpose and in content. Both were practical and eudaimonistic: they developed theories of happiness, with physical doctrines adopted as the understructure and foundation of their ethical principles. In contrast therefore to the Peripatos, to Aristotle and Theophrastus, they make ethics, not metaphysics, the ruling science, the *scientia rectrix*. Ethics is the queen and governing knowledge, metaphysics (or physics, as they call it) the servant Philosophy is pre-eminently "the guide of life,"[7] the means to a happy life. In many, it took the place of religion and later became a rival of Christianity.

We shall study Epicureanism first, as somewhat earlier, less influential, and shorter-lived than Stoicism. The latter will be followed by a brief mention of other movements.

[7] Thus Cicero: *Cultura animi philosophia est* (*Disp. Tusc.*, II, v, 13; *LCL*, p. 158); *Vitae philosophia dux* (*ibid.*, V, ii, 5, p. 428).

CHAPTER X: Epicureanism*

BY REASON of the strict adherence to his principles which Epicurus demanded of his followers, it is hardly correct to call the group a school: in fact, it was more of a cult, so religious in character were the honors paid Epicurus even in his lifetime.

Life. Epicurus was born of Athenian parents at Samos, 341 B.C. He began his study of philosophy at an early age, hearing the Platonist Pamphilos at Samos, and the Democritean Nausiphanes at Teos. The latter probably gave him an initiation into the atomic philosophy of nature, mathematics, and something of rhetoric. At eighteen (323 B.C.), he was in Athens for military duty, but seemingly met none of the philosophers. On his return home, he gave himself over for some years to study and self-instruction. Democritus, Plato, and the Aristotle of the *exoterica* were, apparently, the chief authors that he read, though he was wont later to repudiate his debt and glory that he was self-taught. From these studies, the progress of which is unknown to us, emerged the conviction that the task of philosophy was "peace of mind" and "health of soul."[1] His search for an escape from human miseries and sufferings to a state of happiness was undoubtedly bound up with his own sickly nature.

At the age of thirty-two he opened a school at Mytilene, and went soon after to Lampsacus. In these cities he acquired his most faithful disciples, who accompanied him to Athens in 306. There he bought the *garden* which served as both school and home for himself and his disciples and which gave to his doctrine the title of "philosophy of the garden" (*ἐκ* or *ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων*). Slaves and women were numbered among his adherents, a startling innovation in Athens. His teaching was positive and dogmatic in character, and the disciples were required to commit to memory his maxims.

Epicurus remained in Athens, except for short journeys to his "friends" in Ionia, until his death (270 B.C.), receiving divine honors as a religious leader and prophet more than as a philosopher. Though the historical references are extremely vague, he seems to have engaged in some controversy with the Stoics, Polemon, and Theophrastus, and was not without influence on the latter's theory of happiness.

Writings. His works were many, but not noted for style or the consistent use of scientific terminology. There was one book on logic, the *Canon*; a Περὶ φύσεως in thirty-seven books; others on psychology and ethics; letters to his friends, etc. Only the following are extant:

- Three *Letters*, which provide summaries of his doctrine. The first, *to Herodotos*, gives the bases of his physics. That *to Pythocles* seems to be a later compilation from the Περὶ φύσεως. The third, *to Menœcesus*, is a *Protrepticus* after the manner of Aristotle, setting forth the practical deductions of his physics.
- *The Sovereign Maxims*, Κύριαι δόξαι, or principal tenets of his philosophy (memorized by the school). Resembling these are the *Sententiae Vati-*

* Cf. Bibliography, p. 233.

[1] *Epistles*, I, III.

> *canae*, so called because discovered in a Vatican manuscript in 1888.[2]

The most complete and precise explanation of his physics is found, however, in the *De rerum natura* (*The Nature of Things*) of Lucretius, a Roman poet (d. 55 B.C.).[3]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS

The basic metaphysical principle of Epicurus is that of Democritus: "Nothing comes into being out of what is nonexistent." Therefore nothing passes into nonbeing, but "the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will always remain."[4] If such an axiom, however, was adopted by Democritus as the premise to his physics, for Epicurus it is primarily the key to ethics and happiness. Physics, and all theoretical knowledge, has value only as an instrument,[5] for vain is the philosophy which does not heal the suffering of man.[6]

The Division of Philosophy. Philosophy, "an activity which by words and arguments secures the happy life," embraces three parts: the canonic, the physical, and the ethical; that is, logic, which provides a criterion or method for physics, while the latter in turn subserves ethics. Canonic was usually conjoined to physics, so that the Epicureans often claimed only two parts to philosophy, physics and ethics.[7]

Logic, or canonic, as it is called, furnishes the norms (*κάνονες*) of knowledge and the criteria of truth and certitude. These are sensation, concepts, and feelings.[8] Sensation, whereby we attain what is clear, includes not only direct sense perception through images (*εἴδωλα*) from the objects, but also imaginations (e.g., in dreams), mental pictures caused by atoms too fine to affect the senses. Sensation is always true and reliable, for error is in the judgment (Epicurus offers no criterion for this act). Concept (*ἡ πρόληψις*) is a kind of universal knowledge, a "recollection of an external object often presented"; e.g., when the word "man" is uttered, we think of such an image. Lastly, feelings of pleasure and pain, as favorable or hostile, provide the criterion of choice or flight.[9]

Physics "deals with becoming and perishing, and with nature."[10] It includes Epicurus' variation of the atomic theory, whereby he explains the world, the gods, the celestial phenomena,[11] the human soul, the meaning of death. Thus it is the basis for *ethics*, which considers "things to be sought and avoided, with human life and its goal."

The End of Man. End, as Epicurus accepts the definition from Aristotle,[12] is that toward which the will tends. But while Aristotle argued from the specific

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[2] Diogenes Laertius gives both the Letters and the Maxims; cf. also W. J. Oates (ed.), *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers* (New York, 1940), pp. 3–39; and p. 40 ff., for the *Sententiae* and other fragments.

[3] Prose version in W. J. Oates, *op. cit.*, pp. 69–217. Cf. also *The Nature of the Universe*, tr. by R. E. Lathan (*New York*, 1951), and poetic version in *Lucretius, the Roman Poet of Science*, tr. by A. D. Winspear (New York, 1956).

[4] Ep. I; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[5] Max., XI–XII; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[6] Fragment 54; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

[7] Diogenes Laertius, X, 30.

[8] *κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη* (Diogenes Laertius, X, 31; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 60).

[9] *Ibid.*, X, 31–34; *ibid.*, pp. 60–61.

[10] *Ibid.*, X, 30.

[11] *Ep.* II.

[12] Perhaps *Protrepticus*, 11; *Fragments*, p. 43 ff.

nature of man to virtue and wisdom as his proper goal,[13] Epicurus has recourse to experience and seeks his answer in the animal, that is, living things. He finds that "living things, as soon as they are born, are well content with pleasure and at enmity with pain." Furthermore, men choose virtues on account of pleasure and not for their own sake.[14] Therefore, "pleasure is the beginning and the end of the happy life."[15]

Almost immediately, however, he endeavors to establish the meaning of pleasure. "We do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or those of sensuality," as, he complains, some have misrepresented him.[16] Pleasure includes not only that which consists in movement, as the Cyrenaics held, but also that which is a state of rest; not only that in the body, but above all pleasure in the mind. "Peace of mind (*ἀταραξία*) and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight consist in motion and activity."[17] The former, however, is pre-eminently what he means by pleasure: absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul: *εὐστάθεια*, equilibrium and inner harmony.

If this is the goal, not every pleasure is to be sought or every pain avoided, but those only which will truly secure health of body and tranquillity of soul. Some pleasure may lead to ill-health; it must be avoided. Conversely, a momentary pain may be intense, yet lead to better health: accept it. Prudence is the art which enables us to measure pleasures and pains, and by looking at the inconveniences or advantages of each judges all these matters.[18] It will lead one to sacrifice quantity to quality, to prefer frugality to riches, to be content with little, and to live in retirement and serenity.

Such are the interior conditions of the happy life. Outwardly, Epicurus says, the wise man must be armed against the uncertainty and vicissitudes of fortune by a modicum of this world's goods, for "frugality too has a limit," and by the protection of friendship.[19]

The Fear of the Gods. The evils and errors of life arise not only from uncontrolled desires, but also from irrational fears and groundless imaginings, especially from dread of the gods and the fear of death. To offset this, one must have scientific knowledge of natural philosophy. He will then see that though indeed there are gods, they are not such as the vulgar crowd believes them to be, for they have nothing to do with men.[20] Death is but the deprivation of sensation; and when it comes, we do not exist.[21] These are the practical conclusions of his atomistic physics.

Our investigations of the unseen, he argues, must be kept in accord with our sensations, as the *Canonic* has taught us.[22] Sensations attest the existence of

[13] Cf. *Protrepticus*, *loc. cit.*, and n. 6, p. 34 f.

[14] Diogenes Laertius, X, 137–138; in Oates, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–64.

[15] *Ep.* III; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[17] Diogenes Laertius, X, 136; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[18] *Ep.* III; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[19] *Maxims*, 27–28; *Sent. Vat.*, 47 and 63 (he made sure of his own position, for his adherents each contributed 120 drachmae a year).

[20] *Ep.* I; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 14; *Ep.* III; p. 30.

[21] *Ep.* III; p. 31.

[22] Since Epicurus had much "sympathy" for Anaxagoras (Diogenes Laertius, X, 12), it may well be that he is here adapting the dictum of the "Nous": "Phenomena are the sight of things unseen" (fr. 21).

bodies; and from this reason concludes to the existence of space or the void. Some bodies are composite; and their principles, since nothing comes to be from nonbeing, must be indivisible corporeal natures, i.e., atoms.[23]

Forced, however, by the strictures and objections offered by the Peripatos, Epicurus alters the older atomic theory of Leucippus and Democritus. Their universe had been dominated by blind mechanical necessity and chance. In that of Epicurus, some things happen according to natural necessity, which is the foundation of the order in things and is properly called Nature; others happen by chance; others through free causality, by our own free acts for which we are responsible.[24] The atoms likewise are now considered to have a great variety of shapes; they are therefore limited, yet infinite in number within each group. They move in three ways (instead of one), some falling straight down, others oscillating in one place, others falling in oblique movement.[25] All, however, somehow form an infinite whole (τὸ πᾶν) which was always such as it is now, and such it will remain,[26] in an infinite number of worlds. A theory of cyclic returns (which the Stoics also taught) seems suggested by one fragment,[27] and is made very explicit by Lucretius.[28] This eliminates any need of teleology or of the action of the gods on the world.[29]

The gods themselves are but anthropomorphic beings made up of atoms of the finest kind, who live in the *metakosmia*, the empty spaces between the worlds (to be well out of the crashes, adds Cicero[30]). They are concerned only with their own happiness and mutual bliss and have no care or thought of man.[31] The wise man sees they cannot harm him and he fears them not, while at the same time their hidden and blessed life becomes the model of his own. By such doctrine, as Lucretius sees it, religion, popular mythology, is put under foot and trampled on in turn,[32] though Epicurus actually bade his school keep the laws of public cult without troubling with the common beliefs of men about the gods.[33]

The Fear of Death. The fear of death is quickly dispelled by the same atomic philosophy. The soul as well as the body is composed of atoms, and only within the covering of the flesh are the atoms which constitute the soul capable of sensation. At death, the soul is also dissolved and loses all its power. Death then is but the privation of sensation. "So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, for as long as we exist, death is not with us; and when death does come, then we do not exist."[34]

Lucretius expands this further, to bid his readers worry not about the cyclic returns. The chain of consciousness is snapped at death; and should the light of life be given us again, we shall then have no more memory of this existence than we have now of others that have passed before.[35]

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[23] *Ep.* I; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
[24] *Ep.* III; p. 33.
[25] *Ep.* I; p. 5.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[27] Fragment 226; Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 50, n. 55.
[28] *On the Nature of Things*, II, 297 ff.; III, 854 ff.
[29] *Ep.* I; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[30] *De divinatione*, II, xvii, 40 (*LCL*, p. 414).
[31] *Ep.* III; *Maxim*, I.
[32] *On the Nature of Things*, I, 62–79.
[33] Fragment 387; Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 50, n. 57.
[34] *Ep.* III; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 30; *Ep.* I; p. 10.
[35] *On the Nature of Things*, III, 828 ff.

Pleasure in the Present Life. "A right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable."[36] If there is no future conscious existence for soul or body, since their component atoms disperse, nature must intend us to make the most of this passing life. Our beginning and our end is here, and the goal proper to human nature is reached in the very first instant of existence. We should not then postpone our happiness and waste our life in procrastination: enjoy today, for you are not master of tomorrow.[37] *Carpe diem*, Horace would say.

Moreover, pleasure is perfect in an instant.[38] If one measures by reason the limits of pleasure, infinite time contains no greater pleasure than finite time.[39] Therefore an afterlife, which the mind has demonstrated by physics to be a vain fear, would add nothing to the pleasure or happiness found here. "Every man passes out of life as though he had just been born,"[40] and "the draught swallowed by us at birth is a draught of death."[41]

We cannot, however, violate nature by following every desire and seeking every pleasure. Some desires are vain and bring unhappiness; others are natural and necessary, to be fulfilled lest health of body or peace of soul be disturbed; others are natural but not necessary, and prudence must decide on their choice or avoidance.[42] Of itself, then, Epicurean hedonism does not result in excess or riotous living, but in a calm and peaceful life, moderate asceticism, self-control, and independence. Obviously, however, it is not based on moral obligation or responsibility to a Higher Being, to any law of God or man, for each individual becomes his own legislator. It thus makes for subjective morality, rugged individualism, egoism.

What, finally, is the attitude of the wise man toward pain? Undoubtedly, he will first of all acknowledge that pain of soul is far worse than pain of body.[43] The former he will avoid at all cost. The latter he will tolerate because it is negligible; acute pain has short duration, and that which lasts long in the flesh causes but mild pain.[44] If it is pain due to want, it is easily removed; and some pains are often the prelude to greater joys. Above all, the wise man will follow the example of Epicurus, who substituted for the image of present pain the recollection of past joys.[45] Since sensation is *in loco*, what the body feels is completely independent of what the soul experiences; therefore in adversity, the wise man turns his soul from what the body is undergoing. He can be happy on the rack,[46] and even in the brazen bull of Phalaris.[47]

[36] Ep. III; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[37] Sent. Vat., 14; *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[39] *Maxim*, 19.

[40] Sent Vat., 60; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[41] *Ibid.*, 30, p. 41.

[42] Ep. III, n. 127–128, *ibid.*, p. 31; *Maxim*, 26 and 29; *Sent. Vat.*, 21.

[43] Diogenes Laertius, X, 137.

[44] *Sent. Vat.*, 4; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[45] "On this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The diseases in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity; but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you" (quoted by Diogenes Laertius, X, 22).

[46] Diogenes Laertius, X, 118; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

[47] So Cicero, *Disp. Tusc.*, II, vii, 17 (*LCL*, pp. 162–164). According to *Disp. Tusc.*, V, xxxi, 87 (p. 514), this would go back to Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (cf. *Fragments*, p. 54). Theophrastus disagreed with this.

The happy man, the wise man, then, is "he who holds reverent opinions on the gods, is always free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature. He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfill and easy to attain, while the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain. He laughs at destiny, which some have made mistress of all things. . . . He regards not chance as a god, as most men do. . . . He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. . . ."[48]

Conclusion. Such a philosophy of life was certainly not meant to be an incentive to loose living or raw hedonism. Though one or other fragment might almost point in that direction,[49] the general trend is toward a quiet, simple, retired life, albeit rather selfish and egocentric in its desire not to be disturbed under any circumstances. For "self-sufficiency is the greatest of all riches . . . (and) the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom."[50]

The school and quasi-religious movement continued long after Epicurus' death, guided perhaps by the categoric imperative: *Sic fac omnia, tamquam spectet Epicurus.* Cicero and Atticus found Epicureans at Athens in 79 B.C., and heard Zeno of Sidone. In the same century Titus Lucretius Caro taught the doctrine in his didactic poem, while Asclepiades the physician made use of some of the physics of Epicurus in his medical treatises.

Though Seneca often cited Epicurus, little else is known of the school in the first Christian century. Later, Diogenes of Oinoanda (second century) introduced a renaissance, and undertook to defend the doctrine and attack other ancient schools.

[48] *Ep.* III; in Oates, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–33.

[49] Cf., e.g., *Sent. Vat.*, 51; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[50] W. J. Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 51, n. 70; *Sent. Vat.*, 77; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

CHAPTER XI: Stoicism

THE philosophy of the Stoa (the porch), like that of Epicurus, is constructed for a practical purpose, the attainment of happiness. Both are of this earth, earthy; yet while Epicurus seeks to free men from the fear of the gods who have no part in human life, Stoicism by its monism binds men more closely than ever to the Eternal Logos that rules and determines all things.

§ 1. *History of the Older Stoa*

Unlike Epicureanism, the product of one man who demanded strict orthodoxy on the part of his adherents, Stoicism underwent several phases of development after the work of Zeno, its founder. Its history extends well into the Christian era, and by reason of both inner development and outward expansion is usually divided into three phases: the older Stoa, in the fourth and third centuries before Christ; the middle Stoa, especially under Panaitios (Panaetius) of Rhodes and Poseidonius of Apameia (second and first centuries B.C.); and the later or Roman Stoa, of the early Christian period. We shall treat these groups separately, save insofar as later men illustrate the early teachings.

Zeno (336–264 B.C.). The founder of the Stoa is Zeno, former pupil of Crates the Cynic.[1] Born of Phoenician settlers at Citium on the isle of Cyprus, he came to Athens about 315, perhaps simply because of shipwreck or because his merchant father had brought him books on Socrates. These, especially the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon and the *Apology* of Plato (which he read at home or at Athens), induced him to follow Crates as a reflection of Socrates. He later heard Stilpo the Megarian and Xenocrates and Polemon in the Academy. Of importance too is the study of dialectic he made with Diodorus Kronos the Megarian (d. 307 B.C.) and his pupil Philo.[2] He then established his own school (about 305) in the painted colonnade or Portico of Pisianax, so that those who came to hear him were called men of the Stoa (porch) or Stoics.[3]

His first book was a Πολιτεία (*Republic*) which he wrote under Crates, the general aim of which was that men should discontinue living in separate cities and peoples, and instead regard all men as members of one city and people, having one life and one order. Other works likewise reflect his contact with Cynicism and portend the development of the Stoa: *On life according to Nature; Of impulse, or Human Nature; Emotions; On Duty; On Greek Paideia;* and others, including some on logic.

The Athenians esteemed him and paid him special honors as a man of worth in all respects, devoted to philosophy, exhort-

[1] Cf. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 1–34, for details of his life.

[2] *Ibid.*, VII, 25 and 16. Diodorus was famous for a "master" proof on possibles, a valuable development in the logic of propositions (cf. Epictetus, *Discourses*, II, xix, 1; W. J. Oates, *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers* [New York, 1942], pp. 321–322).

[3] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 5.

ing to virtue and temperance the youths he taught, affording in all his conduct a pattern for imitation in complete consistency with his teachings.[4]

His Disciples. His followers were rather numerous and unimportant, though some made additions to his thought. ARISTON OF CHIOS[5] had little use for the theoretical part of Zeno's philosophy: logic was useless, physics beyond our reach; ethics alone concerned man. It should teach only general norms, and not lay down minute prescriptions for daily life. In contrast, HERILLUS OF CARTHAGE was more faithful. DIONYSIUS OF HERACLEA was called the renegade, because he abandoned Stoicism after a long sickness and went over to the Cyrenaics. PERSAEUS OF CITIUM was the faithful companion and secretary of Zeno. CLEANTHES OF Assos (331–232) was the outstanding immediate disciple of Zeno.[6] A former pugilist, he found the study of philosophy hard and slow, and was called an "ass" by his fellows. Yet he "carried the load of Zeno" and succeeded him as head of the school.

Chrysippus: the Second Founder. A native of Soli or Tarsus in Cilicia (c. 281–c. 208 B.C.), Chrysippus was a pupil of Cleanthes.[7] So great was the labor he performed in reworking Stoic doctrine that men said: "But for Chrysippus, there had been no Stoa."[8] He was particularly renowned for his dialectic and the development of Stoic logic (Dionysius of Halicarnassus remarked that there was no greater dialectician but no worse stylist). His logic quite evidently dealt largely with propositions.[9]

The works of all these men have survived only in fragments and citations in secondary sources. This, plus the variations of doctrines, makes presentation somewhat difficult.

§ 2. *The Philosophy of the Stoa*

Perhaps in dependence on Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, 3, the Stoics defined philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom, and wisdom as the knowledge of things divine and human.[10] Zeno further declared that philosophy was divided into three parts: physical, ethical, and logical, which were organically united, theory supplying the basis of ethical practice. Thus they likened philosophy to a fertile field: logic was the encircling fence, physics the soil or the trees; ethics the crops.[11]

Cleanthes, one might add, continued the analogy when he compared himself to the bee that takes the best from many flowers, and so revealed the *eclectic character* of the system. The physics of the Stoics shows a return to Heraclitus in the doctrine of the Fire and the Logos, with more consistent application of the Logos in human life. In logic, they were influenced by the Megarians and Antisthenes, though here their originality is most manifest. Many details of their ethics go back to earlier sources: Socrates, the Cynics, Plato, and Aristotle. Yet all these elements are incorporated into a fairly consistent doctrine.

Stoic Logic. Logic embraced a wide range of topics: rhetoric and its branches; dialectic, which included both grammar and formal logic; the study of the canons or criteria used in discovering truth; an investigation of the problem of knowledge, etc. The Stoics thus must be credited with many advances in the science of grammar and the theory of

[4] *Ibid.*, 10.
[5] *Ibid.*, 160–164.
[6] *Ibid.*, 168–176.
[7] *Ibid.*, 179–202.
[8] *Ibid.*, 183.
[9] *Ibid.*, 186–187, 189 ff.
[10] Cf. J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, II, n. 36. This definition passed down to Cicero (*De oratore*, I, xlix, 212; *LCL*, p. 150), Philo Judaeus (*De congressu*, 79; *LCL*, IV, p. 496), St. Augustine, and the Scholastics.
[11] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 39–40.

language, and above all the development of logic.

The formal logic of Aristotle and of most of the *Organon* is a logic of terms; it was only in the later parts of the *Topics*, the *Prior Analytics* (both of which seem later elaborations), and in the exoteric works of Theophrastus that syllogistic reasoning is developed. On the other hand, Stoic logic, even in Zeno,[12] is a logic of propositions, that is, the doctrine of the relations between propositions taken as such. Chrysippus in particular seems to have developed the various forms of nonsimple propositions, e.g., the hypothetical, inferential, disjunctive, etc.[13] The Stoics deserve therefore a larger place in the history of logic than was formerly assigned to them; their work is now being recognized.[14]

Knowledge begins from the individual things, since there are no Platonic Ideas or ideal universal forms. Things are apprehended by the sense organs;[15] the result is a "presentation" (φαντασία) made on the soul,[16] the product of which is the phantasm. This process was explained by Zeno and Cleanthes as an *impression* on the soul (τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ), like the imprint made by a seal upon wax; Chrysippus, however, deemed it rather a *process of change* (ἀλλοίωσις or ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς).[17] Hence it was an affection in the soul, something undergone whereby the object was manifest to the soul. The latter, at the beginning of knowledge, was like a bare writing tablet (*tabula rasa!*), and was then filled with pictures.[18] The phantasm is a likeness of the sense object; it is retained in the memory, and from many such presentations an experience is formed.

The object of thought can be the phantasm as presented to the mind, though there seems no process of abstraction or theory of active intellect here. Or the object can be general notions, universals (without foundation *in re*), made by comparisons, analogy, synthesis, etc.[19] Or again, it can be a πρόληψις or "preconception" that is a kind of an inborn idea.[20] This last is introduced, apparently, to explain concepts of things not perceived by sense knowledge, e.g., of God, virtues, duty; yet these are not innate as such: rather, the mind has the inborn capacity to form such concepts after sense experience.

The *criterion of truth* is made to consist in the "presentation" itself, at least primarily; not every such presentation, but that called the "apprehending presentation" (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία) one which comes from a real object.[21] This is rather ambiguous, for the authors do not say whether the object is adequately apprehended in the "presentation" (as Zeno seems to do) or the mind is "grasped" and forced to assent to the truth of the "presentation" (as was held later).

Physics. When Zeno came to Athens,

[12] *Ibid.*, 20 and 25.

[13] *Ibid.*, 65 ff.

[14] Cf. B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley, 1953); J. Lukasiewicz, "Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik," *Erkenntnis*, V (1935), 117 ff.; K. Dürr, *The Propositional Logic of Boethius* (Amsterdam, 1951); I. M. Bochénski, *Elementa logicae graecae*, pp. 10, 82 ff.; and *Ancient Formal Logic*, p. 76 ff.

[15] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 52.

[16] *Ibid.*, 45.

[17] *Fragment* II, n. 56.

[18] *Ibid.*, n. 83.

[19] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 52 and 61.

[20] ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου.

[21] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 54 and 49.

he found many trends of philosophical thought; yet in all of them there was something which went back to Socrates and the quest for a way of life: what was man's goal, and how was he to attain it. The key to happiness was sought on all sides: Plato found it in the city man built within himself; Aristotle in like manner saw it in virtue and wisdom; the lesser Socratics stressed outward resemblance to Socrates, self-sufficiency, and indifference to convention; Epicurus was to come with his mild hedonism; Theophrastus was still trying to answer the question in the Peripatos.

Most of these saw that their ethics had to rest on the grounds of theoretical philosophy. As Zeno in turn set about for a philosophy of life, he went back to the teleology and other teachings of Aristotle, and even further back, though we do not know the precise reason, to the physics of Heraclitus. Once more Fire became the original stuff, now called πνεῦμα: all else came from it or manifested it. Over all was an inexorable Law or Reason (Λόγος), which governed the actions of men as well as the operations of nature. Not really distinct from Fire, it was the immanent principle of life, the soul of the world and yet also destiny or fate, for everything in the world of man or of nature had necessarily to happen according to this Law.

Whether this is a crude materialistic monism or pantheism, or a more refined doctrine, is hard to determine. To some extent it is a compromise between the theism of Plato and Aristotle and the crude unwitting pantheism of earlier philosophers, since the Stoics distinguish between the active element and the passive element. The active element is immanent Reason or God; the passive element is matter or substance devoid of qualities.[22] Yet the former is also materialistic, and both form a whole, the cosmos.[23] The distinction between the two causes, efficient and material, is largely of our making, they would say, though it is founded on the present state of nature; for sense and reason say God is universal being as a whole, while the world in its present orderly form is the progressive manifestation of God.

Stoic physics thus supposes a kind of temporal production of the world: Zeno actually engaged in controversy with Theophratus over Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the present world.[24] In the beginning, he claimed, God was by Himself and was the seminal reason (λόγος σπερματικός) of the universe. He then "created" substance out of Himself into the cosmos which is one, finite, and spherical: the process, as in Heraclitus, proceeds from fire to air to moisture, some of which condenses to earth, some rarifies to form the air of the heavens.[25] God as Fire, *Pneuma*, or Mind pervades all things, acts as the soul of the cosmos and source of order.[26] Since He thus arranges all things, He is at once Providence and Fate or Destiny.[27] Intermediate between Him and the world of men are

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[22] *Ibid.*, 134.

[23] *Ibid.*, 138.

[24] Cf. Aristotle, *On Philosophy*, n. 18 ff., esp. n. 20; in W. D. Ross, *Aristotle: Selected Fragments* (Oxford, 1950), p. 88 ff.

[25] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 136 ff.

[26] Thus Cicero: *Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia reguntur* (*Acad. Prior.*, II, xli, 126; *LCL*, p. 630).

[27] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 138–139, 147 ff.

daimons, beings friendly to men who watch over human affairs.[28] Lastly, in keeping with their teaching of the non-eternal character of the present cosmos, the Stoics held to periodic destruction or absorption of all things by fire: "God . . . at stated periods of time absorbs into Himself the whole of substance and again 'creates' it from Himself"[29] in exactly the same way, so that history will literally repeat itself.[30]

Man resembles the cosmos, being composed of body, the passive element, and soul, the *pneuma* or breath of life congenital to us, which is a part of the world soul.[31] The soul is said to have eight parts: the five senses, the power of speech, the reason (διάνοια), and the generative faculty. The reason is called the ruling power and was thought by some to reside in the breast, because the voice, the expression of our thought, arises there. There was no uniformity of opinion on the survival of the soul; Cleanthes held all continued to exist until the next general conflagration, while Chrysippus said that only the souls of the wise do this.[32]

The *purpose of this monism*, it seems, is to show that the universe is a harmonious whole, a universal city of gods and men. "Just as *polis* is used both of a place to live in and also of the whole complex of state and citizens," said Chrysippus, "so the cosmos is, as it were, a *polis* of gods and men, the gods holding sway, the men obeying. . . . This is law by nature," that is, the law laid down by divine reason.[33] This aspect is stressed later by Epictetus, on the basis of older Stoicism.[34] Thus by their monism they can show that there is a harmony and sympathy of all parts; nature or the world is an organism in which all parts are vitally united. "For what is a man? A part of a city, first a part of the City in which gods and men are incorporate, and secondly of that city which has the next claim to be thus called, which is a small copy of the City Universal."[35]

If the cosmos is thus the expression of the Logos which is immanent to it, it must be the best ordered world. Such optimism, however, makes it difficult to explain *the problem of evil*. Evil does exist; yet if everything is God and from God, then evil must be ascribed to Him also. The answer, suggested at least by the early Stoics and developed later, lies first in a distinction between physical and moral evils. Some evils touch the soul, such as vices and vicious actions; others are external, e.g., to have a foolish country or friend; others are neither, as to be in poor spirits, sick, etc.[36] Physical evils, such as the latter, are not evil properly

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[28] *Ibid.*, 151.

[29] *Ibid.*, 137; cf. 134.

[30] Von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, II, n. 625.

[31] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 156–157.

[32] *Ibid.*, 157; cf. 151.

[33] He thus destroys the Cynic contrast of nature and law, *physis* and *nomos*. Cf. von Arnim, *op. cit.*, II, n. 528; Cicero, *De natura deorum*, II, lxi, 154 (*LCL*, p. 272): *Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominum domus aut urbs utrorumque.*

[34] *Discourses*, III, 24; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

[35] Epictetus, *Discourses*, II, 5; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 290. It is interesting to note that the poet Aratus whom St. Paul quoted in the Areopagus (Acts 17:28) had adopted the Stoic creed. The poem thus quoted is given by E. Bevan, *Later Greek Religion*, p. 35.

[36] Cf. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 96.

speaking, just as other things reckoned as good for man (health, beauty, wealth, etc., or their opposites) actually neither benefit nor harm him.[37] They are morally indifferent and often are the gifts of the gods to test and try the virtue of the good man.[38] On the other hand, the Stoics are forced to admit moral evils, and so claim them as the only true evils.[39] The wise man banishes evil out of sight, to make what good there is in things appear.[40] Chrysippus said that God allowed evil to happen because the evil could serve the good: the contrast gives the good greater meaning and beauty.[41] Thus moral evil makes us cultivate the virtues opposed to it. "For what could anyone do unless he had learned it through temptation?"[42]

Ethics. The contrast to Epicurus is readily discernible in the ethics of the Stoa, though it is not possible to determine how directly Zeno intended to oppose the philosophy of the garden. Later Stoics, we are certain, were at odds in most points with the Epicureans.

The *end of man* is not found in pleasure; nor is pleasure, as Epicurus held, the first impulse of animals. Their first impulse is to self-preservation, to protect that constitution which nature has given them; for nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself, so that the animal from the beginning repels what is injurious and accepts what is of use to it or akin to its nature. Pleasure is merely a by-product or end-product of an accidental nature. Therefore, the end of the animal is to live according to nature. But to man nature has added the gift of reason which allows him to shape his impulses in a knowing way; for him, life according to reason is life according to nature.

Therefore the end of man, as Zeno designated it, is life in agreement with nature; and this is the same as life according to virtue. "Nature" was understood either as nature as a whole, the order of the Logos in the cosmos (Zeno, Cleanthes); or also as our human nature, which is part of the nature of the universe (Chrysippus). This fundamental axiom is not new, for the Stoics seem to have adopted it with the doctrine of Logos and Fire from Heraclitus, who had made the practical conclusion from his own physics: "Insight [into the Logos] is the greatest virtue, and wisdom is to speak the truth and to act according to nature [i.e., the Logos] with understanding."[43] Since the Cynics too had esteemed nature as a norm, but in revolt against law or convention, it is possible that the Stoics accepted but refined their teaching.

Virtue becomes the means to such a life, for it is a "harmonizing disposition," a state of mind which makes our whole life conform with the Logos.[44] Our hap-

[37] *Ibid.*, 102.

[38] So said the later Stoics. Cf. Epictetus, *Discourses*, III, 8; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 358; and Seneca, *De providentia*, II, 6 ff. (*LCL*, I, pp. 8–12). [39] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 102.

[40] *Ibid.*, 118.

[41] In von Arnim, op. cit., II, nos. 1169, 1176–1177, and 1181; cf. E. Bevan, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–26. But Chrysippus also suggested (fr. 1178) that evils, physical evils at least, could be the result of minor negligences on the part of nature or of the daimones.

[42] *Quid quisque posset nisi temptando non didicit?* (Seneca, *De providentia*, c. 4).

[43] Fragment 112.

[44] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 89.

piness thus consists in virtue, in the right conduct in a life of reason, and not in mere *theoria*. Moral goodness, therefore, is "the perfection according to nature of the rational being as rational";[45] so that virtue alone is a good in the full sense of the term,[46] and is to be sought for itself and not because of hope or fear or any external motive.[47] The division of virtues and vices[48] seems influenced by the Peripatetic *De virtutibus et vitiis*. Unlike Aristotle, however, who saw in the passions or emotions, if used rightly, weapons that spur us to virtue, the Stoics reckoned them as a movement at once irrational (i.e., not according to the Logos) and against the nature of the soul.[49]

The *virtuous man*, according to such principles, is he who lives conformed to the logos of the world and his own nature and refrains from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, i.e., the right reason which pervades all. He thus does what is incumbent upon him by destiny, his duty.[50] On the positive side, he will conform his will to the Divine Reason, and will take what comes as coming inevitably from the Logos which he must obey. Negatively, he must be passionless, free from all movement of passion, living in a state of emotionless peace and unshakable calm.[51] He is indifferent to externals, unattached to material goods, family ties, his native *polis*; suffering is inevitable: he will face it calmly; grief is an irrational contraction of the soul: he will allow it no place.[52]

The *place of the free will* of man is not and cannot be adequately determined in Stoic ethics. Their monistic physics declares that everything in the cosmos necessarily happens according to an inexorable Logos or Fate, and so allows no place for the operation of free choice. On the other hand, a science of ethics presupposes that man has at least some share in creating his destiny; this is implied to some extent in the Stoic theory of virtue, since Stoic virtue rests primarily in the will.[53] The Stoics were not unconscious of this paradox, though the solution offered is only an apparent one. Man, they said, is submitted not so much to an exterior destiny as actually to his own destiny; and since the activity of the Logos is in accord with the natures of the beings in which it is operative, man is able to act as man. This means that man has the privilege of knowing the decrees of the Logos, of consciously assenting to them and thus putting himself in harmony with the universe and achieving a frame of mind conducive to happiness.[54] On the other hand, dissent will not interfere with "the endless chain of causation" (fate), but merely produce rebellion and an unhappy, unsubmissive spirit. The wise man assents, the fool rebels. Cleanthes shows himself a wise man:

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[45] *Ibid.*, 94.
[46] *Ibid.*, 101.
[47] *Ibid.*, 89.
[48] *Ibid.*, 92 ff.
[49] J. von Arnim, op. cit., I, n. 205.
[50] This constitutes the Stoic doctrine of the "suitable" (καθῆκον), a word given its moral connotation by Zeno. See Diogenes Laertius, VII, 25.
[51] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 117.

[52] *Ibid.*, 118 ff. Cf. the expressive statement of Epictetus (*Discourses*, II, 19; in Oates, op. cit., p. 42): "Who then is a Stoic? . . ." See also I, 4, p. 230 ff.
[53] Cf. Epictetus, *Discourses*, I, 29; in Oates, op. cit., p. 275; II, 17–18; p. 316 ff.
[54] Diogenes Laertius, VII, 88.

> Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny,
> Whitherso to me ordainèd is by Thee.
> I'll follow, doubting not, or if with will
> Recreant I falter, so must I follow still.[55]

Conclusion. The Stoic philosophy endeavored to answer problems of individual ethics that had hitherto been almost untouched by philosophers; and if it did not adequately solve them, at least it focused men's minds on such questions. In many ways, indeed, the solutions it offered and the ideals it held up were among the noblest of antiquity. This becomes increasingly apparent, as we shall see, among the Roman Stoics. At the same time, the system contains many weak points. Fatalism, the inevitable destiny that governs all things, creates a chasm between physics and a true ethics, for it destroys contingency, free will, man's ability to determine his own destiny. There is too much in the Stoic ideals likewise that is unnatural to man: unnatural because it is superhuman in its demands. Thus, the complete repression of all impulses and emotions both surpasses the power of man and does not correspond to the ideal of human personality, since the emotional element is an indispensable natural basis for all great human effort. Too often, also, the Stoic was utterly lacking in basic humility; he was often filled with contempt and *hauteur* in his dealings with his weaker neighbor, so cold was he and captivated by the consciousness of his own moral worth and greatness.

[55] Quoted by Epictetus, *Manual*, n. 53; in Oates, *op. cit.*, p. 483.

CHAPTER XII: Other Phases of Late Greek Thought

THE Epicureans and the Stoics, both seekers of happiness, were as dogmatic and definite in their philosophy as the Academy and the Peripatos. At the same time, however, there grew up a smaller, less united group that made the disavowal of knowledge, the abandonment of *theoria*, the first step toward happiness. These were the Skeptics, who found fault with all the positive schools and denied the possibility of all dogmatic or certain knowledge. They preferred to live in a state of doctrinal suspense and happy ignorance. Later, another tendency manifested itself: eclecticism or syncretism. This is a sister to skepticism: since all philosophies enjoy only probability, one should choose what he will on the basis of utility or practical needs. We here group together under the two heads of skepticism and electicism men who lived at different times up to the third century after Christ.

§ 1. *The Skeptics*

Skepticism as a quasi system began with Pyrrho of Elis (360–270 B.C.), a contemporary of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and continued intermittently until Sextus Empiricus (c. A.D. 250). It is usual to distinguish the older skeptics, the Middle Academy, and the later skeptics. In general, this movement began as a revolt against dogmatism and the differences between the schools, and gradually grew in the stature of its arguments against all certain knowledge to become a "scientific skepticism."

The Older Skeptics. PYRRHO, one of the first "to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, which took the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgment,"[1] seems to have been influenced thereto by the dialectic of the Megarians, the writings of Democritus (on sense perception), the Sophists, and the Cyrenaics. Since he left no writings, what teachings are ascribed to him by his pupils may be rather their doctrine than his. Most famous of these was TIMON OF PHLIUS (320–230), a sophist, skeptic, and sillographer.

From the report of Diogenes Laertius,[2] the skeptics found so many of the earlier philosophers at odds and denying an absolute truth[3] that they concluded to an outright relativism. Custom and convention alone govern what men do: a Cyrenaic position. Things are inaccessible to us and are hence unknown; we are thus left to our impressions only, which are variable. Since we cannot be certain of anything, the wise man will suspend judgment and so attain to imperturbability or *ataraxia*.

The school would thus determine nothing, in order to keep their state of even balance. *Nothing more* became their motto: i.e., not more one thing than another. By this, said Timon, they meant the absence of all determination and the withholding of all assent.[4] Such a doctrine profoundly affected Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), who in turn had direct influence on René Descartes in the seventeenth century.

The Middle Academy. This begins[5] with

[1] Diogenes Laertius, IX, 61.

[2] *Ibid.*, 71 ff.

[3] For example, Xenophanes as saying: "Clear truth has no man seen nor ever shall know," or Democritus: "Truly we know nothing, for truth is in a well" (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 72).

[4] Diogenes Laertius, IX, 76.

[5] Cf. *Ibid.*, IV, 28.

Arcesilaus (315–241), a contemporary of Timon. His background was wittily phrased by Ariston of Chios: "Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, midway Diodorus." From Plato he accepted the doctrine that all we can have of the sense world is opinion; from Diodorus, his love of argument which under the spell of Pyrrho he used against rather than for any position. Nevertheless, his skepticism was of a milder type, directed primarily against the dogmatism of the Stoics and their criterion of true perception.

Some years later, Carneades (214–129 b.c.), founder of the so-called Third Academy, not only carried on this opposition to the Stoics, but extended his skepticism to a denial of all knowledge and all dogmatic philosophy. Thus he launched a famous attack on the theology of the Stoics, particularly against their arguments for the existence of God and Providence.[6] As a rhetorician and orator he was, according to Cicero, "extremely clever and most prolific."[7] He surprised and shocked the Romans by delivering one day a speech on justice, and on the following a diatribe against it.[8] Propagated by Carneades' pupil and reporter Clitomachus, and then by Charmadas, skepticism was abandoned in the Academy by Philo of Larisa (*infra*).

Later Skepticism. Here we witness not only a renewal of Pyrrho's doctrine, but a far more "scientific" presentation of it, a scientific refutation of all science! Ainesidemos of Knosos (at Alexandria, c. 50 b.c.) considered the source of doubt and perplexity to lie in the relativity of perception and judgment. To illustrate, he drew up a table of ten *τρόποι* or ways[9] in which knowledge varies; ten bases, one might put it, for doubt: (1) The differences between living creatures show that they receive different impressions of the same object: the quail eats hemlock which is fatal to man. Which therefore is true? (2) Differences between individual men show the same fact. (3) Differences between our sense organs: something looks beautiful but tastes very bitter. (4) Differences of conditions and change in general: health, illness, sleep, waking, etc.; impressions will vary correspondingly. (5) [10] Differences arising from customs, laws, myths proper to each nation, etc. (6) Differences arising from mixing, by virtue of which nothing appears purely in itself, but in mixture with air, moisture, etc. (7) [5] Differences caused by distance, perspective; e.g., the sun looks different at its rising than at noon. (8) [7] Differences because of quantity or quality of objects; a little wine helps the body, whereas too much has a bad effect. (9) Differences caused by the regularity, strangeness, or rarity of phenomena. (10) [8] Differences arising from any sort of relationship.

Agrippa, his disciple (otherwise unknown), constructed five *τρόποι* instead of these ten. Of these, three were new: the second: that every premise itself needs a proof, hence involving a regressus *in infinitum*; the fourth: the assumption of arbitrary hypotheses as starting points to avoid such regress (e.g., Epicurus' hypothesis on pleasure); the fifth: the vicious circle or reciprocal influence, i.e., assuming the conclusion as a premise.[10] Other skeptics reduced these to two, which Sextus Empiricus synopsized in his famous *diallelus:* Nothing can be rendered certain through itself; and nothing can be rendered certain through anything else, because this would involve either the regress to infinity or else the vicious circle.[11]

Sextus Empiricus (c. a.d. 150/250?), of whom little is known, belonged with Menodotus and Saturninus to a group of medical practitioners who adopted an empiric, posi-

[6] See the text in E. Bevan, *Later Greek Religion* (New York, 1952), pp. 52–56.

[7] *De oratore*, I, xi, 45; *Acerrimus et copiocissimus*.

[8] Cicero, *Republic*, III, vi, 8 (*LCL*, p. 192).

[9] Cf. Diogenes Laertius, IX, 79–88; and Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrh. Hypothes.*, I, 36 ff. (*LCL*, I, p. 24). The latter's varied arrangement is indicated in brackets.

[10] Diogenes Laertius, IX, 88–89.

[11] Sextus Empiricus, *op. cit.*, I, 178 ff. (*ed. cit.*, I, p. 100).

tivist approach to illness as a result of skepticism; only the symptoms and outer signs are known, not the causes of sickness. He seems to have practiced in Rome, and became the historian and leader of the skeptics. Of his works two have survived: *Pyrrhonian Outlines* and *Against the Dogmatists*. The latter in eleven books actually embraces two works: five books against the dogmatic philosophers; six against the "professors," i.e., the other sciences (grammar, rhetoric, etc.).[12] Their very titles indicate his position: no scientific knowledge is possible, whether in logic, philosophy, theology, or the sciences.

"But what does the soul long for more strongly than the truth?"[13] Skepticism found few followers, and many to refute it.

§ 2. *The Eclectics*

In bringing the post-Aristotelian period to a close, brief mention should be made of some philosophers who attempted a synthesis of various past philosophies (syncretism). They are somewhat symptomatic of a movement that gains force through the next few centuries, of blending elements from the different schools and/or of reconciling Plato and Aristotle. Little, it is true, seems to be known of the reaction to the publication (c. 70 B.C.) of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and the *Corpus Theophrasticum*, but we may well suppose that the "new" Aristotle thus discovered seemed a great contrast to the "exoteric" Aristotle many had known. In their loyalty, they attempted to reconcile the Peripatos of the CA with the Academy, and did not always succeed!

Eclecticism was the dominant note of the "fourth" Academy, after the skepticism of Carneades and Clitomachus. PHILO OF LARISA (160–79 B.C.) began as a skeptic, but came to admit at least the probable as the object of knowledge. In doctrine his interest was primarily in ethics. Cicero heard him teach in Rome in 88 B.C. The return to dogmatism which he thus introduced was continued and developed by his successor ANTIOCHUS OF ASCALON (d. c. 68 B.C.), teacher of Cicero in Athens, 79–78. His dogmatism, however, was not purely a return to Plato, but rather syncretistic. Thus he attempted to show that the basic tenets of Stoicism were taken over from Plato, and that the Academy, Peripatos, and Stoa were in essential agreement. In this, he was close to the eclectic Stoic Panaetius (*infra*); and was accused by Sextus Empiricus of philosophizing as a Stoic in the Academy.[14] Both Varro and Cicero, Roman eclectics (*infra*), were under his influence. The latter devoted the fifth book of *De finibus* to a presentation of Antiochus' ethical teachings, as in agreement with the ancients, especially Aristotle and Polemon.[15] It is apparent that Antiochus followed Aristotle and Zeno in considering happiness to lie in virtue, yet sided with Theophrastus in positing other things as necessary conditions.[16]

The most professed eclecticism is that of POTAMON OF ALEXANDRIA, contemporary of Augustus (27 B.C.–A.D. 14), who introduced an Eclectic School,[17] and made a selection from the tenets of all existing schools. He wrote a commentary on the *Republic* of Plato, followed Aristotle in making the virtuous life the end of human actions, adopted a combination of Aristotelian and Stoic elements as his criterion of truth. Lastly, the school of QUINTUS SEXTUS (70 B.C.–?), though basically Stoic, added Pythagorean and Platonic elements. Apart from influence on Seneca,[18] the school seems of little importance.

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[12] Sextus Empiricus: *Works*, tr. by R. G. Bury (*LCL*, 1935 ff.): Vol. I: Πυρρωνείων ὑποτυπώσεων; Vols. II–IV: *Adversus Dogmaticos*. Cf. V. Cauchy, "The Nature and Genesis of the Sceptic Attitude," *Modern Schoolman*, 27 (1950), 203–221, 297–310.

[13] "*Sed quid fortius desiderat anima quam veritatem?*" St. Augustine, *In Ioann.*, tr. XXVI, 5 (*PL* 35, 1609).

[14] *Pyrrh. Hypothes.*, I, 235 (*ed. cit.*, I, p. 144).

[15] *De finibus*, V, v, 14 (*LCL*, p. 406).

[16] Cicero, *op. cit.*, V, xxiv, 71 (p. 472); and *Academica*, II, xliii, 134 (*LCL*, p. 640).

[17] Diogenes Laertius, Prologue, 21.

[18] *Ep.*, 59, 7 (*LCL*, I, p. 412); cf. *ibid.*, 64, 2 (*ibid.*, p. 438).

SECTION III: HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

It is somewhat arbitrary to begin Hellenistic philosophy at this juncture, since the term "Hellenistic" (as contrasted to "Hellenic") is used to describe the culture spread abroad with and after Alexander the Great. Epicureanism and Stoicism, however, belong in their origins to Hellenic culture, whereas the philosophies that follow arose out of the contact of other peoples with that culture. They are often called mixed philosophies, but more properly Hellenistic, and include those brought from Greece to Rome, the philosophical movement among the Jews of Alexandria, and the last stages of Greek pagan thought, especially in Neoplatonism.

CHAPTER XIII: Roman Philosophy

ROME *per fas et nefas* was becoming the world capital in the centuries preceding the Christian era. As a result of its mercenary armies, its conquests and alliances, its commerce, the city itself as well as the Roman world was undergoing vast cultural changes. Greek teachers and scholars came to Italy (very often as slaves), and Romans went to Athens to study. Soldiers and traders brought new religions, the mystery cults, into the city itself; the good and bad alike flocked to its gates. Much later St. Leo the Great was to describe it as a *silva frementium bestiarum, et turbulentissimae profunditatis oceanum*, a city in which all philosophies found a refuge, in which all manner of Oriental cults received a welcome, in which the gods of all nations were given place in the Pantheon.

§ 1. *The Middle Stoa*

The first contact which the Romans had with philosophy was largely through the Middle Stoa. Diogenes of Seleucia, a disciple of Chrysippus, had come to Rome on a political mission in 156 B.C. with Carneades and Critolaus the Peripatetic; all three had given lectures, to the disgust of the military authorities. Later, the Romans showed more favor to the Stoicism of Panaetius (or Panaitios) of Rhodes and Posidonius (Poseidonios) of Apameia, both of whom modified the harshness of the older Stoa and introduced Platonic elements. Both had influence on Varro and Cicero, the latter attending the lectures of Posidonius at Rhodes in 79 B.C.

Panaetius (c. 185–110 B.C.). A disciple of Diogenes of Seleucia, Panaetius lived for a while in Rome, and influenced several important men by his political and ethical theories. According to Cicero, who used his works (which are no longer extant), he was eclectic in philosophy, avoiding the uncouth and repellent aspects of Stoicism, and constantly using Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and Dikaiarchos.[1] As a result, he gave greater place to external goods and pleasure, and lessened or even rejected *apatheia*. He thus made Stoicism more acceptable to the Romans. The latter showed much interest also in his political philosophy, in which he advocated a combination of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy as the best form of government.[2] His wise man, or the progressive

[1] *De finibus*, IV, xxviii, 79 (*LCL*, pp. 386–388).

[2] Cicero, *De republica*, I, xxix, 45; xxxv, 54; xlv, 69; cf. T. A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought* (London, 1952), pp. 275–277.

(προκόπτων) as he preferred to call him, appealed to the Romans as the true patriot, great and noble in his ideals, loyal to his fatherland, yet not forgetful of the bonds of union and fellowship which existed between all members of the human race.[3] To Panaetius, finally, should be credited perhaps the threefold division of theology: that of the poets (anthropomorphic, false and unworthy); the theology of the philosophers ("natural," rational, and true, but not popular or fitted for ordinary use); and the theology of the statesmen (political or civil, in the traditional cults, necessary for proper education.)[4]

Posidonius of Apameia. Far more important than Panaetius is his disciple Posidonius (c. 135–51 B.C.), whom modern research now recognizes as the most universal mind that Greece had seen since the time of Aristotle. His interests were as diversified as those of Aristotle, while his eclecticism embraced most of his predecesors except the Epicureans. He is, however, a true Stoic in the inner unity of opposites (Heraclitus) which he achieved in his *Weltanschauung*. Herein his tendency is to a synthesis of dualism (from Plato) and monism (Stoics), a search for the organic unity which exists in the present pluralistic world. Σύνδεσμος, *cohaerentia*, becomes the keynote; the whole cosmos is seen as hierarchically (a later word!) composed: the divine forms the apex, God or the gods as supreme;[5] below the divine are the daemons, and beneath them are men, animals, plants (the second book of Cicero's *De natura deorum* would seem to summarize his doctrines). This perfection and order can be only the work of an intelligence and providence immanent and pervading the whole universe. Man is the central figure, the bridge or mean between the purely material and the imperishable, since he is composed of body and soul. Though the soul is a fiery *pneuma* and hence material, Posidonius accepts the Platonic dualism and opposition of soul and body, even teaching the doctrine of pre-existence. Finally, man is the end and crown of the things beneath him in the order of being.[6] Such doctrines were not without influence on Christian philosophers; e.g., Nemesius of Emesa seems to have used and Christianized them in his *On the Nature of Man*.

The influence of Posidonius was extensive. Cicero and Varro, Seneca and Epictetus used his works; Ovid borrowed from him the famous lines on man's erect posture; Philo Judaeus, the Neopythagoreans, and the Neoplatonists found in him their background, especially in their respective teachings on the unity and organic gradation of the elements of the cosmos.

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[3] Cicero, *De officiis*, I, xli, 149 (*LCL*, p. 152). This work of Cicero is consciously modeled on the Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος of Panaetius (cf. *De officiis*, II, xvii, 60; *LCL*, p. 232).

[4] This may have its roots in Antisthenes the Cynic, who taught that the gods were many in name (popular belief), but one in nature (Cicero, *De natura deorum*, I, xiii, 32; *LCL*, p. 34). Panaetius' doctrine was used by his disciple Q. M. Scaevola, the Roman jurist, and by Varro; it is cited by St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, IV, 27.

[5] Cf. the arguments for the existence of God considered to be from Posidonius, in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Mathem.*, ix 60–87 and 123–132 (*LCL*, III, pp. 34 ff., 66 ff.; or in E. Bevan, *Later Greek Religion*, pp. 79–88).

[6] Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum*, II, lxi, 154 ff.

§ 2. *Early Roman Philosophers*

The early Romans were a virile, rugged race, possessed of a religion and a love of law and order but without a philosophy. Their first contacts with philosophy, as we have seen, were unfavorable, for it seemed to them to be a danger to the ancient *virtus Romana* and to engender softness of life. Such too was the general reaction to the whole Hellenistic movement: *pergraecari*, "to Hellenize," came to mean effeminacy and debauchery. Slowly but surely, however, the good things of Greece as well as the bad began to take hold of Roman life. Latin youths went to Greece to finish their education, while Greek slaves, who often filled the roles of tutors and stewards as well as servants in the families of Rome, became the mediums of Grecian culture. Roman art, science, and philosophy thus began as an imitation of the Greek, but was impregnated with the spirit of Rome.

Roman philosophy, then, may be characterized as (1) imitative, by reason of its borrowings from the Greek, for it had little or no originality of its own; (2) eclectic, since it drew from many sources, though actually it was largely Stoic (in those philosophers and statesmen who stressed virtue and law) or Epicurean (in the egoist or more carefree individualist); (3) practical, an outcome of the Latin temperament bent on the development of the res *publica*[7] or the search for a plan or order of life.[8]

M. Terentius Varro (116–27 B.C.). From secondary sources (since most of his works were destroyed), Varro appears as a polymath, a scholar of wide interests rather than a pure philosopher. In imitation of and dependence on Posidonius he wrote on many subjects: history, culture, Latin grammar, geography, meteorology, agriculture, hydrology, and other sciences.[9] He is perhaps of greater importance for Latin grammar and Roman science, although in his eclectic philosophy he was likewise a channel of Greek thought. From Antiochus he borrowed the bases of his ethics; from Panaetius his approach to theology, in which he speaks of one God who is the soul of the world which He governs by reason and from which, Varro thinks, He is really distinct;[10] from the Stoics, perhaps, came his concept of soul as *πνεῦμα*. In turn, Varro was used by later Roman writers, Gellius (*Noctes Atticae*), Macrobius (*De somno Scipionis*), Martianus Capella (*De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae*), etc.

M. Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.). Cicero is of more direct influence on Roman philosophy. Whereas Varro would send to Greece or to Greek originals those Romans who wished to learn philosophy, Cicero defended Latin philosophy since many Romans did not read Greek yet needed the help which philoso-

[7] Thus Cicero: "*Quid esse igitur censes, Laeli, discendum nobis? . . . Eas artes, quae efficiant ut usui civitati simus; id enim esse praeclarissimum sapientiae munus maximumque virtutis vel documentum vel officium puto*" (*De republica*, I, xx, 33; *LCL*, p. 56).

[8] "*O vitae philosophia dux! o virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum!*" (Cicero, *Disp. Tusc.*, V, ii, 5; *LCL*, p. 428.)

[9] Cf. his *Lingua Latina*, tr. by R. G. Kane (*LCL*, 2 vols.); and *De re rustica*, ed. H. Keil (Leipzig, 1889).

[10] Cf. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XIX, 1–3; VI, 5; VII, 6; and IV, 31.

phy afforded.[11] His own works, he readily admits, are not very original but are drawn from his instructors in Greece: Diodotus, Philo of Larisa, Antiochus, Posidonius; they are mere *ἀπόγραφα*, transcripts: "All I do is to supply words, in which I abound."[12] But, he says elsewhere, "I have thought to expound philosophy to our countrymen for the good of the *res publica*, since I judged it would contribute greatly to the honor and the praise of the state to have such weighty and lofty teachings in the Latin tongue also."[13] In the last years of his life, especially after the death of his daughter Tullia (45 B.C.), Cicero accordingly abandoned his forensic works and devoted himself to philosophy. The end product is eclectic in character: Academic in the problem of knowledge; Stoic in ethics with borrowings from Aristotle and Theophrastus; and in politics a combination of Plato, the Peripatos, and the Middle Stoa.

His contributions to European thought and expression are beyond calculation, for he reared to himself a monument more lasting than bronze in his influence on both pagan and Christian thought. Minucius Felix would Christianize the *De natura deorum* in his *Octavius*. St. Augustine was converted to philosophy, a step toward his full conversion, by reading the *Hortensius*, and imitated Cicero in the *De beata vita*; later, he would react against Cicero's Academic skepticism, yet draw on his political writings in *The City of God*. St. Ambrose based his *De officiis ministrorum* on the *De officiis*; and St. Aelred openly says his *De amicitia spirituali* is the supernaturalization of the Ciceronian *De amicitia*. We shall see presently the role of Cicero in Latin classical culture.

Latin Literature. The literature of Rome was somewhat touched by philosophy, owing partly perhaps to the *De rerum natura* of Lucretius. Of the poets, both Horace (65–8 B.C.) and Vergil (70–19 B.C.) were mild Epicureans and deeply conscious of the need of moral reform in Roman society. Q. HORATIUS FLACCUS had studied at Athens and knew the currents of philosophical thought.[14] Stoicism repelled him,[15] and no system fully appealed to him, though Epicureanism became his general norm of life.[16] Thus, while he did love and seek the material joys of life, he constantly advocated the measure of nature and the golden mean. The wise and happy man was he who was content with little and possessed inner tranquillity and freedom.[17] He advocated therefore the return to the ancient *ethos* of Rome[18] by moral reform,[19] and praised the simple life of the countryside.[20] His Epicureanism appears prominently in his notion of death:[21] if there is no survival, make the best of today: *Carpe diem*.[22]

To a lesser extent PUBLIUS VERGILIUS MARO seems infected with this philosophy. More of a shy, scholarly type, Vergil

[11] *Academica*, I, ii–iii, 4–12 (*LCL*, pp. 412–423). Besides the works in the Loeb Classical Library, one will find some philosophical treatises in *The Basic Works of Cicero*, ed. M. Hadas (New York, 1951).

[12] "*Verba tantum affero, quibus abundo*" (*Ad Attic.*, XII, lii, 3).

[13] *De natura deorum*, I, iv, 7 (*LCL*, p. 10); cf. also *Disp. Tusc.*, I, i–iv (*LCL*, pp. 2–9).

[14] *Ep.*, II, ii, 43.

[15] *Serm.*, I, 3; II, 3.

[16] *Ep.*, I, iv, 16.

[17] *Serm.*, II, 7.

[18] *Carm.*, III, 2.

[19] *Ibid.*, II, 15.

[20] *Serm.*, II, 6, 16, 18, etc.

[21] *Carm.*, II, 3.

[22] *Ibid.*, I, 11.

delighted in love of the land and family (*Eclogues* and *Georgics*). His greatest contribution was, of course, the *Aeneid*, an epic of Rome and of humanity which made the Romans conscious of their past and the political, moral, and religious ideals of their forebears.[23] Roman *virtus* and *pietas* were the acme of perfection, and the *pius Aeneas* the model of fear of the gods (which is not very Epicurean) and moral rectitude. The *Aeneid* is not merely the story of the glory of Rome; it is also an epic of human life and destiny.

§ 3. *The Roman Stoa*

Within the later Stoa, which appealed to the higher classes while the Cynics sought to improve the common herd, we may distinguish a more learned or theoretical tendency and, on the other hand, a popular presentation and application of doctrine. To the former belong Apollonius of Tyre, Didymos of Alexandria, L. Annaeus Cornutus, while popular Stoicism finds expression in Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. The Stoicism of this period (first and second centuries of our era) is marked by a return to orthodoxy with less eclecticism and by greater stress on the ethical aspects of the doctrine. The Roman adaptation of Stoicism, in fact, takes on a more definite religious character and practical note, with its emphasis on man's kinship with God and his duty of love toward fellow men. We shall limit ourselves to the popular exponents.

L. Annaeus Seneca (d. A.D. 65).[24] Tutor and minister to Nero, who forced him to kill himself for an alleged conspiracy, Seneca emphasized the practical side of Stoicism and was little given to theory. At the same time, he considered theoretical knowledge necessary for right action: "There is no contemplative art without decrees, which the Greeks call dogmas."[25] He gave short shrift to dialectic and logic: "Philosophy teaches us to do things, not to speak";[26] and considered the so-called liberal studies as a waste of time: "They contribute much to other things, but to virtue not a thing,"[27] for the truly liberal arts are those which concern virtue.

The end of man, the happy life, consists in Stoic wisdom, to follow nature and mold one's life according to its laws and pattern. This can be attained in one way only, by having a sound, courageous, energetic mind ready to endure trials and hardships until it attains unbroken tranquillity and enduring freedom, peace, and harmony of soul.[28] To acquire this, Seneca urged solitude and flight from the

[23] The mission of Rome is expressed in the famous lines of Book VI, 851–853:

"*Tu refere imperio populos, Romane, memento (haę tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere morem, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.*"

[24] *Epistulae ad Lucilium Morales*, tr. R. M. Gummere, 3 vols. (*LCL*, 1934); *Moral Essays* [Dialogues], tr. J. W. Basore, 3 vols. (*LCL*, 1928). Cf. M. Gentile, *I fondamenti metafisici della morale di Seneca* (Milan, 1932).

[25] "*Nulla ars contemplativa sine decretis est, quae Graeci vocent dogmata*" (*Ep.*, 95, 10).

[26] "*Facere docet philosophia, non dicere*" (*Ep.*, 20, 2).

[27] "*Ad alia multum conferunt, ad virtutem nihil*" (*Ep.*, 88, *passim*).

[28] *De vita beata*, III, 3 (*Moral Essays*, II, *LCL*, p. 106). With Plato, Seneca taught the existence of a rational soul; though he considered it material, it survived the body until the general conflagration.

herd: *inimica est multorum conversatio.*[29] Associate with those who will make you better or whom you can benefit.[30] A further step is renunciation of those things which would hinder peace of soul, e.g., the goods of this world (either be a poor man, or resemble one), feelings, vices (*morbi animi*).[31] The wise man will likewise learn how to derive benefit from the trials the gods send him and turn his troubles into an occasion of virtue: success comes to the common man, but to triumph over the calamities and terrors of mortal life is the part of a great man only.[32] To reach such a peak, or indeed to attain any goodness, man needs the help of God: *bonus vero vir sine deo nemo est.* This is in accord with his general doctrine that all things consist of matter and God, and that the human reason is but a part of the divine spirit immersed in matter.[33] Since this bit of the divine may be found in freeman or slave as well as in a Roman aristocrat (*eques*), one must reverence all men (*homo res sacra homini*) and be conscious of the brotherhood of man. Solitary self-sufficiency is not a characteristic of the wise man: "You must live for another, if you wish to live for yourself."[34]

The high ideals of Seneca made him attractive to many; inconsistently, however, he thought of philosophy and its salutary effects as reserved for the few, the elite, the moral aristocrats,[35] while the great unwashed he despised. Yet so closely did he approach Christian thought in his ethics that he found considerable acceptance in Christian circles, even down to late times. This was furthered by an apocryphal series of letters between St. Paul and Seneca and the story of the latter's supposed conversion.[36] Yet he was also far removed from Christianity in his pantheism, naturalism, lack of free will and of any place for humility.

Epictetus of Hierapolis (A.D. 50–138). Epictetus came from his native Phrygia to Rome as a slave to Epaphroditis, a bodyguard of Nero. His master allowed him to receive instruction from the Stoic Musonius Rufus. When he was made a freeman, he remained in Rome and taught until Domitian banished all philosophers (in A.D. 89 or 93). He then established a very popular school at Nikopolis in Epirus, where Arrian copied his *Discourses* (Διατριβαί) in eight books (of which four survive) and *Homilies* in twelve books now lost, and in addition compiled an *Enchiridion* (handbook or manual) of his tenets.[37] His writings were

[29] Ep., 7, 2 (*LCL*, I, p. 30). Thomas à Kempis was to quote Seneca: "As often as I have been among men I have returned home less a man" (*Imitation*, I, 20, 2): *Avarior redeo, ambitiosior, luxuriosior, immo vero crudelior et inhumanior, quia inter homines fui* (*Ep. cit.*, n. 3).

[30] Ep., 7, 8; 109, 1–3.

[31] *Ibid.*, 17, 3 (*LCL*, I, p. 110): "*Multis ad philosophandum obsistere divitiae; paupertas expedita est, secura est.*" *Ibid.*, 5: "*Si vis vacare animo, aut pauper sis oportet aut pauperi similis.*" Also *De tranquillitate, passim.*

[32] *De providentia*, IV, 1.

[33] Ep., 66, 12 (*LCL*, II, pp. 8–10): "*Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa.*" Cf. *Ep.*, 41, 2 (*LCL*, I, p. 272); 65, 23 (p. 456); *De providentia*, IV, 1 (*Moral Essays*, I, p. 24).

[34] "*Alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere*" (*Ep.*, 48, 2).

[35] *De ira*, II, 8–9.

[36] Cf. H. Leclercq, "Seneque et S. Paul," *Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*, XV (1950), cols. 1193–1198. Also J. T. Muckle, "The *De officiis ministrorum* of St. Ambrose: an Example of the Process of the Christianization of the Latin Language," *Mediaeval Studies*, I (1939), 63–80.

[37] Cf. W. J. Oates, *The Stoic and Epicurean*

later much prized by Christians, paraphrased and commented, so closely did they often come to Christian ideals: the importance attached to the concept of duty and obedience to the divine law, the orientation of one's whole life toward the one goal of moral perfection, the clear knowledge and practice of the moral equality of rights for all men as "sons of God."

The Stoicism of Epictetus is marked first of all by a return to the basic and original Stoic tenets, particularly those of Chrysippus. Ethics, the art of living, is, however, the center.[38] Logic is not denied, but rather bypassed as already sufficiently studied by too many philosophers: what is needed is to know how to practice what is learned.[39] In physics, stress is laid rather on the Logos or Destiny and man's subjection to necessity than on the particulars of cosmogony. Furthermore, ethics itself is marked, as in Seneca, by its deep religious coloring, great place being given to man's relations to God and fellow men. His life is considered as the service of God, while obedience and submission in pious faith are the true roots of freedom.[40] Man is a rational animal: therefore he must act like a man and not a dumb brute;[41] man is a son of God: therefore all that he has is his Father's; man is a brother to all men[42] because God is the Father of gods and men;[43] therefore he is a citizen of the universe,[44] cosmopolitan, disregarding social distinctions to love all of whatever rank or station.

Marcus Aurelius (121–180). Born in Rome of Spanish parents, the future emperor-philosopher was tutored by the Stoic, Rusticus, through whom he came to know the *Discourses* of Epictetus.[45] He was also taught by a Platonist and a Peripatetic. Deeply affected by Stoic ethics and polity, and indeed by Plato's ideal of the philosopher-king, he endeavored to live these principles on the imperial throne. To keep his ideals before him, he composed his famous *Meditations*, self-communings or exhortations which reveal the high moral character and the spirit and vision which moved him. There is no indication that he intended the work for anyone but himself; their proper title is Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτὸν (*To Himself*).[46]

As their interest is primarily in self-betterment, the *Meditations* stress practice rather than theory, show a tendency away from orthodox Stoic monism, and reveal a Platonic dualism between soul and body. In the latter doctrine Marcus is influenced also by the Aristotelian-Theophrastic trichotomy of body-soul-mind.[47] The mind or *nous* is the ruling part in man, derived from God,[48] a part of the νοερόν or Mind of the universe,[49] the divinity (or δαίμων) implanted within each man[50] to be guardian and guide.[51] Following it, man lives with the gods.

Philosophers (New York, 1940), pp. 233–484; J. Bonforte, *The Philosophy of Epictetus* (New York, 1955).

[38] *Discourses*, I, xv.

[39] *Ibid.*, III, ii and vi; II, xii.

[40] *Ibid.*, IV, 1.

[41] *Ibid.*, II, ix.

[42] *Ibid.*, x.

[43] *Ibid.*, I, iii.

[44] *Ibid.*, ix.

[45] *Meditations*, I, 7.

[46] W. J. Oates, *op. cit.*, pp. 491–585. Cf. A. S. L. Farquharson, *Marcus Aurelius: His Life and His World*, 2 ed. by D. A. Rees (New York, 1951).

[47] *Meditations*, II, 2; XII, 3.

[48] *Ibid.*, XII, 2.

[49] *Ibid.*, IV, 4.

[50] *Ibid.*, III, 16.

[51] *Ibid.*, V, 27.

Because the *Meditations* reveal both the high standards of their author and the anxieties and tragedies that beset him in office, they are a sad and moving document. Logos and pathos are in every line.

§ 4. *The Formation of Latin Classical Culture**

To understand the origin of that Christian culture which played such a great role in the making of Europe, we must know something of the Latin literature and classical culture from which it arose. Undoubtedly Greek influence will be felt in the patristic culture of the West: of Origen on St. Ambrose, of Plotinus on St. Augustine, of Plato and Aristotle on Boethius. But in the last analysis it was Latin classical culture which the Western Fathers of the Church combined with Christian thought to produce patristic culture. This in turn gave rise to scholastic culture, to be succeeded centuries later by that of the Renaissance. Thus the history of culture is seen as an organic whole, and we need not subscribe to the error that with each new culture the older form completely dies off and is without influence on the newer.

Latin Classical Culture. Like Roman philosophy, Latin culture had its roots in Greece, in the *paideia* introduced by the Sophists and purified by Plato. Like philosophy again, it came to Rome only gradually and not without opposition. The poetic art for Cato the Elder was without honor, and its devotees idlers and scoundrels. Nevertheless, without help from the totalitarian State which paradoxically left education to private initiative,[52] a loosely organized system of education evolved, which was given classical expression and direction by Cicero and Quintilian. The ideals and norms which they established were held in honor throughout the West; the curriculum they advocated embraced branches of knowledge to be studied by a free man (*liber*): the liberal arts, *liberales doctrinae*, the *humaniores litterae*, which make a man more a man.[53]

In the *Roman* "*system*" the boy (or girl) who went to school would learn the A B C's, the *prima literatura*, reading, writing, and calculation in the *ludus* (*schola* was a term reserved for higher studies). Here he would be submitted to the *litterator*, *grammatista*, or *primus magister*, sometimes a slave, more often a lowly freeman who eked out the poorest of living in a profession that neither Cicero nor Seneca considered as liberal or worthy of a citizen.[54] "He did his best," says Apuleius, "to polish the roughness of our minds."[55]

The next step was to enroll in the *schola* of grammar under the *grammaticus*, the teacher of literature and language, to be taught "the art of speaking correctly and the interpretation of the poets."[56] Homer and then gradually

* Cf. Bibliography, p. 234.

[52] Cicero, *De republica*, IV, 3.

[53] Cicero: "*Eae artes quae repertae sunt, ut puerorum mentes ad humanitatem fingerentur et virtutem*" (*De oratore*, III, xv, 58; *LCL*, p. 46). Cf. Seneca, *Ep.*, 88, 2, *De liberalibus studiis; LCL*, II, p. 348. [54] Seneca, *Ep.*, 88, 21; p. 362.

[55] *Florid.*, IV, 20. Cf. St. Augustine's picture of the *ludus* he attended, in *Confessions*, I, ix and xiii.

[56] Quintilian, *Instit. Orat.*, I, iv, 2 (tr. by H. E. Butler, *LCL*, 1920, p. 62); cf. Cicero, *De oratore*, I, xlii, 187.

the Roman poets became the matter of study (prose writers were given scant attention): the teacher demonstrating the art of reading correctly and intelligently,[57] and ex *obliquo* discussing questions of history, geography, philosophy, etc., evoked by the text. Thus there was no set course of disciplines, though the aim was to provide a general education, but of an unscientific character.[58]

The *grammaticus* might give a smattering of rhetoric to his pupils. It was, however, the special duty of the *rhetor* to give formal and professional instruction not only in rhetoric proper, in composition, debating, declaiming (eloquence), but also in dialectic, the art of handling argument, and (in later ages at least) in such disciplines as philosophy, jurisprudence, politics, and the other arts. The *rhetor* was usually held in much higher esteem than his lesser colleagues, adequate support being provided by the municipalities. Not a few schools of rhetoric became famous, as in Carthage.

The curriculum was thus intended to give that mental discipline which would mark the educated man endowed with a knowledge of men and manners and a polished style of speech and writing.

Cicero's Ideal. His studies in Greece had long convinced Cicero both of the need of *eloquentia*, training in oratory, and of the role which the liberal arts played in forming the well-educated and cultured citizen. Even as a student he had composed two books on rhetoric (*De inventione*); and early in his oratorical career (62 B.C.) he had undertaken, in the defense of his ancient teacher Archias (*Pro Archia*), an apologia of the liberal arts. Throughout his life he was faithful to the position of Posidonius, that eloquence alone without learning did not make the perfect orator. Because such a principle was not followed by the Roman rhetors, Cicero deemed it necessary to set forth clearly his ideal of the true orator. This was given full expression in his famous trilogy *De oratore* (55 B.C.), and later in the unfinished *De optimo genere oratorum* (46 B.C.), and the lively *Orator* of the same year.

Docto oratori palma danda est.[59] Cicero's ideal was the learned orator who was at once eloquent and wise, a *homo sapiens* and a *homo copiose loquens*. "In my opinion, none can be an orator worthy of full praise who has not attained a knowledge on all important things as likewise of the arts."[60] The true orator, therefore, is one who, whatever the matter on which he is to discourse, will speak thereon with wisdom, method, charm, and from a retentive memory: *prudenter, et composite, et ornate, et memoriter*;[61] to these Cicero elsewhere added *copiose*. This demands of the perfect orator a wide (rather than deep) knowledge of many things: of laws and letters, the great arts of politics, war and eloquence, the lesser arts (*mediocres artes*) of philosophy, mathematics, music, and grammar, and a knowledge too of human nature: "The orator must be perfect in every kind of speech and in every branch of human nature."[62]

[57] Quintilian, *op. cit.*, I, viii, 8 and 13 (*ed. cit.*, pp. 150, 152) and x, 25 (p. 170).

[58] Quintilian, *op. cit.*, I, x, 1 (p. 160); and Seneca, *Ep.*, 88, 23 (*ed. cit.*, II, p. 362).

[59] *De oratore*, III, xxxv, 143 (*ed. cit.*, p. 112).

[60] *Ibid.*, I, vi, 20.

[61] *Ibid.*, xv, 64.

[62] "*In omni genere sermonis, in omni parte*

Though Cicero's manifest aim is thus a union of eloquence and wisdom, unfortunately the orator triumphs, for wisdom or philosophy is subordinated to eloquence. That philosophy is chosen which is best for the orator; not necessarily the truest one, but that which furnishes the power of treating the greatest problems with adequate fullness and in attractive style: *copiose ornateque*. A philosophy that enables a man to talk at length, not one which reaches its conclusions too quickly; such is the probabilism of Carneades and the Newer Academy, for it can discuss any topic indefinitely.[63] Are not Cicero's own philosophical works examples of an eternally talking eloquence?

M. Fabius Quintilianus (A.D. 35–95). The headmaster of a grammar school for some twenty years, Quintilian was to reduce the ideals of Cicero to a practical level and arrange a course that would put order into his teaching. This he does in the twelve books of the *Institutio Oratoria*.[64] But between Cicero and Quintilian comes Seneca, to cause the author to emphasize the union of eloquence and morality and to illustrate even more than Cicero the place of the arts in the formation of character.

Cicero had glorified the *vir doctus dicendi peritus*, the learned man possessed of eloquence. Quintilian likewise seeks to form the orator; but for him the perfect orator is the *vir bonus*, the morally good man properly trained in eloquence. "Our aim is to form the perfect orator, for whom the first essential is that he be a good man; therefore we demand of him not only consummate ability in speaking, but every excellence of character as well."[65] Such a man alone is, for Quintilian, the true philosopher.[66] Hence in place of the probabilism of the New Academy he adopts the ethics of the Stoa, to train the *vir bonus*.[67]

By Quintilian's day Rome was no longer a republic but an empire, and the eloquence of the orator did not always find a place. Cicero himself had been reduced to silence after the triumph of Julius Caesar. But if eloquence has lost its primacy, the wisdom of the liberal arts and its ideal of *humanitas*, the perfecting of man's nature as man, perdure. These Quintilian saved for posterity and directed to the moral as well as the intellectual training of the young. He thus appealed strongly to the Christians, who held him in high regard. St. Augustine would renew the ideal, under Christian conditions, and propose the *vir Christianus dicendi peritus* in his famous work *De doctrina Christiana*.

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humanitatis dixerim oratorem perfectum esse debere" (*De oratore*, I, xvi 71 [*ed. cit.*, p. 52]; cf. xi, 48 ff.; and xv–xvi, *passim*).

[63] *De oratore*, III, xvii, 64 (*ed. cit.*, p. 52): "*Verum ego non quaero nunc quae sit philosophia verissima sed quae oratori coniuncta maxime* . . ."; (xviii, 65): "*Stoicos autem, quos minime improbo, dimitto tamen* . . ."; (xviii, 68: "*Recentior Academia* . . . *in qua exstitit divina quadam celeritate ingenii dicendique copia Carneades*. . . ." — Cf. *ibid.*, III, xxi, 79 ff. (p. 62 ff.); *Disp. Tusc.*, I, iv, 7 (*ed. cit.*, p. 10), and II, i, 1 ff. (p. 146 ff.).

[64] Translated and edited by H. E. Butler (*LCL*, 4 vols., 1920).

[65] *Institutio*, I, prol., 9.

[66] *Ibid.*, 18.

[67] *Ibid.*, X, 1, 123–124; XII, 2, 10–23.

CHAPTER XIV: Jewish Philosophy

GRECO-JUDAIC philosophy, which is largely that of Philo, the "most learned of the Jews" (as St. Jerome called him), has much in common with the so-called Greco-Oriental philosophy of the succeeding chapter. Not only are both centered largely around, or at least originate in, Alexandria, but both are also part of a movement that somewhat parallels in point of time the coming of the Gospel, a trend to make religion instead of philosophy the source of truth and the guide of life. Both are broadly characterized as an effort to reform the intellectual and moral life of their times by a synthesis of Greek philosophy and Oriental religion.

They thus mark a contrast to Greek philosophy as such. The pre-Socratic world had pursued the knowledge of nature, the external world; the golden age had added to this a broader wisdom of metaphysics and of human life; the Stoics and Epicureans had endeavored to supply a more concrete ethics in relation to God. Now, however, we shall see greater emphasis on God as man's goal, and keener detail on man's journey to his final end. To some extent, likewise, religion appears as an escape from skepticism, for man turns to a being and authority higher than himself for the surety he seeks in knowledge.

§ *1. Cultural and Historical Background*

The movement that resulted in the mixture of East and West is usually called syncretism, both in the fusion of religions or philosophies among themselves, and in the union of religion with philosophy. This, as we have seen, is part of the wider tendency to embrace at least the externals of Greek culture (Hellenism).

The Jews of Alexandria. The meeting place in many such instances was the city of Alexandria in Egypt, "the cross-roads of the world."[1] Founded after Alexander had captured Egypt in 331 B.C., the city was to become the capital of the Alexandrian world. It was "a universal nurse; and every race of men did settle in her,"[2] including a large colony of Jews.

Alexander himself had allowed the Jews to settle in one section of the new city; and so great was their number that the Jewish quarter was almost a city of its own. With their fellow countrymen scattered throughout the rest of the civilized world (many Jews had never returned to Palestine after the Babylonian exile, but continued to live in the "Diaspora"), they were gradually Hellenized.[3] In Alexandria they had the

[1] Thus Dion Chrysostomus (Cynic preacher, c. A.D. 70), *Discourse*, XXXII (*LCL*, III, p. 207).

[2] The Potter's Prophecy, quoted by E. A. Parsons, *The Alexandrian Library* (New York, 1952), p. 57; for the founding of the city, *ibid.*, p. 51 ff.

[3] Cf. J. Lebreton-J. Zeiller, *The History of the Primitive Church*, tr. by E. Messenger, 2 vols. (New York, 1949), tom. I, pp. 38–82, "The World of Jewry."

right indeed to maintain their own political organization and system of education, with freedom to follow their own religion. But they soon adopted Greek speech, and so many forgot their racial tongue that the Old Testament had to be rendered into Greek for their benefit (the Septuagint Version, c. 260 B.C.).

Some of the Jews, likewise, came in contact with Greek philosophical thought and tried to reconcile it with their religion. Of these, ARISTOBULUS is the most important. From surviving fragments he is seen to be a Peripatetic who claimed that the Greeks derived their doctrines from the Jewish Scripture or at least from Jewish tradition.[4] None attained, however, the breadth or depth of Philo, who seems to be the fruit of a long tradition.

Philo Judaeus (c. 20 B.C.–A.D. 40/50).[5] Philo was a rich young man of twenty or more when Mary and Joseph fled with the Christ Child into Egypt, though it is unlikely that he had contact with them. Possessed of a good education in the arts and Greek philosophy[6] as well as in the Septuagint Pentateuch (he does not seem too learned in the rest of the Scripture), he became an important personage among his people, somewhat of a gentleman-philosopher, a Jewish counterpart of Seneca. At the same time, he was an earnest theologian who sought on the one hand to reconcile Jewish belief and Greek philosophy, and on the other to offset a certain liberalism current among his coreligionists.

§ 2. *The Philosophy of Philo*

There is no complete system of philosophy in the works of Philo: they reveal rather that his interests lay largely in developing his religious belief with the help of philosophy. Only four are purely philosophical; thirty-four are primarily religious, the majority of these dealing with the Pentateuch, the Jewish Torah or Law. Nor do the works provide easy reading, for Philo was a rambler and often interested in trivia and undue allegorizing. Nevertheless, some of his doctrines are important, especially in view of his later influence.

Relation of Revelation and Reason. Philo is the first thinker in the history of philosophy to face the problem of the relation between faith in a supernatural revelation and the rational acceptance of philosophy. A religious man, he considered Scripture, especially the books of Moses, as the primary source of truth and the expression of the highest philosophy, for Moses was not only the greatest prophet but also the greatest philosopher.[7] When faced, therefore, with Greek philosophy, he was inclined to be critical of what he called the multitude of so-called philosophers who feigned to seek what was exact and certain in things and yet were so diametrically opposed to one another in their dogmatic conclusions, particularly in regard to God and the world.[8]

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[4] Cf. fragments preserved by Eusebius of Caesarea, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, VIII, x (*PG* 21, 637–639); XIII, xii (col. 1097 ff.). This passes into Christian tradition: e.g., Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus*, VI (*LCL*, p. 159); St. Ambrose, *De officiis*, I, xxviii, 133 (*PL*, ed. 1880, 16, 67).

[5] The edition used here is that of F. H. Colson-G. H. Whitaker, *Philo* (Loeb Classical Library, 12 vols., 1929–1953). Cf. also Bibliography.

[6] *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, XIV, 74 ff. (*ed. cit.*, IV, p. 494); *Quod omnis probus liber sit*, II, 15 (IX, p. 18).

[7] *De opificio mundi*, II, 8 (I, p. 8).

[8] *De ebrietate*, xlviii, 198 (III, p. 420); cf. *De migratione Abraham*, xxxii, 178–81 (IV, pp. 234–236); *De fuga*, ii, 8 (V, p. 14).

On the other hand, what truth philosophy contained was not at variance with that of Scripture. Either the Greeks obtained their doctrines ultimately from Jewish revelation, as Aristobulus had suggested;[9] or, as Philo sometimes held, they discovered the same truths by reason, since philosophy itself was God's gift to the Greeks to discover by natural means what the Jews knew by revelation.[10] Thus, since God is the source of both kinds of knowledge, there can be no contradiction.[11] The difference between them lies simply in this, that Scripture expresses the truth allegorically so that one must look beneath the surface for its full meaning (this leads Philo to excesses in allegorical exegesis), whereas philosophy furnishes a plain, literal version of the same truth.

It is in terms of such allegories that Philo proceeds to revise somewhat the *divisions of philosophy* and to delineate the *degrees of knowledge*. Abraham, who by some etymology represents the scholar, the "taught," or "virtue gained by instruction,"[12] becomes the center of the allegory. When God makes His covenant with him, his name is changed from Abram to Abraham (Gen. 17:5); allegorically, this denotes the change which takes place in the philosopher when he changes over from physics to ethics, abandons the study of the world to find a new home in the knowledge of its Maker, and from this gains piety. From this Philo learns that while philosophy will embrace, as in the Stoic concept, logic, physics, and ethics, the knowledge of God is no longer included under physics but under ethics.[13]

Ethics, which now embraces what others would call theology, is thus the queen of the sciences, and all other knowledge is her handmaid. This is another facet of the life of Abraham, revealed in the story of Sarai and Agar (Gen. 16). Sarai, whose name is changed to Sara, represents thereby the sovereign wisdom, philosophy, theology, or virtue;[14] Agar, "sojourner," her handmaid, represents the lower sciences. Now wisdom and virtue are barren unless the lower sciences are first acquired; so Sara advises Abraham to take Agar to wife. Then, when Agar, who comes from Egypt (i.e., the body or senses), has borne a son to Abraham, the latter is prepared to accept wisdom in the person of Sara. On the basis of such an interpretation Philo evaluates the worth of the various sciences and constructs their hierarchy: "As the school subjects (the *Encyclia*, or arts) contribute to the acquisition of philosophy, so does philosophy to the getting of wisdom," which, in the Stoic definition here repeated, is "the knowledge of things divine and human and their causes."[15]

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[9] Thus, Philo implies, Heraclitus took from Moses his doctrine of the harmony of opposites (*Quis rerum divinarum heres*, xliii, 214; IV, p. 388; cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo* [Cambridge, Mass., 1948], I, p. 141); Zeno the Stoic drew many thoughts from the law book of the Jews (*Quod omnis probus*, viii, 57; IX, p. 42), while Greek legislators copied the sacred tables of Moses (*De specialibus legibus*, IV, x, 61; VIII, pp. 44–46).

[10] *De specialibus legibus* III, 185–186 (VII, p. 592).

[11] Cf. *Legum Allegoriae*, II, xiii, 46 ff. (I, p. 252 ff.).

[12] Cf. references in General Introduction of edition, tome I, p. xxiv.

[13] *De mutatione nominum*, x, 74 ff. (V, pp. 178–180).

[14] *Ibid.*, xi, 77 ff. (V, p. 180).

[15] *De congressu*, xiv, 79 (IV, p. 496); this whole treatise concerns the place of lesser learn-

Philosophy itself becomes the handmaid of Scripture in the thought of Philo. His main interest is the sacred text or, let us say, the allegory behind the letter; philosophy serves as a tool to help him explore it. He is eclectic and critical in the actual use of Greek philosophy; though his preference goes to the Stoics (save in their concept of God) and to Plato (as often correcting the Stoics), Philo feels complete liberty in adapting and sometimes radically changing their thought.[16] Two questions form the bulk of his philosophical speculation: God and the world, and man and his destiny.

God and the World. Philo's doctrine of the creation of the world involves elements derived from Sacred Scripture, Plato, and the Stoics, yet adapted into a new synthesis that implies a thorough revision of Plato's theory of Ideas.

The God of Philo is the God of the Jews, personal, living, lovable, the cause of all things, the goal of man. Since in Scripture His proper name is *He that Is*, Philo does not hesitate to introduce philosophic names and concepts, even using the neuter form: Being (τὸ ὄν), Pure Being (τὸ ὄντως ὄν). Absolutely simple, God does not occupy space. Absolutely transcendent, He surpasses the Platonic Ideas of the Good and the Beautiful; indeed, He so transcends our intellect that we attain Him not by scientific understanding (though Philo admits proofs for the existence of God)[17] but by immediate intuition. Even this is but a knowledge *that* God is; for *what* He is we know not, save that He is Pure Being: "He is unnamable, ineffable and in every way incomprehensible."[18]

Contemplation of the *world* will show us that "its Cause is God, by whom it came to be; its matter, the four elements from which it was compounded; its instrument, the Word (λόγος) of God, through which it was framed; while the final cause of its construction is the goodness of the Demiurge."[19] Combining Moses, Plato, and the Stoics, Philo elucidates this key text, but shapes his sources to his own liking.

Because he had attained both the summit of philosophy and the secrets of revelation, Moses recognized that in the formation of the world there was both an active Cause, God or Mind, and a passive object, matter.[20] The Cause, Father and Maker of all, is good; and because of this He gave a share of His goodness to matter, which of itself was without order or quality, and thus set it in motion to become the most perfect masterpiece, the cosmos: hence the universe has as its source nothing less than true goodness.[21] Such texts might imply that, like the Demiurge of Plato, God is not the creator of the original matter

ing, the *encyclia*, in one's life, and its relation to wisdom. Ariston of Chios is credited by Diogenes Laertius (II, 79–80) with the statement that the encyclic studies are handmaids and philosophy the mistress or queen.

[16] Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 107–113; the vague use Philo makes of Aristotelianism would seem indeed to show that perhaps he knew the dialogues but not the CA.

[17] *De specialibus legibus*, I, vi–ix, 32–52 (VII, 116–128); cf. H. Lewy, *Philo: Selections* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 58–62.

[18] *De somniis*, I, xi, 67 (V, p. 330). See H. A. Wolfson, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 94–164, for texts and discussions on knowledge of God according to Philo.

[19] *De Cherubim*, xxxv, 127 (II, p. 82).

[20] *De opificio mundi*, ii, 8 ff. (I, p. 10 ff.).

[21] *Ibid.*, v, 21–22 (I, p. 18).

from which the cosmos is shaped. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence that Philo held to a doctrine of strict creation ex *nihilo*: "When God gave birth to all things, not only did He bring them into sight, but also made things which before were not, being Himself not only Demiurge but also Creator."[22] In further contrast to the Greek philosophers, Philo sees creation as a free act of the divine will: God did not have to create, as the Demiurge had to work in order to attain perfection. He is self-sufficient: "There is absolutely nothing [outside of Himself] which He needs";[23] therefore He need not have created the world. When He did so, it was by an act of the will and according to a design of His own making.

This account of creation, which reveals a revision of that of the *Timaeus*, is completed by Philo's theory of the *Ideas* and the *Logos*, "the instrument through which the world was framed." The Ideas or pattern of the material world are not simply posited as in Plato with their origin unexplained, for here they are considered the creation of God. "When God willed to create this visible world, He first fully formed the intelligible world, that He might have a pattern wholly incorporeal and God-like."[24] Since the intelligible world (*κόσμος νοητός*: a term coined by Philo) is thus produced by God, the Ideas can no longer be described in the words of Plato as "really real," for though invisible and incorruptible they are not eternal: they have received their being from God. At first, they are in the Divine Reason (the Logos of God Himself); but then acquire an existence of their own in a Mind created by God, the Logos or Word of God. The nature of the Logos and its relation to God are not clearly delineated: it is spoken of as the first-born of God, even the first-born son of God,[25] the image of God, a second God, the wisdom of God. At best, it is a creature of God, the place of the Ideas as not yet made visible in the world, and as such is the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*, the immanent reason, the world of the Ideas.

But the Ideas, or the Logos, are not merely patterns of this visible world; they somehow emanate from God, and come into the world of matter to become the "spoken" word (*λόγος προφορικός*).[26] They now take on the nature of causes, and are now called the *Powers* of God (*δύναμεις*) carrying out the plan of the world, either as makers or rulers.[27] How-

[22] *De somniis*, I, xiii, 76 (V, p. 336). Cf. F. V. Courneen, "Philo Judaeus Had the Concept of Creation," *New Scholasticism*, XV (1941), 46–58; and H. A. Wolfson, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 300–309, for a review of this problem, texts, etc.

[23] *Legum Alleg.*, II, 2 (I, p. 224). Again: "God, with no counsellor to help Him (for who was there beside Him?) by His own sole will determined, etc." (*De opificio mundi*, 23; I, p. 18).

[24] *De opificio mundi*, iv, 16 (I, p. 14).

[25] *De agricultura*, xii, 51 (III, p. 134): "Setting over [this hallowed flock] His true Word and Firstborn Son Who shall take upon Him its government like a viceroy of a great king, for it is said: 'Behold I am: I send my Angel before you to guard you on the way' (Gen. 23:20)." Cf. *Legum Alleg.*, III, lxi, 175 (I, p. 418).

[26] *De vita Mosis*, II, xxv, 127 (VI, p. 510).

[27] See the interpretation of Abraham's vision of the three men as of God and His two "senior" powers (*De Abrahamo*, xxiv, 121 ff., t. VI, p. 62); the explanation of God's knowledge of the tower of Babel (*De confusione linguarum*, xxvii, 134, t. IV, p. 82; xxxiv, 171 ff., pp. 102–106); the six Powers (*De fuga*, xviii, 95 ff., t. V, pp. 60–64).

ever, it is not clear whether Philo thought of these as distinct entities, e.g., as Seraphim, or as aspects or attributes of God. Nevertheless, they somehow become immanent in things, not as formal causes, but as preserving the shapes and qualities of things.[28] They do not act as intermediaries in creation, i.e., as the primary efficient causes, though Philo's doctrine is often thus interpreted. In short, the Logos or Wisdom of God, with the Ideas and the Powers, is simply the instrument through which the world is fashioned, that the arrangement of all might be faultless.[29]

Man and His Destiny. The last of God's creation, its crown, is man, on whom God bestowed a mind most excellent whereby he is the image of his Maker. For the mind in man holds a place like to that which the great Ruler occupies in all the world: it can penetrate all things by knowledge, from the sensible world to substance beyond all sense; it can soar aloft to the intelligible world of the Ideas and, drawn by great longing and desire, there seems to be on its way to the Great King Himself, only to be dazzled by His brightness.[30] Such is man's origin, such his destiny.

In the particulars of his doctrine on the constitution of man and the goal of the soul, Philo once more relies not only on Scripture but also on philosophy. The over-all presentation will show frequent use of Plato's teachings, though many details are transformed or abandoned.

Like all creatures, *man is a composite being.* "God is a Unity since His nature is simple not composite, whereas each of us and of all other created beings is made up of many things. Thus I am many things in one: soul and body; and to soul belong irrational and rational parts, while to body again that which is warm or cold, etc."[31] One immediately discerns doctrines of the *Timaeus* here, and this impression is borne out as Philo elucidates this basic position. Man is the creation of God and of the Powers, as in the *Timaeus* he was the product of the Demiurge and the lesser gods. The body and the irrational soul (which is here also divided into irascible and concupiscible) are the work of the Powers. The rational soul, on the other hand, is the creation of God Himself.[32]

But Philo soon parts company with Plato in his theory of the *creation of the soul.* On the basis of Genesis he distinguishes between the ideal man, i.e., the purely spiritual, created when God said: "Let us make man in our image and likeness" (Gen. 1:26); and the individual man formed of the dust of the ground into whom God breathed the breath of life (Gen. 2:7). The ideal man was created when God formed the intel-

[28] *De specialibus legibus*, I, 47 (VII, p. 124); and 329, p. 290.

[29] "The Logos who is antecedent to all that has come into existence; the word, which the Helmsman of the universe grasps as a rudder to guide all things on their course; and which, when He was fashioning the world, He employed as His instrument, that His handiwork might be without reproach" (*De migratione Abrahami*, ii, 6, t. IV, p. 134).

[30] *De opificio mundi*, xxi–xxiii, 65–71 (I, pp. 50–56).

[31] *Legum Alleg.*, II, i, 2 (I, p. 224).

[32] On the irrational soul, cf. *Legum Alleg.*, III, xxxviii, 114–115 (I, pp. 376–378); Philo at the same time attributes to the irrational soul the vital, nutritive, and sensitive powers (cf. H. A. Wolfson, *op. cit.*, I, p. 389). On the higher soul: *De fuga*, xiii, 69–70 (V, pp. 46–48); *De opificio mundi*, xxiv, 74–75 (I, pp. 58–60).

ligible world on the first day of creation.[33] Later, innumerable imperishable and immortal souls were created and assigned to the air as their abode (not to stars, as in Plato). While all are incorporeal, indivisible, intellectual, possessed of free will, they are not all exactly alike. Some possess earthward tendencies and material tastes, and in due time enter mortal bodies for a time; others, of higher and diviner temper, become what the philosophers (e.g., Socrates) call demons or what Sacred Writ calls angels, and act as the instruments of God's providence to man.[34] Thus "souls and demons and angels are but different names for one and the same underlying object."[35] No reason beyond the will of God is offered for the union of soul and body, which appears somewhat penal in character, since the body is a prison, a grave, the source of evil, misery, and endless calamities.

The destiny of man is described in terms of such doctrine. The soul is but a sojourner on earth, and even here must escape the entanglements of matter to seek union with the divine wisdom, the Logos, and attain a likeness to God.[36] It must with the help of divine grace mount by a series of steps away from matter to the things of the mind.

In this flight Abraham becomes its constant model, since by allegory he is the scholar or learner, who becomes the wise man. As he was called to leave his land and kindred, to go to a land the Lord would show him (cf. Gen. 12:1–3), so the starting point of the soul's salvation is its removal from the body and its desires, from sense knowledge and from outward speech. All of these concern Haran, the land of the senses, which belonged to the Chaldean astrologers. Philo sometimes makes the latter identical with the Stoics, for one must leave their physical philosophy for the higher doctrine of the Ideas.[37] The soul must then come into the new land, the world of reason, the world of the wisdom which God will show it. Here its name too will be changed, to show it is now a student of the upper world of thought.[38]

"In this way, the mind gradually changing its place will arrive at the Father of piety and holiness."[39] For it must next leave itself, the world of reason, and come to the contemplation of Him that Is. Yet it cannot do this unless God show Himself, and lift the soul up into ecstasy. It is then the heir of the things of God. "Who then shall be the heir? (cf. Gen. 15:3 ff.) Not that reasoning which remains in the prison of the body of its own volition, but that which is loosened from those fetters to come to freedom beyond the prison walls and, so to speak, has left behind its own self. . . .

[33] *De opificio mundi*, xlvi, 134–135 (I, p. 106); *Legum Alleg.*, I, xii, 31 (I, p. 166).

[34] *De somniis*, I, xxii, 135–137 (V, pp. 368–370); *De plantatione*, iv, 14 (III, pp. 218–220); while the devil and his cohorts are admitted to exist, Philo apparently gives no adequate explanation of their fall, etc.

[35] *De gigantibus*, iv, 16 (II, p. 452). This doctrine will reappear in Origen.

[36] *De opificio mundi*, l, 144 (I, p. 114).

[37] *De Abrahamo*, xv ff, 68–88 (VI, pp. 38–48); *De migratione Abrahami*, i, 1 ff. (IV, p. 132 ff.); *Quis rerum div. heres*, xx, 96 f. (IV, p. 328 ff.).

[38] *De Abrahamo*, *loc. cit.*; *De mutatione nominum*, ix, 66–67 (V, p. 176). We have already seen the allegorical interpretation given to Agar and Sara, which has its place here also. See also the interpretation of Noe as husbandman (*De agricultura*, passim, t. III, p. 108 ff.).

[39] *De migratione*, xxxv, 194–195 (IV, pp. 244–246).

Therefore, o soul, if you feel any desire to become the heir of the good things of God, leave not only your country, the body, and your kinsfolk, the senses, and your father's house (Gen. 12:1), that is, speech; but flee also from yourself . . . [and] be filled with the frenzy of divine love. For it is this mind . . . stirred to its depths and made mad by heavenly yearning, drawn by Him who truly exists and pulled upward toward Him, with truth to lead the way and remove all obstacles, it is this mind which becomes the inheritor of the good things of God."[40]

We readily discern the influence of Plato (the allegory of the cave, etc.) in this *itinerarium* of the mind to God; yet the doctrine is given a new setting and even a deeper meaning, for Philo sees it must be accompanied by deeper moral virtue and is not accomplished by purely human means.[41] Plotinus will re-emphasize and even more clearly define the steps of this ascent, and from him it will pass to St. Augustine and to Pseudo-Dionysius, to be given a Christian meaning, and so come to the Middle Ages in the School of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure.

Conclusion. *As a philosopher*, Philo is of little importance. An eclectic, he combines all manner of doctrine with his allegorical interpretation of Sacred Scripture. Such an approach does not contribute to the development of philosophy. He is thus not a Hellenistic philosopher with deep interest in religion, but a Jewish theologian who borrows almost at random from current Greek philosophy to aid his allegorizing and his mysticism. One cannot call him (Wolfson to the contrary) the prototype of medieval philosophers, Jewish, Moslem, or Christian.

Yet *he is not without influence*. While he prepares for the doctrine of Neoplatonism, one would be hard put to determine positively the extent of his influence. His importance, rather, lies in the field of religion, especially among the Christian Fathers. Surprisingly, he met with little acceptance on the part of the Jews, owing perhaps to the opposition of the rabbis to the infiltrations of Hellenism. Their traditionalism won the day: there are no Jewish philosophers of any importance until Avicebrol and Moses Maimonides, who do not seem to have known the work of Philo. On the other hand, his influence is felt among the Christian Gnostics, who held with him a double meaning of Scripture, exoteric and esoteric, and especially in the Christian school of Alexandria. Clement and Origen are somewhat influenced by his use of allegory; they cite his interpretation of proper names, symbolism of numbers, and application of Scripture to the moral life of man. Among the Latins, St. Ambrose reveals, in such books as *De Abraham*, *De Isaac et anima*, etc., that he has Christianized the thoughts of Philo.

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[40] *Quis . . . heres*, xiv, 68–70 (IV, p. 316).

[41] Cf. *De posteritate Caini*, xxx, 100–102 (II, pp. 384–386).

CHAPTER XV: Greco-Oriental Philosophy

THE political, religious, and intellectual ferment of the ancient world at the dawn of the Christian era was not without profound influence on human culture in general and on philosophy in particular. It gave birth to mystery cults, new religions, a wave of false oracles, magic, astrology, and produced philosophies or philosophical tendencies which are characterized as Greco-Oriental, since in them are merged Greek philosophy and Oriental religions. Its climax is reached in Neoplatonism, the last stand of intellectual paganism against the doctrines of Christianity.

§ *1. Cultural Movements*

If Hellenism covered the peoples and nations of the East with a veneer of Greek culture, these races in turn exported their cults and superstitions to the West, often through the medium of mercenaries in the Roman army or the Oriental colonies which sprang up in the great cities and ports of the Empire. The latter ethnic groups played no small part in the religious evolution of the Roman world, and helped to fulfill the desire for personal religion not satisfied by the official cult of the Roman State.[1]

Details of this movement, of course, lie beyond the scope of our history. Yet, since this religious ferment gave new direction and spirit to philosophy, which is never completely divorced from the general culture of an age, its influence must be assayed. This manifested itself primarily in the religious coloring given to philosophy, since the latter now offered to men a way of transcending the humdrum of daily life and of achieving union with something or someone divine. Some instances of this we have already witnessed; e.g., the quasi-popular position of Stoicism in the Roman world and, in a less extended sphere of influence, the teachings of Philo.

Gnosticism. Though it took various forms, pagan, Jewish, and Christian, gnosticism always claimed for itself a special knowledge (*γνῶσις*) or divine revelation which would lead its initiates to the vision of God. This esoteric doctrine usually provided (or promised) knowledge of God and of salvation; it taught the soul how to rise above matter, which was invariably conceived as evil; how to pass through intermediaries and come to the spiritual world, often to the accompaniment of magical formulae and rites (theurgism). Though gnosticism might seem externally akin to Plato's catharsis and ascent (because the gnostics borrowed from Greek philosophy), it was actually at odds with Greek thought. The Greek delighted in this world, the gnostic tried to escape it; the Greek rose above matter by his intellect and soul, the gnostic considered the soul as part of the baseness of this world; for the Greek, God was part of His world, whereas the gnostic found constant opposition between the world and God.[2]

Pagan Gnosticism is well represented by the Hermetic books. Fabricated during the early Christian centuries, probably at Alexandria, they pretended to be channels of ancient Egyptian lore on the Great Toth now called Hermes Trismegistos;[3] the pri-

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[1] Cf. Bibliography, p. 234.

[2] Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads*, II, ix, 16, against the gnostics.

[3] Cf. G. R. S. Mead, *Thrice Greatest Hermes* (New York, 1906). Selections in G. H. Clark, *Selections From Hellenistic Philosophy* (New York, 1940).

mary source, in reality, seems to be Posidonius the Stoic. To their readers they revealed a whole system of gods, cosmogony, ethics, and mysticism. Closely allied to them is Neopythagoreanism (*infra*).

Simon Magus is a well-known *Jewish gnostic*. Despite his Christian baptism and seeming repentance after the rebuke of St. Peter (Acts 8:9–24), he became once more the leader, hero, and god of his own sect. That he was not unique among the Jews is evident from the writings of the Apostles and the early Fathers. *Christian gnosticism*, on the other hand, was a very widespread movement which became critical in the middle of the second century; but it belongs to the history of the Church.[4]

Neopythagoreanism. In the first century before Christ the Pythagorean School experienced a revival, though it was more properly a religious than a philosophical movement. Though temporary in character, its influence touched many of the social and intellectual elite. In Rome itself, it possessed a kind of church in the Basilica of the Porta Maior, and left its mark on the Fourth Eclogue of Vergil.

On the authority of Cicero, P. Nigidius Figulus is considered the inceptor of this revival. Its wonder-worker and prophet was Apollonius of Tyana (d. c. a.d. 96), more a charletan than a philosopher.[5] Nicomachus of Gerasa in Arabia (fl. c. a.d. 140) authored an arithmetic (Ἀριθμητικὴ εἰσαγωγή) in which he propagated a numerical interpretation of the Platonic Ideas and a cosmogony; it was translated and adapted by Boethius, and used in the School of Chartres (twelfth century).

The link between Neoplatonism and preceding thought is shown in the syncretism of Numenius of Apameia in Syria (c. a.d. 150). Combining Greek, Jewish, Egyptian, Indian, and even Christian thought, he arrived at a theory of three gods. The highest and first is pure thought (νοῦς) and the principle of all being; from him emanates by participation the second, the demiurge, who looks at the Ideas contained in the first god and shapes the third god, the world.[6] This metaphysics is followed, in what fragments remain, by a psychology that sees the body as evil, and an ethics that teaches the soul how to rise above its prison. Numenius thus remotely prepares for the theories of Plotinus.

Middle Platonists. Though numbered usually in the foregoing group, Numenius held Plato in the highest regard, and is close to those eclectics who form Middle Platonism. They blended Pythagorean tradition with Platonic and Stoic elements, and at the same time were rather anti-Aristotelian.

Chief among them was Plutarch of Chaironea (c. a.d. 50–125), author of the *Lives* of famous Greeks and Romans. After him are Celsus and Maxim of Tyre (both c. 180). The former was a determined opponent of Christianity whose *True Discourse* was answered decades later (c. 248) in great detail by Origen. The doctrines common to this group find place in Neoplatonism: the supertranscendency of God, resultant opposition of God and the world, excessive dualism or contrast between matter and spirit, multiplication of intermediaries between God and the world (demons or subordinate gods), individual inspiration or revelation, mysticism, ecstasy, etc.[7]

Conclusion. These men and movements are indicative of the temper and outlook of their age, but are not important save as a transition to the last great revival of Greek philosophy, Neoplatonism.

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[4] Cf. J. Lebreton-J. Zeiller, *The History of the Primitive Church*, tr. by E. Messenger, 2 vols. (New York, 1949), II, pp. 617–653; G. Bareille, art. "Gnosticisme," *DTC*, VI, cols. 1434–1467.

[5] His later reputation as a messias rests more on fiction than on fact. Second-century references make him more of a magician, and it was not until Philostratus composed a biography at the request of the Syrian wife of the emperor Septimus Severus, more a literary composition than a historical document, that his reputation was improved.

[6] Cf. E. Bevan, *Later Greek Religion*, pp. 148–151.

[7] See sample texts in E. Bevan, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–147.

§ 2. *Plotinus*

Neoplatonism became the last fight of intellectual paganism against Christianity. Founded by AMMONIUS SACCAS (c. 175–242), of whom little is known, it was brought to perfection by his pupil Plotinus. In its later developments it produced in Porphyry the bitterest opponent of the Christians and in Proclus its greatest synthesizer. It flourished until the sixth century.

Life of Plotinus (203–269).* Ammonius had long been teaching in Alexandria before Plotinus arrived about 233. Among his earlier pupils had been at least one Christian, the famous Origen, on whom perhaps he had left his mark. Plotinus, from Lycon or perhaps Lykopolis (in Egypt), attended the lectures for eleven years. Then, on the death of Ammonius, he joined an expedition of the emperor Gordian, that in the East he might study the philosophies of Persia and India. When the expedition ended in disaster, Plotinus escaped to Antioch and thence to Rome, at the age of forty.

In Rome he opened a school after some time, began to write, and acted as a spiritual guide for many distinguished Romans. Even the emperor Gallienus (253–268) and his wife came under his influence. When Porphyry came to Rome in 263, he attached himself to the group, and became the editor and later the biographer of his master. From him we gather that Plotinus seems to have considered himself the destined champion of Hellenism against the growing force of the Christian Church. His immediate adversaries, it is true, were gnostics (against whom he wrote a treatise in the *Enneads*), yet his opposition is more against the fundamentally Christian and anti-Hellenic character of their teachings than against their gnostic mythology. To them he contrasted his own secrets on the world, its unity and origin, the First Principle and its attainment.[8]

Sources. Besides the *Life* of Plotinus, which he composed about A.D. 300, Porphyry edited the master's simple lectures and notes (on which he had sometimes collaborated) in a series of six books of nine chapters each. These he called *The Nines* or *Enneads.*[9] One should not expect to find herein a systematic treatise of Plotinus' doctrine: while there is a vague progression from the meaning of man to that of the First Principle, the work revolves rather around a few central ideas to which Plotinus ever returned. The lack of order is explained likewise by his methods of teaching. In place of formal lectures, he often began by having someone read a passage of Plato or Aristotle, and then launched into a commentary interwoven with his own key principles; or else, at times, the session consisted merely in answering questions. He made no attempt at style, and because of poor eyesight never revised the sections he gave or sent to Porphyry. His work, therefore, does not make for easy reading or study.

The *Enneads* are intended to provide a map of the intelligible world to which man can ascend as from the cave of Plato and escape the trials of earthly existence,[10] a vast speculative system showing how man and the world are linked with God, a religious philosophy that combined classical Greek speculation with the Oriental tendency to mystical union. For Plotinus, philosophy was indeed to be a guide for life, a means of self-purgation and elevation to

* Cf. Bibliography, p. 234.

[8] This interpretation is rejected by P. Henry, noted student of Plotinus, who attributes the title to Porphyry but considers the actual opponents involved to be rival Platonists (*Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 59 [1932], 799).

[9] We have used the edition of F. Creuzer-H. Moser, *Plotini Enneades* (Paris, 1896). A new critical edition is being published by Fr. P. Henry. See Bibliography, pp. 234–235, for other editions and studies.

[10] *Enneads*, IV, viii, 1 and 3.

contemplation. A form of religion, it was for some of its adherents a substitute for Christianity, particularly if with Plotinus they considered the Christian teachings devoid of intellectual appeal; while for others, e.g., St. Augustine, it was a bridge to Christianity.

That Plotinus should cite the allegory of the cave is indicative of his use of Plato as a starting point and foundation. St. Augustine was to remark that in Plotinus Plato lived again, so close was his resemblance.[11] At the same time, the *Corpus Aristotelicum* provides method and doctrine, while the Stoa, Plutarch, and others make some contribution. Despite opposition on fundamentals, Numenius likewise is laid under tribute. The result, however, is not mere eclecticism but the best metaphysics of fast-dying pagan philosophy.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS

The Dialectic. The system of Plotinus rests on the *initial intuition* that the macrocosm (what we would call the objective world) corresponds to the microcosm of man; particularly, that the divine in man images the divine in the universe. "Such things as a soul of this kind possesses here, these things are also there [in the intelligible world]."[12] By examining man, or rather the soul, and by "transferring these very same things to the universe,"[13] one comes to the spiritual world. Yet not every soul can do this, for it must be of kindred nature with the universe to seek and find the principles of all things.[14] Some men are forever rooted in sense objects (Plato would say they are bound in the cave); others move a little higher, yet are not capable of the vision of the things above; only the race of divine men can attain it, men disposed by nature to love the beautiful and to be from the beginning true philosophers. For such a man will fly from beauty of body to that of soul and thence to the cause of what is beautiful in the soul, and come at last to what is first and beautiful of itself.[15]

To what will his *dialectic* lead him? He will know that beauty in body is changeable and derived from the soul; beauty of soul in turn is derived from wisdom bestowed on soul by intellect; and intellect in turn points to something beyond itself, the most divine part of soul.[16] He will then transfer this to the universe and discover that, besides body or the world, it embraces three divine principles: Soul, Mind (Νοῦς), and that beyond Mind which is the principle of all, the One. This flight from matter, this ascent to the divine, as we may suspect, is no mere dialectic of human thought. It is to lead to the goal of life: to become godlike as Plato said,[17] to become united with each succeeding divinity until the climax is reached not in vision but in union with the One: it is "the flight of the alone to the alone."[18]

The Three Ruling Hypostases. Plotinus sometimes calls the pursuit of the divine an ascent upward; elsewhere, a circular movement ever coming closer to the center of all; or else, to combine the two images, it is a spiral ascent ever moving toward the center of the flow of being, until it touches the fountain of life, the principle of being, the One.

Invariably the movement starts with the soul withdrawing from the body and the senses, contemplating itself, and thus

[11] *Contra Academicos*, III, 18.
[12] *Enneads*, V, ix, 13.
[13] *Ibid.*, 3.
[14] *Ibid.*, i, 1.
[15] *Ibid.*, ix, 1–2.
[16] *Ibid.*, and V, viii, 9.
[17] *Ibid.*, II, ii, 1.
[18] *Ibid.*, VI, ix, 11.

coming to the great soul, the *World-Soul.*[19] Since our soul not only is of the same kind as the World-Soul, but also has proceeded from the great Soul and while remaining itself is never completely separate from its source,[20] to study our soul is to know the Psyché of the world. But our soul is one nature with many powers: one part always abides on high in the intelligible world, another is concerned with sensibles, while in the middle is the reasoning part.[21] The Psyché has, so to speak, corresponding parts: the highest always dwells near its father, the Nous, which illuminates and fills it; its lower part engages in the activity of producing, fashioning, forming, and arranging all things in this sensible world, and of governing it (without being attached to it as our soul is to body);[22] whilst its inner life consists in contemplation within itself, in awareness of what it has received from the *Nous* and of what therefore it will impart to the world.[23]

But the Soul is not sufficient to itself; as the human soul is beautiful only by the wisdom it has received from the intellect, so the Soul depends on something higher, the *Nous*, its source and father. For, in spite of its own excellence, "Soul is but an image of Intelligence, as the spoken word is the image of the interior word of the soul."[24] Therefore, from this world with its order and unity we must rise to its archetype, the world of the intelligibles, over which presides pure Intelligence. The *Nous* is thus the intellectual world of Ideas, the *κόσμος νοητός*, the realm of being. It embraces all things in complete unity, in unchanging identity, in fullness and trueness of being: for it gave them being by thinking them.[25] Like the Soul, the *Nous* lives in a threefold contemplation: of that which is above it, of that which is proper to it (the Ideas), and of that which proceeds from it (the Psyché and the reflections of the Ideas, which through the Soul will enter the world to shape the latter).[26]

But why, asks Plotinus, must there be something above Intelligence? Why cannot we assert that the intelligible world is the supreme nature and principle? Because, he says repeatedly,[27] the supreme principle must be truly *One* and simple, whereas the *Nous* contains multiplicity even in its unity: it contains thought and being, the object of thought. Therefore, there must exist something else which makes Intelligence think and Being be, and is the cause of both. Something absolutely simple is, therefore, the ultimate hypostasis. "Above all things there must be Something simple and different from all the rest, something which exists in itself and which, without ever mingling with anything else, nevertheless presides over everything: something really One (*ὄντως ἕν*) . . . a principle unattainable by science or pure thought because it is superior to being itself."[28]

It is not surprising that it is difficult to say what the One is, or that we are

[19] *Ibid.*, V, i, 2.
[20] *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 5; III, v, 4.
[21] *Ibid.*, II, ix, 2.
[22] *Ibid.*, ix, 7. Plotinus supposes also a more proximate world-soul, which he calls the *Physis* (*ibid.*, II, iii, 17; III, viii, 1–3).
[23] *Ibid.*, III, viii, 3–4.
[24] *Ibid.*, V, iii, 3.

[25] *Ibid.*, 4; ix, 8–9.
[26] *Ibid.*, VI, ix, 3.
[27] *Ibid.*, V, ix, 14; III, viii, 8; V, i, 4.
[28] *Ibid.*, V, iv, 1.

forced to use negative terms in speaking of it. It is beyond all determination, beyond all that implies duality, being, thought, act; for it is pure identity and unity.[29] Its name is permanence;[30] yet it is also pure activity, for it makes itself;[31] and has knowledge of itself by an intuition that is less a thought than a contact or nod, a super-thought,[32] whereby it lives for itself. More positively, it is luminous Light unto itself;[33] it is Love itself, love of itself;[34] and it is the Good, if taken as its very nature.[35] Above all, it is Will producing itself, ruling itself as it chooses.[36]

The Many From the One. The One is the First Principle, "the fountain of life, the source of Intelligence, the origin of Being, the cause of the good, the root of the Soul."[37] All these proceed from the One without diminishing or changing it; and because its giving is eternal, they always were and will be begotten.[38] But the One engenders without deliberation, inclination, volition, or any kind of movement;[39] of necessity, therefore, yet with total and absolute freedom.[40]

If the One is "the power which begets the things that are while remaining in itself, suffering no diminution, nor passing into the things to which it gives birth,"[41] we cannot conclude that this is dynamic pantheism, as some have called it. Nor is it strictly an emanationism: since the One does not give of its substance, nothing truly emanates from within it. "It is principle, yet remains in invariable sameness and does not divide itself."[42] To explain the process (if we can explain it), we must fall back on the analogies of Plotinus: "imagine a spring which has no further source, which pours itself into all rivers, yet is not exhausted by them but remains in itself ever undisturbed";[43] or the metaphor he prefers: "it must be conceived as . . . the light which surrounds the sun and is perpetually generated by it."[44]

The One therefore must generate. Indeed, all things as long as they exist must produce out of their very substance and power some further hypostasis around about them which will be the image of that out of which it grew. Thus fire radiates heat, snow spreads cold, perfume diffuses its scent: for whatever has arrived at its point of perfection begets something. Within the sphere of the divine, of the One, the Nous, and the Psyché, not only is this a necessary process; it is also eternal, for what is eternally perfect is eternally productive, and what it produces is likewise eternal.[45] The One, moreover, must generate the Intelligence. From the One must come the

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[29] *πρώτως αὐτὸς καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός* (*ibid.*, VI, viii, 14).

[30] *μονὴ ἐν αὐτῷ* (*ibid.*, 16).

[31] *ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτόν* (*ibid.*, 15).

[32] *Ibid.*, 16.

[33] *Ibid.*, V, v, 7.

[34] *ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὑτοῦ ἔρως* (*ibid.*, VI, viii, 15).

[35] *Ibid.*, II, ix, 1; VI, viii, 38.

[36] *Ibid.*, VI, viii, 15–16.

[37] *Ibid.*, ix, 9.

[38] *Ibid.*, x; II, ix, 3; V, i, 6.

[39] *Ibid.*, V, i, 6.

[40] On the problem here, cf. P. Henry, "Le probleme de la liberté chez Plotin," *Revue néoscolastique*, 33 (1931), 50–79, 180–215, 318–339; and C. P. Gorman, "Freedom in the God of Plotinus," *New Scholasticism*, XIV (1940), 379–405.

[41] *Enneads*, VI, ix, 5.

[42] *Ibid.*, 9.

[43] *Ibid.*, III, viii, 9.

[44] *Ibid.*, V, i, 6; iii, 12.

[45] *Ibid.*, i, 6; IV, viii, 6.

Dyad, a duality that is nevertheless a certain unity. But it is in knowledge or intelligence that knower and known are distinct yet one; Intelligence then is the first begotten.[46]

How does the One produce the Nous, since it is not Intelligence? This question is usually dismissed with the simple statement that of its superabundance the One radiates light around about, and this light as conscious of its origin from the One knows itself and is the Nous; therefore, that it is this exuberance or radiation that begets the second hypostasis.[47] There is, however, a deeper and finer answer based on the inner life of the One, which makes the Nous *the actualization* or full realization in knowledge *of the simple intuition* which the One has of itself. The One, the first hypostasis, cannot be characterized, as we have seen, as something nonliving or totally devoid of spiritual activity.[48] It does not indeed have knowledge, since this implies duality, need, desire, dependence;[49] it does not look at itself,[50] yet it has "contact" with itself,[51] which is somehow simple.

In his care to avoid anything that would imply duality in the One, Plotinus finds himself struggling for words to describe this self-vision of the One: it is a quasi awareness, a kind of looking at itself, a nod toward itself, something that is both action and rest in itself, a love of self that is pure unity, a superthought. Whatever this act is, it surpasses being, intelligence, and life. Yet *this act is their source, and none other.*[52] In brief, somehow, "by a turning toward itself the One has vision: and this vision constitutes the Nous."[53] When this vision becomes so actualized as to include the duality of knower and known, it is the Nous.[54]

The Nous is conscious that it is the product of the One, since it looks upward to the One and sees that it has come from it yet is not wholly separate from it; it sees what power it has from the One, and thinking that power thinks itself and the Ideas; then, in turn, of its fullness and perfection it necessarily generates the third and lower hypostasis, which by analogy or parallel to man is called the Soul. It cannot be another Nous, for it is not the simple Dyad but Number and the more immediate principle of multiplicity in this world. As the image of Nous, it must be inferior and is therefore a kind of Logos, since it is the hypostasis of discursive reason.[55] Again, as Psyché or Logos participates in Nous, though to a lesser extent, it contains the Ideas, not in their purely intelligible state but as reflections. These are the seminal reasons, *λόγοι σπερματικοί,* to be passed on to the Physis or lower world-soul and implanted in matter to produce things.[56]

"This is the extent of the divine things."[57]

Below the Divine. The hierarchy of necessary beings continues below the divine until the multitude of individuals is reached.[58] The Psyché must put forth, as it were, the souls of men, generate the world-soul (*Physis*) and through it implant the seminal reasons in matter. Not every point of doctrine here is too clear,

[46] *Ibid.,* V, i, 6–7.
[47] *Ibid.,* ii, 1.
[48] *Ibid.,* VI, viii, 15.
[49] *Ibid.,* VI, vii, 40.
[50] *Ibid.,* 41.
[51] *Ibid.,* 39.
[52] *ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ οὐ παρ ἀλλοῦ* (*ibid.,* VI, viii, 16).
[53] *Ibid.,* VI, i, 7.
[54] *Ibid.,* III, viii, 10.
[55] *Ibid.,* VI, i, 5–7.
[56] *Ibid.,* II, iii, 17; IV, iii, 10.
[57] *Ibid.,* V, i, 7.
[58] *Ibid.,* IV, viii, 3.

perhaps because Plotinus does not admit that being is found in the sense world, and, as a result, views it as unintelligible.[59]

It is proper, or even necessary, Plotinus says, to begin with the relation of the Psyché to *the world of matter*, to explain its entrance into matter and the animation of the latter. There never was a time, of course, when the universe was not animated or matter unadorned; yet by thought and word we may separate the various steps. Thus we may suppose the body had existence before the Soul could go forth into it; if the Soul is to proceed, however, it will make a place for itself and so will generate the body. This seeming paradox implies that as the Soul was being generated by the Nous, a darkness was meanwhile generated in the extremities of light; when the Soul, having attained its own existence, beheld this darkness, it gave form to it and made it body or world. Yet the Psyché is not so united to the world as to be contained in it; rather it contains the world, and governs and cares for it, and presides over it as from on high.[60] The Physis or proximate world-soul, however, would enter into the world to form and vivify it.[61]

Matter is thus darkness, the lack of light, life, intelligence, and indeed of all things; it is poverty itself and privation. It has no real existence in itself (though actually it never exists apart from form); it is prior to body, and has no magnitude. Deservedly called nonbeing (μὴ ὄν), it is evil, the first evil, and the cause of evil in the world and in the soul of man.[62] As the source of evil, which must exist in the world since matter is necessary, it cannot come from the god (!) as a positive emanation, or have anything in it of the One.[63] Yet if there is a First, there must be a last: the darkness beyond the last procession, the antithesis of the One, τὸ βάθος.

Now, whether matter be assumed to have existed always or is considered generated as the necessary sequence of higher causes,[64] it cannot be left to itself, but must be given a share of the Good to the extent of which it is capable. Therefore, Soul will give it form and infuse into it the seminal reasons, and in union with matter will effect things and living beings. Thus will the material world be illuminated by the intelligible world and reflect it.[65]

In the *microcosm of man*, which will parallel the world-process, the soul stands midway between the divine and the material. It is an issue from the Psyché and yet somehow is not separate from it since it partakes of its nature. We may argue that this seems to imply that all men have the same soul, yet at the same time this shows that the "separation" into individual souls is through bodies. But unless all souls were one, there would be no universe or one principle of souls.[66] As a "part" of the Psyché, our soul reflects its source: her highest part is directed to the Nous and is itself a participated intelligence; her lower part is directed to what is inferior, the body, to order, animate, and govern it; her inner part, directed toward herself, preserves herself.[67]

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[59] *Ibid.*, V, ix, 5–7.
[60] *Ibid.*, IV, iii, 9.
[61] *Ibid.*, III, viii, 3.
[62] *Ibid.*, II, iv; 1, viii, 4 and 14.
[63] *Ibid.*, I, viii, 7.
[64] *Ibid.*, IV, viii, 6. This indicates Plotinus' uncertainty.
[65] *Ibid.*, III, vi, 13–14; IV, iii, 10–11.
[66] *Ibid.*, IV, ix, 1–4; ii, 1–2.
[67] *Ibid.*, viii, 3 and 7.

If the soul must descend to matter, to give it form, quantity, and life, and so produce man, the *union* is both natural and necessary, though the soul is defiled by its contact with matter. The union, moreover, is more intimate than that of Psyché to Cosmos, because Soul rules the world whereas our soul is bound to the body like a fetter,[68] and can be plunged so deeply into body as to lose sight of its union with Psyché.[69] But the union is not substantial, and the soul is not entelechy,[70] since that would imply inseparability. Rather, the body is united to the soul as an instrument to a workman: for the soul is primarily the man.[71] In sensation, as a result, it is the soul that feels, not the composite; the body is but the tool, undergoing the experience and serving as messenger to the soul; the latter perceives the impression produced on the body or through the body, or at least passes judgment on the experience of the body: only thus would sensation be called the common action of soul and body.[72]

The Alone to the Alone. Bound to the body only through its lower part, inseparable from Psyché in its higher part, the soul is torn by two loves, one of which tries to drag it down to the body, the other to raise it up to its origins.[73] But its goal is above, not below: to belong to the Psyché and with it pursue union with the Nous, and with the Nous to approach the One, to rotate around the One, so to speak, as light dances around the sun. Plato rightly declared[74] that our goal is to be like God. This, he said, demands a flight from the things of earth, a flight that begins from the darkness of matter and ends in the light of the One.[75] Under the impetus therefore of that Eros or love which would lead her upward, the soul must undertake a purification to free herself from the dominion of the body and sense knowledge. She can then take the first step of conversion, the practice of the "political" virtues (the four cardinal virtues) which will govern and moderate her desires.[76] But her endeavor and desire is not to be without sin, but to be a god.[77] Therefore the soul must go higher, or more correctly it must retire within itself, and so be united to the Psyché. This it does by concentrating on rational knowledge, philosophy, and science.[78] But with Psyché it must seek the Nous, and through the intellect within the soul[79] ascend to the intelligible world, to purely intelligible knowledge of spiritual objects.

To live in union with Nous is indeed a happy life,[80] since the Nous is the God *par excellence* of Plotinus. For what is better than a most wise, holy, and unerring life? What more excellent than an intellect possessing all things, all life?

[68] *Ibid.*, II, ix, 7.
[69] *Ibid.*, IV, viii, 7–8. Cf. G. Carriere, "Man's Downfall in the Philosophy of Plotinus," *New Scholasticism*, XXIV (1950), 284–308.
[70] *Ibid.*, ii, 1.
[71] *Ibid.*, vii, 1.
[72] *Ibid.*, iii, 26.
[73] *Ibid.*, III, v, 4.
[74] *Theaetetus*, 176B.
[75] Cf. G. Carriere, "Plotinus' Quest of Happiness," *The Thomist*, XIV (1951), 217–237.
[76] *Enneads*, I, ii, 4–5.
[77] *Ibid.*, 6.
[78] *Ibid.*, V, i, 10–11.
[79] This intellect, Plotinus explains (V, iii, 3), does not belong to the soul, and yet it is our intellect, being different from the power of discursive reasoning. At the same time, we must not enumerate it among the powers of the soul. Hence it is ours and yet not ours; we use it and do not use it, though we always employ the dianoetic power. It is ours when we use it, not ours when we do not use it. This is Plotinus' solution of the Peripatetic distinction of nous and psyche, a step toward the doctrine of the Arabians.
[80] *Enneads*, I, iv, 4.

And these are in the Nous. Yet the Nous itself looks higher, to the cause whence it derives its very Being. This likewise is the true end of the soul, to come in contact with the One.[81] Let her not expect, however, to reach the One by reasoning or by knowledge, but by leaving all things,[82] and by being drawn upward by light from the One. Then shall the most divine part of the soul,[83] which is above the intellect (Plotinus does not specify this further), touch the presence of the One, come to union (ἕνωσις) with it and dance around that center of all a truly divine dance.[84] Yet let her not expect to abide in that union or reach it frequently! Plotinus reached it but four times, and Porphyry only once.[85] It is the life of the gods and of godly and happy men, for it is free from all trammels of earth and human pleasures. *It is the flight of the alone to the alone.*[86]

SUMMARY

Plato Redivivus. Plato relives in Plotinus in a new and original synthesis. What Plotinus owed to his more immediate predecessors is a matter of dispute; but his debt to Plato, and to some extent to Aristotle also and the Stoics, is beyond doubt. He professed to find in Plato the three levels of being,[87] the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world,[88] the flight from matter, catharsis, the virtues, and the goal of the soul.[89] All these with many original intuitions are woven into a deep and lofty religious philosophy endowed with a feeling for the divine and the things of the spirit, and free from the aberrations of the Neopythagoreans and other earlier religious philosophers or of Plotinus' own successors.

We may understand therefore the appeal this revised Platonism had for many Christian thinkers (though their knowledge of it was often indirect).[90] Its concept of the immaterial, the spiritual, the intelligible, was to free St. Augustinc from the materialism of the Manichaeans, while its language, method, and approach became the vehicle of his more positive philosophical thought. It was to influence deeply the Christian mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius through the works of Proclus, and so leave its imprint on Christian spirituality.[91] In our own day, Henri Bergson (1859–1941) was to find in Plotinus an antidote against the scientism and materialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Inherent Weaknesses. It is too readily apparent that the over-all structure of Plotinus is intrinsically weak. Though he is a genuinely speculative philosopher, his metaphysics rests on intuition more than on reasoning. It is vitiated by the fundamental error of putting the One beyond being, so that being is no longer the first principle but "the first-born,"[92] we might almost say, of highest Nonbeing. It is permeated likewise with a necessitarianism which, though Plotinus believed the contrary, should logically destroy human liberty; a naturalism which sees the soul as possessed of the inherent capacity for its own redemption and ascent to the One; an intellectualism that considers the only function worthy of man to lie in acts of the intellect; an individualism that neglects the social character both of human nature and of virtue.

[81] *Ibid.*, V, iii, 17.
[82] *Ibid.*
[83] *Ibid.*, V, iii, 9.
[84] *Ibid.*, VI, ix, 8.
[85] *Vita*, xxiii.
[86] φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον. *Enneads*, VI, ix, 11. We cannot neglect the fact that Plotinus often speaks of this as a flight within rather than upward, as though to imply that at her very center the soul will find the One (cf. III, iv, 5; VI, viii, 18). St. Augustine will make a Christian use of this doctrine.
[87] *Enneads*, V, i, 8.
[88] *Ibid.*, ix, 9.
[89] *Ibid.*, I, ii, 1; I, viii, 6.
[90] If the *Enneads* were translated into Latin before the period of the Renaissance (e.g., perhaps by Marius Victorinus), the work has not been found.
[91] Cf. H. F. Müller, *Dionysios, Proklos, Plotinos* (*Beiträge*, XX, 3–4; Münster, 1918).
[92] *Enneads*, V, ii, 1.

§ 3. *Neoplatonic Schools*

The school of Plotinus lasted in various forms among the pagans until the sixth century, remaining at Athens until 529 when the emperor Justinian banished the philosophers and confiscated the Academy. This movement, as we have stressed, represented the final stage of purely Greek (or Hellenic) thought, the last stand of intellectual paganism. At the same time, it was influential among Christians, for contemporaries were forced to answer its attacks, while later Christian philosophers were directly or indirectly affected by some of its literary productions.

Immediate Disciples of Plotinus. AMELIUS, an Etruscan, had joined Plotinus in Rome in 246, becoming before Porphyry the scribe and then the expositor of his master and finally an independent writer. He prepared for the later Neoplatonists by his tendency to multiply hypostases by dividing the Nous; against Plotinus, he held to the unity of all souls in the Psyché.

More important was PORPHYRY OF TYRE (A.D. 232–c. 301), who besides his work for Plotinus wrote independently on many subjects. Probably at least a Christian catechumen before he left Asia Minor, he soon showed himself more interested in religious philosophy, Pythagorean asceticism, the problems of religion, culture, and history, and ended by composing (after the death of Plotinus) a treatise in fifteen books *Against the Christians*.[93] In philosophy he is celebrated for his *Isagoge* or Introduction to the *Categories* of the CA, two commentaries on the same work (one no longer extant), a summary of Plotinus' philosophy, commentaries on Plato, a work on the agreement of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies. The *Isagoge* soon became an indispensable manual to understand the *Organon*. It was translated into many languages and became the subject of numerous commentaries. Thus within a few years after Porphyry's death it was Latinized by Marius Victorinus, and again later by Boethius, who wrote a commentary on it. In general, it was responsible for establishing the place of Aristotle among the Neoplatonists and making the *Organon* the authority in logic.

The School of Jamblichus. Porphyry had shown himself fanatic and somewhat absurd in his religious outlook. This was continued by the Syrian school of Neoplatonism founded by JAMBLICHUS OF CHALKIS (d. c. 330). Influenced by Pythagoreanism, he multiplied the members of the hierarchy of being, to make them correspond to popular religious deities, and emphasized occultism and theurgy (i.e., the magic power of rites and formularies). At the same time, he authored commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, a *Protrepticus* to philosophy, etc. His pupil AEDESIUS founded the school of Pergamos, which was characterized by its interest in the restoration of polytheism. To it belonged Maximus, tutor of the emperor Julian. Thus weaned away from what little Christianity he knew, Julian (known a bit unjustly as the Apostate) showed a fanatical hatred of Christianity and a zeal for polytheism, setting up Jamblichus' deities as the State religion (361–363).

The Athenian School. At the end of the fourth century the successors of Plato in the Academy became Neoplatonists of the Jamblichan school. The early members, e.g., Plutarch and Syrianus, showed interest in Aristotle as well as Plato, not to harmonize them but to show their differences. The most important figure is that of PROCLUS (410–485), though we cannot pass over SIMPLICIUS, who wrote several commentaries on Aristotle, to stress the perfect agreement with Plato.

Considered the greatest successor of Plotinus, Proclus is best known for his *Institutio* or *Elementatio theologica* (Στοιχείωσις θεολογική).[94] He also wrote

[93] For a study of this work cf. L. Vaganay, art. "Porphyre," *DTC*, XII, cols. 2555–2590.

[94] The *Elementatio* is edited with *Plotini Enneades* (Paris, 1896); the medieval transla-

commentaries on Plato, treatises on Providence, an *In theologiam Platonis, De malorum subsistentia*, etc. Though the *Elementatio* was not translated into Latin until the late thirteenth century, it had considerable influence on earlier Scholasticism through the *Liber de causis*, which presented its main theses and doctrines (*infra*). In this work Proclus gave Neoplatonism its definitive form; there is no original contribution after him. Deeply versed in Plato, Aristotle, and the whole preceding current of Neoplatonism, he endeavored to combine all these elements into a complete synthesis on the basis of the triadic principles of Plotinus, of the procession of beings from the One.

Since each emanation or procession takes place by means of a likeness of what proceeds to its source, three steps are involved: in the first, the product remains in its source through its likeness; then, through its unlikeness it achieves its own existence; and lastly, since every being that proceeds has a desire for the Good, there is a return to its original principle, so that the whole procession is a circular process.[95] On such a premise Proclus concludes that the first emanation from the One is not the Nous, but what he calls the Units or Henades (ἑνάδες), the multiplicity of unity, a closer image of the One than is the Nous. (He is here correcting Jamblichus, who had contrived a One above that of Plotinus.) From the Henades proceeds the Nous, the sphere of which is considered by the same premise as possessed of a threefold division, as is also that of the Psyché. In keeping with Jamblichus and his own likings, Proclus identifies the various results with the hierarchy of gods. Unlike Plotinus he does not consider matter as evil, since it was created by God as necessary for the world. Finally, in the human soul he posits in addition to the traditional powers a "one" whereby the soul may reach ecstatic union with the One; this is perhaps the beginning of the doctrine of the *apex mentis* of the Scholastics.

The Alexandrian School. Contemporary with Proclus and the later Athenian school, the Neoplatonists of Alexandria abandoned the exaggerations of Jamblichus and the Athenians, to give themselves to the sober study of Plato and Aristotle. Though HYPATIA, the first woman philosopher, was murdered by fanatical Christians in 415, the school gradually lost its specifically pagan character and found common ground with the contemporary Christian school. Indeed, more than one member was a Monophysite Christian by birth or at least by conversion. Among the latter was JOHN PHILOPONUS, who with Asclepius, Olympiodorus, Elias, and David wrote a series of important commentaries on the *CA*, besides independent works on philosophy and theology.

Christian Neoplatonists. Finally, without anticipating the history of Christian philosophy, we may mention in passing that not a few of the Eastern Fathers show the influence of Neoplatonism, sometimes, as in Pseudo-Dionysius, going so far as to make it the vehicle of Christian thought.[96] In the West, somewhat contemporary with St. Augustine (d. 431), there were scattered Platonists who influenced the early Middle Ages and indirectly at least the great Scholastics.

Conclusion. As a *philosophy* all Neoplatonism suffers from the basic weaknesses found in Plotinus. Indeed, the later Neoplatonists multiplied difficulties as they multiplied their emanations. As a *religion* the movement never attained popular proportions, for both extrinsic and intrinsic reasons. The political situation and the growth and power of Christianity blocked its way. In addition, as

tion of William of Moerbeke is edited (not critically) by C. Vansteenkiste, *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, 13 (1951), 263–302, 491–532. For further details, see Bibliography, p. 235.

[95] *Elementatio*, 29–31.

[96] Cf. R. Arnou, art., "Platonisme des pères," *DTC*, XII, cols. 2258–2292.

St. Augustine points out,[97] Neoplatonism lacked what Christianity was able to offer mankind: the living example of its Founder and disciples, the means (and not just the promise) of inner peace, a doctrine intelligible and attractive to all and not to a small elite, and a spirit of love and brotherhood totally lacking in the intellectualism and individualism of the *Enneads* and Proclus.

GENERAL CONCLUSION TO GREEK PHILOSOPHY

A Retrospect. All men by nature desire to know. Some pursue this search for knowledge to greater depths than others, taking wisdom as the goal of their endeavors. This we have found to be true of Greek philosophy: from the early Ionians to the Neoplatonists, it was a long quest for wisdom. It was by no means a homogeneous quest, nor was it always marked by success and steady advance.

Greek philosophy began when men abandoned mythological tradition to make the data of experience the starting point of their thought. In wonder they sought the meaning of the universe, the Cosmos, and its origin, the Physis. The early Greeks then are rightly called the physicists, for theirs was the wisdom of the Physis. The transition to the *Golden Age* was effected by the Sophists and by Socrates against the background of Greek *paideia*, for each in their own way sought the wisdom of human life. Man was the center: for the Sophists, man as endowed with speech; for Socrates, man as capable of thought. The tradition of Socrates was carried to the heights by Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus, to achieve a wisdom that sought both Man and the Cosmos. This wisdom, at once of life and of the world, found its center in the polis, the city-state. But when the Cosmos became the City, and men began to think in terms of a brave new world-society, philosophy itself would reflect and even help effect the change. The *third period* of Greek philosophy, then, sees at once a broadening of outlook in the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and a certain narrowness likewise in the predominance of ethics and theories of human happiness. Such subjectivism flowers again in *Hellenistic philosophy*, reaching its climax in Neoplatonism. It is a wisdom of Man, the Cosmos, and God.

[97] *Confessions*, VII, xxi.

General Character of Greek Philosophy. For the most part, Greek philosophy is a *human wisdom*. Man-centered, it begins from man and is founded on man and not on God, with great confidence for the most part in the natural goodness of man and his natural capacities for reaching his destiny. In this, it shows a marked contrast to the traditions of the Orient, whether of Egypt, India, or Persia, which start from the Absolute Being and ask how anything can exist which is not God, and often end, as in Hinduism and Buddhism, in pessimism and illusion. Even when Greek philosophy is religious, as in Plato and Plotinus, it ever remains naturalistic.

As a consequence, Greek philosophy is an intellectual or *rational wisdom*, striving to lead man to a rational knowledge of the universe, himself and his destiny. In this it puts almost excessive confidence in human reason, almost doing away with the sense of mystery from which human problems are not completely free. It is rationalistic also in the stress laid on the cognitive to the neglect of the affective side of man. Little attention, comparatively, is given to the will, still less to love, especially love for God. Even in the doctrine of Plotinus, if there is love indeed on the part of the soul as it seeks union, neither the Nous nor the One has love for the soul, which the One does not even know.

Lastly, to consider Greek philosophy from the viewpoint of the theology of history, it was a *pedagogue to Christ*. As St. Paul had told the Galatians: "The Law has become for you a pedagogue to Christ"

(3:24), indicating that the Old Law had led the Jews to the school of Christ but did not teach them Christ;[98] so, many of the early Christian thinkers considered Greek philosophy as somehow preparing for the Gospel and leading the Greeks to the One Master, Christ. This it did both positively and by its defects. Specifically, this *praeparatio evangelica* (as Eusebius of Caesarea called it) might be said to embrace the Greek love of *kalokagathia*, the noble, the good, the virtuous; the religious consciousness of the Greeks, particularly in the later centuries; the theology or doctrine on God arrived at by some philosophers; and lastly, by privation, the lack of love in Greek philosophy and the lack of the fullness of truth.

[98] A pedagogue, in the Greek sense used here, was not a teacher (as we use the term), but a slave who had general supervision of a child, escorted him to school and return, but as a rule did not direct his studies.

Fruits of Greek Philosophy. The history of Greek philosophy has enabled us to see the *true nature of philosophy*, since it was discovered and developed by the Greeks. In the Orient, philosophy was hardly distinguished from the religious knowledge of the people, whereas in Greece it was soon recognized as a distinct and autonomous wisdom.

We have witnessed also the *origin of the basic problems* and the answers which men gave: God and the world, becoming and being, man's nature and destiny. What the Greeks have discovered of the truth, we may claim as our own and use to achieve our philosophy; what mistakes they made will be warnings of what we must avoid.

Lastly, Greek philosophy stands forever as a historical proof of what man may know by the light of reason alone; a witness, therefore, at once to the strength and the weakness of man.

PART II: ORIENTAL SCHOLASTICISM

HELLENISTIC philosophy was to influence many of the early Christian writers (usually called the Church Fathers), who turned to it for doctrinal content or more often for a method in expounding Revelation. These in turn left an immense intellectual heritage to the thinkers of the Middle Ages. The direct descendants however of Plato, the Peripatos, and Plotinus are rather the Arabian *falasifa*, beginning with al-Kindi (d. 873) and ending with Ibn Rushd (Averroës, d. 1198); and, to some extent, such medieval Jewish thinkers as Ibn Gebirol (Avicebrol) and Moses Maimonides. For this reason our history of ancient philosophy includes, in the interest of doctrinal sequence of thought, a study of Arabian and Jewish philosophers of the early Middle Ages, although we shall recapitulate some of this material in our study of medieval philosophy in order to avoid certain difficulties in the teaching of the history of philosophy. This survey emphasizes only those thinkers whose works had bearing on Western Scholasticism in the thirteenth and later centuries, and does not pretend to be exhaustive.

SECTION I: ARABIAN PHILOSOPHERS

CHAPTER XVI: The Transition

THAT St. John of Damascus (Damascenus), who died in Jerusalem, 749, wrote a *Dialectic* as a prelude to his greater work, the Πηγὴ γνώσεως or *Fount of Knowledge*, is rather indicative of the first contact the Arabians had with the Corpus *Aristotelicum:* through the works on logic which had held a large place in the Christian schools of Syria. Later, Greek originals were procured not only of the *Organon* and the *Isagoge* but of the whole *Corpus Aristotelicum*, which with other works were translated directly into Arabic. Some of these gave rise to a Neoplatonic version of Aristotelianism.

§ 1. *Aristotelianism in the East*

The last of the Neoplatonists, the Syrian school of Jamblichus and that of Alexandria, bequeathed their interest in Plato and Aristotle to their Christian neighbors. The latter in turn made Greek studies a part of their schools, teaching philosophy, mathematics, and medicine together with scriptural theology, and translating many works into Syriac or Aramaic. These works served the Arabs later, until new translations were produced in the college of Baghdad.

The Christian Schools. The ancient school of *Edessa*, the true founder of which was St. Ephrem († 363), taught Aristotle, Hippocrates, and Galen. Before it had become corrupted by Nestorianism and was suppressed by the emperor Zeno in 489, it possessed translations of the *Perihermenias* and the *Prior Analytics*, I, 1–7, with commentaries on these and the *Isagoge*, made by Probus (or Probha) of Antioch. Many of its scholars fled to *Nisibis* in Persia, where its interest in Aristotelian logic was continued by the bishop Paul († 571) and Aba of Kaskar (fl. 600).

A wider knowledge of the CA is found among the Monophysites, under the influence of the school of Alexandria. Thus Sergius of Reschaina (or Rashayn) (†536), trained at Alexandria, translated the *Categories*, the *Isagoge*, the *De mundo ad Alexandrum*, a treatise on the soul, works of Galen, etc. Even greater work was done by Severus Sebokt of the monastery of Kinnesrin († 667), his pupil James of Edessa († 708), and Bishop Georgios of Akoula († 724).

These few details suffice to show the type of learning which the Arabians found when they invaded Syria, 642–649. Logic, medicine, mathematics, some theology, perhaps, made up the training of the learned man, especially of the Nestorian and Monophysite clergy. The invaders (called Sarrakeni by the Syrians) left their culture intact, and gradually made some of it their own. Thus, when the Ummayads established the Khalifate of Damascus (661–749), they allowed the former officials of the Byzantine Empire to continue in their employ. Among these was St. John Damascene, who served as chief minister of state until he withdrew to the monastery of St. Sabas in Jerusalem and gave himself to writing. While there is no indication that Muslim teachers or students directly used the Greek materials possessed by the

Christians, evidence does point to a considerable exchange of thought between Arab ruler and Syrian subject, with Muslim canon law and theology affected by Greek thought.

Arabian Schools. When internal intrigue and revolution brought the Ummayad rule to an end (744–749), the new caliphs, of the Abbasid dynasty, abandoned Damascus and Syria, to found a new capital at Baghdad. To it al-Mansur, the second caliph, invited in 762 a number of distinguished scholars from the neighboring camp cities of Basra and Kufa. Later, several Persian scholars and scientists were instrumental in promoting scientific learning derived from Greek sources.

However, Harun al-Rashid, the caliph contemporary with Charlemagne, is the true founder of independent Arabian speculation (786–808). He sent agents to the Byzantine Empire to purchase Greek manuscripts in philosophy, medicine, and science, and supported a quasi academy of scholars who supplemented or even replaced the Syriac-Arabian versions with translations made directly from the Greek. Among the works thus translated were Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*, Ptolemy's Ἡ *μεγίστη σύνταξις*, a standard work on astronomy which the Arabs called *Kitab al-Majisti* (*Almagestus*), and his *Tetrabiblos* on astrology. To these and the Syriac-Arabian versions of parts of the CA were later added the pseudo-Aristotelian *Secretum secretorum* and the influential *Theology of Aristotle* (*infra*).

Under Caliph al-Mamun (813–833), the work continued in a special academy, Dar al-Hikhma (House of Wisdom), which was later placed under the supervision of the greatest of all translators, Hunayn ibn Ishaq (809/810–876). Known to the Latin Middle Ages as Johannicius, Hunayn was at home in Greek, Syriac, and Arabic, as well as in medicine. His translations include both Syriac and Arabic versions of Galen, other medical authors, the *Perihermenias*, *De generatione et corruptione*, and the *De anima* of the CA, some of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. His son Ishaq ibn Hunayn (d. 910–911) and others continued the work, so that some of Plato's dialogues, most of the CA, and many of the earlier commentators (e.g., Porphyry, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Themistius) were known to the Arabians by the end of the tenth century.[1]

Neoplatonic Aristotelianism. Unfortunately, together with the genuine works of the CA, the Syrians had passed on to the Arabians works which purported to be of Aristotelian origin but which were in reality Neoplatonic. These profoundly influenced the interpretation of the Philosopher, so that Muslim philosophy is often an attempted synthesis of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. In addition, we cannot discount the mark which Islamism as a religion left on the philosophy of its adherents.

The most important of these Neoplatonic works was the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, which was translated into Arabic in 840 by Ibn Naima, a Christian of Emessa.[2] The ten books of this work are actually a series of excerpts from the *Enneads*, IV–VI, on the soul and its destiny, the generation of the Nous and Psyché, and the return of the soul to the intelligible world and the Good. The original in Greek or Syriac was written by a Neoplatonist, but as it came to the Arabians it was accompanied by a preface in which Aristotle is made to declare that this is the crown of all his works, since it shows the true meaning of the four causes. It soon became the norm in inter-

[1] Cf. Bibliography, p. 235.

[2] Edited and translated by F. Dieterici, *Die Philosophie der Araber im IX und X Jahrhundert* . . . (Leipzig, 1882–1883). That the translator glossed some of the theses of the original is evident; e.g., "The One is in all things" (*Enneads*, V, ii, 1) becomes "The Pure One is the cause of all things."

preting the Stagirite. Thus, al-Farabi appealed to it constantly in his book on the *Harmony Between Plato and Aristotle*.

On the other hand, the *Liber de causis* (*Liber de essentia purae bonitatis*), which was likewise ascribed to Aristotle (some moderns would attribute it to al-Farabi), was an extract, with commentary, of thirty-two propositions from the *Elementatio theologica* of Proclus.[3] Even more than the *Theology* it was a systematic exposé of Neoplatonism arranged in a series of theorems on the nature and properties of the One, the Intelligence, the Soul. In addition, the Muslim philosophers seem to have been acquainted with the mystical works of the Christian Neoplatonist called [pseudo] Dionysius and the commentaries of John Philoponus (called the Grammaticus).

Such works deeply influenced the interpretation of the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*, the notion of God in His being and His creative activity, the structure of the world, the concept of the human soul and its relation to the Active Intelligence.

§ 2. *Early Muslim Speculation*

It is preferable to call Oriental Scholasticism Muslim or Islamic rather than Arabian, since its representatives were usually not Arabian by birth but belonged to one or other of the peoples subjected to Arabian conquest and converted, sometimes by force, to the religion of Mohamet. Some were Syrians, others Persians or Indians, and, in Spain, Moors and Berberi.

Even before the age of the great *falasifa* of Islam the Koran had awakened some speculation. This was largely of a theological nature, and showed perhaps greater influence of current Christian controversies and sects than of the Greek philosophers.

The Mutazilites. Regarded as the freethinkers of Islam, the Mutazilites (i.e., those who were midway between belief and unbelief)[4] called themselves "the men of justice and unity" because the core of their discussions was the reconciliation of human free will and the presence of evil with the unity and justice of God. This arose out of the question of the attributes of God: could justice and goodness, mercy and wisdom, be ascribed to God, as the Koran implied, and His unity be preserved. "Whoever affirms an eternal quality besides God, affirms two Gods," said Wasil ben Ata, the founder of the sect (699–749). His followers became involved in long discussions on the will of God, predestination, fate, God's relation to the world, while the question of the responsibility of evil became almost an obsession. According to al-Ghazzali (*infra*), they solved the problem by denying God the power to act in the world: evil is purely of the human will.

The Mutakallemin. Opposed to the Mutazilites were the "disputers" (*takallama*, "to speak"), who defended the *kalam-Allah*, the word of Allah, the Koran. St. Thomas and others knew them as the *Loquentes*; they were also called Ash'arites, from their founder al-Ash'ari (873–935).

[3] For editions cf. O. Bardenhewer, *Die pseudoaristotelische Schrift über das reine Gute, bekannt unter den Namen Liber de causis* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1882); R. Steele, in *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Bacon*, XII, pp. 161–187 (Oxford, 1935). On al-Farabi as probable author, cf. H. Bédoret, S.J., "L'auteur et le traducteur du Liber de causis," *RNP* (= *RPL*), 41 (1938), 519–533.

[4] According to another tradition, not too historical, the term connotes those who separated from the extreme conservatives. See art. "Al-Mu'taxila," in *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam* (H. A. R. Gibbs-J. H. Kramers, Leiden, 1953), pp. 421–427.

A former Mutazilite, he attacked their position as heretical and founded a school of orthodox theology at Basra. Ash'ari is perhaps most important for his acceptance of Koranic revelation as the norm of truth and the reduction of philosophy and Aristotelian logic to the status of tools of theology. On such a premise he elaborated an atomistic philosophy substantially different from that of Aristotle and close to Democritus and Epicurus. The system was developed by al-Bakillani (d. 1012) and popularized by al-Ghazzali.[5]

Muslim Mysticism. Other groups in various parts of the Arabian empire were societies of an essentially philosophical nature, esteeming Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, or Aristotle above Mohamet. Most of these considered philosophy and truth to belong not to any sect or school but to "the illumined" and to the mystic. Hence their adherents often formed secret societies.

Such were the Brothers of Purity (*Ihwan es safà*), at Basra c. 970, devoted to the contemplative life, since they considered a life according to philosophy to be a life of purity. Their doctrines are contained in a series of fifty-one epistles, an encyclopedia of Muslim philosophy and science.[6] Neoplatonism, especially of the *Theology of Aristotle*, was the prevalent doctrine, with the emancipation of the soul from matter as the aim of life.

This group gave rise later to the Sufites (i.e., the wool-clad), who while not forming a strict sect were the real mystics of Islam. Again the *Theology of Aristotle* seems to have been the basic primer of their doctrine.

The doctrines of the Brothers of Purity penetrated to Spain about 1000, and had influence on the Western development of philosophy. However, scholars now recognize an earlier development in Spain, in the school of Ibn Masarra (*infra*).

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[5] Cf. R. J. McCarthy, *The Theology of al-Ash'ari* (Beyrouth, 1953); G. Quadri, *La philosophie arabe dans l'Europe médiévale* (Paris, 1947), pp. 36–37; D. O'Leary, *Arabic Thought and Its Place in History* (London, 1922), pp. 208–225; art. "Al-Ash'ari," in *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, pp. 46–47, and art. "Kalam," *ibid.*, pp. 210–214.

[6] Cf. F. Dieterici, *Die Abhandlungen der Ihwan es safa in Auswahl* (Leipzig, 1883–1886); *Die Philosophie der Araber* (Leipzig, 1876–1879).

CHAPTER XVII: The Eastern Falasifa

THOUGH the foregoing doctrines may be called philosophical, the Muslim world reserved the name of philosophers to a special group of scholars. A *falasuf* (pl. *falasifa;* a transliteration from the Greek) was one whose philosophy was based on the texts of Aristotle, either directly or in translation; all other philosophical students were called *hakim* or *nazir*. For the *falasifa,* Aristotle was truly the Philosopher, though their interpretation was largely colored by Alexander of Aphrodisias and/or the spurious *Theology of Aristotle.* Undoubtedly their speculation also showed signs of their religious environment, yet at times they were persecuted for their departure from the Koran. As a result of their religious belief or lack of it, they faced problems unknown to purely Greek or Hellenistic philosophy: the relation of reason and revelation, the reconciliation of the doctrine of creation with the Greek notions of being and becoming, the relation of the created world to its Maker, etc. Unfortunately, their synthesis is sometimes dominated by the principle of necessity in the world of God and of men, to the detriment of the creative liberty of God and free choice in man.

In the East this group was represented by al-Kindi (d. before 873), al-Farabi (d. 950), and Avicenna (Ibn Sina, d. 1037). The tradition was carried on in the West by Avempace (d. 1138), who followed al-Farabi; his successor, Ibn Tufail (d. 1185); and lastly by Averroës (d. 1198), reckoned the greatest of the Muslim philosophers and the best interpreter of Aristotle. These, with certain of the Jewish philosophers, had the greatest influence on Latin Scholasticism which knew very little of other thinkers of Islam.

§ 1. *The Early Philosophers*

Al-Kindi (c. 796–866). A member of the princely family of the Kenda, Abu Iusuf Ia'qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi was not only the first of the falasifa but one of the very few Arabs to engage in Greek philosophy (hence he was called "the philosopher of the Arabians"). Originally a Mutazilite at Basra and Baghdad, he began to use the new translations of the Greeks to achieve a better method of thought; this led him to new questions and broader problems. Thanks to his knowledge of Greek, he soon made compendiums and various commentaries on Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Euclid. Most of his encyclopedic writings, on mathematics, astronomy, medicine, philosophy, etc., have been lost.[1] From what we know of

[1] Several extant treatises in Latin translations have been edited by A. Nagy, *Die philosophischen Abhandlungen des Ja'qub ben Ishaq al-Kindi* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, II–5, 1897).

his work, he is evidently responsible for the key position occupied by the *Theology of Aristotle* in the metaphysics of the falasifa; he was the first, moreover, to investigate under the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias the problem of the *intellectus agens*.

That part of Alexander's commentary on the *De anima* which attempted to clarify the relation of the agent and possible intellects had come to the Arabs as a separate treatise later known to the Latins as *De intellectu et intellecto*.[2] It proposed a threefold division: the material intellect (νοῦς ὑλικός, i.e., in potency), the intellect which actually understands and has the habit or ability to understand (νοῦς καθ' ἕξις), and the νοῦς ποιητικός or active intellect. The last Alexander considered as an extrinsic agent, further identified with God, which causes the material or potential intellect to pass into act and so become the thing understood: to make it therefore the νοῦς καθ' ἕξις.

On the basis of this exegesis, al-Kindi undertook to solve the problem, as he said, according to the mind of Plato and Aristotle.[3] They distinguished, he writes, four different intellects. The first is the intellect, or, as the Arabic speaks of it, the Intelligence, which is always in act: this is no longer God but an emanation from God equivalent to the Nous of Plotinus or of the *Theology of Aristotle*. The second is the intellect in potency, which is in the soul. When the Agent Intelligence causes it to pass into act by giving it the intelligible actuality which it is apt to receive,[4] it becomes the third kind of intellect; and when it uses its knowledge, the fourth type: e.g., in communicating knowledge to another. We here witness the interpretation of Aristotle in terms of the pseudo-*Theology*, and are at the beginning of a great doctrinal development, repercussions of which echo through Latin Scholasticism.

Al-Farabi. Though influenced by al-Kindi, Abu Nasr Mohamet ben Mohamet ben Uzlag al-Farabi (d. 950) is of greater importance.[5] He was called "the second teacher" (Aristotle being the first, Avicenna the third) by reason of his enormous literary production and depth of thought. Little of what he wrote seems to have come to the Latins directly;[6] his

[2] Cf. E. Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-age (AHDLMA)*, IV (1929), pp. 5–158; for Alexander, pp. 7–21. The Latin of this treatise is edited by G. Théry, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise* (Bibl. Thomiste, VII, 1926), pp. 74–82.

[3] A. Nagy, *op. cit.*, p. 1: *Intellexi quod quaeris scribi tibi sermonem brevem de intellectu [et intellecto] secundum sententiam Platonis et Aristotelis. Sententia eorum est, quod intellectus est secundum quatuor species. Prima est intellectus qui semper est in actu. Secunda est intellectus qui in potentia est in anima. Tertia est intellectus cum exit de potentia ad effectum. Quarta est intellectus, quem vocamus demonstrativum.*

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 5: *Et similiter exemplificavit Aristoteles intellectum* [i.e., the thing understood] *scilicet quod anima cum apprehendit intellectum, scilicet formam quae non habet materiam nec phantasiam et unitur cum anima, tunc est in anima in effectu quae non erat antea in anima in effectu sed in potentia. Haec igitur forma, quae iam materiam non habet nec phantasiam, est intellectus adeptus animae ab intelligentia prima, quae est specialitas rerum, quae est in actu semper.* — This would mean, as the text goes on to show, that the Intelligence gives the soul its knowledge; the soul is simply required to be in potency or readiness.

[5] Cf. R. Hammond, *The Philosophy of Alfarabi and Its Influence on Medieval Thought* (New York, 1947); S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris, 1859), pp. 341–352.

[6] Cf. H. Bédoret, "Les premières traductions tolédanes de philosophie. Oeuvres d'Alfarabi,"

influence rather was through Avicenna, save for the *Liber de causis* which perhaps is his work.[7]

Though he wished to be a pure Aristotelian, al-Farabi was essentially a Neoplatonist, again under the influence of the *Theology of Aristotle* and the *Elementatio* of Proclus. Significantly, one of his own works carries the title, *The Agreement Between Plato and Aristotle.*[8] Their differences, he finds, are more verbal than real; both of them speak of the same thing from a different point of view or a different approach. Plato follows the way of analysis, Aristotle of synthesis; yet the subject of each is being as being. If Plato finds substance (*ousía*) to reside primarily in the Idea and Aristotle in the individual, the difference lies in their point of departure. Aristotle begins from physics and logic, Plato from metaphysics and theology. Even the vast difference between their respective theories of knowledge is solved by saying that the soul forms concepts so rapidly that it comes to imagine it possessed them already and so concludes it is but recollecting them.

The Neoplatonic Aristotelianism of al-Farabi is most evident in his *metaphysics*, which combines the doctrines of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* on God, the Prime Mover and the series of movers, and the chapters of the *De anima* on the intellect. He thus achieved a new synthesis which is retained by succeeding Muslim philosophers. Against al-Ash'ari perhaps, the starting point is the distinction of essence and existence in all things other than God. If the essence of man implied existence, we should be unable to conceive the one without the other. But we are able to conceive essence in itself, and not know if the thing exists in reality. The source of being is therefore something other than the essence; it can only be a First Principle whose essence is not distinct from its existence. This must be God who alone is absolutely necessary and exists of Himself, while all other beings are contingent, i.e., caused by Him or given existence by Him.[9]

The absolute necessity of God is thus given primary place by al-Farabi: since His essence is His existence, He must be. From necessity one can further deduce that God is simple and immaterial, without any composition, infinite because uncaused, pure act, unique because simple, intelligent because immaterial. Since His intellect is His essence, He knows Him-

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RNP, 41 (1938), 80–97. The Latins thus possessed his *De scientiis, De ortu scientiarum, De intellectu,* and *Liber introductorius in artem logicae demonstrationis.* A key work not known to the Latins was *The Gems of Wisdom*, transl. (German) and publ. by M. Horten, *Das Buch der Ringsteine Farabis* (Beiträge V-3, 1906).

[7] Cf. p. 195, n. 3. The *Liber de causis* is admittedly at least contemporary with al-Farabi, and unknown to al-Kindi; several manuscripts attribute it to al-Farabi, as does St. Albert; moreover al-Farabi's theory of the ten Intelligences is likely the fruit of this work. Somehow, without any blame attaching to al-Farabi, this came to be known as the work of Aristotle.

[8] Cf. Dario Cabanelas, "Al-Farabi y su 'Libro de la concordancia' entre Platón y Aristóteles," *Verdad y Vida* (Madrid), VIII (1950), 325–350, for editions, study, etc. Other works of al-Farabi no longer extant dealt with the same theme; e.g., *The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; Refutation of the Criticism of John the Grammarian* [Philoponus] *against Aristotle;* etc. (*ibid.*, p. 339).

[9] M. Horten, *Das Buch der Ringsteine*, nn. 1–5, pp. 10–13; and M. Cuiz Hernandez, "El 'Fontes quaestionum' de abu nasr al-farabi," *AHDLMA*, XVIII (1950–1951), pp. 317–318.

self fully; and through His essence knows all other things without dependence on them.[10] This means, however, that "God is the all in the form of a unity," that somehow the being of God is the being of the world: a kind of pantheism that al-Farabi may have acquired from some contact with the Upanishads and their doctrine of Maya.

By knowing Himself, God eternally produces or *emanates* one being: the *First Intelligence*. In this Intelligence (a doctrine borrowed from Proclus) is plurality, since it knows itself both as possible through its own essence and as existing and necessary through God. By knowing itself as necessary, it engenders another Intelligence; as possible, it begets the matter of the first heavens, that of the fixed stars; and by knowing its own essence, it produces the form or soul of the first heavens. The second Intelligence engenders in a like threefold way, as does the third, etc., down to the ninth intelligence, which begets the orb of the moon. The tenth or last Intelligence (ten is ever the perfect number) forms the visible world: it engenders the souls of men, the matter and soul of the sublunary world.

What Plotinus, and Proclus perhaps, had described as a spiritual production, of the Nous, the Psyché, and human souls, al-Farabi has transformed and elaborated into an explanation of the material world. Accordingly, the note of *necessity* now attaches to the whole of "creation," derived no doubt from the necessity of God and weakened perhaps by the distinction of essence and existence, yet indeed necessary and so to speak mechanical. In addition, God is no longer the Prime Mover, since this role is filled by the First Intelligence. In such a system the world must also be eternal: and al-Farabi does not hesitate to posit an eternal matter to which God through the Intelligences imparts movement and form and thus "creates" the world.

Lastly, the *theory of intellectual knowledge* is part and parcel of this system. The last of the Intelligences is the Active Intellect, though God is the ultimate principle of all understanding. On the other hand, the soul is or has an intellect which is in potency to the knowledge it can acquire; this becomes the intellect *in effectu* when it has received and has become in knowledge the form of sensible things; it is further perfected as the "acquired intellect" (*intellectus adeptus*) when it rises to the understanding of the purely intelligible forms (which are properly the acquired intellect, since they are received). Here again, as in al-Kindi, it is the extrinsic Active Intellect, now the tenth Intelligence, which gives to or impresses on the possible intellect the forms it can receive; abstraction is thus the work of the same Intelligence that had conferred these same forms on matter. The Intelligence is therefore properly called the *Dator formarum*, the Giver of Forms. The most important addition al-Farabi makes to the development of this doctrine is the introduction of the acquired intellect. Entirely foreign to Aristotelianism, it is a new version of the union of the soul with the Plotinian Nous or world of intelligibles, the result of al-Farabi's Sufism or mysticism. He who has reached the acquired intellect is

[10] M. Horten, *op. cit.*, nn. 5–9, pp. 12–15; and R. Hammond, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–28.

above sense knowledge; he is a prophet.[11]

Conclusion. The Aristotelianism of al-Farabi is thoroughly colored and transformed by the philosopher's Neoplatonism. His system is not altogether coherent. (One of his friends, in a preface to one work, says that al-Farabi would write sundry notes on a subject and thus compose a book.) But it does contain in germ at least most of what is developed by Avicenna.

Costa ben Luca. Contemporary with al-Farabi, whom he does not seem to have influenced, was Qusta ibn Luqa (864–912), a Syrian Christian physician and philosopher of Baalbek. Called by the Latins Costa ben Luca, and sometimes Constabulus or Constabulinus, he is considered the author of an influential work *De differentia spiritus et animae*[12] used apparently by Avicenna and cited frequently by St. Albert the Great and others.

Drawing largely on the physician Galen (A.D. 131–201), the work proposes what we may call a theory of the human nervous system: "spirit" being taken as a subtle body or fluid which as "vital" is the cause of life in the body and as "animal" is responsible for sense life and sense knowledge; it is thus the medium whereby the soul rules and moves the body.[13] In addition, Costa ben Luca expands Galen's doctrine on the divisions of the brain, and with him localizes the interior senses in its three ventricles. The doctrine is repeated by Avicenna and became standard among the Scholastics before St. Thomas.[14]

§ 2. *Avicenna*

Though titled *al-shaykh al-rais* (Excellency) among the Arabians because of his political position as vizir to several caliphs, Ibn Sina or Avicenna (980–1037) is truly par excellence the philosopher among the thinkers of Eastern Islamism. He is the subject of many studies even at the present time, especially since the years 1951–1952 marked the millennium (according to Moslem reckoning) of his birth.[15]

Life and Works. Born at Afshana in Persia in the year 370 of the hegira, Ibn

[11] Cf. Al-Farabi's *De intellectu* (or *De intelligentiis*) in the *Opera omnia Avicennae* (Venice, 1508), fol. 68r–69v; and a better text in E. Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes . . . ," *loc. cit.*, pp. 115–126. For an exposé of this doctrine, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 27–38.

[12] Edition (Latin): C. S. Barach, *Costa-ben-Lucae de differentia animae et spiritus* (Bibl. phil. med. aet., II) (Innsbruck, 1878). Cf. G. Graf, *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur*, II, pp. 30–32.

[13] *De differentia*, c. II (ed. cit., p. 130): *In humano corpore sunt duo spiritus: unus qui vocatur vitalis, cuius nutrimentum vel sustentatio est aër et eius emanatio est a corde, et inde mittitur per pulsus ad reliquum corpus et operatur vitam, pulsum et anhelitum; et alter, qui ab anima dicitur animalis, qui operatur in ipso cerebro . . . et eius emanatio est a cerebro, et operatur in ipso cerebro cogitationem et memoriam atque providentiam, et ex eo mittitur per nervos ad cetera membra, ut operetur sensum atque motum.* — C. IV (p. 138): *Anima movet corpus et praestat ei sensum atque vitam mediante spiritu, et spiritus operatur hoc absque alio mediatore . . . Spiritus est vitae et sensus atque motus ceterarumque actionum causa propinquior, anima vero longior, quare est magna causa.*

[14] Cf. G. P. Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power* (St. Louis, 1952), *passim*, esp. pp. 44, 84, 90 ff.

[15] For studies see Bibliography, p. 235 f.

Sina according to his autobiography[16] gave his early years to many studies in the Koran, law, logic, geometry, and later to medicine and philosophy. A turning point was his acquaintance with the thought of Aristotle: at first, despite forty readings, he could not understand the *Metaphysics*; then suddenly, when he read the commentary of al-Farabi, the scales fell from his eyes. He was so joyed that he passed out alms in thanksgiving. Not yet twenty years of age, he had acquired an encyclopedic knowledge of all available culture. At twenty-one, he began to write his own works, and thereafter occupied many political positions of importance, despite jealous enmities. He died at Hamadhan in 428 (A.D. 1037).

It is impossible to produce here a complete list of his works: many are unedited, many were not known to the West until more recent times, many remain untranslated into European languages.[17] Of his medical works many became standard textbooks for centuries; some of his philosophical summas found their way to the Scholastics and were very influential in the thirteenth century. Of prime importance are:

1. The *Qānūn*, a medical summa known to the Latins as the *Canon* (Venice, 1543).
2. *Kitab-al-shifâ* (Book of Healing), an encyclopedia of philosophy which the Latins termed *Sufficientia* (corruption of *Shifâ*): the logic, physics, *De anima* (or *Liber sextus naturalium*), *Metaphysics*.[18]
3. *Kitab-al-najât* (Book of Deliverance), a later compendium of the *Shifâ*; unknown to the Latins.[19]
4. *Glosses to the Theology of Aristotle* composed late in life.[20] Invaluable for his Neoplatonic tendencies; part of a lost larger work, the *Insâf* (Book of Fair Judgment), against the Baghdad interpreters of Aristotle.
5. *Hikam-al-mashriqiyya* (Oriental, i.e., mystical, Widsom), a lost work in which apparently he showed greater consciousness of the personal union between philosophy and life.[21]
6. His last great extant work: *Kitab-al-isharat* (Book of Directions and Remarks), a collection of notes on doctrines which were the subject of controversy or frequent discussion.[22]

The character of Ibn Sina's thought emerges to some extent from the very titles of his works; hence we cannot be satisfied with the Latin Avicenna for an adequate knowledge of his teaching or his spirit. The Arabic works enable us to see more clearly the influences which shaped his thought: Aristotelianism both in itself and as seen through the medium of al-Farabi, the *Theology of Aristotle* and the *Liber de causis*, perhaps a certain Platonism and Stoicism through indirect channels, not to speak of factors from Moslem sources, the *kalam* (from the Mutazilites), Sufi mysticism, etc.

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[16] Text in A. J. Arberry, *Avicenna on Theology* (London, 1951), pp. 9–14.

[17] For the elenchus of all known works, cf. M. M. Anawati, "La tradition manuscrite orientale de l'oeuvre d'Avicenne," *Revue Thomiste*, 51 (1951), 407–440; and L. Gardet, *La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* (Paris, 1951), p. 11, for available texts.

[18] Edited at Venice, *Avicennae opera*, 1495, 1508, 1546. On the Latin translations, cf. H. Bédoret, "Les premières versions tolédanes de philosophie. Oeuvres d'Avicenne," *RNP*, 41 (1938), 374–400. The *De anima* was reproduced by G. P. Klubertanz (St. Louis, 1949).

[19] Arabic edition (Cairo, 1938). The *Metaphysics* of the *Najât*, in a modern Latin version: N. Carame, *Avicennae metaphysices compendium* (Rome, 1926); for a section of the *De anima*, cf. F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology: an English Translation of Kitab-al-Najât, Book II, Chapter VI* (Oxford, 1952).

[20] For a French translation, cf. G. Vajda, "Les notes d'Avicenne sur la 'Theologie d'Aristote,'" *Revue Thomiste*, 51 (1951), 346–406. This is preceded by a comment of L. Gardet, "En l'honneur du millénaire d'Avicenne," *ibid.*, 333–345.

[21] Cf. L. Gardet, *La pensée . . .*, pp. 23–29.

[22] In French translation: A. M. Goichon, *Ibn-Sina: Livre des directives et remarques* (Paris, 1951).

Ibn Sina does not always achieve a complete integration or even a simple balance of these elements. His conception of the world is that of al-Farabi and Neoplatonic emanation to which a definite note of necessity is attached; yet he also affirms the Koranic doctrine of creation, and therefore seeks to retain the contingency of the creature. He is basically a monist, yet would escape the pantheism hidden in his premises.

Being: Necessary and Possible. The One which dominates the system of Avicenna is not the One of Plotinus beyond being and beyond knowledge, but rather the Pure Thought which thinks itself, is supreme Beauty and Goodness and highest Love, being both final cause and source from which all else emanates. It is thus the *Summum Bonum* of Plato, the Pure Act of Aristotle, and the One of Neoplatonism.[23] From it emanates the first separate Intelligence, distinguished from it, contingent and possessed of composition. This in turn, as in the system of al-Farabi, becomes the source of further emanations until the tenth Intelligence is reached, whence proceeds this world.

That such a process is a necessary one is a doctrine by no means new. But the thought of Avicenna moves in the milieu of Islamic theology and its discussions of the meaning of creation. The implications, therefore, which he finds in Neoplatonic emanation mark a real advance. He will hold to an eternal creation: eternal because to be Pure Act God must necessarily produce His effect; creation because this effect is essentially dependent on God, the *Ens Necessarium*, and thus somehow contingent. The series of separate Intelligences, and of the souls and bodies of the celestial spheres are indeed necessary, but necessary *ab alio:* therefore essentially though not temporally contingent. If beings of the sublunar world come to be and pass away, they too are included in this universal determinism to the extent that their matter and their species are eternal and subject to the *Dator formarum*.[24]

Only God is truly necessary; all else, because it needs something else to be, is possible,[25] though indeed also necessary. This seeming contradiction is solved by the distinction of essence and existence: the possibility lies in the essence of things, the necessity in their existence.

Essence, Quiddity, Existence. To safeguard contingency, which he admits despite Neoplatonic monism, Avicenna insists that in all beings other than the *Ens Necessarium* there is a real distinction between essence, quiddity, and existence. In the Necessary Being essence (*dhat*) is existence (*wujud*); but because this Being has no definition, He possesses no quiddity (*mahiyya*).[26] Every other

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[23] *Metaphysics*, I, 7 (Venice, 1508), fol. 73ra–74ra; VIII, 4–6, fol. 98vb–100va.

[24] Cf. *Glosses on the Theology of Aristotle*, V, § 1 (G. Vajda, *art. cit.*, 384); for the various degrees of creation, cf. L. Gardet, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–66.

[25] *Metaphysics*, VIII, 3 (fol. 98vb): *Manifestum autem quod necesse esse unum numero est, et patuit quod quicquid aliud est ab eo, cum consideratur per se, est possibile in suo esse et ideo est causatum. . . Unde quicquid est, excepto uno quod est sibi ipsi unum et ente quod est sibi ipsi ens, est acquirens esse ab alio a se per quod est sibi esse non per se.* — Cf. *Glosses*, I, 17 (G. Vajda, *art. cit.*, p. 364).

[26] *Ibid.*, VIII, 4 (fol. 99rb). The Latin Avicenna does not perhaps clearly bring out this distinction of quiddity and essence. It is not correct to say that the Necessary Being of Avicenna has no essence. He has no quiddity; and His essence is not distinct from His existence (cf. L. Gardet, *La pensée . . .* , p. 57, n. 2).

being, however, has received its being from another. Essence and existence are therefore distinct. Essence itself, that whereby a thing is what it is, is not purely identified with quiddity. The latter, as the intelligible principle or basis of definition, limits the essence, since it includes matter and form, genus and difference, is the source of privation and defect, and establishes comparison to other things (peers, contraries, etc.).[27]

But this distinction alone is not sufficient to explain contingency: since the *Ens Necessarium* cannot not produce these beings, their existence is necessary. Avicenna professes to find contingency therefore in their essence, and more precisely in their quiddity, that is, the essence as limited. The quiddity contains nothing that demands existence, for "contingency is a modality of the very quiddity itself."[28] Therefore the being (existence) which comes to it from the First Being, though necessary in itself, is an accident of the essence.[29] Yet these two elements combine to produce the "creature."[30] Hence in the being of every existent apart from God one must distinguish first its being as being, which is univocal since it cannot be specified as contingent or necessary; second, its being as proceeding from the First and related to it: its act of being which as such is necessary; lastly, its being as that of the quiddity, which alone is contingent.[31]

Even though creation (of the higher world) is eternal, the essence of a thing must be considered as at least logically prior to existence and as thus possessing the possibility of being. "Every being which has a beginning was possible before existing since the latter realizes its possibility of being."[32] It had therefore a "before" in which it was not, and in which indeed of itself it merited non-being rather than being, and yet in which it had real possibility. Since in this "before" it possessed no real existence, we cannot picture it as an intelligible thing existing apart (like a Platonic Idea): yet to have real possibility it has need of a subject in which it inheres. This subject, "that in which is found the potency to be of the thing," for beings of the world of change is matter. For immaterial beings, which always are (since they have not begun to be in time), there seems strictly speaking no such real subject; it is sufficient to say that their essences are not simple but contain, in relation to existence, a privation, a possibility, which is logically anterior to their existence. Only in God, whose essence is His existence, is there not to be found at least this possibility.[33]

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[27] Cf. *ibid.*, VIII, 4 (fol. 99rb); and V, 5 (fol. 90ra); *Isharat*, II, iv (ed. A. M. Goichon, pp. 354, 356, 270).

[28] *Glosses*, V, § 2 (G. Vajda, *art. cit.*, 386).

[29] Cf. *Isharat*, II, iv (ed. cit., pp. 364–365).

[30] *Glosses, loc. cit.* (p. 385): *Le début de la dualité dans la crée — quel qu'il soit — est que par soi lui appartient la contingence et de la part de la Vérité Première, l'être. De ces deux éléments se compose une ipséité* [= *substance première*] *existante.*

[31] *Glosses, loc. cit.*, p. 386; *Isharat*, II, iv (ed. cit., pp. 353–354). Cf. L. Gardet, *op. cit.*, p. 58; and for univocity, pp. 56–57.

[32] *Isharat*, II, v (ed. cit., p. 380; cf. p. 378); *Metaphysics*, IV, 2 (fol. 85va): *Omne enim quod incipit esse, antequam sit necesse est ut sit possibile in se. Si enim fuerit non possibile in se, illud non erit ullo modo.*

[33] *Metaphysics*, I, 8 (fol. 74ra): *Istud* [*esse*] *vel accidet ei* [*essentiae*] *semper vel aliquando. Id autem cui aliquando accidit debet habere materiam cuius esse praecedet illud tempore.*

Necessitarianism. We may legitimately question whether Avicenna has achieved a true basis for contingency, and ask if the essences are not, in the last analysis, as equally necessary as the existence of things. Essences are, perhaps, only essences: *equinitas in se est equinitas tantum;*[34] neither singular nor universal; neither denoting nor demanding of themselves the "accident" of existence, but containing a potency for the latter. They are thus contingent. But what is the ultimate source of essences?

They are certainly not uncaused and therefore independent of God; nor self-caused; nor the product of chance or blind necessity. They are brought out of potency into act by the existence emanating from the Necessary Being. But in themselves they have their source directly in that Being. "Master of the dawn," that is, of the beginning of creation, the Necessary Being knows not only His own essence but in the same act and through His essence all the things which will proceed or emanate from that essence: "Since He is the principle of all being, He knows through His essence that of which He is principle. He is principle of the perfect beings [in the world of intelligences] in their concrete essences, of generable and corruptible beings in their species and through these of their individuals."[35] But since He is necessary under all His aspects, this knowledge is also as necessary as the flux or flow of existence which originates in Him. There is in consequence a double flux, which despite Avicenna's efforts to the contrary seems to be a natural effect of the divine essence, a thorough necessitarianism. There is no design or plan for creation, no choice of will: the essence alone is the source whence all comes.[36]

The Soul of Man. Corresponding to the metaphysics in depth and breadth is the study Avicenna devotes to man, especially to the soul and the theory of knowledge. Aristotle, the *Theology of Aristotle*, al-Kindi and al-Farabi, Costa ben Luca are the more important sources, though the resultant doctrine is neither Aristotelian nor Plotinian in character, but highly original in many aspects.

The immediate context of this psychology is the doctrine of al-Farabi and Avicenna's own on the last Intelligence: instead of producing in its turn another Intelligence, the *Dator formarum* emanates the multitude of forms of the world of generation and corruption, and the multitude of human souls and intellects. The soul, however, does not preexist its body, but is infused when the

. . . *Sed id cui semper accidit, eius quidditas non est simplex. Quod enim respectu ipsius habet* [esse], *aliud est ab eo quod habet ab alio a se; et ex his duobus acquiritur ei esse id quod est; et ideo nihil est quod omnino sit expoliatum ab omni eo quod est in potentia et possibilitate respectu suiipsius nisi necesse esse.* — Cf. also *ibid.*, II, 1 (fol. 75ra).

[34] *Ibid.*, V, 1 (fol. 86va); cf. E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 206 ff. Metaphysics becomes for Avicenna the science of essences rather than of being.

[35] *Ibid.*, VIII, 6.

[36] The problem is central and complicated; and this brief statement does not do justice to the complete thought of Avicenna. For a thorough study, cf. A. M. Goichon, *La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn-Sin*, p. 202 ff., esp. pp. 259–284. The most thorough corrective of Avicenna is that offered by John Duns Scotus, who emphasizes the activity of the divine intellect in producing the ideas and the complete freedom of the divine will in creation. On the answer offered by St. Thomas, cf. A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Greeks* (Milwaukee, 1939).

corporeal matter is prepared to receive it. In the union, the soul becomes the form of the body, while the matter in turn individualizes the spiritual soul.[37] This individuation the soul retains after the death of the body (for which there seems no resurrection) even as it is united to the world of intelligences or, because it has here deliberately engulfed itself in matter, becomes subject to an eternity of misery.

Because it is an emanation of the Intelligence, *the human soul is by essence* itself an intelligent being, immaterial, indestructible, immortal. It will, moreover, like its source, have two actions or "two faces": one upward toward its origin, one downward toward the body in which it begins to be; by the former it contemplates its goal, union with the Agent Intellect; by the latter it is to rule and use the body for a time as its kingdom and the instrument through which it is to act and attain its perfection.[38]

The Lower Face of the Soul. Implied in this double relationship is the thought that the soul is not so attached to the body as to be dependent on the body or the composite for its existence, as is the case of the animal soul. Though it comes to being only in a body, it has a life and operation of its own and can and does survive the body. Hence union with the body is not of the essence of the soul; and to speak of soul as form is to speak of a function or a property but not of its essence, just as to define a workman is to indicate his functions but not to define him as a man.[39] Such a statement, however, must be understood in Avicenna's own language.

The union of soul and body to form man is a real and substantial union, so that the soul is of the very essence of man;[40] for "otherwise there would be simply two substances separated from each other."[41] Moreover, there is "a natural yearning [or disposition] of the soul for this body, to occupy itself with it, to use it, control it, and be attracted by it, and which binds the soul specially to this body."[42] Yet, since the soul is an immaterial and immortal substance (proved by immediate self-consciousness and by its immaterial actions), it cannot and does not depend intrinsically on the body. The union is, quite evidently, temporary and dissolved at the death of the body without any essential change in the soul; therefore, the union is not essential to the soul but accidental. Accident, however, must here be taken (as also in the relationship of existence to essence) in the sense intended by Avicenna: not as a simple accident, such as

[37] Matter is prepared for the soul by the *surat-al-jismiya*, or form of corporeity, a substantial form which makes matter a body, that is, endowed with three dimensions and capable of being divided; it remains after the advent of the soul (*Metaphysics*, II, 2, fol. 75vb and 76rb; cf. A. M. Goichon, *La Distinction*, pp. 428–432). On matter as the principle of individuation, *ibid.*, pp. 460–482.

[38] *De anima*, I, 5 (fol. 5va); V, 2 (fol. 23vb): on the two faces of the soul. On the purpose of the union with the body, cf. *De anima*, I, 5 (fol. 6ra); *Najât*, II, vi, 13 (ed. F. Rahman, p. 59, 33 ff.).

[39] *De anima*, I, 1 (fol. 1vb): *Hoc enim nomen anima non est indictum ei ex substantia sua, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora et refertur ad illa et idcirco recipitur corpus in sui definitione* [i.e., Aristotle's], *exempli gratia, sicut opus accipitur in definitione opificis, quamvis non accipiatur in definitione eius secundum quod est homo.* — Cf. *Najât, loc. cit.*, pp. 58, 21 ff.; 61, 13.

[40] *De anima*, I, 1.

[41] *Isharat*, p. 403.

[42] *Najât, loc. cit.*, 13, p. 57, 36–37. *anima*, V, 3 (fol. 24rb).

color, age, etc.; but as a *lazim*, i.e., a proper accident concomitant with the essence — which does not preclude a substantial union of soul and body.[43]

Our conclusion would be that the body is completely united to the soul, since it subsists and acts only through the latter; the soul is not united to the body to the extent that it has its own subsistence and in its intellectual life can and does act without the body; it is united to the body, however, to the degree that it is the form of the body and acts through the body in those operations in which matter is involved.[44]

The Higher Face of the Soul. Though the soul is a single substance in man and has many powers or faculties, only the intellect belongs properly to the essence of the soul. All other powers proceed from the soul, but are conferred on the body and operate in the composite.[45] They thus belong to the lower face of the soul and are under the control of the practical intellect, the *virtus activa*, whereby the soul rules the body and forms practical judgments for everyday life.[46] Their ultimate purpose, however, is to serve the higher face of the soul, the *virtus contemplativa*. They are a preparation for the truly intellectual life of the soul, and thus a means whereby the soul attains perfection.

This perfection, as in the Neoplatonic tradition, lies in the union here and hereafter of the possible intellect with the Active Intellect. From it and it alone our intellect receives the intelligibles. There is no abstraction in an Aristotelian sense whereby the intellect would penetrate to the intelligible in the sensible species, but an infusion of forms pre-existent in the Agent Intellect. Sense knowledge only prepares the way, by causing the human intellect to turn its face upward to the intelligibles and the Giver of Forms.[47]

Taking a cue from the Koran (xxiv, 35), Avicenna uses the metaphor of a lamp to illustrate the steps of the development of the intellect: the first power of the soul is one which prepares it to turn toward the intelligibles: this some call the material intellect, and it is like the niche, capable of holding knowledge yet knowing nothing of itself. This is followed by another faculty which comes to the soul when it is put in act in regard to the first intelligibles (this is the *intellectus in effectu:* the material intellect as somewhat developed). By this the soul can acquire further knowledge, either by reflection (which is like the olive tree) or by intuition (which is like the oil); it is now the *intellectus in habitu*, and is the glass of the lamp. When the intel-

[43] If, as Avicenna insists, essence is only essence, everything else that is intrinsically connected with the essence and proper to it is reckoned an accident in the peculiar sense of *lazim:* e.g., unity, ipseity, existence itself. (Cf. *Logica*, fol. 4ra–vb; *Isharat*, ed. *cit.*, p. 88 ff.; and especially the treatment by A. M. Goichon, *La Distinction*, pp. 114–123.) *Accidere* of the Latin Avicenna is better translated *sequi* (A. M. Goichon, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–91).

[44] Cf. *Najât*, *loc. cit.*, 13, pp. 58–63; *De anima*, V, 4 (fol. 24va–25rb); A. M. Goichon, *La Distinction*, pp. 456–459.

[45] Avicenna must be credited with many contributions to the study of the external and especially the internal senses (on the latter, cf. *De anima*, I, 5, fol. 5ra–b; III, 1–3, fol. 17va–20rb; *Najât*, 3, pp. 30–31; 8, pp. 41–45; and *Isharat*, pp. 316–323).

[46] *De anima*, I, 5 (fol. 5va): *Virtus activa est illa virtus quam habet anima propter debitum quod debet ei quod est infra eam, scil. corpus ad regendum aliquid* (cf. also V, 2, fol. 23vb; *Najât*, 4, p. 32; *Isharat*, p. 324).

[47] *Isharat*, p. 435 ff.

ligibles are actually given to it and it considers them, it is the *intellectus adeptus*, the lamp, which is now lit by the fire from above, the Agent Intellect.[48]

Beyond this, which is the process of intellectual knowledge of this sublunar world, lies the knowledge of the purely intelligible forms of the Intellect itself and the other separate Intelligences. This is the sphere of mystical knowledge, for which is required a purification in both the moral and intellectaul order, a turning away from and a "noble ignorance" of the things of this world. Should the soul be wholly purified at the moment it leaves the body, it will ascend to the intelligible world to enjoy uninterrupted contemplation of the separate substances and the irradiation of the First Being. Should it be less perfect, Avicenna sometimes seems to concede it a period of purification, and at others an incomplete happiness.[49]

Conclusion. Ibn Sina is a profound Muslim thinker deeply influenced by Hellenistic thought. Despite his Mohammedan belief and milieu, which had a real effect on him, he does not escape an implicit monism as the basis of his system, while his attempt to save contingency by the distinction of essence and existence is none too successful.

In Arabic circles Avicenna seems to have found more enemies than friends. In the Christian West, however, his *Shifâ*, translated at Toledo in the second quarter of the twelfth century, soon proved very influential in shaping scholastic thought. Already before 1150 a *De anima*, usually attributed without great proof to Dominicus Gundissalinus, was to attempt an integration of Avicenna and the patristic tradition on the human soul.[50] The monism of the *Shifâ* was to give rise to a treatise *De intelligentiis*, curiously attributed to Avicenna himself, which proposed a Christian interpretation of Neoplatonic metaphysics.[51] The extent to which the great Scholastics borrowed from his metaphysics and psychology is perhaps greater than commonly admitted. Roger Bacon and St. Bonaventure seem to have studied him together at Paris about the year 1238; St. Thomas found much in which to oppose him, but also several doctrines which he transformed into his new synthesis; and Duns Scotus took at least some of his starting point from his thought. The fourteenth century, however, seems to have preferred Averroës as the commentator and guide to Aristotle.

§ 3. *Al-Ghazzali*

Despite the presence of followers of Avicenna and many commentaries which carried on his thought, a reaction among the thinkers of Islam comes as no sur-

[48] From *Isharat*, p. 326; cf. *De anima*, I, 5 (fol. 5va–b); *Najât*, *loc. cit.*, 16, pp. 68–69.

[49] Cf. L. Gardet, *La pensée religieuse . . .*, pp. 143 ff.; and art. "En l'honneur . . . ," *Revue Thomiste*, 51 (1951), 340–345.

[50] Cf. J. T. Muckle, "The Treatise *De Anima* of Dominicus Gundissalinus," *Mediaeval Studies*, II (1940), 23–103. Gundissalinus, himself one of the translators, is the author of a *De immortalitate animae* which relies on Avicenna, and of a *De unitate* long thought to be from Boethius but which uses Ibn Gebirol (*infra*).

[51] In *Avicenna Opera Omnia* (Venice, 1508), fol. 64va–67vb. A new edition with the more correct title, *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, is given by R. De Vaux, *Notes et Textes sur l'Avicennisme latin aux confins des xiie–xiiie siècles* (Paris, 1934), pp. 88–140.

prise. Both the Mutakallemin and the Sufites attacked or criticized him, either for his heterodox teachings or for his theory of mysticism. Later Averroës was to reject his Neoplatonic Aristotelianism in favor of a pure Peripateticism.

Of these early critics the most famous is Abu Hamed Mohamet ibn Mohamet al-Ghazzali (A.D. 1058–1111), known to the Latins as Algazel. Born at Tūs in Khorasan, he studied the mysticism of the Sufis, passed to the pursuit of law, and then to that of philosophy which he taught at Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. Abandoning philosophy, he withdrew into solitude as a wandering dervish. In this period he wrote a considerable number of works in which he attacked philosophy, especially the system of Avicenna, and developed his own religious doctrine.

The Latin Algazel. The first of these works was the *Maqasid-al-falasifa* (The Tendencies of the Philosophers): a plain statement of the teachings of al-Farabi and Avicenna. "My whole purpose is only to make clear the tendencies of the philosophers' words . . . proceeding in this by the simple method of narrating and repeating" (Preface). Intended as the prelude to a forthright attack, this work alone (without its Preface) came to the Latin world as the *Metaphysics* or *Physics* of Algazel.[52] Though a few medievals seem to have known the truth of the matter, the majority reckoned Algazel as the faithful disciple of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Thus he was saluted and used by St. Albert, John de la Rochelle, and others.

The Real al-Ghazzali. In the original trilogy, the so-called *Metaphysics* was followed by the *Tahafut-al-falasifa* (The Destruction [also interpreted as the Incoherence] of the Philosophers). In this al-Ghazzali undertook to refute some twenty theses, especially from Avicenna, which he declared to be erroneous, that is, contradicting both reason and the religious teaching of the Koran. Four of these he stamped as impious, since they denied the temporal character of the world, the divine knowledge of singulars, the resurrection of the body. The remaining sixteen were considered as reprehensible innovations. The net result of his disputations is a skepticism which denies the validity of reason and its powers to attain the truth. Of itself, reason leads man into a labyrinth of probable hypotheses and often into error, even in the field of theology. Intuition must accompany reason, and both must probe the marvels of the heart, for here alone is found the word of God.

In the same vein, the third great work of al-Ghazzali, the *Ihya-alum-al-din* (Restoration of Religious Knowledge), undertakes to criticize the Islamic theologians and their argumentations.[53] One must return to the pure theology of the Koran which demands faith and not reasoning or proofs. Yet he does not mean thereby a barren and blind faith, but one purified and illumined from on high which can attain the mysteries of the law. The *Ihya* presents a very lengthy and detailed "new" or "renewed" theology.

Conclusion. The work of al-Ghazzali may be considered the climax of Muslim theology; thereafter there was little original development. Its most important contribution, as the author intended, was to Sufi mysticism. "Knowledge is the tree; practice, its fruit." As the reaction of Muslim theology to the philosophy of al-Farabi and Avicenna, it did not indeed impede the development of philosophy in the Arabian world, but caused it to move westward to Spain, where it flowered anew in Avempace, Ibn Thofail, and Averroës.

[52] For an edition see J. T. Muckle, *Algazel's Metaphysics, a Mediaeval Translation* (Toronto, 1933). Cf. D. Salmon, "The Mediaeval Latin Translations of Alfarabi's Works," *New Scholasticism*, XIII (1939), 245–261.

[53] An abridgment, *The Alchemy of Happiness* (Albany, 1873; London, 1910); cf. also W. M. Watt, *The Faith and Practice of Al Ghazali* (New York, 1953).

CHAPTER XVIII: The Falasifa of Spain

MUSLIM philosophy in Spain[1] had its roots in the East and manifested no interest in or connection with the Christian culture of the conquered people of the peninsula. Indeed, the Arabs and Berberi, uncouth warriors and fanatic Mohammedans, who invaded the land in A.D. 711, were hostile to literary pursuits among their own people. For political reasons many of the caliphs of Cordoba repressed any speculative thinking, while the orthodox Muslim clergy, the *maliki*, resolutely opposed as so many heresies all attempts at philosophy.

§ *1. Early Trends*

Only in Andalusia after the middle of the ninth century did a philosophy of a Neoplatonic character make its appearance, and this in the guise of Mutazilite doctrine and quasi-monastic asceticism. Gradually, despite unsettled political conditions, Aristotelianism filtered in from the East, to gain ground in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and reach its climax in Averroës.

Ibn Masarra.[2] Little is known directly of Ibn Masarra (883–931) and his school, for their writings (if any) have not survived. But from the attacks of his enemies it appears that he learned much from his father who had been trained in the schools of Basra, that he lived a kind of eremitical life with his disciples and so escaped official persecution, and that his teaching was a combination of Neoplatonic, pseudo-Empedoclean (i.e., hermetic), cabbalistic, and Mohammedan doctrines. Perhaps his most important tenet was that of a spiritual matter common to all beings except God. This he considered the first hypostasis of the intelligible world and, after the Koran, likened it to the divine Throne. In this he anticipates Ibn Gebirol.

His school continued to exist for more than a century after his death, owing to the veneration in which he was held and to the political tolerance of al-Hakam II, whose reign was marked by a flowering of the sciences. But when the school openly professed its doctrines, opposition caused its dispersal. In the end, it degenerated into a political party.

Early Aristotelianism. The first works of Aristotle known in the West were those of the *Organon*, and despite tragic political conditions and official and popular hostility they soon attracted much attention. Thus IBN HAZM (994–1063), author of over four hundred works both in philosophy and Islamic theology, wrote on the classification of the sciences, the laws of reasoning, as well as on speculative questions of the Koran.[3] Later, IBN AL-SID (1052–1127) made the first attempt in the West to harmonize Greek thought and Mohammedan belief. Philosophically, his doctrine was a Neoplatonism with Neopythagorean elements made to agree with religious orthodoxy. At the same time, he anticipated

[1] Cf. D. Cabanelas, "La filosofía hispano-musulmana," *Verdad y Vida*, XI (1953), 257–303.

[2] M. Asín, *Ibn Masarra y su escuela* (Obras escogidas de don Migule Asin, I, Madrid, 1946); D. Cabanelas, *art. cit.*, pp. 261–269.

[3] M. Asín, *Abenhazam de Cordoba y su Historia critica de las ideas religiosas*, 5 vols. (Madrid, 1927–1932).

Averroës on the unity of the active intellect.

The first real philosopher of this group, however, was Abu Bakr Mohamet ibn Yahya (or Ibn Bayya, or Badja), known to the Latins as AVEMPACE (c. 1087–1138).[4] Besides philosophy, he was well versed in mathematics, medicine, music, and astronomy. But the constant preoccupation of his thought, as is evident from his extant work, was the final end of man. Thus to his favorite disciple Ibn al-Imam he wrote a *Letter of Farewell* (*Epistola expeditionis:* to accompany him on a journey to Mecca), to instruct him on union with the active intellect; while the *Guide of the Solitary*, his most notable work (though incomplete), the *Treatise on the Union of the Intellect with Man*, and his tract *On the Soul* set forth the doctrine in greater detail. These postulate the teaching of Aristotle on the supreme happiness and final end of man: the intellectual contemplation of the separate substances which are interpreted as the Intellect and its forms. The soul may ascend to this goal of pure intellection by a series of abstractions and a progressive renouncement of apparent goods, of acts and habits, images, emotions, and appetites inspired by material forms and even by singular spiritual forms. Such theories, apparently, were intended to agree with Sufism.

Ibn Tufail. Known also as Thofail, Abentofal, and even Abubacher, he was the quasi successor of Avempace and immediate forerunner of Averroës (1108?–1185).[5] As vizir and court physician to the sultan Abu Yaqub Yusuf (1163–1184), he was able to foster the growth of philosophical studies, and is said to have introduced Averroës to the sultan who commissioned the latter to comment on Aristotle. He seems to have authored only one work (unknown to the Latins), a philosophical novel, *Hayy ibn Yagzan*, known much later to the West as the *Philosophus autodidactus*.[6] It pictures the life story of one who from birth has lived in solitude on a desert isle of the Indian Ocean and who by the sole power of experience and reason eventually rises to the contemplation of the pure intelligibles in accordance with both Greek thought and Muslim theology. The work was intended to show both the harmony and difference of philosophy, theology, and religion. Religion is but a veiled and vague expression of the pure truth to which pure reason attains; religious belief therefore is for the many, the illumination of philosophy for the few. Midway is theology, which is able to interpret allegorically the obscurities of the Koran and reconcile its dogmas with the postulates of philosophy.

§ 2. *Averroës: Ibn Rushd*

Abu'l-Walid Muhammad ibn Rushd (1126–1198), known more frequently as Averroës, marks the peak of Muslim scholasticism in the West. Son of a Cordoba family famous for its jurists, he studied law, medicine, and philosophy, became cadi or judge of Seville (1169) and Cordoba (1171), and, at the retirement of Tufail (1182), physician to the sultan Yaqub Yusuf. He continued in this post

[4] Cf. S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris, 1859), pp. 383–418; for a summary of more recent studies, cf. D. Cabanelas, *art. cit.*, pp. 284–290.

[5] It seems somewhat questionable that he is the Abubacher who with Avempace is accused by Averroës of identifying the material (possible) intellect with the imagination (*De anima*, III, comm. 36). Likely, this Abubacher was actually Abu Bakr Razi (d. c. 925), opponent of al-Kindi (cf. D. Cabanelas, *art. cit.*, p. 294).

[6] A Renaissance version: *Philosophus autodidactus, sive Epistola Abi Iafar ebn Thofail de Hai ebn Iodkan, in qua ostenditur, quomodo ex Inferiorum contemplatione ad Superiorum notitiam Ratio humana ascendere possit. Ex arabica in Linguam Latinam versa ab Edoardo Pocockio* (Oxford, 1671). English versions were made by several writers, and the book attracted much attention in England.

under the latter's son until 1195 when the intrigues of his enemies caused him to fall from favor. Pardoned in 1198, he went to Marrakus in Morocco, where he died soon after.

The Work of Averroës. Original works and commentaries on Aristotle make up the writings of Averroës.[7] Among the former are a famous treatise on medicine, the *Kullijat* (which the Latins named *Colliget*), others on astronomy, jurisprudence, the relation of faith and reason, questions on the metaphysics of Avicenna (with whom he disagreed), an answer to al-Ghazzali (*Tahafut-al-tahafut*, the *Destructio destructionis*); and smaller works: *De animae beatitudine*, *De substantia orbis*, and an *Epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine*.

The great work of Averroës is his immense series of commentaries on the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, undertaken perhaps at the suggestion of the sultan (though this is likely a legend intended to enhance the honor of Ibn Tufail). The works fall into three groups, more because of chronology and the internal development of Averroës than for any other reason. The earliest (c. 1159–1162) are the *Summae* or *Compendia* (also called *Paraphrases* or *Epitomes*) on the *Organon*, *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *De anima*, etc. These were followed (1168–1175) by the *taljisat* or "middle" commentaries (*expositio media*) on the same books, together with epitomes of the *Parva naturalia* and *On Animals*. The third group (1184–1198) is made up of the Great Commentaries (*tafsirat* or *suruh*) on the *Analytics*, *Physics*, *De caelo*, *De anima*, and the *Metaphysics*. All of these are found in Latin versions; many of the Arabic originals have been lost.

For Averroës, as for Dante, Aristotle was the master of those who know: "I believe this man was a rule in nature and a model which nature produced to show the ultimate in human perfection."[8] If Aristotle is thus the Philosopher, Averroës in turn fully merits his title of the Commentator. Though he had but mediocre translations on which to rely, and knew neither Greek nor the historical milieu or chronology of the pre-Socratics or the Peripatos, his understanding of the text is very surprising and his commentary usually faithful and exact. His philosophical insight must have equaled that of his model and ideal.

At the same time, he had certain theories of his own which he sometimes found bolstered by the text on which he commented and which in turn he embodied in his own original treatises.

Reason and Revelation. It was inevitable that, like many of his predecessors, Averroës had to face the basic and practical problem of the relation of faith and reason. The society in which he lived was made up of simple believers, the priests and wise men of Muslimism and those who like himself strove to follow both the Koran and the philosophy of Aristotle. The philosophically minded were accused of unorthodoxy and heresy by the theologians who could point to

[7] We cite according to the Venice edition of 1550 (ten quarto vols.) by volume and folio. This edition was known as the Iunta edition and is the best and most commonly used. A new *Corpus commentarium Averroes in Aristotelem* is being prepared by the Mediaeval Academy of America; of this the *Parva Naturalia* (VII) and the *In Libros de Anima* (VI, 1) have appeared to date. For studies cf. Bibliography, p. 236.

[8] *In Libros de Anima*, III, comm. 14 (t. VI, fol. 169ra, 59): *Credo enim quod iste homo fuit regula in natura et exemplar quod natura invenit ad demonstrandum ultimam perfectionem humanam.* Cf. also *Paraphrasis in Libros de Gen. Anim.*, I, 20 (t. VI, 216rb9 ff.), for a prayer of thanksgiving to God for the gift of Aristotle. — See also E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), p. 642, n. 17.

al-Ghazzali's *Destructio* as proving their incriminations; the philosophers in turn protested their innocence and accused the theologians of perverting the Law, while the simple believers were scandalized by such dissension. Yet philosophical speculation has its place, for one cannot render higher worship to God than to know His works;[9] on the other hand, the theologians must guard against interpreting the Law at will, for the Koran (iii, 5) reserves interpretation "to men of profound knowledge."

Averroës' answer,[10] influenced by Ibn Tufail, was to clarify the degrees of knowledge admitted by the Koran, assign these according to the capacities of each stratum of society, and forbid the higher to divulge its knowledge to the lower. This implied a definite hierarchy of knowledge and certain other consequences.

The Koran, which is the result of a miracle, is truth itself; and whoever departs from it is a heretic and deserving of the punishment of heretics. Some of its truth is indeed beyond the capacity of any intellect, and God supplies for this by prophecy. Other truths are such that they are unintelligible to some men, either because they are naturally deficient (*in radice creationis*) or because they lack training; thus the *vulgus*, the common herd, uses its imagination and cannot reach the truly intelligible. Yet those who, trained in the lower sciences, use their intellects and not their imagination may come to a higher truth. For God has indeed not made all men alike: some are men of demonstration, *quos dedicavit Deus veritati*, and these are philosophers; others are men of dialectic, who are satisfied with probable arguments, and these are theologians (Mutazilites, Ash'arites), while the majority are men of persuasion, to whose imagination and passions appeal is made through oratory.

Each group therefore must understand the Law in the way in which it is capable, nor must one group try to teach the other: "Just as some food is good for one animal but poison for another, so is a doctrine good for one man but not for another." The common man must be satisfied with the literal meaning of the Law, and thus be a simple believer.[11] "But if you belong to those men who are so created that they can receive science, and have constancy and leisure, I command you to devote yourself to the books of the philosophers, and the sciences they contain, that you may know the truth to be found there or its contrary. At the same time, you must not divulge it to

[9] *Comm. in Metaph.*, II, 1, comm. 2; quoted from the Hebrew by S. Munk (*Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* [Paris, 1859], p. 455, n. 4); it is not contained in the Latin (t. VIII, f. 14va).

[10] To be found in the *Destructio destructionis* (more properly rendered as the *Incoherence of the 'Incoherence'*), undertaken to show that al-Ghazzali has proved not the incoherence of philosophy but simply his own incoherence (*et appellatur hic liber Destructio simpliciter, non autem destructio philosophiae: Destructio*, disp. 6, concl., t. IX, f. 40vb62 ff.). In addition, three treatises bear directly on the question: "On the accord between the Law of religion and the law of philosophy," "On the removal of the veils on methods of proving the dogmas of religion," and an Appendix to the first work.

[11] *Destructio*, disp. 6 (fol. 40ra40 ff.): *Non pervenit intelligentia vulgi ad tales profunditates, et cum disputatur cum eis in hoc, destruitur divinitas apud eos. Quare disputatio cum eis in hac scientia prohibita est, cum sufficiet in felicitate eorum ut intelligant in hoc id quod potest percipere intelligentia eorum.* — Cf. also Disp. 3, fol. 26ra–b.

those of the crowd, for they have not the principles to follow you."

The middle group, the *Loquentes*, receives little or no commendation from Averroës. He must perforce admit their existence, but he despises them for using sophistic argumentation and for contradicting both sense and intellect, not to speak of the Law. "If, then, you lack the conditions of a philosopher, devote yourself to the simple sayings of the Law, and do not be concerned with the credulities of these men, for if you belong to them you are neither a man of truth nor a man of the Law." Al-Ghazzali is their champion, yet his reasoning is ever sophistical and rhetorical.

For Averroës, therefore, *philosophy* stands at the head and summit of all knowledge, since it yields absolute science and absolute truth. Following Aristotle, he sees it as the divine science, the subject of which is God; therefore it is the noblest of all sciences.[12] Below this is grudgingly placed the religious learning of the *Loquentes* (which does not seem to be designated formally as theology), built on probable reasonings, sophistry, and rhetoric. Last of all is simple faith or religion, the acceptance of the Law in its literal meaning.

Each of these grades concerns itself with the Law and its teachings; each is a different degree of understanding one and the same truth. This does not imply, however, that Averroës is guilty of the accusation of holding a "double truth," namely that reason may arrive at a truth opposite to that of revelation.[13]

Problems. Al-Ghazzali had accused the philosophers, remarks Averroës in concluding the *Destructio destructionis*, of erring greatly on three broad questions: the nature of the soul, the divine knowledge of particulars, and the antiquity of the world; and had claimed further that these problems were not within the competence of the philosophers. But this man himself, retorts Averroës, has erred both in regard to science and in the respect to the Law: *et Deus vindictam de eo faciat!* Therefore Averroës attacks anew each of these questions (in reverse order) in the course of the *Destructio*. Since they contain in essence the whole of the Commentator's own philosophy, we shall examine them in turn.

The Eternity of the World. Avicenna's reasoning had led him to hold that the world, or at least its basic elements, the intelligences, time, movement, prime matter, though essentially posterior to God, were eternally produced. He had thought that though his conclusions were in apparent contradiction to the Koran, this might be explained away by the proper exegesis of the text of the Law. The *Destructio* of al-Ghazzali undoubtedly advanced strong and sometimes solid criticism against such a theory, in the defense of the revealed doctrine of the temporal creation of the world. But it also forced Averroës to renew the attack and restate the theory of eternal creation in his own terms.[14]

There is a First Principle, indeed, who is the Glorious God, for Aristotle has abundantly proved that there must be an Eternal Mover on which the world depends. There are then only two real

[12] *Summa in Metaph.*, VI, 2 (t. IX, fol. 69rb39 ff.).

[13] Cf. M. Asín, "El Averroismo teológico de Santo Tomás de Aquino," in *Homenaje à D. Fran. Codera* (Zaragoza, 1904), 271–331.

[14] *Destructio*, disp. 1 (fol. 8 ff.); and *Epitome in Metaph.*, IV (t. VIII, fol. 181 ff.).

beings in question here: the mover and the moved. But if the mover is eternal, its movement is eternal; and therefore the thing moved, the world, must also be eternal. The mover cannot have been first in repose and then moved, for that would imply violence from an external agent and destroy its primacy as unmoved mover. Al-Ghazzali cannot therefore claim that there was an hour, a definite time, when the world was produced or created by the will of God. He is in error also as to the nature of time, which is not something created or generated but rather a mere consequence or accident of movement and is with movement a *continuum aeternum*. — Such a doctrine does away indeed with any creation *ex nihilo*, which Averroës considered merely as the opinion of the theologians.[15] At the same time, it does not deny the dependence of the world on God as the thing moved depends on its mover: the causal dependence of the possible on the necessary, which does not of itself imply time or a beginning of time.

The fault of the theologians, Averroës states, consists in making a comparison between causality in God and in sublunar agents whether natural or voluntary. In secondary causes, the action begins at a definite time before which the agent is somehow drawn to the action either by force of nature or by choice and change of will. God's causality is entirely different: there is no will (because that is a passion and implies change) nor choice (which seeks something lacking to an agent). Much less is it a merely natural action, since this is without knowledge. Yet God is *volens et agens*, but not in the manner known to us: *agens mundi* in that He commands from eternity the Intelligences to move the spheres. This is all that is meant by speaking of the Creator and the creature, the Agent and the thing acted upon.[16]

God's Knowledge of Particulars. This interpretation of creation or the dependence of the world on the First Principle supplies likewise the answer to the second accusation brought against the philosophers, that they deny providence because God would not know particulars. This, says Averroës, is a foolish question: *declarabimus quod sit quaestio vana in Deo glorioso*. The command of God, or what Averroës calls the *una potentia vitalis*, extends to all things at once: therefore, God does not need knowledge of particulars, for the lower forces act as His vicars.[17] Or again, by knowing Himself He knows the order and proportion of things; but this cannot be either uni-

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[15] *Metaphysics*, XII, comm. 18 (VIII, f. 143rb): *Dicentes autem creationem dicunt quod agens creat totum ens de novo ex nihilo, quod non habet necesse ad hoc ut fit materia in quam agat, sed creat totum. Et haec est opinio Loquentium in nostra lege, et lege Christianorum.*

[16] *Destructio*, disp. 3 (fol. 24ra44 ff.): *Ex eo, quod apparet quod omnes orbes moventur motu diurno, licet moveantur motu proprio, verificatum est apud eos quod iubens in istis motibus est primum principium, et est Deus gloriosus, et quod ipse iussit omnibus principiis, ut iubeant caeteris orbibus in aliis motibus, et hoc iussu permansit caelum et terra. . . . Habent a primo principio status tales, quibus non perficitur esse nisi in illo tali loco, et copulatio, quae est inter ea, est illud, quod facit ea esse causata ab invicem, et omnia a primo principio, et non intelligitur de agente et acto, et creatore et creato in illo esse, nisi hoc tantum.* — This does not deny the Aristotelian dictum that the *Primum Movens* moves as a final cause (*Comm. in Metaph.*, XII, comm. 37, t. VIII, fol. 150rb).

[17] *Destructio*, disp. 3 (fol. 27vb49 ff.; 28ra 22 ff.). Cf. also Disp. 11–13 (fol. 46rb–51ra); and *Metaphysics*, XII, comm. 51 (VIII, fol. 157va–158rb).

versal or particular knowledge, since such is caused by things.

In his view this does not destroy the doctrine of Providence. Sublunar things owe their being to the last Intelligence, by which their perpetuity as a *species* is conserved. Ultimately they depend on the First Principle; therefore, God has care of us.[18] But to say that God has knowledge and therefore care of each individual (which, in his opinion, would suppose new particular knowledge on God's part) is not only erroneous but impious!

The Nature of the Soul. The question of the human soul is one of the most profound in all philosophy: *sermo de anima est nimis profundus*. Averroës makes it more difficult by treating it in several works[19] in which many deviations from past theories are introduced in a doctrine that is not always clear and concise. The context of the problem is not only the difficult chapters of Aristotle's *De anima* but also the whole cosmic order as conceived in the Neoplatonic tradition and retained by Averroës.

God is the First Principle; and, in order below Him, a second cause (not specified); then the Agent Intellect (which is identified with the Holy Spirit), the human soul, form, and body.[20] In the soul of rational animals is to be found a rational power (an intellect proper to man), plus motive, imaginative and sensible powers. The goal of the soul here is to reach union with the separate Intellect and to achieve contemplation of the separate substances.

The soul of man, a substance perduring from generation until death only, is individual since it is bound up with the body. But since such numerical multiplication is the result of matter, the intellect which Aristotle calls unmixed and from without cannot be individualized in each man. This holds true also of the material or possible intellect, so that Averroës in departure from Avicenna and others grants the individual man another kind of intellect, a *passive intellect*. This is nothing more than a simple disposition in the soul to receive intelligibles, though of itself it is actually insufficient to receive them and requires the light of the Agent Intellect. When the latter illumines the passive intellect, this contact produces a combination which is called the material or possible intellect, to signify that it is this intellect which can now receive intelligibles. The Scholastics of the West, however, were in error in interpreting

[18] *Epitome Metaph.*, tr. IV (t. VIII, fol. 185va53): *Eorum autem principia acquisiverunt illud a primo principio, quod est Deus gloriosus et excelsus: ergo prima cura de nobis est a Deo glorioso, et ipse est causa loci habitabilis super terram, et quicquid invenitur hic de eo quod est bonum perfectum, provenit a voluntate et intentione sua.* — But individual providence is denied, *ibid.*, fol. 185vb14 ff.

[19] The middle commentary on the *De anima* was never translated and is unedited today (S. Munk gives certain key passages, *op. cit.*, pp. 445–448); so also a treatise on the material intellect (see analysis in S. Munk, pp. 448–454). In addition to the Great Commentary and the Epitome on the *De anima*, the question is treated in the *Tract. de animae beatitudine* (t. IX, fol. 64 ff.), written after these commentaries and considered by Averroës as a better statement (fol. 64ra44–46); of this a part forms the *Epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine* (*ibid.*, fol. 67–68).

[20] *De animae beatitudine*, c. 5 (t. IX, fol. 66rb ff.). In the *Destructio*, disp. 17 (disp. 1 de Physica) (fol. 56rb6 ff.), however, the Koran is said to identify the Agent Intellect with an Angel.

this to be a second intellect; though unique and one for all men, it is not separate from the Agent Intellect but is rather the latter as particularizing itself in an individual soul.[21]

The subsequent union of the material intellect, and therefore also of the passive intellect, with the agent intellect and all pure intelligibles is very obscurely described. Yet the ultimate consequence is clear: there is no immortality of soul as of an intelligent substance capable of surviving the body. The individual passive intellect perishes with the body, while the possible or material intellect is absorbed into the Agent Intellect; and all, eventually, is absorbed by God.[22] Such a doctrine is a practical consequence also of ranking the species above the individual and of seeing in the soul only the act of the body: it has no further function once the body is destroyed.

Conclusion. The doctrine of Averroës, it is evident, marks a departure from and a certain reaction to preceding Arabian Neoplatonism. It is an attempt to return to the pure doctrine of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, though the author does not totally succeed in the objectivity of his interpretation.

His influence on the history of Western medieval thought was decisive. While the Muslims themselves seem to have soon destroyed his works, the praise given them by Maimonides inspired the Jews to accept and translate or synopsize them in Hebrew. Averroës became their chief authority with the *Guide* of Moses until the fifteenth century.

From the Hebrew and from the original Arabic the works were translated into Latin at Toledo and especially at the court of Frederick II, by Michael Scott, Herman of Dalmatia, and others. The works were not known at Paris before 1230, and it was some time before the Scholastics recognized the true nature of Averroism. After 1250, it became the object of severe attacks from many quarters, though a few like St. Thomas drew much good from the Commentator, while a certain group in the arts faculty of Paris took him as its guide to Aristotle.

[21] Cf. text in S. Munk, *op. cit.*, p. 447, from the Middle Commentary; or the long and complicated *Commentum quintum in III de Anima* (t. VI, fol. 160va20 ff.). See also E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 645, n. 23.

[22] The *Destructio* plainly denies the survival of the soul (disp. 19 [3 *de Phys.*], fol. 62vb57).

SECTION II: THE JEWISH PHILOSOPHERS

There were few philosophers among the Jews, as Moses Maimonides remarked, for several reasons. Only a few scholars had the requisite education, and they transmitted their findings orally. A cultural decadence had resulted from the conditions under which Jews often had to live in both Moslem and Christian lands. But above all, a general distrust of reason and philosophy prevailed among the people accustomed more to the moral precepts of the Torah and the Talmud than to speculation and dogma.

The philosophical movement we here consider is the result, then, of contact with Moslem thought in Egypt and Spain rather than of any tradition within Jewry itself. This contact paralleled the development of doctrine among the Arabs: at first it produced theological schools in revolt against rabbinical authoritarianism, and only later in a few representatives an interest in the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic interpretation of the world.

CHAPTER XIX: Early Philosophers

MAIMONIDES is properly reckoned the greatest of the Jewish philosophers of antiquity, if not indeed "the greatest Jew since Bible times." But the way was prepared for him by others of lesser importance. Such were Saadia ben Josef who, though not the oldest Jewish philosopher, since Isaac Israeli is somewhat earlier, is reckoned the founder of this new movement; and Ibn Gebirol, whose work was popular in the thirteenth century.

§ *1. The New Movement*

Saadia ben Josef. Celebrated as an exegete, theologian, and talmudist, Saadia (882–942) was born at Fajjum in Egypt; hence he is also known as al-Fayyumi. In 928 he became the head of the Talmudic school at Sura in Babylon, and here attempted to elaborate a doctrine harmonizing Jewish traditions and scientific and philosophical opinion. Thus his most famous work, the *Book of Beliefs and Opinions*, is at once a defense of Jewish dogma and a reconciliation with philosophical thought. That the book is divided into *Unity* and *Justice* shows clearly the influence of the Mutazilites from whom the author also borrowed many of his arguments.

Opposed to eternity of matter and any theory of emanation, he tried to demonstrate creation *ex nihilo*, and the existence of God on the basis of such creation. Quite correctly he held to the divine liberty in creation, but overemphasized the will of God as the sole cause. This was to have influence later on Ibn Gebirol. Saadia was entirely unknown to the Christian Scholastics.

Isaac Israeli. The first Jewish Neoplatonist, Isaac ben Solomon Israeli (c. 865–955) was better known to his own age and later as a physician. As a philosopher, he was more a compiler, as is evidenced by his *Book of Elements* (which transmitted much of Galen's teachings on human physiology), the *Book of Definitions*, and a fragment extant of his *Book of Spirit and Soul*.[1] These present a mixture of Aristotelian logic and physics, elements from Galen and Hippocrates, and many notions drawn from Neoplatonism, especially on the origin of the world, the nature of the soul, and its union with the body. While the works contain a certain amount of doctrine on God, there is no attempt to reconcile Jewish belief with Greek thought. A little severely perhaps Moses Maimonides said the treatises consisted in windy imaginings and empty talk.

§2. *Ibn Gebirol*

The first Jewish philosopher of Andalusia (c. 1020–1070), yet almost unknown to later fellow Jews save as a hymnologist, Solomon ibn Gebirol (Avicebrol, Avincebron, etc.) was popular among Chris-

[1] For editions, cf. Bibliography, p. 236 f.

tian Scholastics for his *Fons Vitae*.[2] If, as it seems, this was but part of a trilogy on Matter and Form, the Will, and the First Essence, the second and third parts have been lost. The extant text is a dialogue on creatures, which proposes universal matter and form as the explanation of substantiality. The doctrine is Neoplatonic in character, the direct sources being the *Theology of Aristotle*, the *Five Substances* of pseudo-Empedocles, and the *Liber de causis*. However, further research may possibly show that Gebirol drew his doctrine largely from Ibn Masarra. There is such slight trace of open Judaism in the work that the Middle Ages thought Avicebron was a Mohammedan or even a Christian.

Universal Hylomorphism. The end of man, the dialogue begins, is to raise his soul to the higher world and there attain union. This man does by knowledge and by virtue, for these free the soul from the darkness and captivity of nature. The knowledge for which man is made is the science of all things *secundum quod sunt*, and especially the knowledge of the First Essence which sustains and moves man. But the First Essence cannot be known in itself because it is above all else and is infinite. It can, however, be known from the works begotten by it: if we consider the essence of all being (*esse universale*) we can know that the Essence exists.

Now, universal being, i.e., of all things below the First Essence, though multiple as experience shows, is one in that it has two common elements, universal matter and universal form, the roots of all things that are. Of the things that are, some indeed are spiritual and some are material; yet if they are substances, substantiality is common to all while they are diverse in essence: that in which they agree is ultimately matter, that by which they differ is form.

By this Ibn Gebirol does not mean that all things possess corporeal matter, for the ultimate matter to which he refers is the first emanation or creation of God and is spiritual in character. In the realm of being, God is the *First Essence*. From Him flows wisdom, which is the *fountain of life*; and from wisdom emanates a *Will* which draws existence out of nonexistence.[3] The Will produces by creation or emanation the First Matter and the First Form. These are combined to produce the purely spiritual beings: Intelligence, Soul, and Nature, which though composed are simple since they have no corporeity. From Soul, which is also spoken of as three souls, comes the soul of man (or three souls, vegetative, animal, rational). From Nature proceeds the substance subject to the categories, that is, possessing corporeal matter.

Purpose of This Doctrine. Though it has its roots in the past and seems to borrow from Ibn Masarra, such a doctrine is somewhat of a startling innovation. If the role of the divine will, which

[2] Latin version of the twelfth century edited by C. Baeumker, *Avencebrolis Fons Vitae* (Beiträge, I–2–4, 1892–1894). The Hebrew epitome of Falaquera (1225–1290) is published by S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris, 1859), p. 537 ff., with a French translation, *ibid.*, pp. 1–148, and commentary, pp. 151–306. See E. Bertola, *Salomon Ibn Gabirol: vita, opere e pensiero* (Padua, 1953); also I. Husik, *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy* (Philadelphia, 1916 and 1944), pp. 59–79; and J. Guttmann, *Die Philosophie des Judentums*, pp. 102–119.

[3] Thus Gebirol expresses the doctrine of the *Fons Vitae* in a religious poem, "The Royal Crown" (quoted by I. Husik, *op. cit.*, p. 76 ff.).

Gebirol adopted from Saadia ben Josef, carries scriptural connotations, that will seem at times to be a hypostasis somewhat separate from God, finite in action, infinite in essence. This doctrine is intended to safeguard the liberty of creation, as opposed to any necessitarianism. The notion of a First Matter, likened to the Throne of God, which by reception of a *forma corporeitatis* becomes extended matter, is influenced at least remotely by pseudo-Empedocles. The emanation of intelligence, soul, nature is Neoplatonic. But the *ratio essendi* of all substances, spiritual as well as corporeal, is now found in a prime matter which is intellectual or spiritual, the function of which is to bestow subsistence, and in a prime spiritual form, the action of which is to give esse to all things.[4] That all substances are thus composed of matter and form marks the distinction between God and creatures: the First Substance forms a true unity with His attribute (wisdom) with no distinction whatever, whereas the matter and form in things are distinct (thus Falaquera); or, as the Latin version reads: God the Creator is an essence to which belongs essentially what is predicated of it, but the creature is two essences, matter and form.[5]

Influence of Ibn Gebirol. The *Fons Vitae* was Latinized at Toledo c. 1150 by Johannes Hispanus (Ibn Daûd, a convert Jew) and Dominicus Gundissalinus; and was later epitomized by some unknown student. The tract came to be considered the source of certain doctrines, e.g., the universality (and basic unity) of matter, plurality of substantial forms,[6] denial of the activity of bodies (since this was assigned to form), and extreme emphasis on the will. The work had great influence among Latin Scholastics, though one no longer holds that it was so dominant as to shape all pre-Thomist thought.

To William of Auvergne (d. 1249), Avicebron was the most noble of philosophers: *unicus omnium philosophantium nobilissimus*.[7] From the early writings of Roger Bacon and the *Sentences* of St. Bonaventure we may judge that the doctrines of the *Fons Vitae* were well known in the arts faculty of Paris in the first half of the thirteenth century. Thus, the theory of universal hylomorphism was much discussed. Though rejected by William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, and John de la Rochelle, it was accepted into the so-called *Summa fratris Alexandri* and the works of Roger Bacon and St. Bonaventure as applying to angels and the human soul. In England, Thomas of York reveals a marked use of the work in his *Sapientiale*, the first summa of metaphysics of that century. Later, Vital du Four carried the doctrine to an extreme in the *De rerum principio* (long attributed to Duns Scotus). On the other hand, St. Albert and St. Thomas Aquinas resolutely opposed most if not all the doctrines attributed to Ibn Gebirol.

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[4] *Fons Vitae*, V, 22 (*ed. cit.*, p. 298, 13–21): *Descriptio materiae primae . . . haec est, scilicet quod est substantia existens per se, sustentatrix diversitatis, una numero; et iterum describitur sic, quod est substantia receptibilis omnium formarum. Sed descriptio formae universalis haec est, scilicet quod est substantia constituens essentiam omnium formarum; et iterum describitur sic, quod ipsa est sapientia perfecta, lumen purissimum.*

[5] Falaquera, *Epitome*, V, § 67 (S. Munk, *op. cit.*, p. 141); *Fons Vitae*, V, 42 (*ed. cit.*, p. 333, 6 ff.): *Et haec est differentia inter factorem et factum, quia factor est essentia designata essentialiter, et factum est duae essentiae, quae sunt materia et forma.*

[6] Cf. R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controvèrse sur la pluralité des formes* (Phil. Mediévaux II, Louvain, 1951), p. 420 ff. Though the doctrine is often taken proximately from Gebirol, it can be traced back to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Avicenna.

[7] *De Trinitate*, c. 12.

CHAPTER XX: Moses Maimonides

THE immediate successors of Ibn Gebirol, all of whom were unknown to Christian Scholasticism, were Neoplatonic in outlook; several were affected by his moral teachings, few by his metaphysics.[1] Under the influence of the works of al-Farabi and Avicenna, moreover, there was a gradual swing to Aristotelianism as more compatible with Judaism.[2] This new movement, which was to reach its acme in Moses Maimonides, found its first champion in Abraham Ibn Daûd of Toledo (1110–1180). Though overshadowed and superseded by "Rabbi Moysis," Abraham must be credited with a sincere and deliberate effort to harmonize Aristotelianism and Judaism; he began thereby what Moses finished.[3] But he was soon forgotten because of the popularity and prestige of his successor, Moses ben Maimon (1135–1204).

Life and Writings.[4] Known to the medieval Jews as Rambam (from the initials of his name), to the Latins as Rabbi Moysis, to the moderns as Maimonides, this great philosopher and leader was born at Cordoba. The mature years of his life, after much wandering to escape religious persecution, were spent at Fostat or Old Cairo in Egypt. Here, like many of his forebears, he exercised the office of Dayan or local judge in the Jewish community, taught and wrote on both Jewish law and Aristotelian philosophy, and was physician to the Sultan Saladin.

His many works, produced not in great leisure but written amid trials and wanderings and many distractions, have not ceased to influence his people. Though their author was often misunderstood and maligned, their purpose was to achieve a complete system of Judaism, to produce a more enlightened faith and observance of the law, and to solve the apparent conflict between philosophy and religion. Thus, for the guidance of his coreligionists he composed commentaries on the Talmud which were superseded by a commentary on the Misnah (postbiblical code of laws) and by the Misnah Torah (a complete restudy of the Jewish code). Yet his first book, tradition says, was an *Introduction to Logic*; his last, a *Letter on Astrology*; while his *Guide for the Perplexed* was the most outstanding from the philosophical viewpoint. We shall limit ourselves to its doctrine, since it establishes the author's place in the history of philosophy.

The Perplexed. The *More Nebukim* or *Guide*, as its dedicatory letter informs us, was composed amid other occupations and sent chapter by chapter to a favorite pupil, Josef ibn Aknim, who though a believer was puzzled and perplexed by the literal sense of Scripture

[1] Thus Josef ibn Zaddik (d. at Cordoba, 1149). Cf. Bibliography.

[2] For an example of this development, cf. G. Vajda, "Les idées théologiques et philosophiques d'Abraham bar Hiyya," *AHDLMA*, XV (1946), 191–223.

[3] Cf. I. Husik, *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy* (Philadelphia, 1916 and 1944), pp. 197–235; J. Guttmann, *Die Philosophie des Judentums* (München, 1933), pp. 153–173.

[4] For texts and studies, cf. Bibliography, p. 237.

and the theories of (Arabian) theologians. It is not a full treatise or handbook either of metaphysics or of theology, but a guide or aid for reflection for individuals who have personal difficulties in reconciling their belief and the teachings of philosophers. "The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has been trained to believe in our holy law . . . and at the same time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason had attracted him to abide in its sphere, and he finds it difficult to accept as correct the teachings based on the literal interpretation of the law. . . . Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety" (Introduction). The book supposes therefore both belief in Jewish teachings and acceptance of the philosophers, since it seeks to reconcile these two sources of human knowledge not in theory alone but in contact with the actual problems of life.

The answer given throughout the *Guide* respects the rights both of reason and of faith. To function as a true human being, man must seek knowledge through the use of reason, since the possession of the intellect is the mark which distinguishes man from the beast. Reason is man's guide not only in the practical concerns of life, but also in the theoretical vision of the world as a whole and in the pursuit of the knowledge of God through His creation. It is man's duty then to lead the life of reason, to pursue philosophy, since physics and metaphysics lead to a true knowledge of God. On the other hand, we must be conscious of the limits of reason; it is not sufficient of itself to guide man toward the truth needed for a full human and religious life. In addition, man needs divine revelation.[5] This is given to man in Sacred Scripture which has to be properly interpreted with the aid of reason and what sound notions the philosophers may offer us.

From such premises the *Guide* proceeds in three books to examine respectively difficulties on the nature of God, the existence of God and the problem of creation, and the way to achieve a rational or enlightened religious outlook. The first book, one might say, concerns theology; the second, philosophy, while the last comes to grips with practical problems.

How Shall We Think of God? Surprisingly, the *Guide* begins with perplexities on the nature of God rather than on His existence: but while its readers did not deny His existence, many possessed a very inadequate concept of His nature. Their difficulties arose primarily either from the texts of Scripture or from the teachings of theologians. The Torah and the prophets often picture God in a human way, as possessed of body or of emotions or as using material things ("the doors of heaven, Thy book, etc."); or again they seem to ascribe all causation only to God. Such things are not to be taken literally but figuratively. More positively, philosophy supplies us the key to many biblical terms: body and spirit, matter and form, good and evil, etc. We thus use philosophy to recover the truth behind the human language so often used in Sacred Writ.

But besides banishing all anthropomorphisms, the *Guide* goes deeper into

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[5] *Guide*, I, cc. 31–36. Later, Thomas Aquinas was to recall the "five reasons" advanced by Rabbi Moysis for the need of revelation even of things man could naturally know.

the question of the attributes of God and the unity of His nature. If we speak of God as possessing such qualitative attributes as mercy and wisdom or such essential attributes as existence, knowledge, power, will, these are neither accidents in Him nor in any way distinct from His essence, for all attributes are mere logical distinctions of the human mind. As such attributes apply to God and man, they may agree in name (homonyms) but differ completely not only in degree but also in kind. Since this leaves no room for analogy, one may know God's essence only negatively, through the denial of all imperfections. The more we negate, the more we know of God. However, Maimonides does not rest in the "negative way," for God is known through His works, His creatures, and His actions in governing the world: therefore we study the science of nature, that through nature we may come to God. But at best our knowledge is wholly inadequate and unequal to its sublime subject.[6]

Lastly the *Guide* attacks the theologians, especially the Mutazilites and the Mutakallemin. Neither group offers scientific proofs of their theories, for they have begun by examining "what must be the properties of the things that should yield proof for or against a certain creed; when this was ascertained, they asserted that the thing must be endowed with those properties." This is circular reasoning, sophism, not demonstration. Though they have been imitated by our own people, Moses complains, let not the perplexed give such men serious consideration.

God and the Philosophers. Since Moses read and praised the works of his contemporary, Averroës, only late in life, the philosophers (or "scientists") of the second book of the *Guide* are pre-eminently Aristotle, al-Farabi, Avicenna. In their own sphere, the philosophers are generally reliable; at times, however, their conclusions overreach the limits of philosophy, as when they assert the eternity of the world. Yet if we offer them proper correction, they can be reconciled with the Scripture and in turn help us to know God.

The perplexed need not fear the scientists in their teaching on God. They do not destroy our notion of God but accept the existence, incorporeality, and unity of the First Principle. On the basis of some twenty-six propositions drawn from the philosophers, we are able to establish a demonstration of the existence of God from motion. This would be valid even if motion were eternal, a position that was much disputed later.[7] With their help we thus avoid the circular proof of the theologians who argue from a created universe to a Creator. Yet here we must follow a middle course, correcting both extremes. The philosophers, including Aristotle, assume rather than prove the eternity of motion; we cannot argue, as they do, from the world as it is now to the world as it might have been. On the other hand, neither can we demonstrate creation; yet we can show that it is not impossible, thus safeguarding the doc-

[6] *Ibid.*, I, 58: "All that we understand is that He exists, that He is a Being to whom none of His creatures is similar, who had nothing in common with them. . . . In the endeavor to extol Him in words, our efforts are weakness and failure."

[7] Cf. I. Husik, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–260, for a lengthy analysis. As Moses himself said, he did not believe in the eternity of the world, but wished to establish the existence of God by an indisputable proof which would be admitted even by those who held that the world is eternal.

trine that the world is the product of a free intelligence endowed with reason and will.[8]

In the cosmic order, the teachings of the "scientists" are far more in agreement with faith than those of the theologians. The atomism of the Ash'arites, which requires an ever renewing act of God's will, a constant re-creation, to explain the existence of the world, actually destroys the cosmos, the order of the universe; whereas the philosophers agree with us in seeing nature as a coherent whole. If they speak of the Intelligences as the agents of such intrinsic design, we can boldly identify them with the angels of God, the messengers who fulfill His word.[9] Yet the universe for the philosopher and the believer will always be permeated with mystery, for neither can know the final why of all things. "We must content ourselves with that which is within our reach."

The *Guide* does not accept everything, of course, which the philosophers teach. In the third book, Maimonides criticizes strongly their denial of divine providence and of divine knowledge of particulars. Though he cannot demonstrate his position, his own belief is that man enjoys individual providence, whereas it extends only to the species in plant and animal. And if the philosophers argue that God does not know His creatures, we can rebuke them for assuming a comparison between human and divine knowledge.

Man and the Universe. Practical issues occupy the last book of the *Guide*. Besides the problem of providence just mentioned, it undertakes a study of evil and sin, virtues, the norms of human life (including the ceremonial laws of the Jews), the nature of man and human freedom, to achieve what may be called the way of rational religion. The ethics proposed here, as well as the interpretation of the Mosaic laws, is intellectualistic, under the inspiration of the Aristotelian concept of beatitude. More emphasis is thus placed on the knowledge than the love of God, a radical departure from the spirit of the Old Testament.[10]

Aristotelianism as interpreted by al-Farabi rather than Avicenna provides the doctrine of man. This is given comparatively little place, since Moses had already written *Eight Chapters* on psychology.[11] The theory of knowledge is considered incidentally under the question of prophecy: ideas are received from the Active Intellect (an angel) through the medium of the imagination. The soul is not a substance, but rather a power loaned man by God which at first slumbers in the body, then through intellectual activity becomes the material or passive intellect, and finally achieves through the Agent Intellect actuality and independent existence as the *intellectus adeptus*. At death, this is absorbed into the Agent Intellect, "returning to the original source whence it issued." Since even this immortality depends on knowledge acquired, one has the duty to preserve as much as possible of himself by enriching his intellect through the exercise of philosophy.

Conclusion. Even within his lifetime Maimonides became an important figure in the Jewish world, certainly because of the *Guide* and the intellectual norms it

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[8] *Guide*, II, 12–29.

[9] *Ibid.*, II, 3–8.

[10] Cf. B. Z. Bokser, *The Legacy of Maimonides* (New York, 1950), pp. 79–87.

[11] English version by J. I. Gorfinkle (New York, 1912).

established, but more so perhaps because of his great works on Jewish laws and practices. His interpretations led to controversy and division in the Jewish world, some (especially in Provence, in southern France) regarding him as the greatest teacher of history, others branding him an archheretic and appealing even to the Christian Inquisition for judgment on him (his works were publicly burned at Montpelier in 1233). The *Guide* continued to have its influence through the centuries. Baruch Spinoza (d. 1677) fell under its spell in his youth; it helped to shape his thought and was partially responsible for his excommunication from the Synagogue. Later Jewish philosophers, e.g., Moses Mendelssohn (d. 1786) and Herman Cohen (d. 1918), were in his debt.

To the Christian Scholastics, who received the *Guide* through a Latin translation made within a few decades after Moses' death, he was an example of a believing philosopher who faced many of the same problems that had arisen with the new influx of Aristotelian literature. The extent, however, to which the *Guide* was actually used has not been fully studied. The two great Dominicans, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, made conscious appeal to it, especially on the proofs for the existence of God and the problem of creation.[12] But it is excessive to claim that "without Maimonides there would have been no Thomas Aquinas and no Albertus Magnus." On the other hand, the errors of Rabbi Moysis were included in the *De erroribus philosophorum* of the latter half of the century.[13] In the fourteenth century, Meister Eckhart, the Dominican mystic, did not hesitate to use "Raby Moyses" in his commentary on the *Book of Wisdom*.[14]

SUMMARY

Both Muslim and Jewish speculation shows the influence of religious belief. It is at once philosophic and religious in character, since both Arabian and Jewish philosophers were usually men who were religious in outlook. For the most part, however, their religion did not furnish them with premises for their philosophy, for they seem to have realized that such a procedure would have destroyed philosophy. At the same time, it is instructive to see their reactions as they face difficulties in reconciling Greek thought with Jewish or Mohammedan traditions. As such they have a parallel in the Christian philosophers of both the Patristic and Scholastic tradition.

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[12] Cf. Jacob Guttmann, *Der Einfluss der Maimonidischen Philosophie auf das christlichen Abendland* (Leipzig, 1908); A. Rohner, *Das Schöpfungsproblem bei Moses Maimonides, Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin* (Beiträge, XI–5, 1913). On medieval Latin translations, cf. W. Kluxen, "Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides," *Récherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, XXI (1954), 23–50.

[13] Cf. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, ed. 2 (Philosophes Belges, VII), pp. 1–25; and J. Koch-J. O. Riedl, *Giles of Rome: Errores Philosophorum* (Milwaukee, 1944).

[14] Cf. G. Théry, O.P., "Le Commentaire de Maitre Eckhart sur le livre de la Sagesse," *AHDLMA*, III (1928), 321–442; IV (1929–1930), 233–393.

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